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  From	  the	  raids	  of	  the	  early	  Portuguese	  slave	  traders	  to	  King	  Leopold’s	  abusive	  personal	  colonial	  fiefdom	  and	  beyond	  Mobutu’s	  rapacious	  rule	  into	  the	  present;	  the	  history	  of	  foreign	  meddling	  in	  Congo1	  remains	  a	  grim	  but	  seldom	  told	  tale	  of	  human	  tragedy	   the	   dimensions	   of	   which	   have	   rarely	   been	   paralleled	   even	   in	   Africa’s	  troubled	   past.	   Congo	   has	   consistently	   ranked	   as	   one	   of	   the	   front-­‐runners	   on	   the	  Failed	  State	  Index	  in	  recent	  years.2	  Fifteen	  years	  of	  violence	  (including	  Congo’s	  two	  wars	  in	  1996-­‐97	  and	  1998-­‐2003	  respectively)	  have	  killed	  some	  five	  million	  people	  with	  millions	  more	  displaced.3	  Even	  today,	   the	  country	   is	  beset	  by	  corruption	  (the	  electoral	   fraud	   of	   the	  November	   2011	   election-­‐	   only	   the	   second	   genuine	   national	  election	   since	   1960-­‐	   is	   but	   the	   most	   immediate	   example	   of	   this)	   while	   the	  population	  at	  large	  languishes	  in	  extreme	  poverty.4	  Despite	  the	  official	  cessation	  of	  war	  some	  eight	  years	  ago,	  the	  abuses	  of	  local	  militias	  and	  the	  national	  army	  in	  the	  historically	  neglected	  Kivus	   in	  eastern	  Congo	  continue	  to	   include	  plunder,	  murder	  and	  extreme	  acts	  of	  sexual	  violence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Contemporary	   analysts	   and	   political	   scientists	   commenting	   on	   the	   roots	   of	  today’s	   seemingly	   perpetual	   crisis	   usually	   attribute	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   functioning	  state	  apparatus	  to	  the	  decay	  bequeathed	  by	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  These	  brief	  asides	  do	   not	   do	   justice,	   however,	   to	   the	   complex	   circumstances	   following	   Congolese	  independence	   that	   saw	  Mobutu	   rise	   to	   the	   helm	   of	   Congolese	   politics,	   create	   his	  peculiar	   version	  of	   a	   totalitarian	   state	   and	   amass	   a	   personal	   fortune	   estimated	   at	  some	   five	  billion	  dollars	  by	   the	  early	  1990s	  against	   the	  backdrop	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  superpower	  struggle	  in	  Africa.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  odds	  were	  stacked	  against	  the	  successful	  development	  of	  an	  independent,	  prosperous	  and	  unified	  Congo	  even	  before	  the	  emergence	  of	  Mobutu	  as	  a	  political	  force.	  The	  arbitrary	  borders	  of	  the	  colonial	  era	  bequeathed	  a	  seemingly	  unworkable	  geography	  that	  has	  not	  been	  successfully	  mastered	  by	  democratic	  government	  into	  the	   present.	   The	   largest	   country	   by	   surface	   area	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa,	   this	   vast	  territory	  of	  over	   two	  million	   square	  kilometres	   contains	  more	   than	   two-­‐hundred-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  territory	  under	  consideration	  has	  endured	  a	  number	  of	  labels	  from	  Leopold’s	  ‘Congo	  Free	  State’,	  ‘Belgian	  Congo’,	  ‘Republic	  of	  Congo’	  in	  1960	  to	  Mobutu’s	  ‘Zaire’	  and	  into	  today’s	  ‘Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo’.	  For	  the	  purposes	  here,	  simply	  ‘Congo’	  will	  be	  used	  throughout	  (except	  when	  quoting	  directly	  from	  documents	  or	  secondary	  texts).	  	  2www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings	  	  3	  International Crisis Group, No Stability in the Kivus, Africa Report No. 165, 16th November 2010; Human 
Rights Watch, Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone July 2009; United Nations Security Council, 
Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 12th May 2011; Lacaille,	  Guillaume	  &	  Paddon,	  Emily,	  ‘Stabilising	  Congo’	  Forced	  Migration	  Policy	  Briefing	  8,	  December	  2011	  (Refugee	  Studies	  Centre,	  Oxford	  Department	  of	  International	  Development,	  University	  of	  Oxford)	  4	  www.cartercenter.org/news/publications/election_reports.html#drc	  5	  Paul	  Nugent,	  Africa	  Since	  Independence	  (Palgrave	  MacMillan;	  Basingstoke,	  2004)	  p.	  236	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and-­‐fifty	  ethnic	  groups	  divided	  by	  a	  similar	  number	  of	  languages	  and	  local	  dialects.6	  Furthermore,	  with	  only	  a	   forty-­‐five	  kilometre	  coastline,	  an	  essentially	   land	   locked	  treasure	   chest	   of	   copper,	   uranium,	   gold,	   tin,	   cobalt,	   tantalum	   and	   industrial	  diamonds	   has	   struggled	   with	   what	   development	   economists	   have	   termed	   the	  ‘Resource	  Trap’.7	  Added	  to	   this	  mix	  was	   the	  particularly	  brutal	  history	  of	  Western	  intervention.	  Three	  centuries	  of	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  slave	  trading,	  the	  cruel	  chapter	  of	  the	  ‘Bula	   Matari’	   exploitation	   under	   King	   Leopold	   II	   and	   the	   hasty	   and	   incomplete	  decolonisation	   from	   paternalistic	   Belgian	   colonial	   rule	   all	   contributed	   to	   Congo’s	  troubles	  even	  before	  the	  Cold	  War	  intrigues	  that	  followed	  independence.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	  23rd	  September	  1960,	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  heralded	   the	   ‘momentous	   impact	  of	   Africa’s	   awakening	   upon	   the	   modern	   world’	   at	   the	   United	   Nations	   General	  Assembly	  as	  sixteen	  former	  African	  colonies	  gained	  admission	  to	  the	  world	  body.9	  1960	   was	   to	   be	   the	   ‘Year	   of	   Africa’	   as	   these	   countries	   followed	   the	   Ghanaian	  example	   of	   three	   years	   earlier	   and	   finally	   gained	   independence	   from	   respective	  French,	  British	  and	  Belgian	  rule.	  With	  the	  notable	  exception	  of	  the	  Algerian	  War,	  the	  first	   tide	  of	  decolonisation	  was	   a	   relatively	  peaceful	   affair	   as	   the	   former	   colonists	  sought	   to	   accommodate	   the	   growing	   African	   nationalist	   clamour	   in	   the	   hope	   of	  protecting	   their	   substantial	   economic	   interests	   on	   the	   continent	   and	   retaining	  political	   influence,	   if	   indirectly,	   on	   their	   former	   charges.	   Soon,	  however,	   events	   in	  Congo	  would	  stain	  Nkrumah’s	  optimistic	  pan-­‐African	  dream	  as	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  both	   the	   old	  European	  order	   and	   the	  Cold	  War	   superpowers	   viewed	   this	   ‘African	  awakening’	  as	  much	  as	  a	  danger	  to	  be	  managed	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  be	  exploited.10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   Belgian-­‐abetted	   secession	   of	   the	   mineral	   rich	   Katanga	   province	   and	   the	  desperate	  pleas	  of	  Patrice	  Lumumba,	  Congo’s	  ill-­‐fated	  first	  Prime	  Minister,	  initially	  to	   the	   unresponsive	   United	   States	   and	   then	   to	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   for	   help	   in	  preserving	  Congo’s	   territorial	   integrity	   and	  political	   sovereignty	  brought	   the	  Cold	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Roughly	  the	  size	  of	  Spain,	  France,	  Germany,	  Norway	  and	  Sweden;	  Congo	  was	  the	  second	  largest	  country	  by	  surface	  area	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  until	  the	  independence	  of	  Southern	  Sudan	  from	  Sudan	  in	  2011.	  	  
7	  Paul	  Collier,	  The	  Bottom	  Billion	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  	  8	  ‘Bula	  Matari’	  (or	  breaker	  of	  rocks)	  was	  the	  name	  given	  to	  the	  explorer	  Henry	  Morton	  Stanley,	  commissioned	  by	  Leopold	  II,	  for	  his	  cruel	  methods	  and	  soon	  became	  a	  synonym	  for	  the	  entire	  colonial	  state.	  Adam	  Hochschild,	  King	  Leopold’s	  Ghost	  (MacMillan,	  1999);	  Thomas	  Pakenham,	  The	  Scramble	  for	  Africa,	  1876-­‐1912	  (George	  Weidenfeld	  &	  Nicolson,	  1991);	  H.M.	  Stanley,	  Through	  the	  Dark	  Continent,	  Volume	  I	  &	  II	  (Harper	  Brothers;	  New	  York,	  1879)	  	  9	  Samuel	  Obeng,	  Selected	  Speeches	  of	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  Vol.	  1(Afram	  Publications;	  Accra,	  1979)	  pp.156-­‐186	  10	  The	  African	  brands	  of	  socialism	  espoused	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Guinea’s	  Ahmed	  Sékou	  Touré,	  Tanzania’s	  Julius	  Nyerere,	  Senegal’s	  Léopold	  Sédar	  Senghor	  and	  Ghana’s	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  no	  doubt	  added	  to	  American	  unease.	  Steven	  Metz,	  ‘American	  Attitudes	  Towards	  Decolonization	  in	  Africa’	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly	  Vo.	  9.	  No.	  33	  (Autumn,	  1984)	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War	  to	  Africa	  in	  1960.	  The	  intrigues	  surrounding	  Lumumba’s	  murder,	  the	  American	  manipulations	   of	   Congo’s	   first	   United	   Nations	   intervention	   and	   the	   superpower	  meddling	  in	  Congo’s	  nascent	  politics	  of	  the	  first	  Congo	  crisis,	  that	  also	  saw	  the	  CIA	  make	   its	   initial	   contacts	  with	  Colonel	   Joseph	  Désiré	  Mobutu	   as	  he	   staged	  his	   first	  coup	  to	  briefly	   take	  control	  of	   the	  country	  and	  ensure	   the	  demise	  of	  his	  erstwhile	  ally	  Lumumba,	  have	  been	  well	  documented.11	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Some	   five	   years	   after	   independence,	   the	   Johnson	   administration	   backing	  Mobutu’s	  second	  and	  permanent	  military	  coup	  saw	  a	  further	  development	  in	  what	  became	  America’s	   first	   foray	   into	   rudimentary	  nation	  building	   in	  Congo,	   albeit	  on	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  and	  improvised	  basis.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  short-­‐term	  manipulations	  of	  the	  Eisenhower	   and	   Kennedy	   administrations	   to	   ward	   off	   any	   Soviet	   gains	   in	   the	  immediate	   aftermath	   of	   Congo’s	   independence,	   by	   1965	   the	   United	   States	   now	  actively	   shaped	   an	   alternative	   political	   path	   for	   Congo,	   even	   as	   the	   Soviets	   had	  withdrawn	  from	  this	  arena,	  to	  ensure	  the	  emergence	  and	  survival	  of	  a	  regime	  that	  both	  provided	  a	  modicum	  of	   stability	   in	  central	  Africa	  and	  placed	  Congo	   firmly	   in	  the	   American	   camp.	   As	   such,	   the	   very	   same	   sequence	   of	   events	   that	   was	   soon	  vaunted	   as	   a	   successful	   Cold	   War	   operation	   in	   Washington	   bequeathed	   one	   of	  Africa’s	  most	  notorious	  and	  durable	  dictators	  onto	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Enjoying	   American	   protection	   for	   much	   of	   his	   rule,	   Mobutu	   set	   about	  bankrupting	   his	   country	   as	   he	   amassed	   a	   personal	   fortune	   in	   a	   system	   that	   has	  since	  been	  evocatively	  dubbed	  Africa’s	   ‘State	  Kleptocracy’.	  The	   legacy	  for	  Congo	  is	  sadly	   apparent	   in	   a	   country	   that	   remains	   a	   chamber	   of	   horrors	   for	   much	   of	   its	  population.	  Even	  with	  regards	  to	  America’s	  immediate	  Cold	  War	  objectives	  in	  Africa	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  a	  strategy	  that	  leant	  so	  heavily	  on	  Washington’s	  Mobutu	  alliance	  were	  often	  visible	  already	  to	  contemporary	  American	  observers,	  however.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  American	   hand	   in	  Mobutu’s	   rise,	   how	   and	  why	   the	   survival	   of	   Congo’s	   profligate	  dictator	   came	   to	   be	   so	   intimately	   tied	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   successive	   and	   very	  different	  Washington	   administrations	   from	   Lyndon	   Johnson	   to	   Jimmy	   Carter,	   the	  impact	  of	  this	  on	  Congo,	  on	  the	  American	  approach	  to	  Africa	  and,	  ultimately,	  on	  the	  broader	  Cold	  War	  is	  a	  story	  that	  requires	  more	  careful	  telling.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  My	  own	  interest	  in	  Congo	  is	  both	  academic	  and	  personal.	  While	  completing	  my	  Masters	  at	   the	   Johns	  Hopkins	  School	  of	  Advanced	   International	   Studies	   in	  2004,	   I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11Kelly	  refers	  to	  an	  interview	  with	  Belgian	  Colonel	  Van	  de	  Walle	  to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  Mobutu	  was	  already	  on	  the	  Belgian	  secret	  police	  (Sûreté)	  payroll	  from	  before	  independence.	  Sean	  Kelly,	  America’s	  Tyrant:	  The	  CIA	  and	  Mobutu	  of	  Zaire	  (American	  University	  Press,	  1993)	  pp.	  10-­‐11	  R.	  Weissman,	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  the	  Congo,	  1960-­‐64	  (Cornell	  University	  Press;	  Ithaca	  &	  London,	  1974);	  Madeleine	  Kalb,	  The	  Congo	  Cables:	  The	  Cold	  War	  in	  Africa-­‐	  from	  Eisenhower	  to	  Kennedy	  (MacMillan;	  New	  York,	  1982);	  Richard	  Mahoney,	  JFK:	  Ordeal	  in	  Africa	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1982)	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had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  study	  under	  Piero	  Gleijeses	  and	  was	  instantly	  captivated	  by	  his	   rendition	   of	   Cold	   War	   forces	   conspiring	   in	   Africa	   and	   the	   Third	   World.	   His	  ‘Conflicting	  Missions’,	   detailing	   the	  Cuban	   confrontation	  with	   the	  United	   States	   in	  Africa,	  introduced	  me	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  intrigues	  in	  newly	  independent	  Congo	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  me	  my	  first	   taste	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  meticulous	  multi-­‐archival	  research	  whose	  focus	  went	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  US,	  Soviet	  and	  European	  dimensions.12	  Two	  years	  later,	  Arne	  Westad’s	  seminal	  ‘Global	  Cold	  War’	  further	  refined	  the	  debate	  by	  shifting	  the	   focus	  of	  scholarship	   towards	   the	  central	  role	  of	   the	  Third	  World	   in	   this	  global	  ideological	   and	   geostrategic	   superpower	   conflict.13	  The	   explicit	   call	   for	   further	  research	  entailed	  in	  this	  study	  was	  a	  central	  motivation	  for	  my	  own	  project.	  Finally	  and	   a	   little	   less	   theoretically,	   my	   own	   travels	   to	   Congo	   have	   further	   fuelled	   my	  fascination	  with	  a	  country	  that	  is	  as	  blessed	  with	  natural	  beauty	  as	  it	  is	  laden	  with	  mineral	  resources	  and	  marred	  by	  human	  failing.	  While	  passing	  through	  the	  Kivus,	  I	  have	  experienced	  the	  exhilaration	  of	  sitting	  within	  touching	  distance	  of	  a	  family	  of	  some	   of	   the	   world’s	   last	   remaining	   mountain	   gorillas	   in	   Virunga	   National	   Park,	  camped	  within	   breath-­‐taking	   view	   of	   the	   erupting	   volcano	   of	  Mount	   Nyiragongo,	  and	  enjoyed	  lively	  exchanges	  (and	  the	  odd	  Primus-­‐	  Congo’s	  beer	  of	  choice)	  with	  my	  fellow	  Congolese	  passengers	  aboard	  the	  ferries	  of	  Lake	  Kivu.	  I	  was	  also	  introduced	  to	  victims	  of	  Congo’s	  on	  going	  rape	  epidemic	  at	  the	  V-­‐Day	  ‘City	  of	  Joy’	  in	  Bukavu.	  As	  such,	   even	   from	   my	   own	   limited	   personal	   experience,	   Congo	   remains	   a	   tattered	  contradiction	  of	  awe-­‐inspiring	  beauty	  and	  heart-­‐wrenching	  tragedy	  in	  which	  much	  of	   the	  population	   continues	   to	   feel	   the	   after-­‐tremors	  of	   the	  Mobutu-­‐induced	   state	  collapse.	  My	  hankering	  to	  tell	  at	  least	  part	  of	  this	  story	  with	  more	  careful	  research	  into	  the	  American	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  sustenance	  of	  the	  Mobutist	  regime	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  thus	  inspired	  and	  directed	  by	  the	  ground	  breaking	  works	  of	  Piero	  Gleijeses	   and	   O.A.	   Westad	   and	   further	   stoked	   by	   my	   own	   experiences	   of	   the	  wonders	  and	  calamities	  of	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	   research	   in	   this	   area	   remains	   patchy,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   first	   study	   of	  American	   Cold	  War	   interventions	   in	   Congo,	   of	   course.	   The	   existing	   literature	   can	  perhaps	  best	  be	  subdivided	  into	  four	  broad	  categories;	  detailed	  studies	  of	  America’s	  Cold	   War	   Congo	   interventions,	   subchapters	   within	   broader	   surveys	   of	   American	  interventions	   in	  Africa,	   the	   economic	   determinist	   paradigm	   for	  US	   Congo	   policies	  and	   the	   Africanist	   approach	   to	   the	   American	   role	   in	   Congo.	   As	   such,	   it	   is	   worth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Piero	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Mission:	  Havana,	  Washington	  &	  Africa	  (UNC	  Press;	  Chapel	  Hill,	  2002)	  13	  O.A.	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War:	  Third	  World	  Interventions	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Our	  Time	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press;	  New	  York,	  2005)	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pausing	   briefly	   and	   considering	   the	   state	   of	   scholarship	   and	  where	   the	   following	  study	  falls	  within	  these	  fields.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Building	   on	   the	   earlier	   efforts	   of	   Stephen	   R.	   Weissmann,	   Madeleine	   Kalb’s	  ‘Congo	   Cables’	   and	   Richard	   Mahoney’s	   ‘JFK:	   Ordeal	   in	   Africa’	   remain	   necessary	  starting	   points	   for	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   American	   approach	   to	   newly	  independent	   Congo	   in	   the	   1960s.14	  Largely	   based	   on	   American	   archives,	   these	  studies	   reveal	   valuable	   details	   of	   the	   American	   operations	   in	   Congo	   during	   the	  Eisenhower	  and	  Kennedy	  years.	  From	  the	  CIA	  plots	  to	  murder	  Patrice	  Lumumba	  to	  the	   manipulations	   of	   the	   UN	   Congo	   force	   and	   the	   backstage	   subversion	   of	  Kinshasa’s	   nascent	   political	   scene,	   both	   these	   titles	   are	   primarily	   concerned	  with	  Washington	   decision	   making	   and	   the	   motivations	   driving	   US	   policy	   in	   Congo.15	  Kalb’s	   tendency	   to	   overemphasise	   the	   contrast	   between	   the	   conservative	  Eisenhower	  and	  the	  more	  liberal	  Kennedy	  and	  her	  willingness	  to	  ascribe	  American	  policy	   to	   Soviet	   expansionism	   in	   Africa	   should	   be	   treated	   with	   care.	   Indeed,	  Mahoney	  offers	  a	  more	  nuanced	  assessment	  of	  Kennedy’s	  Africa	  strategy,	  swaying	  as	  it	  did	  between	  his	  recognition	  of	  the	  genuine	  nationalist	  forces	  at	  work	  in	  Africa	  and	   the	  more	   traditional	   containment	   impulse	   of	   his	   predecessors	  when	   political	  setbacks	   for	   the	  West	   threatened	   in	   Congo.	   The	   issues	   raised	   in	   these	   two	   useful	  analyses,	  however,	  have	  shaped	  the	  subsequent	  literature	  to	  a	  considerable	  extent.	  How	   far	   the	  United	  States	  was	   responding	   to	  a	  genuine	  Soviet	   threat,	   the	   relative	  emphasis	   given	   to	   the	   regional	   concerns	   of	  Washington’s	  more	   liberal	   Africanists	  when	   faced	   with	   more	   traditional	   Cold	   War	   geo-­‐strategic	   considerations,	   the	  importance	  attached	  to	  Africa	  and	  Congo	  within	  the	  context	  of	  other	  foreign	  policy	  crises	  around	  the	  globe	  and,	  ultimately,	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  American	  Congo	  strategy	  in	   achieving	   its	   aims	   are	   questions	   that	   have	   not	   lost	   their	   relevance	   also	   for	   the	  study	  undertaken	  here.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Weissman’s	  earlier	  study	  makes	  a	  useful	  case	  for	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  American	  policies	  in	  Congo	  responding	  to	  an	  illusory	  Communist	  threat	  and	  failing	  to	  realize	  the	  liberal	  hopes	  of	  Africa.	  Drawing	  largely	  on	  unnamed	  interviews,	  his	  slightly	  polemic	  account	  is	  quickly	  surpassed	  in	  terms	  of	  relevance	  by	  the	  archival	  analyses	  of	  Kalb	  and	  Mahoney.	  Weissman	  (1974);	  Kalb	  (1982);	  Mahoney	  (1982)	  	  15	  In	  line	  with	  this	  focus	  on	  the	  first	  Congo	  crisis	  are	  even	  more	  specific	  studies	  of	  its	  various	  components.	  Ludo	  deWitte	  has	  produced	  the	  most	  definitive	  analysis	  of	  the	  murky	  events	  surrounding	  Lumumba’s	  murder	  to	  conclude	  that	  Belgian	  and	  Congolese	  forces	  were	  ultimately	  behind	  the	  murder,	  while	  events	  would	  not	  have	  progressed	  as	  they	  did	  without	  American	  backing.	  de	  Witte,	  The	  Assassination	  of	  Patrice	  Lumumba	  (Verso;	  London	  &	  New	  York,	  2001).	  John	  Kent	  gives	  an	  excellent	  analysis	  of	  the	  American	  manipulations	  of	  the	  first	  UN	  intervention,	  as	  well	  as	  pointing	  to	  the	  events	  surrounding	  Secretary	  General	  Dag	  Hammarskjöld’s	  fatal	  plane	  crash	  on	  route	  to	  negotiate	  with	  Katangan	  leaders	  in	  Ndola,	  Northern	  Rhodesia.	  Kent,	  America,	  the	  UN	  and	  Decolonisation:	  Cold	  War	  in	  Congo	  (Routledge,	  2010).	  The	  memoirs	  of	  Hammarskjöld’s	  on	  site	  director	  in	  Congo,	  Rajeshwar	  Dayal,	  and	  CIA	  Station	  Chief,	  Lawrence	  Devlin,	  add	  colour	  to	  this	  picture.	  Dayal,	  Mission	  for	  Hammarskjöld:	  the	  Congo	  Crisis	  (Oxford	  University	  Press;	  London,	  1976);	  Devlin,	  Chief	  of	  Station:	  Congo;	  A	  Memoir	  of	  1960-­‐67	  (Perseus,	  New	  York,	  2007)	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  Their	   narrow	   periodic	   focus	   on	   the	   Eisenhower	   and	   Kennedy	   years,	   while	  quite	   worthy	   studies	   in	   themselves,	   comes	   at	   a	   price	   for	   the	   unfolding	   Congo	  debate,	   however.	  All	   too	   often	  Washington’s	   support	   of	   the	  Mobutu	   coup	   and	   the	  relationship	  that	  then	  developed	  with	  the	  Kinshasa	  despot	  is	  simply	  seen	  as	  a	  linear	  continuation	  of	  earlier	  policies	  and	  the	  successful	  conclusion	  of	  a	  half-­‐decade	  long	  intervention	  in	  Congo	  to	  fend	  off	  Soviet	  advances	  in	  central	  Africa.	  Broader	  studies	  on	   American	   foreign	   policy	   in	   Africa	   such	   as	   Henry	   F.	   Jackson’s	   ‘From	   Congo	   to	  Soweto’	  and	  Peter	  J.	  Schraeder’s	  ‘United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy	  toward	  Africa’	  as	  such	  willingly	   take	   up	   this	   orthodoxy.16	  Each	   of	   these	   explore	   the	   relative	   neglect	   of	  Africa	   amongst	   Washington	   policymakers	   and	   the	   dominance	   of	   perceived	   Cold	  War	   crises	   in	   provoking	   an	  American	   response	   and	   thus	   shaping	   the	   direction	   of	  policies	  taken.	  Their	  respective	  chapters	  on	  Congo,	  however,	  shed	  little	  new	  light	  on	  the	   nuances	   driving	   the	   Washington-­‐Mobutu	   alliance.	   Similarly,	   the	   excellent	  analytical	   framework	  of	  Zaiki	  Laidi’s	   ‘Superpowers	   in	  Africa’,	   that	   charts	   the	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  rivalry	  according	  to	  the	  rhythms	  of	  African	  tensions	  and	  the	   interplay	   between	   internal	   and	   external	   dynamics	   that	   exacerbated	   the	  flashpoints	  on	  the	  continent,	  does	  not	  go	  much	  further	  with	  regards	  to	  Congo.17	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  many	  essays	  on	  Congo	  within	  edited	  volumes	  on	  American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Africa	  usually	  also	   fit	   into	   this	  pattern.	  The	  collections	  of	  Bender,	  Coleman	  and	  Sklar	   or	   René	   Lemarchand,	   for	   example,	   explore	   the	   efficacy	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	  dominated	   American	   approach	   towards	   Africa	   without	   going	   beyond	   this	   simple	  continuity	  in	  American	  policy.18	  Crawford	  Young’s	  essay	  in	  the	  former,	  for	  instance,	  is	  an	  excellent	  overview	  of	  twenty	  years	  of	  American	  support	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  in	  the	  name	  of	  stability	  while	  René	  Lemarchand’s	  chapter	  in	  his	  own	  volume	  offers	  a	   more	   prescriptive	   enquiry	   into	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   this	   approach.	   Neither,	  however,	   explores	   the	   specific	   factors	   that	   set	   the	   American-­‐Mobutu	   relationship	  apart	   within	   this	   broader	   thesis.	   Even	   the	   invaluable	   insights	   of	   Gleijeses	   and	  Westad	  mentioned	   earlier,	   casting	   new	   light	   on	   specific	   events	   with	   their	   use	   of	  Cuban	   and	   Soviet	   sources	   during	   the	   CIA	   sponsored	  mercenary	   operations	   of	   the	  1960s	  and	  the	  Angola	  conflict	  of	  1975-­‐6,	  do	  not	  aim	  at	  a	  more	  detailed	  reading	  of	  the	  role	  of	  Washington’s	  Mobutu	  alliance	  in	  shaping	  American	  policies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Peter	  J.	  Schraeder,	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy	  Toward	  Africa:	  Incrementalism,	  Crisis	  and	  Change	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1994);	  Henry	  F.	  Jackson,	  From	  Congo	  to	  Soweto;	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy	  Towards	  Africa	  Since	  1960	  (William	  Morrow	  &	  Co.	  Inc.;	  New	  York,	  1982)	  17	  Zaki	  Laidi,	  Superpowers	  and	  Africa;	  Constraints	  of	  a	  Rivalry,	  1960-­‐1990	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1990)	  18	  Gerald	  J.	  Bender,	  James	  S.	  Coleman,	  Richard	  L.	  Sklar	  (eds.),	  African	  Crisis	  Areas	  and	  US	  Foreign	  Policy	  (University	  of	  California,	  Berkley;	  London	  and	  Los	  Angeles,	  1985);	  René	  Lemarchand	  (ed.)	  American	  Policy	  in	  Southern	  Africa	  (University	  Press	  of	  America;	  New	  York	  &	  London,	  1981)	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  The	  literature	  described	  thus	  far	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  faulty	  in	  itself	  and	  much	  of	  the	   above	   make	   important	   contributions	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   American	  interventions	   into	   Congo.	   Indeed,	   many	   of	   these	   commentaries	   even	   point	   to	  Mobutu’s	   ability	   to	  manipulate	   American	   Cold	  War	   paranoia	   to	   ensure	   continued	  support	   from	   successive	   Washington	   administrations.	   Crawford	   Young	   himself	  neatly	  encapsulates	  this	  argument	  as	  follows,	  	  ‘Mobutu,	  meanwhile,	   turns	   the	   very	  weakness	   of	   the	   regime	   and	   decay	   of	   the	  state	   into	   assets	   for	   his	   own	   survival.	   These	   basic	   factors	   serve	   to	   foster	  credibility	  of	  the	  “Mobutu	  or	  Chaos”	  argument,	  which	  has-­‐	  so	  far-­‐	  always	  bought	  enough	   Western	   support	   in	   the	   face	   of	   any	   serious	   challenge	   to	   sustain	   the	  regime.	  By	  repressing,	  dividing,	  and	  co-­‐opting	  potential	  opposition,	   the	  regime	  succeeds	   in	   preserving	   near	   total	   uncertainty	   abroad	   as	   to	   the	   shape	   of	   an	  alternative	   political	   formula,	   or	   how	   it	   might	   come	   into	   existence.	   This	   leave	  ample	  room	  for	  the	  diplomatic	  community-­‐	  by	  instinct	  and	  training	  disposed	  to	  short-­‐term	   risk	   aversion,	   to	   prefer	   a	   hopeless	   present	   to	   an	   unknowable	  future.’19	  	  While	  this	  succinctly	  summarises	  an	  increasingly	  visible	  and	  formative	  dynamic	  in	  Congolese	  politics,	  the	  details	  behind	  this	  American	  emphasis	  on	  Mobutu’s	  survival,	  Washington’s	  willingness	  to	  rely	  on	  its	  Kinshasa	  alliance	  and	  the	  impact	  this	  had	  on	  both	   protagonists	   remain	   obscure.	   As	   such,	   previous	   studies	   that	   fall	   under	   the	  above	   categories,	   either	   casting	   events	   in	   such	   broad	   strokes	   or	   focusing	   too	  narrowly	   on	   very	   specific	   aspects	   of	   the	   story,	   fail	   to	   do	   justice	   to	   the	   peculiar	  nuances	   of	   the	   American-­‐Mobutu	   relationship	   that	   shaped	   Congo	   and,	   to	   some	  extent,	   determined	   the	   course	   of	   American	   policy	   not	   just	   in	   this	   central	   African	  country	  but	  also	  more	  broadly	  towards	  the	  region.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Two	  notable	   exceptions	   to	   this	  periodic	  distinction	   look	   to	   address	  America’s	  Mobutu	   dilemma	   more	   directly.	   Michael	   G.	   Schatzberg’s	   ‘Mobutu	   or	   Chaos’	   is	   an	  eminently	  readable	  overview	  of	  Washington’s	  thirty-­‐year	  relationship	  with	  Mobutu	  from	   1960	   to	   1990.20	  As	   its	   title	   suggests,	   essentially	   a	   policy	   piece	   based	   on	  secondary	   sources,	   this	   survey	   makes	   a	   strong	   moral	   and	   strategic	   case	   against	  prevailing	   assumptions	   in	   Washington	   by	   appealing	   to	   American	   self-­‐interest	   to	  drop	  its	  support	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  to	  avoid	  an	  eventual	  anti-­‐American	  backlash	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Crawford	  Young,	  ‘The	  Zairian	  Crisis	  and	  American	  Foreign	  Policy’	  in	  Bender,	  Coleman	  and	  Sklar	  (eds.)	  African	  Crisis	  Areas	  and	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy	  (University	  of	  California	  Press;	  London	  &	  Los	  Angeles,	  1985)	  20	  Michael	  G.	  Schatzberg,	  Mobutu	  or	  Chaos:	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Zaire	  1960-­‐1990	  (Lanham,	  Md:	  University	  Press	  of	  America	  ;	  Philadelphia,	  Pa	  :	  Foreign	  Policy	  Research	  Institute,	  1991)	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from	   the	   downtrodden	   Congolese	   population.	   As	   this	   account	   does	   not	   seek	   to	  uncover	  new	  material,	  it	  also	  comes	  up	  short	  in	  pointing	  to	  specific	  instances	  when	  the	  Mobutu	  alliance	  proved	  detrimental	  even	  to	  American	  contemporary	  Cold	  War	  aims	  during	  the	  period	  under	  review.	  Sean	  Kelly’s	   ‘America’s	  Tyrant’,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  looks	  to	  go	  further	  as	  it	  grapples	  with	  archival	  material	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  the	  American	   hand	   in	   the	  Mobutu	   regime.21	  As	   an	   exploration	   between	   the	   interplay	  between	  Washington	  and	  the	  Kinshasa	  despot	  in	  defining	  their	  respective	  policies,	  this	  study	  is	  a	  little	  disappointing,	  however,	  especially	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  Mobutu	  era.	  The	  actual	  establishment	  of	  Mobutu’s	  ‘tyranny’	  over	  Congo	  is	  not	  tackled	  until	  the	  tenth	  chapter	  of	  the	  book,	  the	  superficial	  treatment	  of	  Mobutu’s	  role	  in	  shaping	  Kissinger’s	   Angola	   venture	   relies	   primarily	   on	   secondary	   sources	   (and	   John	  Stockwell’s	   account	   in	   particular)	   and	   Carter’s	   part	   in	   the	   two	   Shaba	  wars	   is	   not	  considered	  at	   all.22	  More	   importantly,	   and	  not	  doubt	  due	   to	   the	  material	   available	  when	  this	  book	  was	  published	  almost	  twenty	  years	  ago,	  Kelly	  does	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  the	   documentary	   record	   in	   the	   American	   archives	   even	   on	   the	   earlier	   period	   of	  Mobutu’s	  coup	  and	  his	  subsequent	  consolidation	  of	  power.	  While	  these	  two	  books	  thus	  offer	  very	  readable	  overviews	  of	  America’s	  Mobutu	  relationship,	  many	  of	   the	  details	  of	  the	  now	  declassified	  record	  remain	  to	  be	  unearthed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Breaking	  with	   the	   common	   assumption	   in	   the	   above	   literature	   that	   Cold	  War	  geostrategic	  considerations	  were	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Washington’s	  Congo	  policies	  is	  the	  ‘Economic	   determinist’	   school	   of	   thought.	   This	   alternative	   paradigm	   seeks	   to	  explain	  the	  American	  interventions	  through	  the	  superpower’s	  economic	  interests	  in	  the	   region	   and	   is	   perhaps	   best	   split	   into	   two	   sub-­‐groups;	   the	   ‘structuralist’	  approach	  and	  the	  ‘business	  interest’	  approach.	  The	  former	  is	  relatively	  easily	  dealt	  with	  as	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  American	  state	  was	  broadly	  acting	  in	  defence	  of	  its	  capitalist	  world	  vision	  is	  not	  particularly	  controversial	  with	  regards	  to	  Congo	  and	  is	  easily	  reconciled	  with	  the	  primacy	  of	  geostrategic	   thinking	   in	  Washington	  and	  the	  perceived	   need	   to	   counteract	   potential	   communist	   gains	   in	   Africa.	   Nevertheless,	  this	   view	   often	   places	   too	  much	   emphasis	   on	   the	   need	   to	   secure	   Congo’s	   natural	  resources	   as	   driving	   government	   policy	   towards	   Congo.	   Gerhard	   Th.	   Mollin	  advances	   this	   explanation,	   for	   example,	  when	  he	  points	   to	   a	   ‘working	   community	  between	   the	  American	   government	   and	  Brussels’	   high	   finance’	   as	   replacing	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Kelly,	  America’s	  Tyrant	  	  22	  John	  Stockwell,	  In	  Search	  of	  Enemies:	  A	  CIA	  Story	  (New	  York:	  Norton,	  1978)	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formal	  imperialism	  in	  Congo	  already	  from	  the	  Truman	  administration.23	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	   however,	   the	   actual	   historical	   record	   does	   not	   support	   such	   the	   narrow	  economic	  resource-­‐driven	  explanation	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Congo	  offered	  here.	   Nor	   does	   such	   a	   mono-­‐causal	   explanation	   satisfactorily	   account	   for	   the	  nuances	   in	   specific	   policies	   that	   emerged	   during	   the	   successive	   Washington	  administrations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Here	   the	   ‘business	   interest’	   approach	   offers	   a	   more	   adaptable,	   if	   equally	  theoretical,	   analytical	   framework.	   It’s	   chief	   proponent,	   David	   N.	   Gibbs,	   looks	   to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  competing	  private	  business	  agendas	  in	  influencing	  government	  policy.	  Using	  Congo	  as	   its	   case	   study,	   the	   thesis	  of	  his	   ‘Political	  Economy	  of	  Third	  World	  Intervention’,	  is	  fundamentally	  flawed,	  however.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  reductionist	  claim	   that	   simply	   cites	   apparent	   business	   contacts	   of	   various	   administration	  insiders	   as	   reasons	   for	   the	   direction	   of	   particular	   policies	   does	   not	   stand	   up	   to	  scrutiny.	   It	   takes	   a	   considerable	   leap,	   for	   example,	   to	   attribute	   the	   direction	   of	  Eisenhower’s	  Congo	  policies	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Christian	  A.	  Herter	  had	  married	  into	  the	  Standard	  Oil	  family	  and	  that	  his	  son	  became	  an	  executive	  with	  Mobil	   Oil.	   This	   reveals	   the	   pitfalls	   of	   such	   an	   overly	   theoretical	   approach	   that	  contorts	   events	   to	   fit	   a	   particular	  model.	   As	   such,	   his	   analysis	   of	   the	  Mobutu	   era	  sees	   a	   simple	   continuity	   from	   Johnson’s	   policies	   in	   support	   of	   the	   1965	   coup	  through	  to	  the	  very	  public	  ties	  of	  the	  Nixon	  White	  House	  with	  the	  Kinshasa	  despot.	  The	  awarding	  of	  the	  Tenke	  Fungurume	  copper	  concession	  to	  a	  mining	  consortium	  led	  by	  Maurice	  Templesman	  over	   its	  Belgian	  rival	  Union	  Minière	  de	  Haut	  Katanga	  (UMHK,	   the	  Belgian	  mining	  conglomerate	  created	  by	  Leopold	   II	  and	  Cecil	  Rhodes’	  Tanganyika	   Concessions	   in	   1906)	   is	   thus	   portrayed	   as	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   single	  government	  effort	  to	  advance	  the	  aims	  of	  influential	  American	  privateers.	  As	  such,	  Gibbs	  writes,	   ‘The	  United	  States,	   it	   is	   argued,	   sought	   to	   reduce	   influence	  of	  Union	  Minière	   in	   the	   Congo	   in	   order	   to	   open	   investment	   opportunities	   for	   American	  businesses.	   The	   US	   government	   was	   in	   essence	   an	   instrument	   of	   American	  business.’24	  This	  fundamentally	  underestimates	  the	  importance	  of	  geostrategic	  Cold	  War	   factors	   in	  determining	   the	  Washington	  attitude	   towards	  Congo	  as	  much	  as	   it	  runs	  roughshod	  over	  the	  much	  more	  complex	  historical	  record.	  At	  no	  point	  does	  the	  paper	  trail	  left	  by	  successive	  administrations	  support	  claims	  for	  the	  primacy	  of	  such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Gerhard	  Th.	  Mollin	  refers	  to	  an	  ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft	  zwischen	  Amerikanischer	  Regierung	  und	  
Brüsseler	  Finanzkapital’	  in	  his,	  Die	  USA	  und	  der	  Kolonialismus;	  Amerika	  als	  Partner	  und	  Nachfolger	  der	  Belgischen	  Macht	  in	  Afrika,	  1939-­‐65	  (Akademie	  Verlag;	  Berlin,	  1996)	  p.	  471	  24	  David	  N.	  Gibbs,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Third	  World	  Intervention:	  Mines,	  Money	  and	  US	  Policy	  in	  the	  Congo	  Crisis	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1991)	  p.	  185	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private	   business	   interests	   influencing	   Washington	   policy	   makers.	   As	   such,	   the	  research	   conducted	   here	   will	   go	   some	   way	   towards	   dispelling	   this	   view	   and	   the	  third	  chapter	  in	  particular	  takes	  on	  Gibbs’s	  contentions	  more	  thoroughly.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Private	   business	   interests	   and	   economic	   factors	   should	   not	   be	   entirely	  discarded	   from	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  Washington-­‐Mobutu	  alliance	  during	   this	  period,	  of	   course.	   The	   studies	   of	   Benoit	   Verhaegan	   and	   Guy	   Gran	   each	   offer	   valuable	  insights	   into	   both	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   Congo	   itself	   and	   the	   role	   of	  Mobutu’s	  foreign	   partners	   in	   contributing	   to	   its	   economic	   collapse	   in	   the	   1970s. 25 	  In	  particular,	   Benoit	   Verhaegan’s	   term	   ‘technological	   imperialism’	   eloquently	  describes	   the	   willingness	   of	   Western	   firms	   (often	   with	   direct-­‐	   or	   government-­‐guaranteed	  financing)	  to	  feed	  Kinshasa’s	  political	  elite’s	  penchant	  for	  massive	  white	  elephant	   prestige	   projects	   without	   any	   regard	   for	   their	   long-­‐term	   viability.26	  The	  American	   government’s	  willingness	   to	   continue	   to	   subsidise	  Mobutu’s	   fixation	   on	  sophisticated	  military	  hardware,	  even	  against	  the	  warnings	  of	  the	  IMF	  for	  much	  of	  the	  1970s,	  also	  fits	  into	  this	  pattern	  of	  transactions	  conducted	  with	  a	  political	  elite	  without	  due	  concern	  for	  the	  economic	  impact	  on	  Congo.	  Acknowledging	  the	  role	  of	  these	  developments	  in	  contributing	  to	  the	  corruption	  and	  economic	  disintegration	  of	  Congo	  is	  very	  different	  to	  the	  assertion	  that	  private	  business	  interests	  defined	  the	  American	  policy	   towards	   the	  Mobutist	   state.	   In	   fact,	   the	  picture	   that	   emerges	   is	   a	  rather	   different	   one	   with	   the	   Congolese	   and	   American	   governments	   working	  together	  to	  court	  American	  businesses	  and	  harness	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  their	  own	  ends	   rather	   than	   the	   other	   way	   round.	   As	   such,	   the	   Washington	   role	   both	   in	  Mobutu’s	  and	  the	  IMF’s	  economic	  initiatives	  in	  Congo,	  the	  specific	  agendas	  pursued	  by	   American	   administrations	   within	   this	   and	   how	   this	   contributed	   to	   Congo’s	  economic	  collapse	  form	  a	  recurring	  theme	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	   the	   ‘Africanist’	  approach	  to	  this	  chapter	  of	  Congolese	  history	  naturally	  shares	   a	   similar	   focus	   on	   Congo’s	   internal	   dynamics.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	  works	   of	  Thomas	   Turner,	   M.	   Crawford	   Young	   and	   Michael	   G.	   Schatzberg	   stand	   out	   as	  necessary	   accompaniments	   to	   any	   study	   of	   Congo.27	  Each	   of	   these	   explores	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Benoit	  Verhaegan,	  ‘Les	  Safaris	  Technologiques	  au	  Zaire,	  1970-­‐80’	  Politique	  Africaine	  (June,	  1985);	  Guy	  Gran	  (eds.),	  Zaire:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Underdevelopment	  (Praeger;	  New	  York,	  1979);	  Guy	  Gran	  (ed.),	  Zaire:	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Underdevelopment	  (New	  York;	  Praeger,	  1979);	  Also	  David	  J.	  Gould,	  Bureaucratic	  Corruption	  and	  Underdevelopment	  in	  the	  Third	  World:	  the	  Case	  of	  Zaire	  (Pergamon	  Press;	  New	  York,	  1980)	  26	  See	  also	  Crawford	  Young,	  ‘The	  Zairian	  Crisis	  and	  American	  Foreign	  Policy’	  in	  Bender,	  Coleman	  and	  Sklar	  (1985)	  27	  M.	  Crawford	  Young	  &	  Thomas	  Turner,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Decline	  of	  the	  Zairian	  State	  (University	  of	  Wisconsin,	  1985);	  Michael	  G.	  Schatzberg,	  Dialectics	  of	  Oppression	  in	  Zaire	  (Indiana	  University	  Press;	  Bloomington	  &	  Indianapolis,	  1988);	  For	  a	  more	  general	  survey	  see	  also,	  Georges	  Nzongola-­‐Ntalja,	  The	  Congo	  from	  Leopold	  to	  Kabila:	  A	  People’s	  History	  (Zed	  Books;	  London	  &	  New	  York,	  2002)	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reincarnation	   of	   Leopold’s	   exploitative	   colonial	   state	   in	   the	   guise	   of	   Mobutu’s	  ‘kleptocracy’.	   Young	   and	   Turner	   offer	   a	   lucid	   analysis	   of	   the	   establishment	   of	  Mobutu’s	   dictatorship,	   its	   shortcomings	   in	   providing	   even	   a	   basic	   services	   to	   its	  citizens	  and	  the	  increasing	  collapse	  of	  the	  state	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1970s.	  Schatzberg,	  by	  contrast,	   focuses	  more	  narrowly	  on	  the	  repressive	  apparatus	  at	  Mobutu’s	  disposal	  based	   on	   his	   fieldwork	   in	   Lisala	   in	   Equateur	   province	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1970s.	   While	  concentrating	  on	   the	  domestic	  machinations	  of	   the	  Congolese	   state,	   each	  of	   these	  analyses	   ascribes	   a	   degree	   of	   centrality	   to	   American	   backing	   in	   sustaining	   the	  defunct	   Mobutu	   regime.	   Schatzberg,	   for	   example,	   points	   to	   the	   continued	   IMF,	  World	   Bank	   and	   Western	   donors,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   sporadic	   Western	   military	  interventions,	   that	   allowed	   the	   bankrupt	   regime	   to	   grind	   on	   and	   ‘demonstrate	   to	  Zaire’s	  dispossessed	  that	  the	  state’s	  leadership,	  if	  challenged,	  could	  call	  on	  powerful	  outside	   support.’28	  Furthermore,	   each	   of	   these	   studies	   concurs	  with	   the	   view	   that	  American	  policy	   towards	  Congo	  was	  essentially	  driven	  by	  Washington’s	  Cold	  War	  preoccupations	   that	   ensured	   the	   self-­‐reinforcing	   mantra,	   ‘Mobutu	   or	   Chaos’,	  prevailed	   as	   the	   centrepiece	   of	   American	   strategy.	   Ultimately,	   however,	   beyond	  their	   call	   for	   a	   more	   regionalist	   approach	   towards	   Congo	   in	   Washington,	   these	  fascinating	  studies	  of	   the	  Congolese	  state	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  explore	   the	  details	  of	   the	  American	  role	  in	  Congo	  as	  a	  story	  in	  itself.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	  summarise,	   this	  brief	  overview	  reveals	   three	  relatively	  consistently	  upheld	  themes	   throughout	   the	   existing	   literature	   exploring	   the	   American	   relationship	  towards	  Congo	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  First	  of	  all,	  there	  is	  a	  common	  assumption	  that	  Africa	  was	   a	   low	   priority	   on	   the	   foreign	   policy	   agenda	   of	   successive	  Washington	  administrations,	  at	  least	  until	  the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War	  rekindled	  the	  Cold	  War	  on	  the	  continent	  in	  the	  mid	  1970s.	  Secondly,	  the	  emphasis	  of	  past	  research	  placed	  on	  the	  early	  1960s	  encourages	  the	  tendency	  to	  view	  the	  Mobutu	  era	  as	  a	  straightforward	  progression	  and	  conclusion	  of	  earlier	  policies,	  without	  giving	  due	  attention	   to	   the	  very	   specific	   peculiarities	   of	   this	   era.	   Finally,	   and	   directly	   related	   to	   this,	   is	   the	  inclination	   to	  view	  the	  American	  hand	   in	  Mobutu’s	  coup	  and	   the	  relationship	   that	  subsequently	   unfolded	   as	   the	   successful	   culmination	   of	   a	   covert	   Cold	   War	  intervention	   that	   served	   immediate	   American	   interests,	   either	   strategic	   or	  economic	  depending	  on	  the	  emphasis	  of	  the	  studies,	  albeit	  with	  considerable	  cost	  to	  Congo.	   There	   is	   ample	   evidence,	   however,	   to	   suggest	   that,	   even	   within	   such	   a	  narrow	  geostrategic	  Cold	  War	  interpretation,	  the	  benefits	  of	  Washington’s	  Mobutu	  alliance	   were	   extremely	   limited	   and	   ultimately	   undermined	   even	   immediate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Schatzberg,	  Dialectics	  of	  Oppression	  in	  Zaire	  p.	  141	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American	  aims.	  This	  highlights	  the	  need	  for	  a	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  American-­‐Mobutu	   alliance,	   its	   impact	   not	   just	   on	   Congo	   but	   on	   the	   American	   approach	  towards	  Africa	  and	  its	  role	  within	  the	  broader	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  study	  explores	  the	  events	  in	  Congo	  and	  their	  contemporaneous	  interpretations	   that	   conspired	   to	  move	   successive	  Washington	   administrations	   to	  foster	  and	  sustain	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime	  from	  1964	  to	  1981,	  as	  Joseph	  Désiré	  Mobutu	  evolved	  into	  an	  increasingly	  megalomanic	  despot.	  Building	  on	  the	  detailed	  research	  of	   the	   earlier	   period	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   Congo’s	   independence,	   the	  following	   pages	   share	   the	   analysis	   that	   the	   American	   Cold	   War	   containment	  impulse,	   often	   reinforced	   by	   racist	   undertones,	   consistently	   trumped	   economic	  factors	   and	   a	   more	   Afrocentric	   reading	   of	   events	   in	   Congo	   in	   the	   approach	   of	  successive	   administrations	   from	   Presidents	   Johnson	   to	   Carter.	   A	   more	   detailed	  consideration	  suggests,	  however,	   that	   the	  Mobutu	  era	   that	  unfolded	  after	  his	   final	  American	  assisted	  coup	  d’état	  in	  November	  1965	  marked	  a	  qualitative	  departure	  in	  American	   policies	   towards	   the	   region	   with	   very	   specific	   consequences	   both	   for	  Congo	   and	   the	   United	   States.	   Most	   obviously,	   the	   Johnson	   administration’s	  continued	  and	  escalated	  meddling	  in	  Congo	  took	  place	  against	  a	  new	  backdrop	  that	  was	  more	  or	  less	  devoid	  of	  an	  actual	  Soviet	  threat	  to	  the	  region.	  More	  than	  this,	  its	  instrumental	   hand	   in	   the	   Mobutu	   coup	   saw	   the	   United	   States	   for	   the	   first	   time	  embark	  on	  a	   rudimentary	  nation-­‐building	  project	   in	   a	  newly	   independent	  African	  country.	   This	   somewhat	   uncomfortable	   new	   role	   nevertheless	   ensured	   that	  America	  displaced	  its	  Belgium	  and	  European	  allies	  as	  the	  principal	  influence	  on	  the	  emerging	  Kinshasa	  regime.	  It	  also	  marked	  a	  shifting	  attitude	  towards	  the	  region	  in	  Washington.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	   has	   been	   noted,	   studies	   of	   American	   foreign	   policy	   most	   usually	   treat	  Africa	  as	   the	  ugly	   stepsister	  of	  Europe,	   the	  Middle	  East,	   South-­‐East	  Asia	  and	  even	  Latin	  America	  in	  terms	  of	  strategic	  importance.29	  Challenging	  this	  assumption	  over	  Africa’s	   lowly	   status	  on	  Washington’s	   agenda,	  however,	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   successive	  administrations	  nevertheless	   felt	   the	  need	  to	  actively	   intervene	   in	  Congo	  to	  shape	  its	  domestic	  political	  landscape	  from	  the	  outset	  of	  its	  independence.	  This	  dichotomy	  between	   an	   apparent	   executive	   disinterest	   alongside	   a	   growing	   American	   role	   in	  events	   in	   Congo	   as	   they	   unfolded	   has	   a	   two-­‐part	   explanation.	   First	   of	   all,	   while	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Terence	  Lyons,	  ‘Keeping	  Africa	  off	  the	  Agenda’	  in	  Warren	  I.	  Cohen	  and	  Nancy	  Benkopf	  Tucker	  (eds.)	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  Confronts	  the	  World;	  American	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1963-­‐68	  (Cambridge	  Uni	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1994);	  Logevall	  and	  Preston’s	  edited	  volume	  on	  the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  1970s	  does	  not	  even	  include	  a	  chapter	  on	  Africa;	  Fredrik	  Logevall	  and	  Andrew	  Preston	  (eds.)	  Nixon	  and	  the	  World:	  American	  Foreign	  Relations,	  1969-­‐1977	  (Oxford	  Uni.	  Press,	  2008)	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strategically	   any	   Soviet	   gains	   in	   Africa	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   its	   surge	   towards	  independence	   were	   viewed	   with	   considerable	   trepidation,	   Washington	   saw	   the	  continent	  as	  traditionally	  a	  European	  responsibility	  and	  looked	  to	  its	  NATO	  allies	  to	  fulfil	  their	  obligations	  there.	  A	  second	  reason,	  however,	  comes	  to	  the	  fore	  during	  the	  first	  years	  of	  the	  Johnson	  presidency.	  With	  it’s	  active	  support	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  coup	  in	  November	   1965,	  Washington	   felt	   it	   had	   successfully	  mastered	   the	  most	   pressing	  African	   trouble	   spot	   with	   a	   low-­‐cost	   covert	   operation	   that	   seemingly	   effectively	  precluded	   Soviet	   gains	   in	   Congo.	   The	   self-­‐congratulatory	   backslapping	   that	  followed	   established	  Congo	   as	   a	   shining	   example	   of	   a	   successful	   covert	   operation	  and	   an	   efficient	   way	   of	   dealing	   with	   the	   region	   that	   was	   upheld	   by	   subsequent	  administrations.	  No	  doubt	  smarting	  from	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  and	  continued	  troubles	  in	  Vietnam,	  a	  more	  critical	  reading	  of	  this	  superficial	  engagement	  that	  simply	  co-­‐opted	  a	  corrupt	  elite	  to	  serve	  perceived	  American	  Cold	  War	  interests	  was	  notably	  absent	  in	  the	  euphoria	  of	  the	  intelligence	  community	  that	  propagated	  this	  myth	  for	  years	  to	  come.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Establishing	   the	   Mobutu	   alliance	   as	   Washington’s	   modus	   operandi	   towards	  Congo	  and	  the	  wider	  region	  had	  profound	  consequences.	  The	  devastating	  effects	  on	  this	  fractured	  central	  African	  state	  of	  the	  American	  sustenance	  of	  a	  corrupt	  dictator	  bent	  on	  the	  exploitation	  of	  his	  domain	  have	  been	  well	  documented	  and	  continue	  to	  haunt	  Congo	  into	  the	  present.	  Going	  beyond	  this,	  however,	  this	  study	  explores	  the	  extent	   to	  which	   the	  bleaker	   implications	  of	  American	  policies	   for	  Congo’s	   stunted	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  were	  already	  apparent	  to	  contemporary	  American	  officials.	  	  Unfortunately,	  these	  issues	  never	  seemed	  to	  rank	  highly	  enough	  to	   actually	   affect	   a	   change	   of	   heart	   or	   direction	   in	  Washington	   during	   the	   entire	  period	  under	  review.	  Still	  more	  surprising	  and	  controversial,	  however,	  is	  the	  impact	  of	   the	  Washington	   line	  even	  on	   immediate	  American	  Cold	  War	  aims.	  As	  such,	   this	  thesis	  goes	  considerably	  further	  in	  exploring	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  United	  States’	  partnership	   with	   Mobutu,	   and	   the	   Congolese	   leader’s	   ability	   to	   manipulate	   his	  stalwart	  ally,	  actually	  shaped	  America’s	  ill-­‐conceived	  Africa	  strategy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Time	   and	   again,	   through	   its	   intimate	   affiliation	   with	   the	   Mobutu	   regime,	   the	  United	  States	  was	  caught	  on	  the	  side	  of	  dictatorial	  oppression	  and	  reactionary	  neo-­‐colonialism	   in	   the	   name	   of	   its	   greater	   Cold	   War	   designs,	   tarnishing	   America’s	  standing	   in	  Africa	   and	   the	   emerging	   Third	  World.	  Moreover,	   viewing	   the	  Mobutu	  regime	  as	  an	  instrumental	  ally	  in	  containing	  perceived	  threats	  in	  the	  area	  not	  only	  permitted	  Washington’s	  relative	  inattention	  towards	  the	  region	  until	  the	  mid	  1970s	  but	  also	  ensured	  that	  subsequent	  American	  policies	  were	  based	  on	  extremely	  weak	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foundations.	   Indeed,	   some	   ten	   years	   after	   Mobutu’s	   Washington-­‐backed	   coup,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Henry	  Kissinger	  embarked	  on	  his	  calamitous	  Angola	  intervention	  that	  rekindled	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Africa.	  It	  was	  no	  coincidence	  that,	  when	  faced	  with	  the	   break	   up	   of	   the	   Portuguese	   empire	   in	   1974,	   the	   much-­‐vaunted	   architect	   of	  American	   foreign	   policy	   turned	   to	  Washington’s	   old	   Congolese	   ally.	   Thus,	   the	   ill-­‐fated	  Angola	   strategy	   that	   followed	  drew	   its	   inspiration	   from	  a	  breakfast	  meeting	  with	  Mobutu,	  from	  which	  this	  thesis	  takes	  its	  title.	  Moreover,	  a	  decade-­‐long	  policy	  of	  unfettered	  support	  for	  the	  Kinshasa	  tyrant	  in	  the	  build	  up	  to	  the	  Angola	  war	  was	  self-­‐reinforcing	  as	  Mobutu’s	  survival	  became	  intimately	  tied	  to	  American	  prestige	  in	  the	  Third	  World,	   at	   least	   to	   the	  Cold	  War	  mind-­‐set	   that	   prevailed	   in	  Washington,	  and	  ensured	   that	  his	   regime	  became	   increasingly	  difficult	   to	   abandon	  even	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  this	  debacle	  during	  the	  Carter	  years.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Drawing	  on	  American,	  European	  and	  African	  sources,	   this	   then	   is	   the	  story	  of	  Mobutu’s	   emergence	   as	   the	   centrepiece	   of	   American	   strategy	   towards	   Congo	   and	  the	  wider	  region	  from	  the	  mid	  1960s	  that	  haunted	  the	  two	  countries	  for	  over	  three	  decades.	  The	  mainstay	  of	   the	  story	  told	  on	  the	  following	  pages	  relies	  on	  extensive	  research	   in	   the	   American	   presidential	   archives	   from	   Lyndon	   Johnson	   to	   Jimmy	  Carter,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  CIA	   and	   State	  Department	   records	   available	   at	   the	  National	  Archives	   in	  Maryland.	   The	  Congolese	   government	   archives,	   unfortunately,	   remain	  largely	  fragmented	  with	  neither	  finding	  aids	  nor	  catalogues	  to	  assist	  the	  researcher.	  Due	  to	  complexities	  of	  conducting	  research	  in	  Kinshasa	  and	  the	  constraints	  of	  time	  and	   resources	   available	   for	   this	   project,	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	   Congolese	  government	   record	   (or	   as	   much	   of	   it	   as	   still	   exists)	   remains	   an	   omission	   in	   this	  study.	   This	   imbalance	   is	   offset	   to	   a	   degree	   through	   recourse	   to	   European	   and,	  where	   available,	   Ghanaian	   records	   to	   present	   alternative	   insights	   to	   the	   events	  under	  scrutiny.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   rich	   documentary	   record	   of	   the	   Lyndon	   Johnson	   library	   give	   a	   detailed	  picture	  of	  the	  American	  approach	  to	  Congo,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  intelligence	  available,	  how	  this	  was	  interpreted	  and	  the	  policies	  this	  gave	  rise	  to	  during	  the	  1960s.	  With	  Brussels	   still	   the	   most	   dominant	   foreign	   influence	   on	   Congo	   for	   much	   of	   this	  decade;	   the	  Belgian	  diplomatic	  archives	   further	  elucidate	  events	   in	  Congo	  and	   the	  interplay	  between	  Brussels	  and	  Washington.	  The	  British	  and	  West	  German	  records,	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   often	   offer	   useful	   observations	   from	   quarters	   with	   less	  immediate	   interests	   to	   compliment	   this	   picture.	   Finally,	   the	   East	   German	   and	  Ghanaian	  archives	  each	  give	  insights	  with	  a	  very	  different	  perspective.	  The	  former	  illustrate	   both	   the	   fragmented	   and	   increasingly	   desperate	   nature	   of	   Congo’s	   anti-­‐
	   20	  
government	   forces,	   as	   well	   as	   documenting	   the	   reluctance	   of	   the	   Soviet	   bloc	   to	  involve	   itself	   once	   more	   in	   Congo.	   The	   latter	   serve	   as	   a	   useful	   measure	   of	   the	  genuine	   outrage	   that	   spread	   through	   Africa	   and	   much	   of	   the	   Third	   World	   over	  American	  policies	  in	  Congo	  and	  the	  abhorrence	  with	  which	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  was	  initially	  viewed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  the	  1970s	  the	  governmental	  record	  is	  not	  quite	  as	  accessible.	  Both	  the	  Nixon	  and	   Ford	   presidential	   archives	   again	   serve	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   third	   and	   fourth	  chapter	  respectively,	  having	  thus	  far	  received	  scant	  attention	  with	  regards	  to	  their	  specific	   Congo	   policies.	   Unfortunately,	   for	   the	   Carter	   years	   much	   of	   the	   State	  Department	   record	   (with	   the	   notable	   exception	   of	   the	   Anthony	   Lake,	   Warren	  Christopher	   and	  Edmund	  Muskie	   papers)	   remains	   classified	   but	   the	  White	  House	  briefs	  available	  at	   the	  Carter	  Library	  and	  the	  CIA	  reports	  available	  at	   the	  National	  Archives	  allow	  for	  an	   initial	  assessment	  of	   the	  American	  approach	  towards	  Congo	  during	  this	  period.	  Again	  this	  American	  archival	  focus	  is	  complimented	  with	  British	  and	  West	  German	  archives,	  particularly	  useful	  for	  the	  discussions	  amongst	  donors	  over	   extending	   Congolese	   debt	   following	   its	   economic	   collapse	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  while	  the	  East	  German	  archives	  continue	  to	  give	  insights	  into	  the	  line	  taken	  by	  the	  Eastern	   Bloc.	   Unfortunately,	   both	   the	   Ghanaian	   and	   the	   Belgian	   records	   for	   the	  1970s	  had	  not	  been	  processed	  by	   the	   time	  of	  writing.	  With	  an	   increasingly	  active	  French	   role	   in	   support	   of	   the	   Mobutu	   regime,	   however,	   recourse	   to	   the	   French	  diplomatic	   record	   partially	   fills	   this	   gap	   for	   the	   1970s.	   Finally,	   this	   international	  diplomatic	   history	   is	   complimented	   by	   a	   review	   of	   contemporary	   American	  newspapers	  and	  the	  published	  memoirs	  of	  various	  protagonists	  to	  flesh	  out	  details	  and	  add	  colour	  to	  the	  picture	  painted	  by	  the	  above	  record.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Picking	   up	   the	   thread	   from	   the	   valuable	   research	   of	   Madeleine	   Kalb	   and	  Richard	   Mahoney	   on	   the	   American	   role	   in	   newly	   independent	   Congo,	   the	   first	  chapter	  thus	  focuses	  on	  the	  initial	  approach	  of	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  towards	  the	   spread	   of	   further	   insurgencies	   in	   Congo	   in	   1964.	   Despite	   the	   absence	   of	   any	  sinister	  Soviet	  involvement	  at	  this	  stage	  and	  the	  CIA’s	  own	  reading	  of	  the	  spreading	  ‘rebellion’	   as	   largely	   fuelled	   by	   parochial	   grievances,	   the	   United	   States	   felt	  compelled	  to	  act	  once	  more.	  The	  slightly	  incoherent	  policies	  that	  emerged	  were	  the	  hodgepodge	  product	  of	  an	  extremely	  active	  embassy	   in	  close	  cooperation	  with	  an	  all	  too	  energetic	  CIA	  presence	  and	  Washington’s	  propensity	  to	  look	  to	  a	  Belgian	  lead	  in	   Congo.	   The	   result	   was	   a	   central	   American	   role	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   white	  mercenary	   column,	   the	   return	   of	   the	   controversial	   figure	   of	   Moise	   Tshombe,	  Katanga’s	   former	   secessionist	   leader,	   to	   Kinshasa’s	   political	   fold	   and	   a	   direct	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military	  strike	  on	  Kisangani	  by	  Belgian	  para-­‐Commando	  units	  airlifted	  in	  American	  planes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  political	  infighting	  in	  Kinshasa	  continued,	  it	  was	  only	  with	  the	  Mobutu	  coup	  in	  November	  1965	  that	  Washington	  began	  to	  feel	  vindicated	  in	  its	  course.	  As	  such,	  the	   second	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   the	   American	   role	   in	  Mobutu’s	   sudden	   rise	   to	   the	  helm	   of	   Kinshasa	   politics	   and	   its	   subsequent	   efforts	   to	   maintain	   and	   foster	   his	  initially	  tenuous	  grasp	  on	  power.	  Again,	  it	  was	  a	  series	  of	  short-­‐term	  manipulations	  that	   saw	  Washington	   play	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   fortuitous	   rise	   of	   a	   leader	   whose	  commitment	   and	   ability	   were	   questioned	   even	   by	   the	   CIA’s	   own	   intelligence	  assessments.	  Once	  in	  place,	  however,	  Washington	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	  cultivate	  a	  loyal	   and	   friendly	   force	   in	   central	   Africa	   and	   threw	   its	   whole-­‐hearted	   support	  behind	   the	  Mobutu	   regime.	  Thus	   it	  was	  under	   the	   somewhat	   inattentive	  watch	  of	  President	  Johnson	  that	  the	  United	  States	  conceived	  its	  unfaltering	  Mobutu-­‐alliance	  that	   both	   saw	   Belgium	   gradually	   displaced	   as	   the	   principle	   foreign	   influence	   on	  Kinshasa	   politics	   and	   coloured	   the	   American	   relationship	  with	   Africa	   throughout	  the	   subsequent	   years.	   Indeed,	   this	   strategy	   of	   securing	   a	   loyal	   elite	   in	   Congo	   in	  pursuit	  of	   its	   strategic	  Cold	  War	  aims,	   even	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   a	  direct	  Communist	  threat,	  constitutes	  a	  constant	  theme	  throughout	  the	  period	  under	  review.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  With	   a	   return	   of	   relative	   calm	   following	   the	   turbulent	   1960s,	   the	  Nixon	   years	  saw	   high	   expectations	   for	   Congo’s	   future	   soon	   turn	   to	   despair	   as	   an	   increasingly	  self-­‐confident	  Mobutu	  asserted	  his	  dominance	  and	  moulded	  Kinshasa	  politics	  to	  his	  own	   ends.	   The	   third	   chapter	   explores	   Congo’s	   internal	   dynamics	   as	   seen	   through	  the	   contemporary	   American	   intelligence	   record,	   revealing	   a	   detailed	   and	   critical	  understanding	   of	   the	   growing	   pitfalls	   of	   Mobutu’s	   regime	   and	   the	   burdens	   this	  imposed	   on	   ordinary	   Congolese	   citizens	   even	   at	   the	   time.	   Nevertheless,	   Mobutu	  received	   an	   untrammelled	   endorsement	   from	   his	   American	   counterpart	   as	   he	  willingly	   and	   ably	   presented	   himself	   as	   a	   perfect	   fit	   for	   the	   Nixon	   Doctrine’s	  declared	   intent	   of	   cultivating	   and	   strengthening	   regional	   allies	   in	   the	   global	   fight	  against	   communism.	  Despite	   its	  own	  accurate	   intelligence	  and	   the	  warnings	  of	  an	  increasingly	  nervous	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF),	  Nixon	  indulged	  Mobutu’s	  lavish	   appetites	   by	   encouraging	   both	   his	   fixation	   on	   sophisticated	   military	  hardware	   as	   well	   proving	   a	   valuable	   link	   to	   American	   private	   investment	   into	  Congo.	  With	   regard	   to	   this	   latter	   point,	   this	   chapter	   also	   provides	   an	   autopsy	   of	  David	   N.	   Gibbs’	   flawed	   ideas	   of	   the	   primacy	   of	   American	   business	   interests	   in	  Washington’s	   policy	   formulation.	   Finally,	   it	   was	   during	   this	   period	   that	   Mobutu	  made	  his	  first	  contacts	  with	  the	  giant	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy,	  Henry	  Kissinger.	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  Even	   before	   he	  was	   awarded	   the	  Nobel	   Peace	   Prize	   for	   his	   role	   in	   the	   Paris	  negotiations	  that	  brought	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  to	  a	  close,	  controversy	  surrounded	  this	  Harvard	  academic	   (busying	  himself	  with	   triangular	  diplomacy	  with	  China	  and	   the	  Soviet	   Union,	   his	   role	   in	   engineering	   détente	   and	   his	   shuttle	   diplomacy	   in	   the	  Middle	  East)	  whose	  substantial	  diplomatic	  talents	  were	  at	  times	  overshadowed	  by	  his	  secretive	  and	  high-­‐handed	  modus	  operandi.30	  Under	  Nixon,	  Kissinger	  eventually	  occupied	   simultaneously	   the	   dual	   functions	   of	   the	   presidential	   National	   Security	  Adviser	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  in	  part	  illustrating	  the	  White	  House	  grip	  on	  foreign	  policy	  during	  the	  Nixon	  years.	  With	  the	  Watergate	  crisis	   finally	  ending	  the	  mutual	  jealousies	  and	  petty	  rivalries	  with	  Nixon,	  Kissinger	  dominated	  the	  diplomatic	  arena	  ever	   further	   during	   the	   Ford	   years.	   Indeed,	   nowhere	  was	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State’s	  bulldozing	   style	   and	   penchant	   for	   back	   channels	   and	   personal	   diplomacy	   more	  visible	  than	  in	  his	  approach	  to	  the	  unfolding	  crisis	  in	  Angola	  following	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  empire	  and	  in	  his	  dealings	  with	  his	  own	  Africa	  Department.	  More	  than	  this,	  when	   it	  came	  to	  Africa	   it	  seems	  this	  grand	  strategist	  of	  American	  policy	  was	  devoid	  of	  a	  coherent	  and	  sustainable	  long-­‐term	  vision.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  superpower	  confrontation	  in	  the	  Angolan	  civil	  war	  has,	  of	  course,	  received	  considerable	   scholarly	   attention.31	  The	   fourth	   chapter,	   however,	   approaches	   the	  turmoil	   to	   Congo’s	   southern	   border	   through	   the	   prism	   of	   America’s	   Mobutu	  alliance.	   Kissinger	   himself	   remains	   unrepentant	   about	   his	   close	   partnership	   with	  Mobutu	  seeing	  it	  as	  a	  necessary,	  conventional	  and	  unremarkable	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  need	  for	  stability	  as	  he	  wrote,	  ‘A	  succession	  of	  American	  administrations	  maintained	  a	  working	  relationship	  with	  Mobutu	  because	  none	  of	  them	  wanted	  to	  ad	  turmoil	  in	  Central	  Africa	  to	  already	  excessive	  list	  of	  foreign	  crises.’32	  A	  closer	  look	  at	  the	   now	   available	   record	   suggests	   considerably	   more	   as	   the	   Congolese	   leader	  assumed	   a	   central	   role	   in	   shaping	   American	   strategy.	   The	   defeat	   of	   American	  interests	   in	   Angola	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   backed	   MPLA	   (Popular	  Movement	   of	   Angola)	   thus	   not	   only	   demonstrates	  Mobutu’s	   ability	   to	  manipulate	  even	  the	  grand	  strategist,	  Kissinger,	  to	  his	  own	  ends	  but	  also	  reveals	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  a	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  For	  example:	  Jussi	  Hanhimäki,	  The	  Flawed	  Architect:	  Henry	  Kissinger	  and	  the	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  Christopher	  Hitchens,	  The	  Trial	  of	  Henry	  Kissinger	  (London,	  Verso	  Press,	  2001;	  Jeremi	  Suri,	  Henry	  Kissinger	  and	  the	  American	  Century	  (Harvard	  Uni	  Press,	  2007);	  Robert	  Dallek,	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger:	  Partners	  in	  Power	  (London,	  Penguin;	  2008);	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  Years	  of	  Renewal	  (New	  York,	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  1999)	  31	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions;	  Westad,	  Global	  Cold	  War;	  Stockwell,	  In	  Search	  of	  Enemies;	  Laidi,	  Superpowers	  and	  Africa;	  Raymond	  Garthoff,	  Détente	  and	  Confrontation	  (Brookings	  Institute;	  Washington,	  1985);	  Shannon	  Butler,	  Into	  the	  Storm:	  American	  Covert	  Involvement	  in	  the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War,	  1974-­‐1975	  (PhD	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  University	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  Arizona,	  2008)	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decade-­‐long	   American	   reliance	   on	   the	   very	   fallible	   Kinshasa	   dictator	   whose	  decaying	  state	  was	  of	  little	  use	  in	  furthering	  American	  aims.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Defeat	   in	   Angola	   brought	   Africa	   into	   sharp	   focus	   for	   the	   United	   States	   and	  made	   it	  a	   fertile	  battleground	  for	   further	  Cold	  War	  confrontations,	  with	  events	  on	  the	  Horn	   challenging	   Carter’s	   avowed	   return	   to	   a	  more	  moral	   foreign	   policy.	   The	  Carter	   administration’s	   first	   encounter	   with	   Africa	   was	   over	   renewed	   crisis	   in	  Congo,	   however,	   and	   the	   final	   chapter	   explores	   how,	   when	   faced	   with	   spreading	  turmoil	  in	  Katanga	  (then	  Shaba)	  province,	  the	  Carter	  administration	  reacted	  with	  a	  notably	  uniform	  and	  conventional	  Cold	  War	  response.	  True,	  constrained	  by	  a	  more	  critical	  Congress	  and	  public	  at	  large	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Angola	  and	  the	  Senate’s	  Church	  Committee	   Report	   detailing	   the	   CIA’s	   past	   excesses,	   Carter	   was	   outspoken	   in	   his	  criticisms	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime’	  human	  rights	  transgressions.33	  Nevertheless,	  when	  the	  Kinshasa	  despot	  appeared	  threatened,	  Washington	  responded	  in	  familiar	  style	  and	  rushed	  to	  secure	  the	  recalcitrant	  dictator’s	  survival.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  detailed	  studies	  of	   the	  first	  Congo	  crisis	   in	  the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	   its	  independence	   have	   naturally	   defined	   the	   subsequent	   scholarship	   on	   American-­‐Congolese	  relations	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  To	  view	  the	  renewed	  interventions	  under	  Johnson	  simply	  as	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	  earlier	  policies	  fails	  to	  adequately	  consider	  the	  shifting	  circumstances	  under	  which	  Washington	  was	  now	  operating.	  A	  familiar	  containment	   impulse	   continued	   to	   dominate	   the	   American	   approach	   even	   as	   the	  Soviet	   Union’s	   interest	   had	  waned	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   Lumumba	   tragedy	   and	   the	  CIA’s	   dominance	   of	   Kinshasa’s	   political	   scene.	   Just	   as	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   had	  seemingly	   turned	   its	   back	   on	   Congo,	   the	   United	   States	   now	   embarked	   upon	   a	  peculiar	  form	  of	  state	  building	  in	  the	  fledgling	  country.	  The	  Johnson	  administration	  throwing	  its	  weight	  behind	  the	  Mobutu	  coup	  and	  its	  sustenance	  of	  his	  regime	  was	  thus	  not	   simply	   the	   final	  act	  of	   the	  crisis	   sparked	  by	  Congolese	   independence	  but	  the	   beginning	   of	   a	   relationship	  with	   profound	   and	   singular	   consequences	   for	   the	  stunted	  development	  of	  Congo.	  More	  than	  this,	  Washington’s	  subsequent	  increasing	  reliance	  on	   the	  Kinshasa	  despot	  not	  only	  shaped	  the	  American	  approach	   to	  Africa	  for	  much	  of	   this	  period	  but	  ultimately	  even	  dealt	   a	   severe	  blow	   to	   the	   immediate	  Cold	   War	   aims	   it	   was	   pursuing,	   and	   to	   which	   Mobutu’s	   brand	   of	   stability	   was	  deemed	  a	  vital	  ingredient	  by	  successive	  administrations	  from	  Johnson	  to	  Carter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	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  Lyndon	  Johnson	  oversaw	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  on	  2nd	  July	  1964	  to	  outlaw	  major	  forms	  of	  racial	  discrimination	  and	  segregation	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  following	  months,	  as	  he	  cast	  half	  an	  eye	  towards	  Africa,	  the	  president	  approved	  the	  furnishing	  of	  a	  white	  mercenary	  brigade,	  predominantly	  from	  South	  Africa	  and	  Zimbabwe	   (then	   Southern	   Rhodesia),	   to	   quash	   an	   indigenous	   uprising	   in	   eastern	  Congo	  and	  mounted	  a	  direct	  military	  intervention	  on	  Kisangani	  (then	  Stanleyville)	  in	   allegiance	   with	   Belgium,	   Congo’s	   former	   colonial	   masters.	   For	   all	   his	   political	  acumen	  in	  the	  domestic	  arena,	  Johnson	  singularly	  failed	  to	  appreciate	  the	  negative	  implications	  of	   these	  Congo	  policies	   for	  American	  relations	  with	   the	   region.	  Much	  has	   been	   written	   about	   Lyndon	   Johnson	   as	   the	   domestic	   reformer	   who	   viewed	  foreign	  policy	  as	  an	  unwelcome	  distraction	  or,	   as	  Eric	  Goldman	  put	   it,	   ‘something	  you	   had,	   like	   measles,	   and	   got	   over	   with	   as	   quickly	   as	   possible.’34	  Perhaps	   H.W.	  Brandt	  offers	  a	  more	  balanced	  picture	  in	  his	  assessment	  that,	  ‘Johnson	  sought,	  with	  singular	  success,	  to	  change	  America’s	  direction	  in	  matters	  touching	  minorities,	  the	  poor,	   and	   the	   otherwise	   disadvantaged.	   He	   made	   almost	   no	   effort	   to	   change	  America’s	   direction	   in	   international	   affairs,	   even	   when	   change	   was	   necessary.’35	  This	   foreign	   policy	   conservatism	   rings	   particularly	   true	   for	   the	   Congo	   policies	  pursued	   under	   Johnson,	   marred	   by	   an	   incoherence	   that	   reflected	   a	   degree	   of	  executive	  inattention.	  Even	  as	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Tonkin	  incident	  saw	  a	  steady	  escalation	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  was	  caught	  in	  a	  dilemma	  of	  wanting	  to	  influence	  events	  in	  Congo	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  remaining	  wary	  of	  being	  drawn	  into	  another	  costly	  Third	  World	  conflict.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Despite	   the	   efforts	   of	   the	   Eisenhower	   and	   Kennedy	   administrations	   to	  influence,	   harangue	   and	   shape	   the	   newly	   independent	   Congolese	   government,	   by	  the	   time	  Lyndon	   Johnson	   inherited	   the	  presidency	   turmoil	  was	  once	  more	  on	   the	  horizon	   or,	   as	   one	   intelligence	   memorandum	   cynically	   noted,	   ‘the	   Congo	   seems	  destined	  for	  continued	  crisis.’36	  Both	  Washington	  and	  the	  American	  mission	  on	  the	  ground	   in	   Congo	   concurred	   in	   their	   analysis	   of	   the	   spreading	   unrest	   as	   largely	  ‘tribal’	   in	  nature	  and	  parochial	   in	  motivation.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  United	  States	  once	  again	   sprang	   into	   action	   to	   intervene	   in	   Congo	   not	   only	   with	   an	   ever	   increasing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Eric	  Goldman,	  The	  Tragedy	  of	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  (Dell	  Publishing,	  New	  York,	  1969)	  pp.	  447-­‐448;	  H.W.	  Brands	  (ed.)	  The	  Foreign	  Policies	  of	  Lyndon	  Johnson:	  Beyond	  Vietnam	  (Texas	  A&M	  University,	  College	  Station,	  1999);	  Terence	  Lyons,	  ‘Keeping	  Africa	  off	  the	  Agenda’	  in	  Warren	  I.	  Cohen	  and	  Nancy	  Benkopf	  Tucker	  (eds.)	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  Confronts	  the	  World;	  American	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1963-­‐68	  (Cambridge	  Uni	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1994)	  35	  H.W.	  Brands,	  The	  Wage	  of	  Globalism:	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  American	  Power	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995)	  p.	  28	  36	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  (CIA),	  Directorate	  of	  Intelligence,	  Memorandum:	  ‘The	  Political	  Situation	  and	  Prospects	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  20th	  February	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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Military	   Assistance	   Program	   (MAP)	   to	   the	   Kinshasa	   (Leopoldville	   until	   1966)	  government	   and	   further	  meddling	   in	   Congolese	   politics	   that	   ultimately	   facilitated	  the	   return	   of	   the	   controversial	   Moise	   Tshombe	   (Katanga’s	   former	   secessionist	  leader)	  as	  Prime	  Minister,	  but	  also	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  white	  mercenaries	  and	  in	   providing	   airlift	   capabilities	   for	   a	   direct	   Belgian	   military	   intervention	   in	  Kisangani.	  This	   flurry	  of	  activity	   from	  Washington	  and	  its	  allies	   left	   little	  room	  for	  the	  diplomatic	  initiatives	  of	  Africa’s	  emerging	  leaders	  and	  the	  nascent	  Organisation	  of	  African	  Unity	  (OAU),	  however,	  and	  its	  efforts	  to	  facilitate	  a	  political	  settlement	  to	  Congo’s	  troubles	  were	  either	  ignored	  or	  bulldozed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  American	  approach	  lay	  the	  continued	  deep-­‐rooted	  Cold	  War	  myopia	  that	  interpreted	  events	  in	  Congo	  in	  terms	  of	  potential	  Soviet	  opportunities,	  while	  looking	  to	  the	  old	  Africa	  hands	  of	  Europe	  to	  carry	  the	  security	  burden	  there.	  Rather	   than	   the	   apparent	   Soviet	   disinterest	   in	   Congo	   during	   the	   1964	   rebellions	  prompting	   Washington	   to	   reassess	   its	   stance	   towards	   Africa,	   under	   Johnson	   a	  willingness	   to	   defer	   to	   Belgium	   in	   the	   events	   that	   followed	   and	   the	   readiness	   to	  engage	   white	   mercenaries	   in	   their	   joint	   cause	   to	   steady	   the	   central	   authority	   in	  Kinshasa	   stood	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   Kennedy’s	   more	   delicate	   handling	   of	   the	  American	  image	  in	  Africa.	  As	  an	  appraisal	  of	  the	  Ghanaian	  government	  archives	  and	  the	   palpable	   outrage	   of	   Kwame	   Nkrumah	   indicate,	   this	   renewed	   foray	   into	  Congolese	  affairs	  during	  Johnson’s	  first	  year	  in	  office	  dealt	  the	  American	  standing	  in	  Africa	  a	   severe	  blow	  as	   it	   found	   itself	  on	   the	  side	  of	  Africa’s	   reactionary	  elements	  and	   Congo’s	   former	   colonial	   rulers.	   Paradoxically,	   it	   was	   only	  with	   the	   Kisangani	  intervention	   that	   the	   communist	   powers	   took	   note	   of	   the	   popular	   outrage	   that	  spread	   through	   Africa	   and	   began	   once	  more	   to	   assist	   the	   rebels,	   with	   Cuba	   even	  sending	  troops	  to	  rally	  to	  their	  cause.	  This	  may	  not	  have	  proved	  sufficient	  to	  swing	  the	  military	   tide	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   insurgents	   but	   it	   did	   reveal	   deep	   pitfalls	   in	   the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  early	  response	  to	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   lack	   of	   a	   decisive	   executive	   leadership	   ensured	   that	   the	   United	   States	  responded	  to	  renewed	  crisis	   in	  Congo	   in	  1964	  with	  a	  mix	  of	  policies	   that	  at	   times	  simply	   followed	   the	   recommendations	   of	   an	   extremely	   active	   embassy	   and	   CIA	  presence	  on	   the	  ground	  and	  more	  often	   took	   its	   lead	   from	   its	  Belgian	  partners	  at	  this	  early	  stage.	  As	  such,	  this	  chapter	  essentially	  divides	  into	  three	  parts;	  the	  nature	  of	   the	   growing	   unrest	   threatening	   Congolese	   stability	   as	   it	   was	   interpreted	   by	  American	  intelligence	  assessments,	  how	  this	  in	  turn	  translated	  into	  actual	  policy	  in	  Washington	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  broader	  implications	  of	  these	  policies.	  While	  there	  was	  no	  immediate	  communist	  involvement	  in	  the	  events	  that	  unfolded	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in	   Congo	   in	   1964,	   the	   Cold	   War	   remained	   the	   central	   preoccupation	   behind	   the	  emerging	  American	  approach	  that	  was	  simply	  unwilling	   to	  allow	  the	  Congolese	  to	  work	  out	  their	  own	  political	  destiny.	  Keen	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  central	  government	  but	  devoid	  of	   a	   central	   vision	   for	  Africa,	  Washington’s	  willingness	   to	   follow	  a	  Belgian	  lead	  once	  more	  placed	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  reactionary	  camp	  as	  Africa’s	  struggle	  for	  independence	  continued.	  	  	  
Rebellion	  in	  Congo:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   disunity	   that	   had	   marred	   its	   independence	   in	   1960	   continued	   to	   haunt	  Congo	  even	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Katangan	  secession	  and	  the	  return	  to	  a	  semblance	  of	   parliamentary	   politics	   in	   Kinshasa.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   1963	   various	   forces	   were	  competing	   to	   assert	   their	   interests	   and	  make	   their	  mark	   on	   the	   country’s	   future.	  The	   central	   government	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Cyrille	   Adoula,	   the	   moderate	   labour	  leader	  whose	  electoral	   success	  had	  been	  secured	  by	   the	  CIA’s	  baksheesh	   in	  1961,	  and	  President	  Joseph	  Kasavubu,	  the	  Abako	  Party	  leader	  of	  the	  1950s	  independence	  movement,	  had	  only	  a	  tenuous	  grip	  on	  Congo’s	  vast	  interior.	  Waiting	  in	  the	  wings	  of	  the	  flimsy	  Kinshasa	  government	  was	  the	  ‘Binza	  Group’.	  Named	  after	  a	  quarter	  in	  the	  capital	  and	  consisting	  of	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  Justin	  Bomboko,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  security	  services	  (Sûreté)	  Victor	  Nendanka	  and	  the	  army’s	  (ANC)	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  Joseph	  Désiré	  Mobutu;	   the	   Binza	   cohorts	   were	   reputed	   for	   their	   backstage	   manoeuvres	   in	  Kinshasa	   politics	   and	   ties	   to	   the	   CIA.	   	   Opposing	   these	   groups	   cultivated	   by	   the	  American	   presence	   in	   Congo	   since	   independence	   were	   the	   disenfranchised	  Lumumbist	   politicians	   exiled	   across	   the	   Congo	   River	   in	   Brazzaville	   plotting	   their	  return	   to	   Congo’s	   political	   fold.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   rural	   uprisings	   in	   the	   more	  disparate	   and	   neglected	   provinces	   of	   Congo	   threatened	   to	   unhinge	   any	   central	  political	  authority.	  As	  such,	   this	   first	  section	  examines	  the	  nature	  of	   the	  spreading	  turmoil	  and	  how	  American	  perceptions	  of	  these	  events	  provoked	  renewed	  western	  intervention	  in	  Congolese	  affairs	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  Johnson’s	  presidency.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  1963	  insurgency	  was	  spreading	  in	  the	  western	  province	  of	  Kwilu	   under	   Pierre	   Mulele,	   Lumumba’s	   former	   Minister	   of	   Education	   who	   had	  undergone	   some	   rudimentary	   training	   in	   Beijing	   and	  was	  most	   often	   cited	   as	   an	  example	  of	  an	  ideologically	  driven	  leader.37	  While	  this	  rural	  uprising,	  having	  failed	  to	  capture	  any	  major	  towns,	  was	  fizzling	  out	  already	  by	  April	  1964,	  Mulele’s	  rebel	  bands	  continued	  to	  operate	  throughout	  that	  year.	  The	  ‘Simba’	  rebellion	  in	  the	  Kivu	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  M.	  Crawford	  Young,	  ‘The	  Congo	  Rebellion’	  Africa	  Report,	  10:4	  (April,	  1965)	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area	   (‘Simba’	   meaning	   ‘lion’	   in	   Kiswahili),	   loosely	   organised	   by	   the	   rural	  commanders	   ‘General’	   Nicholas	   Olenga	   and	   Gastion	   Soumialot,	   posed	   a	   more	  sustained	   threat	   to	   the	  central	  government’s	  hold	  on	   the	  country,	  as	   the	   towns	  of	  Uvira	   and	   Kalemie	   (formerly	   Albertville)	   fell	   in	   June	   and	   the	   rebels	   fanned	   out	  across	   Nord-­‐Katanga.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   in	   October	   1963	   opposition	   politicians	  formed	  the	  Conseil	  National	  de	  Libération	  (CNL)	  under	  the	  loose	  leadership	  of	  the	  likes	   of	   Antoine	   Gizenga	   and	   Christophe	   Gbenye	   (both	   former	   members	   of	   the	  splintered	  Movement	  Nationale	  Congolais-­‐	  MNC/Lumumba)	  in	  Brazzaville.	  Lacking	  unity	  and	  driven	  more	  by	  personal	  ambitions	  than	  any	  formal	  ideological	  program,	  they	   were	   essentially	   disparate	   groups,	   split	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   the	   two	   leaders	  mentioned,	  who	  would	  later	  seek	  to	  at	   least	  nominally	  harness	  the	  rural	  uprisings	  in	  eastern	  Congo.38	  While	   the	  Sûreté	  easily	  dealt	  with	   the	  coup-­‐style	   tactics	  of	   the	  CNL	   in	   Kinshasa	   itself,	   the	   central	   government	   proved	   singularly	   incapable	   in	  quashing	  the	  provincial	  Simba	  uprisings	  that	  continued	  to	  spread	  throughout	  1964,	  not	  least	  to	  its	  own	  internal	  weaknesses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  American	  embassy	  officials	  were	  painfully	  aware	  already	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  1964,	   the	   Congolese	   government	   lacked	   both	   the	   popular	   legitimacy	   and	  military	  strength	   to	   counter	   these	   waves	   of	   unrest.	   Having	   come	   to	   power	   with	   a	   little	  behind	  the	  scene	  help	  from	  his	  US	  allies	  two	  years	  earlier,	  the	  premiership	  of	  Cyril	  Adoula	   failed	   to	   inspire.39	  As	   a	   CIA	   report	   in	   February	   pointed	   out,	   ‘Like	   Spanish	  moss,	   the	   present	   Congo	   government	   has	   its	   roots	   in	   the	   air	   not	   the	   Congolese	  hinterland.’40	  More	  than	  simply	  lacking	  support,	  however,	  the	  central	  and	  provincial	  administrations	  were	  haunted	  as	  much	  by	  their	  own	  political	  infighting	  as	  by	  their	  apparent	   inability	   to	   effectively	   govern.	   American	   ambassador	   Edward	   Gullion	  conveyed	  his	  efforts	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	  political	  wrangling	   in	  Kwilu	  province	  and	  from	   May	   the	   US	   embassy	   reported	   growing	   animosity	   between	   Adoula	   and	  Kasavubu	  amidst	  the	  mounting	  rebellion.	  Gullion	  summarised	  the	  situation	  shortly	  before	  the	  end	  of	  his	  tenure	  in	  Congo,	  ‘…	  corrupt	  and	  inefficient	  local	  governments	  and	   smouldering	   tribal	   antagonism	   ripen	   opportunity	   for	   revolt’.41	  Nor	   was	   the	  political	   wrangling	   to	   get	   any	   easier	   either,	   with	   national	   elections	   and	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  For	  an	  excellent	  discussion	  of	  these	  leaders	  see	  an	  article	  written	  already	  in	  1965:	  M.	  Crawford	  Young,	  ‘The	  Congo	  Rebellion’	  Africa	  Report,	  10:4	  (April,	  1965);	  also	  Benoit	  Verhaegen,	  Rebellions	  au	  Congo,	  Vol.	  I	  &	  II	  (Brussels:	  Centre	  de	  Recherches	  et	  D’Information	  Socio-­‐Politiques;	  CRISP,	  1966)	  	  39	  Richard	  Mahoney	  describes	  US	  behind	  the	  scenes	  maneuvering,	  bribes	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  coup	  to	  ensure	  Adoula’s	  election	  in	  JFK:	  Ordeal	  in	  Africa	  p.	  38	  40	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  (CIA),	  Directorate	  of	  Intelligence,	  Memorandum:	  ‘The	  Political	  Situation	  and	  Prospects	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  20th	  February	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  Library,	  Austin,	  Texas	  (hereafter	  LBJL)	  41	  Gullion,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  February	  4	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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referendum	  on	  a	  new	  constitution	  scheduled	  for	  June.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  political	  incompetence	  was	  more	  than	  matched	  by	  the	  dismal	  performance	  of	   the	  Congolese	  National	  Army	  (ANC).	  Formerly	  the	  brutal	   instrument	  of	  colonial	  repression	  as	   the	  Force	  Publique,	   the	  ANC	  continued	   to	  be	   ‘noted	   for	   its	  pillaging	  and	  raping’	  and	  was	  ‘hated	  and	  feared’,	  according	  to	  one	  CIA	  report.42	  Perhaps	  even	  more	  concerning	  from	  an	  American	  perspective,	  the	  Congolese	  army	  failed	  to	  offer	  any	  serious	  resistance	  to	  the	  ‘Simba’	  rebels,	  despite	  usually	  being	  better	  armed	  and	  equipped.	  A	  hint	  of	  racist	  scorn	  coloured	  National	  Security	  Council	  staffer	  William	  H.	   (Bill)	   Brubeck’s	   commentary	   to	   the	   President,	   ‘Well	   armed	   troops	   are	   being	  routed	  by	  pygmies	  carrying	  spears	  and	  machetes’.43	  The	  CIA	  concurred,	   ‘…the	  ANC	  unaided	   would	   probably	   be	   unable	   to	   contain	   additional	   disturbances	   elsewhere	  even	  on	  a	  modest	  scale.’44	  Undisciplined,	  lacking	  in	  leadership	  and	  its	  loyalty	  by	  no	  means	   certain,	   the	   ANC	   often	   simply	   abandoned	   its	   posts	   and	   weapons	   to	   the	  rebels.	  Again,	   this	   situation	  was	   further	  exacerbated	  by	   the	   June	  30th	  deadline	   for	  the	  departure	  of	  UN	  troops.	  As	  a	  result,	  throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1964	  it	  became	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  Congo	  was	  slipping	  further	  into	  rebellion	  and	  chaos.	  What	  is	  far	   from	   obvious,	   however,	   is	   why	   this	   was	   once	   more	   deemed	   worthy	   of	  Washington’s	  attention	  and	  interference?	  As	  such,	  before	  considering	  the	  American	  response	  to	  events	  in	  Congo,	  Washington’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  rebellion	  itself	  should	  briefly	  be	  examined.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Cold	  War	  prism	  undoubtedly	  coloured	  any	  contemporary	  western	  analysis	  of	   events	   in	   the	  Congo.	   Even	   in	   his	   recently	   published	  memoirs,	   for	   example,	   CIA	  Station	  Chief	  Larry	  Devlin	  concludes	  with	  the	  self-­‐satisfied	  assertion,	   ‘I	  thoroughly	  enjoyed	  my	  tours	  of	  duty	  in	  the	  Congo.	  It	  was	  a	  tough	  tiring	  time,	  but	  accomplishing	  American	   objectives	   and	   contributing	   to	   the	   defeat	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   made	   it	  worth	  while.’45	  There	  was	   indeed	   some	   communist	   involvement.	  Much	  was	  made,	  for	   example,	   of	   Pierre	   Mulele’s	   apparent	   ties	   to	   the	   Chinese.	   Thus,	   Governor	   W.	  Averell	  Harriman,	   the	  Ambassador	   at	   large	   known	   as	   the	  War	  Horse	   for	   his	   hard	  line	  approach	  to	  the	  Cold	  War,	  cabled	  Kinshasa	  on	  July	  7,	  1964,	   ‘All	  evidence	  here	  leads	   to	   firm	   belief	   that	   Mulele,	   if	   not	   communist,	   is	   Peking-­‐trained	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  CIA,	  Intelligence	  Memorandum:	  ‘Security	  Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  12th	  June	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  43	  Brubeck,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  the	  President’,	  15th	  June	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  44	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  Intelligence	  Memorandum:	  ‘Security	  Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  17th	  June	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  45	  Devlin	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  most	  controversial	  figures	  in	  Congolese	  history,	  not	  least	  due	  to	  his	  alleged	  complicity	  in	  the	  murder	  of	  Lumumba	  and	  his	  return	  to	  Congo	  as	  an	  emissary	  of	  the	  Templesman	  mining	  group.	  Larry	  Devlin,	  Chief	  of	  Station,	  Congo	  (Public	  Affairs	  Perseus	  Books,	  New	  York,	  2007)	  p.	  267	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undoubtedly	  susceptible	  communist,	  particularly	  CHICOM,	  discipline	  and	  control.’46	  Much	   of	   the	   language	   used	   in	   the	   communications	   between	   Kinshasa	   and	  Washington	  reflected	  this	  Cold	  War	  mindset	  with	  frequent	  references	  to	  the	  ‘rabid	  and	   leftist’	   movement. 47 	  Even	   the	   UN	   chimed	   in	   pointing	   to	   ‘overwhelming	  evidence’	   of	   involvement	   in	   the	   Kivu	   uprising	   of	   Chinese	   communists	   operating	  from	   Burundi	   and	   the	   West	   German	   embassy	   reported	   the	   swelling	   Chinese	  embassies	  in	  Bujumbura	  and	  Brazzaville	  with	  more	  than	  a	  hint	  of	  suspicion.48	  There	  was	  also	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  rebels	  were	  receiving	  arms	  from	  external	  sources	  as	  ambassador	  G.	  McMurtrie	  Godley,	  the	  former	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  Mission	  during	  the	  Lumumba	   years	   who	   replaced	   Gullion	   in	   1964,	   wrote	   of	   the	   rebels,	   ‘that	   they	  appear	  to	  be	  armed	  with	  something	  more	  than	  bows	  and	  arrows.’49	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Beyond	   these	   rhetorical	   assertions,	   however,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   make	   the	  connection	  between	  rebel	  objectives	  and	   the	  super-­‐power	  rivalry	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  and	  even	  American	  observers	  noted	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  direct	  Soviet	  involvement	  in	  Congo’s	   troubles	   at	   this	   early	   stage.	   Reports	   emanating	   from	  East	   German	   (GDR)	  embassies	   in	   Prague	   and	  Moscow	   certainly	   suggest	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   its	  allies	  kept	  the	  rebel	  cause	  at	  a	  safe	  distance	  and	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  CNL	  calls	  for	  material	  assistance.50	  Indeed,	  as	  early	  as	  September	  1964	  a	  report	  of	  a	  conversation	  between	  East	  German	  and	  Russian	  officials	  at	  the	  GDR	  embassy	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Republic	  (UAR)	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  Soviets	  and	  their	  allies	  were	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  dissent	   amongst	   the	   various	   rebel	   factions,	   and	   between	   the	   CNL	   and	   the	   newly	  created	  Kisangani	  revolutionary	  government	  in	  particular.51	  Put	  off	  by	  their	  internal	  squabbling	  and	  having	  burned	  their	  fingers	  in	  1960,	  the	  Soviets	  were	  wary	  of	  Congo	  and	  the	  Chinese	  also	  kept	  a	  safe	  distance	  in	  the	  early	  months	  of	  1964.	  More	  to	  the	  point,	   a	  CIA	   report	   that	  May	   illustrates	   that	   the	  US	  was	  well	   aware	  of	   their	   super	  power	   rival’s	   reticence	   and	   never	   at	   any	   point	   during	   this	   early	   but	   formative	  period	  was	  there	  any	  hard	  evidence	  given	  of	  active	  communist	  involvement	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Harriman	  to	  Embassy	  Kinshasa,	  7th	  July	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJK	  47	  Gullion,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  4th	  February	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  48	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  (reporting	  on	  conversation	  between	  DCM	  Blake	  and	  the	  UN’s	  Osario	  Tafall);	  	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL;	  German	  Ambassador	  Hermann	  Huber,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Auswärtigesamt,	  Berlin,	  ‘Lage	  im	  Kongo’,	  30th	  August	  1964;	  Band	  500,	  Kongo	  Leopoldville	  1964,	  B34,	  Auswärtiges	  Amt,	  Berlin,	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  (hereafter	  BRD)	  49	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  50	  Gespräche	  mit	  der	  Vertretung	  der	  Kongolesischen	  Freiheitsbewegung	  in	  Bamoko,	  Conakry,	  Dares	  Salaam,	  Havana,	  Moskau,	  Prag,	  1963-­‐64;	  1966-­‐68;	  Abteilung	  Ost	  und	  Zentralafrika,	  Sektor	  Zentralafrika,	  Mikrofiche	  C791/74,	  MfAA,	  Auswärtiges	  Amt,	  Berlin,	  Deutsche	  Demokratische	  Republik	  (hereafter	  DDR)	  51	  Gespräche	  mit	  der	  Vertretung	  der	  Kongolesischen	  Freiheitsbewegung	  in	  der	  Botschaft	  in	  Kairo,	  1963-­‐67;	  Abteilung	  Ost	  und	  Zentralafrika,	  Sektor	  Zentralafrika,	  Mikrofiche	  790,	  MfAA,	  DDR	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rebellion.52	  Even	   Harriman	   had	   to	   admit	   that	   the,	   ‘Congolese	   left	   is	   characterised	  more	   by	   incompetence	   rather	   than	   strong	   connections	   to	   communists.’53	  In	   other	  words,	   even	   the	   most	   hard-­‐nosed	   Cold	   War	   warriors	   in	   the	   State	   Department	  grasped	   the	   fact	   that	  both	   the	  Chinese	  and	   the	  Soviets	  were	  keeping	   the	  rebels	  at	  arms	  length,	  wary	  of	  their	  motivations	  and	  doubtful	  of	  their	  abilities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Rather	   than	   a	   communist	   orchestrated	   plot	   to	   gain	   a	   foothold	   in	   Africa,	   all	  shared	   the	   view	   of	   the	   Simba	   rebels	   as	   a	   rag-­‐tag	   and	   disorganised	   grass	   roots	  movement,	   responding	   to	   local	   discontent	   and	   never	   more	   than	   nominally	  controlled	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Soumialot	  and	  Olenga	  on	  the	  ground,	  with	  only	  loose	  ties	  to	   political	   leaders	   such	   as	   Gizenga	   and	   Gbenye.	   In	   contrast	   to	  Mulele,	   Soumialot	  and	   Olenga	   appeared	   little	   more	   than	   able	   organisers	   who	   combined	   tactical	  shrewdness	   with	   ruthless	   brutality	   to	   give	   the	   rural	   uprising	   a	   semblance	   of	  direction. 54 	  The	   CIA,	   the	   American	   embassy	   in	   Kinshasa	   and	   their	   Belgian	  counterparts	  agreed	  in	  their	  assessment	  of	  the	  rebellion	  as	  largely	  tribal	  in	  nature	  and	   resulting	   from	   a	   general	   dissatisfaction	  with	   the,	   ‘corruption	   of	   GOC	   officials,	  incompetence,	  maladministration,	  plus	  brutality	  of	  ANC	  in	  dealing	  with	  villagers.’55	  An	  intelligence	  memorandum	  passed	  to	  the	  president	  on	  the	  16th	  June	  detailed	  the	  dire	   situation	   in	  most	   areas	   of	   the	   country,	   ‘The	   causes	   of	   the	   security	   crisis	   are	  many,	  but	  basic	   to	   them	  is	   the	  widespread	  dissatisfaction	  of	   the	  people	  with	   their	  governments-­‐	   national,	   provincial	   and	   local.	   These	   governments	   are	   corrupt	   and	  incompetent.’	  It	  went	  on	  to	  describe	  how	  local	  corruption	  siphoned	  off	  the	  salaries	  of	   low-­‐level	   civil	   servants,	   poor	   infrastructure	  prevented	   farmers	   from	  marketing	  their	   produce,	   the	   social	   services	   of	   pre-­‐independence	   days	  were	   rarely	   available	  and	  rampant	  inflation	  made	  life	  increasingly	  unaffordable-­‐	  the	  food	  price	  index,	  at	  100	  in	  1959,	  had	  risen	  to	  239	  by	  November	  1963	  and	  to	  425	  the	  following	  June.56	  The	   picture	   of	   the	   rebellion	   clearly	   painted	   by	   intelligence	   reports	   and	   the	  correspondence	  between	   the	  State	  Department,	  Kinshasa	  and	  Brussels	   is	  one	  of	  a	  popular	  uprising	  essentially	  without	  any	  sophisticated	  ideology,	  central	  cohesion	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  	  CIA	  Special	  Report,	  Office	  of	  Current	  Intelligence,	  ‘Exile	  Activity	  Against	  Leopoldville’	  22nd	  May	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  53	  Harriman	  to	  Embassy,	  Kinshasa,	  4th	  July	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  54	  M.	  Crawford	  Young,	  ‘The	  Congo	  Rebellion’	  Africa	  Report,	  10:4	  (April,	  1965)	  55	  ‘Ambassador	  MacArthur,	  Brussels	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  (reporting	  the	  views	  of	  Belgian	  Foreign	  Office	  Official	  Davignon),	  9th	  June	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL;	  The	  ‘Direction	  d’Administration	  des	  Affaires	  Congolaises	  et	  du	  Rwanda-­‐Burundi’	  in	  Brussels	  noted	  that	  Belgian	  Foreign	  Minister	  Spaak	  was	  less	  inclined	  to	  view	  the	  rebellion	  in	  Cold	  War	  terms	  than	  his	  American	  counterparts	  (M.	  Spaak	  est	  d’autre	  part	  moins	  enclin	  que	  les	  Américains	  a	  imputer	  la	  rébellion	  
a	  un	  complot	  communiste).	  J.	  de	  Bassompierre,	  ‘Weekly	  Report,	  5th-­‐9th	  September	  1964;	  Direction	  d’Administration	  des	  Affaires	  Congolaises	  et	  du	  Rwanda-­‐Burundi’	  (hereafter	  Weekly	  Reports);	  File	  18517-­‐4,	  Congo,	  January	  to	  September	  1964,	  Belgian	  Diplomatic	  Archives,	  Brussels	  (hereafter	  BDA)	  56	  	  CIA,	  Office	  of	  Current	  Intelligence,	  Memorandum:	  ‘Security	  Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  12th	  June	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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significant	  external	  influence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Why,	   then,	   did	   such	   an	   uprising	   send	   warning	   signals	   to	   Washington	   and	  demand	   US	   intervention?	   Any	   suggestion	   that	   the	   US	   was	   involving	   itself	   on	  altruistic	   humanitarian	   grounds	   can	   easily	   be	   dismissed.	   As	   has	   been	   seen,	  successive	  Washington	  administrations	  since	  Congo’s	  independence	  had	  no	  qualms	  over	   offering	   assistance	   to	   the	   ANC	   despite	   its	   known	   track	   record	   of	   atrocities.	  Some	  commentators,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  pointed	  to	  the	  rich	  and	  strategically	  vital	  resources	  of	  Congo,	  from	  copper	  and	  tin	  to	  cobalt	  and	  industrial	  diamonds,	  as	  the	  primary	  motivation	  behind	  all	  American	  actions	   there.57	  Certainly,	   the	  Belgian	  focus	   towards	   its	   former	   colony	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   coloured	   primarily	   by	  economic	   considerations	   and	   its	   effort	   to	   retain	   its	   stranglehold	   on	   Congolese	  resources.58	  Indeed,	   in	   1965	   UMHK,	   represented	   no	   less	   than	   sixty	   per	   cent	   of	  Congo’s	   entire	   exports. 59 	  The	   pitfalls	   of	   this	   reductionist	   explanation	   of	   the	  American	  position	  will	   be	   developed	   further	   later	   (chapter	   three)	   but	   there	   is	   no	  evidence	  that	  the	  US	  was	  concerned	  with	  securing	  either	  resources	  or	  contracts	  for	  US	   firms	  during	   the	   Johnson	  years.	  When	  economic	  considerations	  are	  mentioned	  in	   the	  American	   reports,	   they	  are	   incidental	   and	   intended	   to	  give	  an	   indication	  of	  the	  overall	  situation	  in	  the	  country.60	  At	  no	  point,	  however,	  is	  there	  any	  hint	  in	  any	  of	   the	  reports	  and	  correspondences	  of	  an	  American	  plot	   to	  secure	  economic	  gains	  for	  either	  the	  US	  government	  or	  private	  businesses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   fact,	   the	   Cold	   War	   remained	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   Washington’s	   Congo	  deliberations.	   Refracted	   through	   this	   paradigm,	   there	   was	   no	   contradiction	  between	   the	   apparent	   indigenous	   nature	   of	   a	   rebellion,	   borne	   out	   of	   local	  discontent,	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  an	  imminent	  communist	  coup	  spreading	  from	  Congo	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  According	  to	  Henry	  J.	  Tasca,	  the	  US	  obtained	  ¾	  of	  its	  cobalt	  and	  ½	  of	  its	  tantalum	  from	  Katanga	  in	  1959,	  Henry	  F.	  Jackson,	  From	  the	  Congo	  to	  Soweto	  p.	  22;	  Gibbs,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Third	  World	  Intervention	  58	  Both	  the	  Adoula	  and	  Tshombe	  government	  were	  dependent	  on	  financial	  and	  technical	  advisors	  and	  the	  Belgian	  government	  viewed	  with	  alarm	  any	  efforts	  to	  change	  these	  arrangements.	  Furthermore,	  much	  of	  the	  weekly	  reports	  emanating	  from	  Brussels	  throughout	  1964	  were	  concerned	  with	  the	  ‘Contentieux	  Agreement’	  designed	  to	  maintain	  Belgian	  and	  Union	  Miniere	  de	  Haut	  Katanga’s	  (UMHK)	  dominance	  over	  the	  Congolese	  economy	  through	  negotiations	  over	  Congolese	  debt.	  File	  18517-­‐	  4,	  Congo,	  January	  to	  September	  1964,	  BDA	  59	  David	  Renton,	  David	  Seddon	  and	  Leo	  Zeilig,	  The	  Congo:	  Plunder	  and	  Resistance	  (Zed	  Books,	  London	  &	  New	  York,	  2007)	  pp.	  120-­‐21	  60	  Ambassador	  Gullion	  warned	  in	  February	  1964	  of	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  the	  Kwilu	  uprising	  on	  production	  of	  the	  Lever	  plantation	  in	  the	  North-­‐West	  of	  Kikwit	  and	  the	  blocking	  of	  copper	  shipments	  on	  the	  Kasai	  River	  due	  to	  rebel	  activity,	  Gullion	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  4th	  February	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  Two	  CIA	  situation	  reports	  mention	  the	  Congolese	  economy,	  and	  the	  foreign	  companies	  operating	  there,	  continuing	  largely	  unaffected	  and	  summarising	  the	  nature	  of	  Belgian	  economic	  interests	  in	  the	  Congo	  in	  February	  and	  June	  respectively.	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  Directorate	  of	  Intelligence,	  Memorandum:	  ‘The	  Political	  Situation	  and	  Prospects	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  20th	  February	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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engulf	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa.	   The	   CIA,	   the	   State	   Department	   and	   the	   embassy	   in	  Kinshasa	   were	   well	   aware	   that	   neither	   the	   Soviets	   nor	   the	   Chinese	   were	  significantly	   involved	   in	   the	   Congolese	   rebellion	   but	   this	   did	   nothing	   to	   alleviate	  their	   fears.	   This	   is	   because	   it	   was	   not	   merely	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   Communists	  themselves	  that	  were	  feared,	  but	  what	  they	  could	  or	  might	  do	  if	  certain	  conditions	  prevailed.	   Thus,	   while	   reporting	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   Chinese	   had	   turned	  down	  assisting	  the	  Brazzaville	  exiles	  on	  the	  one	  had,	   in	  the	  very	  same	  assessment	  the	  CIA	  continued	  to	  assume	  the	  worst,	  ‘Peiping-­‐	  and	  Moscow	  as	  well-­‐	  presumably	  is	  assessing	  the	  CNL’s	  future.	  It	  probably	  wants	  to	  be	  ready	  to	  step	  in	  quickly	  with	  an	  offer	  of	  substantial	  aid	  if	  the	  CNL	  shows	  any	  real	  capability’	  [emphasis	  added].61	  Similarly,	  when	  one	  of	   the	  major	  towns	   in	  the	  Kivu	  area	  was	  under	  threat	   in	  May,	  Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   African	   Affairs,	   Henry	   J.	   Tasca,	   cabled	   Kinshasa	  warning	   against	   allowing	   the	   ‘situation	   in	   Bukavu	   to	   continue	   to	   deteriorate,	  providing	   golden	  opportunity	   for	   external	   intervention	   from	  Burundi	   and	  points	  east’62[emphasis	   added].	   In	   other	  words,	   at	   this	   stage	   in	   the	   initial	  months	   of	   the	  Johnson	  administration,	  the	  fight	  in	  Congo	  was	  not	  against	  the	  Cold	  War	  rival	  itself	  but	   one	   against	   the	   conditions	   in	   which	   communist	   subversion	   could	   flourish.	   If	  chaos	  prevailed	  the	  Soviets	  might	  re-­‐enter	  the	  scene.	  If	  the	  rebels	  succeed	  they	  may	  be	  recognised	  or	  receive	  arms	  from	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  constituted	  a	  notable	  qualitative	  departure	  from	  earlier	  US	  entanglements.	  Eisenhower’s	  much-­‐discussed	  showdown	  with	  Patrice	  Lumumba	  was	  a	  response	  to	  a	   perceived	   direct	   and	   imminent	   threat.	   Real	   or	   imagined,	   the	   policies	   of	   the	  Eisenhower	   administration	  were	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   fear	   that	   Lumumba	  would	  eject	   Western	   interests	   from	   Congo	   and	   open	   it	   up	   to	   Soviet	   influence.	   As	  Eisenhower	  himself	  exclaimed	   in	  an	  NSC	  meeting	   in	  1960,	   	   ‘We	  are	   talking	  of	  one	  man	  forcing	  us	  out	  of	  the	  Congo’.63	  While	  this	  may	  have	  been	  a	  warped	  misreading	  of	   the	   intelligence	   at	   hand,	   there	   is	   little	   doubt	   that	   the	   administration	   in	  Washington	   felt	   an	   urgent	   need	   to	   counter	   what	   they	   saw	   as	   an	   impending	  communist	  coup.	   In	  early	  1964,	  however,	  such	  a	   threat	  was	  not	  apparent.	   Indeed,	  Godley	  pointed	  out	   in	   a	   telegram	   that	  May,	   ‘Also	  we	  do	  not	  believe	   that	   this	   time	  danger	  of	  Russian/US	  confrontation	  is	  as	  great	  as	  it	  was	  in	  1960…’64	  It	  was	  not	  that	  American	   strategic	   interests	   were	   immediately	   threatened	   or	   Congo	   was	   on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  CIA	  Special	  Report,	  Office	  of	  Current	  Intelligence,	  ‘Exile	  Activity	  Against	  Leopoldville’	  22nd	  May	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  62	  Tasca	  to	  Godley,	  Kinshasa,	  31st	  May	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  63	  Cited	  in	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verge	   of	   communist	   subversion.	   Much	   rather,	   the	   assumption	   that	   chaos	   left	  untreated	  would	  allow	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  allies	  to	  penetrate	  Congo	  compelled	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  into	  action.	  	  In	  strategic	  terms,	  this	  was	  a	  questionable	  shift	   to	  control	  the	   internal	  mechanics	  of	  a	  state	   in	  order	  to	  pre-­‐empt,	  rather	  than	  prevent,	   the	   seeds	   of	   Soviet	   control.	   In	   other	   words,	   while	   well	   aware	   that	   the	  Soviet	  bloc	  had	  turned	  its	  back	  on	  Congo	  and	  that	  Congo’s	  troubles	  were	  largely	  the	  result	   of	   localised	   popular	   discontent	   in	   1964,	   no	   one	   within	   the	   Johnson	  administration	  apparently	  recognised	  this	  as	  an	  opportune	  moment	  to	  formulate	  a	  new	  approach	  towards	  Congo	  and	  Africa	  at	   large	  that	  went	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  concerns	  of	  the	  superpower	  rivalry.	  Much	  rather,	  the	  globalist	  Cold	  War	  paradigm	  continued	   to	  define	   the	  American	  Congo	  approach	   from	  the	  outset	  of	   the	   Johnson	  years	  and	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  this	  translated	  into	  policy.	  	  
‘No	  One	  Fights	  American	  Brigades’:	  	  
White	  Mercenaries	  and	  the	  Kisangani	  Intervention	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  When	   surveying	   its	   options	   in	   early	   1964,	   the	   Johnson	   administration	   was	  grappling	  with	   the	   dilemma	  of	   balancing	   its	   anxiety	   over	   inaction	  with	   its	   fear	   of	  overly	   committing	   in	   Congo.	   	   Perhaps	   the	   logical	   response	   to	   counter	   a	   largely	  ‘tribal’	   rebellion	   fuelled	   by	   local	   discontent	   would	   be	   to	   improve	   the	   material	  conditions	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  concern.	  Indeed,	  this	  was	  precisely	  Godley’s	  prescription	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  disaffected	  areas	  in	  the	  Kivus	  and	  Kwilu,	   ‘Best	  way	  to	  do	  so	  is	  by	  an	  active	  and	  effective	  civil	  operations	  program	  which	  will	  bring	  some	  material	  well	  being	  to	  effected	  areas	  but	  more	  importantly	  give	  them	  better	  administration	  and	   govt.’65	  As	   Godley	   mentioned	   in	   this	   cable,	   however,	   pressures	   to	   this	   effect	  were	   frustrated	   by	   the	   political	   infighting	   and	   resulting	   inertia	   of	   the	   Congolese	  government.	   Furthermore,	   with	   the	   outbreak	   of	   further	   violence	   and	   open	  rebellion,	   from	  a	  US	  perspective	  a	  military	  problem	  demanded	  a	  military	  solution.	  Despite	   having	   analysed	   the	   material	   root	   causes	   of	   the	   rebellion,	   the	   Belgian	  suggestion	  of	  negotiating	  with	  the	  rebels	  and	  the	  exiled	  CNL	  was	  out	  of	  the	  question	  for	  Godley,	  ‘Surely	  our	  experience	  here	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  world	  has	  conclusively	  demonstrated	   that	   negotiating	  with	   communists	   or	   communist	   backed	   politicians	  from	   position	   of	   weakness	   is	   mistake.’ 66 	  Washington	   concurred	   and	   was	  determined	   for	   the	   rebels	   to	   be	   defeated	   in	   the	   field,	   as	   the	   Belgian	   ambassador	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summarised,	   ‘De	   l’avis	   des	   Américains,	   une	   solution	   politique	   nécessite	   la	  restauration	   d’un	   minimum	   d’ordre	   et	   d’autorité	   de	   la	   parte	   des	   dirigeants	   de	  Leo.’67	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  such,	  Washington	  continued	  to	  escalate	  its	  own	  military	  assistance	  program	  (MAP).	   With	   ever	   increasing	   rumblings	   in	   Vietnam	   and	   a	   presidential	   election	  scheduled	   for	   November,	   however,	   the	   US	   was	   not	   prepared	   to	   commit	   its	   own	  troops	  and	  frantically	  searched	  for	  an	  ally	  to	  carry	  the	  burden	  in	  its	  stead.	  Beyond	  this,	   as	   the	   Adoula	   administration	   continued	   to	   falter	   under	   popular	   illegitimacy	  and	   internal	   squabbling,	   the	  United	  States	   took	   refuge	   in	   clandestine	  king	  making	  and	  was	  intimately	  involved	  in	  the	  return	  to	  Congolese	  politics	  of	  Moise	  Tshombe;	  the	   erstwhile	   Katangan	   secessionist	   reviled	   amongst	   African	   nationalists	   for	   his	  collaboration	  with	   Belgium	   in	   the	   independence	   aftermath,	   his	   recourse	   to	  white	  mercenaries	   in	   this	   crisis	   and	   his	   close	   ties	   to	   the	   Portuguese	   colonists	   and	   the	  South	   African	   white	   minority	   regime.	   These	   political	   developments	   also	   led	   to	   a	  further	  military	  escalation	  as	  the	  CIA	  assisted	  in	  the	  formation	  and	  furnishing	  of	  a	  white	   mercenary	   column.	   Finally,	   faced	   with	   the	   devastating	   combination	   of	   the	  American	  supplied	  air	  power	  and	  the	  mercenary	  onslaught,	   the	   insurgents	   turned	  on	   the	   local	   white	   population.	   This	   in	   turn	   prompted	   the	   only	   direct	   military	  intervention	   during	   the	   Simba	   rebellion	   as	   the	   United	   States	   airlifted	   Belgian	  paratroopers	   to	   strike	   Kisangani,	   ostensibly	   in	   a	   humanitarian	   effort	   to	   rescue	  white	   hostages.	   As	   a	   result,	   each	   of	   these	   elements	   of	   the	   evolving	   United	   States	  policy	  marked	  a	  gradual	  escalation	  of	  American	  commitments	  in	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  President	  Johnson	  had	  inherited	  a	  substantial	  military	  aid	  program	  to	  Congo	  in	  the	  form	  of	  equipment,	  funds	  and	  even	  US	  fighter	  planes	  flown	  by	  Cuban	  exiles	  from	  the	  Kennedy	   administration.	   As	   disorder	   spread,	   however,	   this	  was	   soon	  deemed	  insufficient.	   The	   correspondence	   between	  Washington	   and	   Kinshasa	   reveals	   that	  the	   embassy	   took	   the	   lead	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   in	  pushing	   for	   increased	  military	   aid.	  Thus	  on	  February	  4th	  and	  8th	  Ambassador	  Gullion	  cabled	  Washington	  with	  requests	  for	   military	   training	   teams	   (MTTs)	   and	   a	   tentative	   list	   of	   equipment	   needed.68	  Washington	  was	  not	  slow	  to	  respond.	  On	  February	  20th	  an	  earlier	  proposal	  drafted	  by	   the	   Joint	  Chief	  of	  Staffs	   (JCS)	   to	  equip	  one	  parachute-­‐,	   two	  commando	  and	  one	  infantry-­‐	   battalion,	   as	   well	   as	   deploying	   seventeen	   MTTS	   consisting	   of	   a	   total	   of	  thirty-­‐one	   officers	   and	   seventy-­‐four	   US	   regular	   troops,	   was	   approved	   by	   the	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president.	   According	   to	   a	   CIA	   intelligence	   memorandum,	   by	   June	   there	   were	  seventy	  US	  military	  personnel	  deployed	  with	  more	  on	  their	  way.69	  Similarly,	  when	  Kinshasa	   passed	   on	   Premier	   Adoula’s	   panicked	   request	   for	   US	   fighter	   planes	   and	  crews	  to	  stave	  off	  the	  complete	  collapse	  of	  the	  ANC	  in	  the	  Kivu	  area	  on	  the	  23rd	  May,	  the	   State	   Department’s	   response	   was	   immediate	   and	   positive. 70 	  Three	   C-­‐130	  turboprop	   and	   six	   T-­‐28	   fighter	   planes	   arrived	  with	   an	   eight-­‐man	   crew	   and	   nine-­‐man	  technical	  support	  team	  on	  the	  27th	  May.71As	  a	  result,	  largely	  under	  the	  urging	  of	   the	  Kinshasa	  embassy,	   the	  United	  States	  had	  significantly	   increased	   its	  military	  commitment	  to	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nor	  did	  America	  stop	  short	  at	  this.	  At	  all	  times,	  the	  United	  States	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  stress	  the	  limited	  nature	  of	  its	  involvement,	  that	  it	  was	  merely	  assisting	  in	  the	  training	  of	  legitimate	  government	  forces	  and	  that	  the	  planes	  were	  on	  loan	  to	  the	  Congolese	  government,	  flown	  by	  non-­‐US	  nationals	  also	  under	  contract.	  That	  this	  was	  a	  little	  disingenuous	  must	  have	  been	  clear	  even	  to	  close	  observers	  at	  the	  time.	  If	  nothing	  else,	  America	  was	  supplying	  the	  planes	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  financing	  the	  costs	   of	   loaning	   them	   and	   their	   Cuban-­‐exile	   pilots	   under	   its	   Military	   Assistance	  Program	   on	   the	   other.	   As	   a	   New	   York	   Times	   article	   that	   November	   pointed	   out,	  ‘Through	   a	   technical-­‐assistance	   agreement	   the	   United	   States	   is	   also	   financing	   the	  Congolese	   air	   force.	   The	   Pilots	   are	   Cuban	   mercenaries.	   Some,	   ominously,	   are	  veterans	   of	   the	   Bay	   of	   Pigs.’ 72 	  Nevertheless,	   the	   official	   US	   line	   was	   that	   no	  Americans	   would	   be	   involved	   in	   operational	   activities.	   This	   was	   clearly	  communicated	  to	  the	  president	  in	  a	  memo	  on	  June	  16th	  that	  went	  on	  to	  confirm	  the	  delivery	  of	  a	  further	  six	  T-­‐28	  and	  ten	  T-­‐47	  planes	  and	  six	  helicopters,	   ‘to	  be	  flown	  by	  Belgians	  and	  contract	  personnel	  with	  no	  US	  military	  involvement.’73	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Two	   incidents,	  however,	   suggest	   that	   the	  American	   involvement	  went	  beyond	  the	  strictly	  non-­‐operational	  on	  occasion.	  After	  the	  press	  had	  picked	  up	  a	  story	  on	  US	  involvement	  in	  combat	  flying	  in	  Congo,	  Bill	  Brubeck	  sent	  an	  explanatory	  note	  to	  the	  President	  on	  June	  20th	  detailing	  the	  involvement	  of	  two	  US	  ‘civilians’	  overseeing	  the	  FAC’s	  (Congolese	  Air	  Force)	  use	  of	  US	  planes	  and	  contract	  pilots,	  ‘They	  were	  under	  certain	   restriction	   but	   did	   do	   some	   reconnaissance	   and	   combat	   missions	   in	   the	  Kwilu	   in	  Spring,	  but	  were	   subsequently	  ordered	   to	  do	  no	  more	   combat	  missions.’	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Despite	  these	  directives,	  faced	  with	  the	  imminent	  collapse	  of	  the	  ANC	  and	  Adoula’s	  demands	  for	  US	  support	  at	  the	  end	  of	  May,	  it	  seems	  the	  American	  mission	  in	  Congo	  took	   the	   unilateral	   and	   unauthorised	   decision	   to	   allow	   the	   US	   ‘civilians’	   to	   fly	  combat	  missions	  to	  stave	  off	  the	  rebels	  in	  Kivu.	  Bill	  Brubeck	  confirmed	  exactly	  this	  without	  any	  hint	  of	  criticism,	  	  ‘The	   two	   Americans	   were	   under	   heavy	   local	   pressure	   during	   the	   past	   two	  weeks,	   however,	   to	   fly	   combat	   in	   the	   Eastern	   Congo	   crisis	   as	   the	   only	   pilots	  already	   trained	   to	   fly	   the	   T-­‐28s.	   They	   did	   so,	   and	   their	   contribution	   was	  probably	   decisive	   in	   temporarily	   saving	   the	   Kivu.	   It	  would	   be	   hard	   to	   second	  guess	  the	  decision	  now	  by	  hindsight.’74	  	  Similarly,	   the	  evidence	  suggests	   that	  US	  officers	  at	   times	  served	  as	  more	  than	   just	  technical	   advisors.	   This	   is	   clearly	   borne	   out	   by	   a	   cable	   from	   Godley	   in	   May	  discussing	  the	  possibility	  of	  and	  need	  for	  increased	  foreign	  troops	  in	  Congo,	  ‘Proof	  of	  pudding	  is	  highly	  effective	  discreet	  advice	  Col.	  Dodds	  has	  been	  giving	  in	  Bukavu…	  Intend	  to	  keep	  at	  least	  one	  competent	  US	  army	  officer	  available	  as	  Matheron’s	  (US	  Consul	  in	  Bukavu)	  “technical	  advisor”	  but	  who	  in	  reality	  will	  be	  there	  to	  help	  stiffen	  Congolese	  backbone.’75	  The	   implications	  of	  both	  these	   incidents	  are	  clear.	  Without	  waiting	  for	  approval	  from	  Washington,	  the	  US	  mission	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Congo	  was	  at	   times	   quite	   prepared	   to	   use	   the	   resources	   at	   its	   disposal	   and	   stretch	   the	   US	  mandate	  beyond	  what	  had	  formally	  been	  approved.	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  Washington	  was	   well	   aware	   of	   this	   and	   made	   no	   objection.	   These	   means	   were	   not	   deemed	  sufficient	   to	   stem	   the	   tied	  of	  unrest	   spreading	   through	   the	   country,	  however,	   and	  the	   Johnson	   administration	   desperately	   sought	   a	  willing	   partner	   to	  more	   actively	  intervene	  in	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   most	   obvious	   port	   of	   call	   was	   NATO	   ally	   and	   Congo’s	   former	   colonial	  masters	  Belgium.	  As	  such,	  already	  in	  February	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Rusk	  sought	  to	   pressure	   his	   Belgian	   counterpart,	   Foreign	   Minister	   Paul-­‐Henri	   Spaak,	   as	   he	  framed	  a	  direct	  appeal	  in	  the	  most	  cogent	  Cold	  War	  terms,	  	  ‘From	  where	   I	   sit,	   trying	   to	   look	   at	   our	   various	   responsibilities	   for	   free	  world	  defence	   in	   several	   parts	   of	   the	   globe,	   I	   am	   impressed	   both	  with	   the	   potential	  dangers	   of	   communist	   breakthrough	   in	   the	   Congo	   and	   with	   the	   special	  responsibility	  which	  Belgium,	  because	  of	  its	  historical	  affiliation	  with	  the	  Congo	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  Brubeck,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  the	  President:	  ‘American	  Pilots	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  June	  20	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  75	  ‘Cable	  form	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	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has	  to	  shore	  up	  that	  particular	  front.’76	  	  The	  American	  view	  was	  that	  Belgium	  had	  both	  a	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  a	  material	  interest	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  3.5	  billion	  dollar	  stake	  in	  the	  Congolese	  economy)	  to	  clean	  up	   the	  mess	   in	   Congo,	   and	   calls	   to	   this	   effect	   from	   the	   State	   Department	   and	   US	  Ambassador	  MacArthur	   in	  Brussels	   intensified	   throughout	  May	  and	   June.	  77	  	  To	  be	  sure,	   Belgium	   continued	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   Congo	   beyond	   simply	   tending	   to	   its	  financial	  interests	  in	  the	  form	  of	  training	  and	  technical	  support	  of	  the	  ANC	  and	  the	  police	  force.	  One	  hundred	  Belgium	  officers	  and	  a	  training	  camp	  in	  Kitona	  served	  to	  this	   effect.78	  Indeed,	   by	   the	   end	   of	   June	   MacArthur	   reported	   that	   Belgium	   was	  proving	  more	  responsive	  to	  consistent	  American	  prodding,	  having	  provided	  crews	  for	  the	  US-­‐supplied	  C-­‐47	  planes	  and	  helicopters.79	  Nevertheless,	  from	  an	  American	  standpoint	   this	   was	   simply	   not	   enough	   and	   the	   sense	   of	   frustration	   in	   the	  correspondence	   between	   the	   Brussels	   embassy	   and	   Washington	   was	   palpable.	  While	  Belgium	  kept	   troops	   at	   the	   ready	   to	   protect	   its	   own	  material	   interests,	   the	  Belgian	   government	   was	   not	   prepared	   to	   consider	   the	   recruitment	   of	   Belgian	  officers	   into	   active	   service	   in	   the	   ANC	   at	   Battalion	   level,	   as	   was	   the	   American	  suggestion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nor	  was	  this	  mere	  ‘dilatory	  foot	  dragging’,	  as	  MacArthur	  suggested.80	  Secretary	  Spaak	   was	   well	   aware	   of	   the	   international	   backlash	   against	   the	   first	   Belgian	  intervention	   in	   Katanga	   immediately	   after	   independence	   and	   wished	   to	   avoid	   a	  similar	   spectacle.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  he	  voiced	  concern	  over	  Belgian	  officers	  being	  associated	   with	   the	   known	   brutality	   of	   the	   ANC	   and	   a	   possible	   backlash	   against	  Belgian	  civilians	  dispersed	  throughout	  Congo.81	  Finally,	  as	  unwilling	  as	  the	  Belgians	  were	  to	  send	  officers	  to	  join	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  ANC	  at	  this	  stage;	  Mobutu,	  Adoula	  and	  Kasavubu	   were	   no	   more	   keen	   to	   have	   them	   for	   fear	   of	   the	   negative	   political	  consequences	   of	   permitting	   the	   return	   of	   the	   former	   colonial	   masters.	   Similarly,	  despite	   the	   close	   relations	   between	   US	   officials	   and	   UN	   Special	   Representative	  Osario-­‐Tafall,	   the	   frantic	   US	   efforts	   to	   ensure	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   UNOC	   mission	  beyond	   the	   June	   30th	   deadline,	   and	   the	   continued	   presence	   of	   General	   Ironsi’s	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  Rusk,	  Washington	  to	  Spaak,	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  10th	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  1964,	  LBJL-­‐	  NSC-­‐	  Country	  File-­‐	  Africa-­‐	  Congo-­‐	  Box	  81	  77	  CIA	  Special	  Report	  (Office	  of	  Current	  Intelligence),	  ‘Belgium’s	  Continuing	  Problems	  with	  the	  Congo’	  LBJL-­‐	  NSF-­‐	  Country	  File-­‐	  Africa-­‐	  Congo-­‐	  Box	  81	  78	  MacArthur,	  Brussels	  to	  Washington’,	  15th	  February	  1964,	  LBJL-­‐	  NSF-­‐	  Country	  File-­‐	  Africa-­‐	  Congo-­‐	  Box	  81	  	  79	  MacArthur,	  Brussels	  to	  Washington’,	  23rd	  June	  1964,	  LBJL-­‐	  NSF-­‐	  Country	  File-­‐	  Africa-­‐	  Congo-­‐	  Box	  81	  80	  MacArthur,	  Brussels	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  11th	  February,	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  81	  The	  weekly	  reports	  throughout	  1964	  stress	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  Belgian	  government	  of	  becoming	  associated	  with	  the	  ANC	  resulting	  in	  reprisals	  against	  Belgian	  nationals	  in	  rebel	  held	  territory;	  File	  18517-­‐	  4,	  Congo	  January	  to	  September	  1964,	  BDA	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Nigerian	  troops,	  came	  to	  nothing.	  America’s	  European	  allies	  were	  also	  unwilling	  to	  assume	  a	  more	  active	  role	   in	  Congo.	  The	   Italians	  were	  supplying	  a	  number	  of	  T-­‐6	  training	  aircraft	  and	  helping	  to	  train	  the	  Congolese	  Air	  Force	  (FAC)	  and	  Israel	  had	  offered	   to	   train	   a	   battalion	   of	   Para-­‐commandos,	   but	   Europe	   could	   not	   be	   pushed	  beyond	  this.82	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	   a	   more	   ready	   source	   of	   assistance	   could	   be	   found	   among	   Africa’s	  regional	  protagonists.	  Even	  before	  the	  Simba	  rebellion	  had	  mounted	  its	  first	  attack,	  President	   Kwame	   Nkrumah	   of	   Ghana,	   one	   of	   the	   founding	   fathers	   of	   African	  nationalism	   and	   pan-­‐Africanism,	   voiced	   his	   concerns	   over	   the	   fate	   of	   Congo	  following	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  UN	  troops	  on	  June	  30th	  1964.83	  In	   late	  1963	  and	  early	  1964,	   Nkrumah	   wrote	   a	   series	   of	   letters	   to	   Prime	   Minister	   Adoula,	   President	  Kasavubu	  and	  even	  United	  Nations	  Secretary	  General	  U-­‐Thant	  appealing	  for	  an	  ‘All	  African	  Force	  under	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  Addis	  Ababa	  Charter’	   to	   replace	  United	  Nations	  Operations	  in	  Congo	  (UNOC)	  ‘for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  African	  people	  and	  in	  the	  interest	   of	   world	   peace.’84	  Unfortunately,	   this	   opportunity	   to	   resolve	   the	   growing	  turmoil	   in	   Congo	   through	   the	   Organisation	   of	   African	   Union	   (OAU),	   and	   by	  extension	   strengthening	   this	   fledgling	   organisation	  within	   a	   year	   of	   its	   inception,	  was	  never	   fully	   explored.	   Certainly	   the	  United	   States	   appealed	   to	  Nigeria,	   Tunisia	  and	  Ethiopia	   for	  a	   continued	   troop	  presence	  after	   June	  30th,	  but	   these	  plans	  were	  shelved	  at	  least	  as	  much	  due	  to	  Congolese	  resistance	  to	  such	  an	  idea	  as	  due	  to	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  question.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   as	   the	   Ghanaian	   Ambassador	   in	   Leopoldville	   pointed	   out,	  Congolese	   politicians	   were	   wary	   of	   African	   troops	   for	   fear	   that	   they	   would	   not	  prove	   loyal	   when	   faced	   with	   popular	   uprisings	   in	   rural	   Congo.85	  More	   than	   this,	  however,	  reports	  from	  the	  US	  and	  Ghanaian	  embassies	  concur	  that	  it	  was	  primarily	  the	   loss	   of	   face	   of	   having	   the	   ANC	   shored	   up	   by	   other	   African	   contingents	   that	  moved	  Adoula,	  Kasavubu	  as	  well	   as	  Mobutu	   and	  his	  Binza	   cohorts	   to	   vehemently	  oppose	   such	   a	   move. 86 	  Perhaps	   the	   uncertainties	   inherent	   in	   transferring	  responsibility	  of	  resolving	  the	  Congo	  crisis	  to	  an	  African	  organisation	  that	  may	  not	  be	  as	  malleable	   to	   the	  American	  position	  as	   the	  United	  Nations	  had	  proved	   in	   the	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  David	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  Press,	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  Open	  Letter	  from	  President	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  to	  Premier	  Adoula	  (copied	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  24th	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  RG-­‐17-­‐2-­‐207,	  Political	  Relations	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  Public	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  Administration,	  Accra	  Ghana	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  85	  Ambassador	  J.K.F.	  Quashie,	  Ghanaian	  Embassy,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Principal	  Secretary	  of	  African	  Affairs	  Dei	  Anang,	  Accra,	  27th	  February	  1964;	  RG17-­‐2-­‐232,	  Political	  Reports	  from	  Leopoldville,	  1964,	  PRAAD	  86	  Ibid.	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post-­‐independence	   crisis	   also	   prevented	   Washington	   from	   exploring	   Nkrumah’s	  suggestions	   more	   fully	   or	   exerting	   greater	   pressure	   on	   Congo’s	   political	   elite	  towards	  such	  a	  goal.	  Thus,	  a	  regional	  approach	  remained	  an	  untried	  theory	  and	  the	  United	   States	   effort	   to	   find	   a	   willing	   successor	   to	   relieve	   the	   withdrawing	   UNOC	  force	  and	  shoulder	   the	  burden	  of	  direct	  military	  action	   in	  Congo	  came	  to	  nothing.	  Furthermore,	  the	  difficulties	  of	  the	  ANC	  in	  maintaining	  order	  were	  at	  the	  very	  least	  matched	   by	   the	   deteriorating	   political	   situation	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   Adoula-­‐Kasavubu	  government	  to	  effectively	  govern	  the	  country.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Throughout	  May	   and	   June,	   US	   officials	  were	   increasingly	   aware	   that	   a	   purely	  military	  solution	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  quash	  the	  popular	  discontent	  that	  had	  engulfed	  the	  Kivu	  region	  and	  threatened	  to	  spread	  through	  Congo.	  Nevertheless,	  as	  the	  June	  30th	   deadline	   for	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Congolese	   Government’s	   mandate	   approached,	  events	   threatened	   to	   overtake	   the	   embassy	   in	   Kinshasa	   in	   its	   search	   for	   an	  appropriate	  heir.	  By	  mid	  June	  the	  cable	  traffic	  with	  Washington	  was	  reverberating	  with	   speculation	   over	   who	   could	   or	   should	   be	   Kasavubu’s	   new	   ‘Formateur’	   and	  Prime	  Minister.	   Ultimately,	  while	   Defence	  Minister	   Jerome	   Anany’s	   name	   popped	  up	  consistently	  as	  a	  moderate	  and	  workable	  alternative,	  Godley	  and	  his	  team	  came	  out	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  Kasavubu-­‐Adoula	  arrangement.	  The	  embassy	  and	   Washington	   were	   united	   in	   their	   rejection	   of	   the	   Belgian	   suggestion	   of	  including	  CNL	  members	  in	  any	  new	  government,	  ‘Broad	  GOC	  along	  lines	  envisioned	  by	  Spaak	  would	  not	  be	  stable,	  would	  not	  be	  pro-­‐Western	  and	  would	  not	  end	  Congo	  violence’.87	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  One	   name	   that	   was	   at	   first	   vehemently	   rejected	   by	   Godley	   was	   that	   of	   the	  charismatic	  but	  controversial	  Moise	  Tshombe.	  In	  an	  almost	  hysterical	  tone,	  Godley	  warned	   against	   being	   tarnished	   by	   the	   same	   brush	   as	   the	   Belgians	   in	   supporting	  Tshombe’s	   controversial	   and	   divisive	   self.	   Remarkably,	   Godley	   went	   as	   far	   as	   to	  portray	   him	   as	   in	   league	   with	   the	   CNL	   (and	   by	   extension	   the	   Chinese),	   despite	  Tshombe’s	   right	   wing	   credentials	   and	   collusion	   with	   apartheid	   South	   Africa,	  ‘Tshombe’s	  true	  colours	  are	  flying	  from	  CHICOM-­‐supported	  CNL	  flagpole	  and	  its	  is	  impossible	  to	  salute	  one	  without	  other.’88	  Perhaps	  this	  only	  demonstrates	  the	  depth	  of	   feeling	  Tshombe	  evoked	   in	  Godley	  who,	   then	  as	   the	   embassy’s	  Deputy	  Chief	   of	  Mission	   (DCM),	   had	   opposed	   him	   and	   his	   gendarme/mercenary	   units	   during	   the	  Katangan	  secession	  of	  1960.	  Indeed	  the	  West	  German	  ambassador	  noted	  precisely	  this	   personal	   antipathy	   (‘allgemeine	   Reserve	   gegenüber	   Tshombe’)	   leading	   to	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  13th	  June	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  88	  Ibid.	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perceived	   hesitancy	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   United	   States	   to	   come	   out	   in	   support	   of	  Tshombe	   that	   July.89	  Certainly	   this	   supports	   Piero	   Gleijeses’	   contention	   that	   the	  embassy	   was	   taken	   by	   surprise	   when	   Kasavubu	   asked	   Tshombe	   to	   form	   a	   new	  government	  on	  July	  6th.90	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	   the	   US	   embassy	   in	   Kinshasa	  may	   have	   been	   surprised	   by	   the	   speed	   of	  events,	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  certain	  that	  the	  US	  was	  entirely	  absent	  from	  the	  behind	  the	  scene	  manoeuvring	   that	   led	   to	   this	   outcome	   and	   perhaps	   certain	   quarters	  within	  the	   State	   Department	   were	   not	   quite	   as	   bewildered.	  91	  To	   be	   sure,	   there	   is	   no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  America	  played	  an	  active	  role	  in	  bringing	  Tshombe	  to	  power.	   In	   his	   post	   mortem	   of	   the	   events	   to	   Washington,	   Godley	   surmised	   that	  Kasavubu	   was	   surprised	   by	   Tshombe’s	   momentary	   popular	   appeal	   following	   his	  return	  to	  Kinshasa	  on	  the	  24th	  June	  and	  panicked	  into	  appointing	  him	  ‘Formateur’.92	  Nevertheless,	   a	   detailed	   reading	   of	   both	   the	   State	   Department,	   CIA	   and	   Belgian	  Foreign	  Ministry	  correspondences	  and	  reports	  suggests	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  collusion	  from	  Washington	  than	  perhaps	  immediately	  apparent.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   Belgian	   government,	   as	   well	   as	   private	   business	   such	   as	   Union	   Méniere	  Minière	   de	   Haut	   Katanga	   (UMHK),	   had	   long-­‐standing	   ties	   to	   Tshombe	   and	   had	  actively	   collaborated	  with	  him	  both	   in	   the	  Katangan	   secession	   and	   the	  murder	   of	  Patrice	  Lumumba	  during	  the	  first	  year	  of	  Congolese	  independence.93	  As	  such,	  some	  level	  of	   involvement	  by	  Brussels	   in	   the	  events	   that	  unfolded	  seems	   likely.	   Indeed,	  throughout	   May	   Belgian	   reports	   were	   promulgating	   Tshombe’s	   return	   to	   the	  Congolese	   politics	   as	   a	   natural	   expression	   of	   popular	   opinion,	   ‘La	   population	  africaine	   qui	   se	   sent	   abandonnée	   et	   brimée	   par	   Leopoldville	   aspire	   à	   un	  changement	   qui	   la	   tourne	   naturellement	   vers	   le	   Président	   Tshombe’.94	  More	   than	  championing	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   Congolese	   population,	   it	   seems	   that	   Belgium	   was	  increasingly	   exacerbated	   with	   Premier	   Adoula’s	   efforts	   to	   replace	   his	   Belgian	  advisors,	  no	  doubt	  driven	  by	   considerations	  of	  domestic	  political	   expediency,	   and	  wanted	  to	  counteract	  any	  potential	  decline	   in	   its	   influence	  over	  Congolese	  politics	  by	   seeing	   the	   revival	   of	   a	   tried	   and	   dependable	   ally.95	  Indeed,	   a	   further	   Brussels	  Foreign	   Ministry	   report	   stated	   Belgian	   made	   brief	   reference	   to	   precisely	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Huber,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Bonn,	  7th	  July	  1964;	  B34-­‐	  Band	  497,	  Kongo	  Leopoldville,	  Rebellen,	  1964,	  BRD	  90	  Piero	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions	  p.	  64	  91	  Harriman,	  Washington	  to	  Embassy	  Kinshasa,	  16th	  July	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  92	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  Kinshasa	  to	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  of	  State,	  25th	  July	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  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  93	  de	  Witte,	  The	  Assassination	  of	  Patrice	  Lumumba	  	  94	  J.	  de	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Belgian	  involvement,	   ‘A	  son	  passage	  á	  Bruxelles,	  l’ancien	  President	  Katangais	  a	  été	  reçu	  par	  M.	  Spaak…	  Le	  gouvernement	  Belge	  fidèle	  a	  sa	  politique	  d’apaisement	  et	  de	  réconciliation	   a	   pris	   les	   mesures	   en	   son	   pouvoir	   pour	   facilité	   le	   retour	   de	   M.	  Tshombe	  au	  Congo.’96	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  Belgian	  attitude	  and	  the	  CIA	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	  Katangan’s	  return	   to	   the	  political	   fold	   in	  Leopoldville	  could	   be	   instrumental,	   or	   at	   least	   a	   necessary	   precondition,	   in	   bringing	   about	   an	  increased	   Belgian	  military	   effort,	   ‘Should	   the	   Congolese	   Government	   be	   forced	   to	  call	   on	   the	   Belgians	   for	   military	   assistance,	   the	   Belgians	   might	   well	   require	  Tshombe’s	  presence	   in	   the	  government,	  perhaps	  as	  Premier,	   as	  a	  quid	  pro	  quo.’97	  Furthermore,	  as	  early	  as	  March,	  Harriman,	  who	  had	  personally	  met	  with	  Tshombe	  on	   two	   occasions	   in	   New	   York	   and	   Geneva,	   could	   be	   heard	   sounding	   out	   the	  Nigerian	  Prime	  Minister	  Balewa	  on	  the	  viability	  of	  Tshombe	  leading	  the	  Congolese	  government,	  cautioning	  that	  the	  US	  could	  not	  take	  the	  lead	  on	  such	  an	  arrangement	  due	  to	  the	  diplomatic	  difficulties	  involved.98	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	  most	  tellingly,	  however,	  in	  a	  series	  of	  telegrams	  between	  Brussels	  and	  Washington	  the	  State	  Department	  expressed	  its	  view	  that,	  ‘Inclusion	  representative	  Katangese	   individual	   or	   individuals,	   even	   Tshombe	   representative	   or	  representatives	   in	   cabinet	   acceptable	   however.’ 99 	  Significantly,	   US	   ambassador	  MacArthur	  met	  with	  Belgian	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Spaak	  three	  days	  later	  and	  Tshombe	  himself	  the	  very	  next	  day	  to	  discuss	  exactly	  these	  issues.	  That	  Washington	  assumed	  Belgian	   involvement	   in	   the	   turn	   of	   events	   is	   clear	   from	  Harriman’s	   reprimanding	  tone	  in	  a	  cable	  to	  Kinshasa	  on	  July	  16th,	  ‘Dept	  feels	  GOB	  should	  have	  kept	  US	  better	  informed	  about	  its	  relations	  with	  Tshombe	  in	  recent	  past,	  particularly	  as	  Harriman	  urged	   Spaak	   to	   take	   measures	   to	   ascertain	   Tshombe’s	   intentions.’	   As	   such,	   the	  ‘Brussels	   Cables’	   reveal	   that	   the	   State	   Department	   had	   signalled	   Tshombe’s	  acceptability	  early	  on	  and	  was	  willing	  to	  let	  Belgium	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  pushing	  for	  his	  selection	  as	  Premier,	  no	  doubt	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  this	  might	  precipitate	  an	  increased	  Belgium	   role	   in	   solving	   Congo’s	   security	   dilemmas.	   This	   is	   notable	   as	   it	   suggests	  that,	   in	   its	  eagerness	  for	  some	  kind	  of	  action,	  Washington	  was	  willing	  to	   let	  policy	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be	   dictated	   by	   Belgium	   and	   events	   in	   Congo,	   even	   when	   this	   went	   against	   the	  opinions	   of	   its	   embassy	   staff	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   compromised	   the	   diplomatic	  position	  eventually	  taken	  by	  Kennedy	  during	  the	  first	  Congo	  crisis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Unfortunately,	   Tshombe’s	   rise	   to	   power	   far	   from	   ended	   Congo’s	   internal	  problems.	  Those	  who	  had	  hoped	  for	  a	  truly	  inclusive	  political	  solution	  to	  Congolese	  turmoil	  would	  be	  disappointed	  by	  the	  slender	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  new	  ‘Government	  of	  Reconciliation’.	  Power	  was	  concentrated	  narrowly	  with	  Kasavubu,	  Tshombe	  and	  his	  Katangan	  deputy,	  Godefroid	  Munongo,	  implicated	  in	  Kasai	  ethnic	  cleansing	  of	  1960	  and	   the	   murder	   of	   Lumumba. 100 	  Throughout	   July,	   the	   American	   Leopoldville	  embassy	  reported	  mounting	  rebel	  successes	  as	  the	  first	  towns	  began	  to	  fall	  to	  rebel	  activity	  deemed,	  ‘not	  so	  much	  organised	  insurrection	  as	  spreading	  chaos’101.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  July,	  the	  rebels	  had	  taken	  Kalemie,	  Kirungu	  (Baudouinville),	  Kongolo,	  Kabalo	  and	  Uvira.	  Ominously,	  Kisangani	  fell	  on	  August	  4th.	  Thus,	  the	  insurgents	  had	  taken	  over	  much	   of	   eastern	   Congo	   and	   the	   provinces	   of	   Kivu,	  Maniema	   and	  Katanga	   in	  what	  was	  essentially,	   ‘a	  vacuum	  in	  which	  no-­‐one,	  except	  possibly	  local	  figures,	  has	  any	  real	  control’.102	  By	  August	  11th,	  the	  embassy	  was	  so	  panicked	  that	  contingency	  plans	   for	   the	   evacuation	   of	   the	   capital	   were	   being	   drafted.	   Consistent	   with	   the	  reasoning	  explored	  in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter,	  the	  US	  desperately	  searched	  for	   an	   ally	   to	   shoulder	   the	   burden	   in	   Congo.	   While	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   Washington,	  recently	   independent	   Africa	   may	   have	   been	   a	   ‘mess’	   of	   European	   creation	   and	  responsibility,	   America’s	   NATO	   allies	   remained	   unmoved.	   The	   hope	   of	   African	  troops	  actively	  intervening	  had	  also	  suffered	  a	  severe	  set	  back	  with	  the	  nomination	  of	  the	  widely	  despised	  Tshombe	  as	  Premier.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	   in	  Congo,	  however,	  a	  ready-­‐made	  answer	  was	  presenting	   itself	   in	   the	  form	   of	  white	  mercenaries.	   In	   the	   summer	   of	   1964	   	   the	   Vandewalle	   plan,	   named	  after	   Colonel	   Frederic	   Vandewalle-­‐	   the	   Belgian	   military	   adviser	   to	   Tshombe,	  emerged.	  It	  envisioned	  integrating	  the	  three	  thousand	  strong	  Katangan	  gendarmes	  into	   the	   ANC	   while	   retaining	   a	   separate	   column	   of	   two	   to	   three	   hundred	  mercenaries	   from	  South	  Africa,	  Zimbabwe,	  Belgium	  and	  other	  European	  countries	  in	  light-­‐armoured	  Ferrets	  to	  spearhead	  the	  drive	  into	  Eastern	  Congo.	  Conventional	  analyses	  suggest	  that	  it	  was	  the	  US	  that	  pushed	  Belgium	  and	  an	  accepting	  Tshombe	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Belgian	  diplomats	  in	  particular	  were	  frustrated	  with	  Tshombe’s	  failure	  to	  deliver	  the	  hoped	  for	  government	  of	  reconciliation.	  J.	  de	  Bassompierre,	  ‘Weekly	  Report	  10th	  to	  15th	  August,	  1964’;	  File	  18517-­‐	  4	  -­‐	  Congo-­‐	  January	  to	  September	  1964,	  BDA;	  See	  also	  Georges	  Nzongola-­‐Ntalaja,	  From	  Leopold	  to	  Kabila	  p.	  105	  101	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Intelligence	  and	  Research,	  Thomas	  L.	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  Country	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  NSF,	  LBJL	  	  102	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to	  adopt	  this	  as	  the	  viable	  next	  best	  alternative	  to	  regular	  foreign	  troops	  joining	  the	  ranks	   of	   the	   ANC.	   Piero	   Gleijeses	   argues	   that	   the	   Belgians	   bowed	   to	   American	  pressure	  to	  embrace	  the	  mercenary	  solution.103	  Wagoner	  and	  Odom’s	  studies	  of	  the	  subsequent	  Stanleyville	   ‘rescue’	  operation	  concur.104	  Certainly	  British	  Ambassador	  Rose	   voiced	   the	   opinion	   that	   the	   mercenary	   solution	   was	   a	   US-­‐Belgian	   product	  following	  Harriman’s	  diplomatic	  mission	  to	  Brussels	  that	  August.105	  Indeed,	  broadly	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  Belgians	  were	  harassed	  by	  American	  pressure	  for	  some	  kind	  of	   action	   to	   deal	   with	   Congo	   rings	   true.	   That	   is	   not	   to	   say,	   however,	   that	   the	  mercenary	  innovation	  was	  an	  American	  product.	  Indeed,	  this	  assumption	  needs	  to	  be	  reconsidered	  with	  closer	  attention	  to	  the	  exact	  sequence	  of	  events.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Throughout	  July	  it	  became	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  Tshombe	  was	  reverting	  to	  his	  tried	  tactic	  of	  using	  his	  Katangan	  gendarmes	  alongside	  white	  mercenaries.	  Already	  in	   May	   the	   Belgian	   embassy	   in	   Luanda	   had	   expressed	   the	   view	   that	   Katangan	  gendarmes	   and	   mercenaries	   were	   regrouping	   in	   Angola	   and	   by	   28th	   July	   the	  American	   embassy	  was	   reporting	   the	   presence	   of	  mercenaries	   openly	   arriving	   in	  Leopoldville	   and	   settling	   at	   the	   Hotel	   Memling.106	  Thus	   Godley	   wrote,	   ‘Now	   it	   is	  becoming	  common	  knowledge	  here	   in	  Leo	   that	  white	  mercenaries	   from	  Rhodesia,	  South	  Africa,	  Belgium	  and	  perhaps	   some	  other	   countries,	   have	   in	   fact	   returned	  at	  Tshombe’s	   call.’107	  At	   this	   stage,	   the	   mixed	   messages	   were	   still	   coming	   from	   the	  American	   country	   team	   in	   Congo	   and	   no	   decision	   over	   the	   use	   of	   mercenaries	  appears	   to	   have	   been	  made	   in	  Washington.	  While	   agreeing	  with	   the	   Lubumbashi	  (Elizabethville)	  American	  Consul	  Dean	  and	  the	  US	  military	  attaché,	  Colonel	  William	  A.	   Dodds,	   that	   mercenaries	   might	   be	   the	   next	   best	   and	   only	   workable	   solution,	  Godley	  continued	  to	  warn	  against	  the	  negative	  implications	  any	  US	  association	  with	  such	   a	  mercenary	   force	  would	   have	   and	   on	   the	   28th	   July	   the	   Belgian	   embassy	   in	  Washington	   reported	   that	   the	   State	   Department	   remained	   hesitant	   with	   similar	  reservations.108	  Furthermore,	   a	  memorandum	  discussing	   the	   issue	   from	  Harriman	  to	   National	   Security	   Advisor	   McGeorge	   Bundy	   suggests	   the	   US	   was	   still	   in	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deliberations	  over	  whether	  to	  embrace	  the	  emerging	  solution	  on	  the	  4th	  August.109	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  Belgians	  were	  involved	  on	  some	  level	  even	  at	  this	  early	  stage	  in	  Tshombe’s	  plans.	  Godley	  voiced	  these	  suspicions	  towards	  the	  end	   of	   July	   and,	   more	   importantly,	   Dodds	   reported	   a	   meeting	   with	   the	   Belgian	  military	  mission	  on	  August	  3rd	  in	  which	  Belgian	  Colonel	  Marlière	  (Mobutu’s	  military	  advisor	  since	  the	  days	  of	  independence)	  had	  indicated	  that	  he	  would	  be	  arranging	  housing	   and	   logistical	   support	   of	   the	   two	   to	   three	   planeloads	   of	   Tshombe’s	   new	  guests	   expected	   to	   arrive	   at	   Kamina	   airbase.110	  A	   telegram	   from	   Foreign	  Minister	  Spaak	  on	  the	  29th	  July	  confirms	  the	  accuracy	  of	  these	  suspicions	  as	  he	  explained	  the	  Belgian	   willingness	   to	   see	   mercenaries	   deployed	   provided	   that	   they	   were	   not	  Belgian	   nationals	   to	   his	   ambassador	   in	   Washington. 111 	  As	   a	   result,	   the	  correspondence	   suggests	   that	   Washington	   was	   just	   behind	   its	   Belgian	   allies	   in	  adopting	  this	  solution.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   balance	   in	   Washington	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   tipped	   when	   Bill	   Brubeck	  made	   his	   personal	   recommendation	   to	   the	   president	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   spreading	  turmoil	  in	  Congo	  by	  assisting	  the	  Congolese	  Government	  ‘in	  every	  way	  to	  organise	  mercenary-­‐led	  force’	  on	  August	  6th.	  That	  same	  day,	  Rusk	  cabled	  Spaak	  stating	  that	  the	   ‘President	  shares	  my	  deep	  concern	  over	   the	  situation’	  and	  going	  on	  to	  call	   for	  Belgian	   officer	   enlistment	   into	   the	   ANC	   or,	   alternatively,	   Belgian	   assistance	   in,	  ‘establishment	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  of	  gendarmerie	  force	  with	  mercenary	  officers.’112	  The	   outcome	   of	   Harriman’s	   trip	   to	   Brussels,	   also	   leaving	   on	   the	   6th,	   was	   thus	   a	  foregone	  conclusion.	  The	  Belgians	  remained	  firm	  in	  their	  refusal	  to	  commit	  regular	  officers	  to	  an	  active	  combat	  role	  amongst	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  ANC	  but	  ‘agreed’	  to	  share	  the	   burden	   of	   organising,	   equipping	   and	   supporting	   the	   assembling	   mercenary	  force.113	  All	  this	  suggests	  that	  Godley’s	  assessment	  on	  3rd	  August	  was	  exactly	  right,	  ‘It	   may	   be	   that	   Belgian	   military	   here,	   desiring	   as	   they	   do	   avoid	   greater	   direct	  military	   commitment	   to	   Congo,	   are	   pushing	   Tshombe	   and	   Mobutu	   hard	   on	   this	  point	  [the	  use	  of	  mercenaries].’114	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	   should	   not,	   of	   course,	   downplay	   the	   American	   role	   in	   the	   mercenary	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solution.	   It	  was	  Washington	   that	  was	  applying	  pressure	   for	   some	  kind	  of	  decisive	  action	   and,	   when	   the	  mercenary	   solution	   suggested	   itself,	   was	   quite	   prepared	   to	  embrace	   it.	   That	   this	   was	   not	   the	   first	   choice	   contingency	   is	   clear	   from	   the	  continued	  search	  for	  foreign	  troops	  throughout	  August	  and	  beyond,	  as	  indicated	  by	  Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	  G.	  Mennen	   ‘Soapy’	  Williams	   trip	   to	   garner	   support	   in	  Africa,	   the	   continued	   pressure	   on	   Tshombe	   to	   request	   troops	   from	   the	   OAU	   and	  Senegal,	   Liberia,	  Malaga	   and	  Nigeria	   individually,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  US	   effort	   to	   coax	  Bonn	  into	  deploying	  troops.115	  These	  efforts,	  while	  sincere,	  were	  probably	  as	  much	  an	   attempt	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   Government	   of	   Congo	   had	   no	   choice	   but	   to	  resort	  to	  mercenaries	  as	  they	  constituted	  a	  genuine	  desire	  to	  garner	  an	  alternative	  force	  to	  bare	  Congo’s	  security	  burden.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	   such,	   having	   followed	   the	   Belgian	   lead,	   the	   US	   commitment	   to	   Congo	   had	  again	   changed	   character	   by	   mid	   August.	   The	   Military	   Assistance	   Program	   (MAP)	  continued	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  August	  the	  US	  had	  made	  available	  eleven	  C-­‐47s,	  twelve	  T-­‐28s,	   twenty-­‐four	  T6s,	  six	  H-­‐21s	  and	  7	  B-­‐26s	   to	   the	  FAC.116	  Despite	   lip	  service	   to	  the	   contrary,	   the	   more	   direct	   involvement	   of	   US	   military	   personnel	   also	   quietly	  continued.117	  Colonel	  Dodds	  joined	  the	  ANC/Belgian	  planning	  staff	  on	  directives	  of	  the	  Congo	  Working	  Group	  formed	  under	  Joseph	  Palmer	  II	  at	  the	  end	  of	  August;	  the	  ‘three	   little	   Dodds’,	   Bryant,	  MacFarlane	   and	   Rattan,	   continued	   to	   actively	   ‘advise’	  the	  ANC	   efforts	   in	   Luluabourg	   and	  Bukavu;	   and	  Mobutu	   praised	   the	   efforts	   of	  US	  pilots	   as	   ‘the	   only	   reason	   Bukavu	   was	   held’. 118 	  In	   addition	   to	   overt	   military	  assistance	  came	  the	  innovation	  of	  the	  ‘Harriman-­‐Spaak	  deal’	  in	  Brussels	  to	  organise,	  furnish	  and	  finance	  a	  white	  mercenary	  force	  to	  come	  to	  Tshombe’s	  rescue.	  The	  US	  alone,	   with	   its	   C-­‐130	   airlift	   capacity,	   would	   be	   responsible	   for	   ferrying	   both	   the	  Belgian	  supplied	  equipment,	  the	  ANC,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  mercenaries	  themselves.	  Thus,	  while	  architect	  only	  to	  a	  limited	  degree,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  both	  the	  catalyst	  and	  the	   primary	   driving	   force	   behind	   the	   ensuing	   onslaught	   on	   the	   rebel	   territory	   in	  Eastern	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  results	  were	  clear	  and	  devastating.	  By	  the	  time	  Gbenye	  and	  Soumialot	  had	  formed	   their	   revolutionary	   government	   in	   Kisangani	   on	   September	   6th,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  The	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  African	  Affairs	  was	  popular	  on	  the	  continent	  for	  his	  call	  of	  ‘Africa	  for	  the	  Africans’	  since	  the	  Kennedy	  years.	  G.	  Mennen	  Williams,	  Africa	  for	  the	  Africans	  (Ann	  Arbor;	  Books	  on	  Demand,	  1969)	  116	  Commander	  in	  Chief,	  US	  Strike	  Force	  (CINCSTRIKE),	  Kinshasa	  to	  Joint	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  (JCS),	  Washington,	  August	  19th	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  82,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  117	  Brubeck,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  the	  President’,	  June	  15th	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  and	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Aug	  28th	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  82,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  118	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Aug	  28th	  1964	  and	  14th	  October	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  82,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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insurgency	   was	   already	   suffering	   severe	   setbacks.	   Even	   before	   the	   mercenaries	  were	  effectively	  deployed,	  the	  American	  supplied	  air	  support	  was	  making	  itself	  felt.	  Colonel	  Dodds	  enthused	  over	  the	  ANC	  effort	  to	  hold	  Bukavu	  in	  August	  and	  a	  rag-­‐tag	  ensemble	   of	   local	   police,	   ex-­‐gendarmes	   and	   Belgian	   inhabitants	   on	   August	   14th	  retook	   Moba.119	  Throughout,	   the	   FAC	   was	   deemed	   the	   decisive	   factor	   operating	  ‘with	   impunity’	   as	   the	   Simbas	   lacked	   any	   anti-­‐aircraft	   weaponry	   worthy	   of	  mention.120	  Thus,	  when	  the	  all-­‐white	  mercenary	  ‘Fifth	  Column’	  finally	  got	  underway	  that	  November	  under	   the	  command	  of	   the	   Irish	  Colonel	  Michael	  Hoare,	  described	  by	   the	   press	   as	   ‘Mad	   Mike’	   and	   by	   Devlin	   as	   ‘a	   delightful	   gentlemen’,	   rebel	  resistance	   crumbled.	  121	  The	   CIA	   situation	   reports	   throughout	   the	  month	   tell	   how	  town	  after	   town	  was	   retaken	  with	   little	   resistance	  and	   few	  casualties	   in	  what	   the	  mercenaries	  themselves	  described	  as	  a	  ‘coconut	  shoot’.122	  Indeed,	  the	  rebels	  had	  no	  answer	  to	  this	  new	  force	  as	  the	  resigned	  words	  of	  one	  Simba	  commander	  recorded,	  ‘No	   one	   fights	   American	   brigades’.123 	  The	   fact	   that	   the	   rebels	   considered	   the	  mercenaries	  American	  only	  demonstrates	  the	  transparency	  of	  this	  covert	  operation.	  By	  November	  10th	  the	  CIA	  estimated,	  ‘The	  rebel	  regime	  is	  probably	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  collapse’.124	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	   swift	   and	   decisive	   onslaught	   brought	   with	   it	   an	   ominous	   side	   effect.	   In	  their	  desperation,	  the	  insurgents	  turned	  on	  the	  white	  populations	  within	  rebel-­‐held	  territory	  and	  sought	  to	  use	  them	  as	  hostages	  against	  the	  use	  of	  white	  mercenaries	  combined	  with	  US	   planes	   and	  military	   equipment.	   It	  was	   this	   turn	   of	   events	   that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  only	  direct	  Western	  intervention	  in	  Congo	  during	  the	  entire	  crisis.	  	  As	   T-­‐28s	   strafed	   the	   Simbas	   to	   hold	   Bukavu,	   General	   Olenga	   decided	   to	   use	   US	  Consul	  Michael	  Hoyt	  and	  his	  staff	  as	  bait	  in	  this	  form.	  The	  message	  could	  not	  have	  been	  clearer.	  On	  21st	  August	  Godley	  passed	  on	  a	  commercial	  telegram	  received	  from	  Kisangani	  with	  the	  following	  urgent	  appeal,	  apparently	  from	  Hoyt	  himself,	  ‘We	  ask	  you	  emphatically	   (de	   la	  manière	   la	  plus	   ‘insistant’)	   to	   reconsider	  policy	  American	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  Col.	  Dodds	  to	  JCS,	  Washington,	  23rd	  August	  1964;	  &	  CIA	  Information	  Cable,	  ‘Situation	  in	  Badouinville’,	  14th	  August	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  82,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  120	  CIA	  Weekly	  Reports,	  ‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  17th	  November	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  121	  Interview	  with	  Devlin	  (Locust	  Grove,	  Virginia,	  12th	  March	  2004);	  Hoare	  himself	  bears	  testimony	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  gentleman	  he	  was	  describing	  an	  incident	  of	  military	  justice	  in	  which	  he	  shot	  off	  the	  big	  toes	  of	  one	  of	  his	  recruits	  for	  raping	  and	  murdering	  a	  Congolese	  girl	  in	  Kisangani.	  Mike	  Hoare,	  Congo	  Mercenary	  (Robert	  Hale,	  London,	  1967)	  pp.	  134-­‐135	  122	  CIA	  Weekly	  Reports,	  ‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  10th	  and	  17th	  November	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL;	  Lloyd	  Garrison,	  ‘White	  Mercenaries	  on	  a	  Rabbit	  Hunt’	  New	  York	  Times	  (15th	  November	  1964)	  123	  CIA	  Weekly	  Reports,	  ‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  3rd	  November	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  124	  CIA	  Weekly	  Reports,	  ‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  10th	  November	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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military	  assistance	  Congo	  central	  government.	  The	   lives	  rpt.	   lives	  of	  all	  Americans	  resident	  here,	  including	  consular	  personnel,	  are	  at	  stake.’125	  On	  October	  14th	  a	  ‘ham’	  radio	  operator	  in	  Congo	  intercepted	  a	  message	  from	  Colonel	  Opepe	  in	  Kisangani	  to	  Colonel	   Olenga	   in	   Paulis,	   stating	   that	   American	   planes	   had	   bombed	   Bumba	   and	  requesting	  permission	  to	  kill	  all	  Americans	  in	  the	  ‘liberated’	  zone.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	   be	   clear,	   the	   lives	   of	   local	  white	   populations	  were	   only	   targeted	   once	   the	  combined	  mercenary	  and	  US-­‐supplied	  aerial	  onslaught	   threatened	  the	  rebel	  cause	  from	  August.	  Thus	  Spaak,	  while	  considering	  the	  possibility	  of	  reprisals	  against	  the	  local	   European	   population,	   remarked	   to	   his	   ambassador	   in	   Paris	   that	   the	   rebel	  government	  in	  Kisangani	  had	  not	  taken	  an	  overtly	  anti-­‐	  Western	  or	  anti-­‐European	  character	   up	   until	   this	   point.126	  In	   other	   words,	   European	   and	   American	   lives	   in	  Congo	  were	   endangered	   as	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   US-­‐Belgian	   policy.	  Moreover,	  while	   the	   protagonists	  were	  well	   aware	   of	   the	   risks	   they	  were	   taking,	   they	  were	  clearly	  rattled	  in	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  precarious	  development.	  Initially	  in	  August,	  Washington	   considered	   taking	   counter-­‐hostages.	   The	   October	   radio	   interception	  even	  saw	  a	   temporary	  caving	   in	   to	   rebel	  demands,	  with	  a	   seven-­‐day	  aerial	   stand-­‐down	  imposed	  by	  the	  US	  on	  the	  FAC	  between	  16th	  and	  23rd	  October.127	  While	  quite	  prepared	   to	   instrumentalise	   respected	  African	   leaders	  such	  as	   Jomo	  Kenyatta	  and	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	   into	   pressuring	   the	   insurgent	   leadership	   into	   ensuring	   humane	  treatment	  of	  their	  western	  captives,	  a	  sincere	  diplomatic	  effort	  to	  force	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Kisangani	  regime	  was	  never	  attempted	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  however.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Throughout	   1964	   American	   officials	   in	   Kinshasa	   and	   Washington	   alike	   had	  consistently	   ignored	  calls	   for	  negotiations	  on	   the	  grounds	   that	   the	  rebels	   lacked	  a	  central	  authority	   that	   truly	  controlled	   the	  movement.	  With	  regards	   to	   the	  hostage	  situation,	   however,	   this	   could	   not	   be	   deemed	   true.	   Gbenye	   remained	   open	   to	  Kenyatta’s	   appeals	   not	   to	   harm	   the	   hostages	   in	   Kisangani	   throughout	   November	  and	   sent	   Thomas	   Kanza	   to	   negotiate	   a	   peaceful	   outcome	   with	   US	   Ambassador	  William	   Attwood	   in	   Nairobi	   on	   the	   22nd	   November.128	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   from	  September	   Nkrumah	   had	   called	   for	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   foreign	   influence	   and	   a	  political	   settlement	   as	   the	   only	   viable	   solution	   to	   Congo,	   offering	   to	   chair	   round-­‐table	   discussions	   under	   OAU	   auspices	   in	   Accra.	   Parallel	   to	   this	   the	   OAU	   met	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Commercial	  Telegram	  from	  Michael	  Hoyt,	  Kisangani	  to	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  and	  passed	  on	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  on	  21st	  August	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  82,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  126	  Spaak,	  Brussels	  to	  Jaspar,	  Paris,	  10th	  August	  1964;	  File	  18517-­‐	  4	  -­‐	  Congo-­‐	  January	  to	  September	  1964,BDA	  	  127	  CIA	  Weekly	  Reports,	  ‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  10th	  November	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  128	  Ambassador	  Attwood	  provides	  a	  lively	  first	  hand	  account	  of	  these	  proceedings	  in	  his	  memoirs.	  William	  Attwood,	  The	  Reds	  and	  the	  Blacks	  (Harper	  &	  Row,	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  1967)	  pp.208-­‐217	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Nairobi	  and	  called	  for	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  and	  sent	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  commission	  under	  Kenyatta	  to	   Washington	   to	   appeal	   to	   Lyndon	   Johnson	   directly	   to	   push	   for	   national	  reconciliation	  in	  Congo.	  This	  African	  diplomatic	  mission	  did	  not	  receive	  an	  audience	  with	   the	  president,	  of	   course,	  under	   the	  pretext	   that	  no	  discussions	  could	  be	  held	  with	  regards	  to	  Congo	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  its	  sovereign	  government.	  A	  telegram	  from	  Dean	  Rusk	  to	  Kenyatta	  intended	  to	  smooth	  over	  the	  resulting	  diplomatic	  debacle,	  	  ‘I	   know	   you	   are	   aware	   through	   Ambassador	   Attwood	   of	   the	   importance	   my	  government	   attaches	   to	   the	   efforts	   of	   the	   Organisation	   of	   African	   Unity	   to	  contribute	   to	   a	   solution	   of	   the	   Congo	   problem…	  We	   sincerely	   regret,	   as	   I	   am	  sure	  you	  do,	   the	  difficulties	   that	  have	  arisen	   in	   connection	  with	   the	  proposed	  delegation	  from	  the	  OAU	  commission.	  I	  wish	  to	  assure	  you	  that	  my	  government	  wholeheartedly	   and	   unreservedly	   shares	   the	   objectives	   set	   forth	   in	   the	   OAU	  resolution,	  ie.	  “to	  support	  and	  encourage	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  in	  the	  restoration	  of	  national	  reconciliation.”’129	  	  While	   playing	   lip	   service	   to	   a	   political	   settlement	   as	   proposed	   by	   the	   OAU,	  Washington	  was	  all	  the	  while	  planning	  its	  hostage	  rescue	  operations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Here	  the	  United	  States	  once	  more	  allowed	  itself	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  the	  Belgian	  position.	   As	   early	   as	   the	   7th	   November	   Spaak	   had	   signalled	   to	   his	   American	  counterpart	  that	  the	  time	  for	  talk	  was	  over	  and	  that	  decisive	  action	  was	  needed.130	  At	   this	   point	   Washington	   was	   still	   dithering	   until	   finally	   coming	   round	   to	   the	  Belgian	   view	   as	   is	   clearly	   borne	   out	   by	   the	   notes	   of	   a	   telephone	   conversation	  between	  Undersecretary	  of	  State	  George	  Ball	  and	  McGeorge	  Bundy	  that	  expressed	  a	  willingness	   to	  negotiate	   scuppered	  by	  Belgian	   intransigence,	   ‘Mr.	  Ball	   said	   to	  him	  that	  there	  were	  two	  courses	  of	  action.	  One	  is	  to	  try	  to	  play	  this	  negotiating	  track	  out,	  but	  we	  haven’t	  any	  cards	  because	  the	  Belgians	  won’t	  play.	  The	  second	  is	  to	  drop	  the	  paratroopers	   in.’131	  Although	  Belgium	  was	  dependent	  on	  America’s	  moral	   support	  and	  its	  crucial	  airlift	  capacity,	  the	  United	  States	  again	  remained	  reluctant	  to	  take	  a	  decisive	   lead	   and	  use	   its	   leverage	   to	  dictate	  policy	   to	   its	   allies.	   The	   result	  was	   an	  American	  refusal	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  rebels	  and	  Kanza’s	  call	   for	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  was	  deemed	  ‘outrageous	  blackmail’	  and	  rejected.132	  In	  fact,	  the	  situation	  reports	  of	  these	  negotiations	  suggest	  that	  Attwood	  was	  used	  as	  a	  mere	  stalling	  tactic	  while	  the	  final	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  Rusk,	  Washington	  to	  President	  Kenyatta,	  Nairobi,	  27th	  September	  1964	  and	  passed	  on	  to	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  on	  the	  same	  day;	  RG17-­‐2-­‐570,	  OAU	  Papers,	  PRAAD	  130	  Telegram	  from	  Spaak,	  Washington	  to	  Ambassador	  de	  Kerchove,	  Kinshasa,	  7th	  November	  1964;	  File	  18293	  I	  (a)-­‐	  Congo	  Télégrammes-­‐	  Entrées	  Washington;	  1964,	  BDA	  	  131	  Notes	  on	  Telecon:	  ‘George	  Ball	  and	  McGeorge	  Bundy’,	  20th	  November	  1964;	  Personal	  Papers,	  Papers	  of	  George	  W.	  Ball,	  Box	  2,	  LBJL	  	  132	  Attwood,	  Reds	  and	  the	  Blacks	  p.	  215	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preparations	   for	   the	   ‘Dragon’	   operations	   were	   made,	   ‘Ambassador	   Attwood’s	  instructions	   remain	  unchanged	  although	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	   talks	   is	   now	  purely	   a	  holding	  operation.’133	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  efforts	  of	  Kenyatta,	  Nkrumah	  and	  the	  OAU	  were	  cynically	  deployed	   to	  delay	  any	  possible	  violence	  against	   the	  hostages	  while	  American-­‐Belgian	  military	  planning	  progressed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Thus,	   following	   a	   further	   declaration	   by	   Gbenye’s	   rebel	   government	   that	  Belgians	   and	   Americans	   were	   being	   treated	   as	   prisoners	   of	   war	   and	   their	   lives	  depended	  upon	  a	  cessation	  of	  all	  aerial	  attacks,	   the	  president	  approved	  operation	  ‘Dragon	  Rouge’	   from	  his	  ranch	  in	  Texas.134	  On	  November	  24th,	  a	   total	  of	  seventeen	  US	  C-­‐130s	  airlifted	  600	  Belgian	  para-­‐troops	  to	  free	  the	  hostages	  in	  Kisangani.	  Two	  days	  later,	  a	  further	  seven	  C-­‐130s	  dropped	  256	  Belgian	  Para-­‐troops	  at	  Paulis	  (Isiro)	  in	   the	   second	   ‘Dragon’	   operation	   (Dragon	   Noir).	   All	   in	   all,	   these	   two	   direct	  interventions	   evacuated	   1,295	   hostages	   from	   the	   rebel-­‐held	   towns	   (919	   from	  Kisangani	   and	   375	   from	   Isiro).	   Fifty-­‐five	   of	   these	   were	   Americans.	   An	   estimated	  seventy-­‐six	   white	   hostages	   were	   killed	   in	   these	   immediate	   operations	   (sixty	   in	  Kisangani	   and	   sixteen	   in	   Isiro),	   three	  of	   these	  American.	  Despite	   the	  CIA	  warning	  that	  around	  a	  further	  thousand	  hostages,	  were	  being	  held	  at	  Wamba,	  south	  of	  Isiro,	  no	   further	   rescue	  operations	  were	  undertaken.	  As	  predicted	  by	   the	  CIA,	   a	   further	  185	  Europeans	  were	  killed	  at	  Wamba,	  not	   to	  mention	  the	   thousands	  of	  Congolese	  that	   lost	   their	   lives	   in	   reprisals	   from	   both	   sides	   as	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   these	  operations.	  Thus,	  viewed	  in	  purely	  humanitarian	  term,	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  negotiate	  with	   the	   rebels	   appears	   questionable	   at	   the	   least. 135 	  Indeed,	   the	   Kisangani	  intervention	  revealed	  deep	  pitfalls	   in	   the	  American	  strategy	   in	  Congo	  at	   this	  early	  stage.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Within	   a	   year	   of	   his	   inauguration,	   the	   Johnson	   administration	  had	  once	  more	  embroiled	   the	   United	   States	   in	   a	   further	   conflict	   in	   Congo.	   Its	   efforts	   to	   balance	  countering	  the	  spreading	  turmoil	  in	  Africa’s	  heart	  with	  its	  obvious	  reluctance	  to	  be	  dragged	   into	   another	   Third	  World	   conflict	   alongside	   its	   growing	   commitments	   in	  Vietnam	  ensured	  an	  executive	  in	  Washington	  both	  eager	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  Kinshasa	  government	  but	  quite	  willing	  to	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  its	  Belgian	  ally	  to	  mastermind	  the	  details	  of	   its	  renewed	  intervention.	  Accurate	  readings	  of	  rural	  uprisings	  fuelled	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  National	  Security	  Council	  (NSC),	  Executive	  Secretary,	  Bromley	  Smith,	  ‘Special	  Situation	  Reports’,	  23rd	  November	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  84,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  134	  National	  Security	  Council	  Staffer,	  Hal	  Saunders,	  Memorandum	  (passed	  from	  then	  NSC	  staffer	  Robert	  Komer	  to	  Bundy);	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  135	  Certainly	  the	  West	  German	  embassy	  reported	  that	  the	  Kisangani	  strike	  was	  a	  failure	  both	  in	  humanitarian	  and	  political	  terms.	  Telegram	  from	  Kinshasa	  to	  Bonn,	  ‘Belgisch-­‐Amerikanische	  Befreiungsaktion	  im	  Kongo’,	  1st	  December	  1964;	  Band	  500,	  Kongo	  Leopoldville	  1964,	  B34,	  BRD	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local	  discontent	  and	  loosely	  harnessed	  by	  disenfranchised	  politicians	  looking	  for	  a	  place	  in	  Kinshasa’s	  political	  fold	  thus	  nevertheless	  led	  to	  an	  effort	  to	  control	  events	  in	  Congo,	  even	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  any	   imminent	  Soviet	  or	  communist	   involvement.	  Following	  the	  Belgian	   lead,	  however,	  not	  only	   tied	  America	   to	   the	  return	  of	  Moise	  Tshombe	  and	  all	  this	  ‘walking	  museum	  of	  colonialism’	  stood	  for	  but	  also	  implicated	  the	  United	  States	  in	  his	  domestic	  misdoings	  and	  his	  questionable	  allegiances	  to	  the	  Belgian	   colonial	   masters	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Portuguese	   and	   South	   African	   white	  minority	   regimes.136	  Following	   Kennedy’s	   successful	   rhetorical	   appeal	   to	   African	  nationalism,	   the	  United	  States	  was	  now	  once	  more	   intimately	   associated	  with	   the	  formation	   of	   a	   white	   mercenary	   force	   and	   a	   direct	   military	   intervention	   of	   the	  former	  colonial	  power	  to	  crush	  the	  aspirations	  of	  an	  indigenous	  uprising.	  Moreover,	  the	   popular	   backlash	   that	   ensued	   throughout	   Africa	   and	   the	   Third	   World	   even	  rallied	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  allies	  to	  the	  rebel	  cause.	  	  	  
Choosing	  Sides:	  the	  Implications	  of	  Johnson’s	  Congo	  Policies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  contrast	  to	  this	  predecessor,	  under	  Johnson	  the	  American	  handling	  of	  Congo	  betrayed	   its	   insensitivity	   to	   the	  growing	  aspirations	  of	  African	  nationalists.	  At	   the	  heart	   of	   this	   lay	   two	   fundamentally	   opposing	   paradigms.	   Nkrumah	   and	   the	   CIA’s	  Larry	  Devlin	  seemingly	  concurred	  on	  the	  strategic	  importance	  of	  Congo	  in	  the	  heart	  of	   Africa.	   For	   the	   latter,	   however,	   this	   presented	   a	   possible	   springboard	   for	  communist	   subversion	   of	   the	   continent	  while	   the	   former	   saw	   Congo’s	   continuing	  troubles	   as	   the	   soft	   underbelly	   for	   further	   neo-­‐colonial	   domination	   and	   white	  minority	   rule	   in	   Africa.	   Washington’s	   Cold	  War	   preoccupation	   no	   doubt	   ensured	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  its	  policies	  on	  Congo	  and	  the	  wider	  region	  remained	  secondary.	  While	  its	  reliance	  on	  a	  Belgian	  lead	  and	  recourse	  to	  white	  mercenaries	  might	  prove	  successful	   in	   the	   immediate	   crushing	   of	   the	   Congolese	   rebellion,	   this	   rather	  blinkered	   approach	   once	  more	   transformed	   a	   parochial	   uprising	   into	   a	   Cold	  War	  crisis	   in	   Congo.	   The	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   its	   allies	   finally	   responded	   to	   the	   popular	  outcry	  that	  reverberated	  through	  Africa	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  Kisangani	   intervention	  by	  once	  more	  supplying	  material	  support	  to	  the	  insurgents,	  with	  Cuba	  even	  sending	  troops	  to	  rally	  the	  rebel	  cause.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  darker	  implications	  for	  Congo	  were	  clear	  even	  to	  contemporary	  American	  observers.	   Not	   only	   did	   the	   American	   approach	   entirely	   ignore	   calls	   to	   negotiate	  with	   the	   rebels	  and	   the	  exiled	  CNL	  exiles	   (as	  proposed	  by	  both	  Nkrumah	  and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Algeria’s	  President	  Ahmed	  Ben	  Bella	  quoted	  in	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions	  p.	  65	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African	   diplomatic	   drive	   and	   even	   the	   Belgian	   government),	   but	   a	   pattern	   of	  American	   support	   for	   the	   instruments	   of	   internal	   repression	   of	   the	   central	  government	  was	   also	   established	   at	   this	   stage.	   It	  was	   the	  US-­‐Belgian	   backing,	   for	  example,	   that	   allowed	   the	   Congolese	   government	   to	   pursue	   its	   own	   political	  vendettas	  in	  Kinshasa.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  it	  was	  directly	  involved,	  the	  CIA	   at	   the	   very	   least	   was	   privy	   to	   the	   lists	   of	   who	   was	   targeted	   by	   the	   Sûreté’s	  assassination	  commandos	  in	  the	  clamp	  down	  on	  political	  opposition	  that	  August.137	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   Tshombe	   had	   ordered	   the	   expulsion	   from	   Kinshasa	   of	   all	  Congolese	  (Brazzaville)	  nationals	  and	  women	  and	  children	  assembled	  at	  roadsides	  in	   the	   capital	   while	   the	   heads	   of	   households	   were	   rounded	   up.	   The	   result	   was	  ‘predictable	   hysteria,	   tears,	   anguish	   and	   increased	   tension.’138	  That	   the	   United	  States	  was	  essentially	  acting	  as	  quartermaster	  for	  a	  rapacious	  and	  abusive	  ANC	  was	  also	   plainly	   apparent.	   By	   the	   latter	   half	   of	   1964,	   however,	   the	   Congolese	  Government’s	   most	   notorious	   weapon	   were	   the	   white	   mercenary	   commandos	  whose	  appalling	  spree	  of	  looting,	  rape	  and	  murder	  at	  Kisangani	  did	  not	  escape	  the	  African	  and	  international	  press,	  as	  Piero	  Gleijeses	  has	  shown.	  139	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	   was	   this	   latter	   point	   that	   brought	   with	   it	   the	  most	   sinister	   implication	   for	  American	   policy	   in	   Congo	   thus	   far,	   however,	   as	   it	   demonstrated	   a	   willingness	   to	  collaborate	   with	   the	   ‘Ancien	   Regime’	   of	   white	   rule	   in	   Africa	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	  Portuguese	  and	  Apartheid	  South	  African	  governments.	  That	   the	  mass	   recruitment	  of	  South	  Africans	  to	  fight	  in	  this	  private	  army	  was	  not	  possible	  without	  at	  least	  ‘tacit	  agreements’	  from	  the	  South	  African	  government	  was	  clear,	  not	  least	  to	  Ambassador	  Godley.140	  Indeed,	   the	  West	  German	  embassy	   in	  Cape	  Town	  wrote	   to	  Berlin	  about	  precisely	   this	   very	   public	   recruitment	   on	   the	   streets	   of	   Johannesburg	   with	   the	  ‘absolute	  consent’	  (‘unter	  der	  vollen	  Duldung’)	  of	  the	  South	  African	  government.141	  More	   than	   simply	   looking	   away,	   however,	   representatives	   of	   the	   South	   African	  government	   were	   present	   in	   Congo	   and	   even	   met	   with	   American	   officials	   on	  multiple	   occasions.	   Thus	   both	   Godley	   and	   the	   British	  Military	   Attaché	   reported	   a	  meeting	  between	  the	  Belgian	  Colonel	  Van	  de	  Walle,	  Colonel	  Dodds	  and	  a	  Brigadier	  Robertze	   (Robertse	   in	   the	   British	   reports)	   at	   the	   formers	   house	   on	   the	   14th	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  Intelligence	  Information	  Cable,	  distributed	  29th	  August	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  82,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  138	  Dodds,	  Kinshasa	  to	  DoD,	  Washington,	  20th	  August	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  82,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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  Gleijeses,	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  Missions	  pp.	  70-­‐75	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  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  15th	  September	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  141	  German	  Embassy,	  Capetown	  to	  Auswärtiges	  Amt,	  Bonn,	  ‘Anwerbung	  Südafrikanischer	  Söldner	  in	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  25th	  February	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  Leopoldville	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  1965,	  B34,	  BRD	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September.	  Godley	  was	  keen	  to	  stress	  that	  this	  was	  a	  necessary	  meeting	  to	  smooth	  over	  differences	  between	  the	  South	  Africans	  and	  the	  other	  nationals	  assembling	  at	  Kamina	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   the	   Van	   de	  Walle	   plan	   on	   track.	   Privy	   to	   the	   American	  minutes	   of	   the	   meeting,	   the	   British	   account	   offers	   rather	   more	   as	   Robertze	  apparently	   both	   produced	   credentials	   as	   the	   official	   representative	   of	   the	   South	  African	   government	   and	   explained	   that	   Tshombe	   had	   requested	   South	   African	  assistance	  already	  two	  months	  before	  his	  return	  to	  Congo	  and	  his	  government	  had	  consented	  provided	  that	  he	  was	  ‘the	  representative	  of	  the	  legitimate	  government	  at	  the	  time.’	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  Godley	  the	  South	  Africans,	  more	  than	  assisting	  in	  the	  recruitment,	   were	   also	   offering	   material	   assistance	   in	   the	   form	   of	   uniforms	   and	  web-­‐equipment.	  Godley	  concluded	  this	  report	  by	  stating	  that	  these	  contacts	  would	  be	   upheld	   for	   ‘intelligence	   purposes’	   as	   Van	   de	   Walle	   was	   keeping	   his	   cards	  ‘dangerously	  close	  to	  his	  chest’.142	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Similarly,	   Tshombe’s	   close	   ties	   with	   the	   Portuguese	   were	   apparent	   by	   their	  willingness	  to	  allow	  his	  Katangan	  gendarmes	  to	  return	  to	  Congo	  across	  the	  Angolan	  border	   suggesting	   ‘that	   secret	   agreements	   likewise	   exist	   between	   Tshombe	   and	  ranking	   Portuguese	   officials,’	   in	   Godley’s	   words.143	  This	   also	   marked	   a	   shift	   in	  Congo’s	  previously	  benevolent	  attitude	  towards	  the	  Angolan	  freedom	  fighters,	  and	  Holden	   Roberto’s	   Revolutionary	   Government	   in	   Exile	   (GRAE)	   in	   particular, 144	  leaving	   the	   United	   States	   in	   the	   strangely	   ambivalent	   position	   of	   maintaining	  Holden	  Roberto	   on	   a	   CIA	   pay	   roll	  while	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   supporting	   a	   Portugal	  friendly	   regime	   in	  Kinshasa.145	  More	   than	   turning	   a	   quiet	   blind	   eye,	   however,	   the	  Portuguese	  government	  too	  appears	  to	  have	  offered	  material	  support	  to	  Tshombe’s	  regime	  in	  the	  form	  of	  two	  DC-­‐4	  planes	  from	  Luanda.146	  Ultimately,	  all	  this	  suggests	  that,	  while	  keenly	   aware	  of	   the	  diplomatic	   cavities	  of	   this	  unpalatable	   association	  with	  minority	  white	  rule	   in	  Africa,	   the	  United	  States	  was	  quite	  prepared	  to	  accept	  assistance	   and	   even	   actively	   cooperate	   with	   the	   Portuguese	   and	   South	   African	  governments	   in	  order	   to	   ensure	   the	   success	  of	   the	  Van	  de	  Walle	  plan.	   In	   fact,	   the	  American	  embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  in	  Washington	  were	  both	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  Godley	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  15th	  September	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  143	  Ibid.	  144	  The	  newly	  arrived	  German	  ambassador	  in	  Kinshasa,	  Baron	  von	  Müllheim-­‐Rechberg,	  remarked	  upon	  precisely	  this	  shift	  in	  support.	  Adoula	  personally	  had	  been	  close	  to	  Roberto	  and	  his	  government	  had	  both	  furnished	  the	  GRAE	  with	  weapons	  and	  permitted	  a	  military	  training	  camp	  to	  be	  established	  at	  Kinkusu.	  Telegram	  from	  Müllheim-­‐Rechberg,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Bonn,	  ‘Verhältnis	  der	  Kongolesischen	  
Regieurng	  zu	  den	  Angolanischen	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  7th	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  Kongo	  Leopoldville	  Januar-­‐	  Dezember	  1965,	  B34,	  BRD	  	  145	  See,	  for	  example,	  Stephen	  R.	  Weissman,	  ‘CIA	  Covert	  Action	  in	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  and	  Angola:	  Patterns	  and	  
Consequences,’	  Political	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  pp.	  263-­‐286	  146	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  9th	  February	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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eager	  to	  ignore	  this	  unpleasant	  aspect	  of	  US	  policy	  by	  simply	  blurring	  the	  details	  of	  the	   mercenaries’	   origins,	   as	   Godley	   concluded,	   ‘…we	   have	   always	   supportd	   VdW	  plan	  and	  basic	  element	  that	  South	  African	  mercenaries	  being	  “cutting	  edge”	  of	  each	  of	  the	  6	  columns.	  This	  was	  clearly	  brought	  out	  in	  Governor	  Williams’	  meeting	  with	  Tshombe,	   but	   here	   again	  nationality	   of	  mercenaries	  never	  probed.’147	  Washington	  was	  thus	  quite	  prepared	  to	  make	  Faustian	  bargains	  with	  the	  reactionary	   forces	  of	  Africa	  in	  its	  eagerness	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  Kinshasa	  government.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  American	  willingness	   to	   collaborate	  with	   both	  Belgium	   and	   the	   forces	   of	  continued	  white	  minority	   rule	   in	   Africa	   had	   immediate	   diplomatic	   consequences.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Washington	   did	   effectively	   contain	   the	   outrage	   of	   the	   OAU	  throughout	   this	   period.	   With	   subtle	   diplomacy	   it	   successfully	   managed	   the	  delegation	  sent	  to	  Washington	  by	  the	  Ad	  Hoc	  Commission	  on	  Congo	  under	  Kenyatta	  in	   September	   and	   curtailed	   the	   severity	   of	   the	   condemnations	  made	   at	   the	  Addis	  Ababa	  Summit	  called	  on	  the	  27th	  November	  in	  response	  to	  Kisangani.148	  Indeed,	  by	  February	  of	   the	   following	  year	   the	  OAU	  was	  again	  playing	  a	  positive	   if	  peripheral	  role	   in	   Congo	   as	   a	   delegation	   arrived	   to	   observe	   the	   national	   elections.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  diplomatic	   fall-­‐out	  was	   severe.	  As	  Ambassador	  Attwood	  himself	  wrote	  in	  1967	  of	  the	  African	  reaction	  to	  Kisangani,	  	  ‘The	  white	  man	  with	  a	  gun,	  the	  old	  plunderer	  who	  had	  enslaved	  his	  ancestors,	  was	  back	  again,	  doing	  what	  he	  pleased,	  when	  he	  pleased,	  where	  he	  pleased.	  And	  there	  wasn’t	  a	  damn	  thing	  Africa	  could	  do	  about	  it,	  except	  yell	  rape…	  The	  yelling	  started	  on	  November	  25th	  and	  lasted	  for	  several	  weeks.’149	  	  This	  time,	  however,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  one	  of	  these	  ‘white	  men’.	  Of	  course	  Cold	  War	   propaganda	   efforts	   played	   a	   part,	   but	   a	   genuine	   heartfelt	   outrage	   spread	  through	  Africa,	   as	  demonstrations	   in	  Cairo,	  Algiers,	  Dar	   es	   Salaam,	  Khartoum	  and	  Nairobi	  made	  known.150	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  ‘beacon	  on	  the	  hill’	  image	  of	  America	  so	  successfully	  projected	  to	  Africa	  by	  Kennedy	  had	  been	  shattered	  within	  the	  first	  year	  of	  Johnson’s	  presidency.	  Perhaps	  the	   biggest	   diplomatic	   setback,	   however,	   was	   suffered	   by	   the	   OAU	   itself,	   ‘which	  emerged	  with	  its	  membership	  split	  and	  its	  prestige	  dimmed,’	  according	  to	  Attwood	  himself.151	  Indeed,	   Ghanaian	   reports	   from	   Nairobi	   in	   early	   1965	   illustrate	   the	  frustrations	   and	   internal	   squabbling	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   unable	   to	   reach	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  82	  149	  William	  Attwood,	  The	  Reds	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  (Harper	  &	  Row,	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  1967)	  p.219	  150	  Bromley	  Smith,	  ‘Congo	  Special	  Situation	  Report’,	  No.	  15,	  27th	  November	  1964,	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  Country	  File-­‐	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  Attwood,	  The	  Reds	  and	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further	   resolutions	   on	   Congo.152	  The	  American-­‐Belgian	   approach	   of	   bypassing	   the	  OAU	  while	  cynically	  harnessing	  the	  goodwill	  and	  influence	  of	  African	  Statesmen	  to	  their	   own	   ends,	   rather	   than	   strengthening	   this	   fledgling	   institution,	   left	   African	  leaders	   floundering	   in	   their	   own	   impotence.	   	   Within	   a	   year	   of	   its	   inception,	  American	   Cold	   War	   manoeuvres	   in	   Congo	   had	   shattered	   the	   illusions	   of	   this	  organisation.	   This	   must	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   profoundly	   negative,	   if	   not	   immediately	  apparent,	   development	   to	   an	   administration	   fearful	   of	   the	   spread	   of	   chaos	   and	  turmoil,	  with	  communism	  on	  its	  back,	  through	  the	  continent.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Hand	  in	  hand	  with	  this	  negative	  publicity	  and	  popular	  backlash	  against	  the	  US	  came	   an	   equally	   sinister	   but	   more	   tangible	   development-­‐	   the	   growing	  internationalisation	  of	   the	   conflict.	  To	  be	   sure,	  with	  Rwandan	  Tutsi	   and	  Sudanese	  refugees	  and	  Holden	  Roberto’s	  Angolan	  Revolutionary	  Government	  in	  Exile	  (GRAE)	  within	  Congolese	  borders,	  any	  conflict	  in	  Congo	  was	  to	  have	  a	  certain	  international	  element	  to	  it.	  For	  example,	  the	  Congolese	  government	  was	  quite	  willing	  to	  involve	  itself	   in	  a	  cross	  border	  dispute	  with	  Sudan	  and	  an	  American	   intelligence	  report	   in	  January	  pointed	  to	  Kinshasa	  forwarding	  arms	  to	  the	  Sudanese	  rebels	  and	  Mobutu’s	  instructing	   Mike	   Hoare	   to	   contact	   a	   Southern	   Sudanese	   dissident	   leader	   then	   in	  Kinshasa	   to	   coordinate	  mercenary	  activity	  with	   the	  Sudanese	   rebels	  as	   the	  Congo	  Army	  approached	   the	   Sudan	  border.153	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  much	   to	   the	  dismay	  of	  many	   African	   nationalists,	   Tshombe	   harassed	   the	   efforts	   of	   Holden	   Roberto’s	  attacks	   on	   Angola	   from	   Congo.154	  At	   the	   same	   time	   Tutsi	   refugees	   hounded	   the	  Rwandan	  governments	   from	  Congo	  and	  Uganda	  piled	   troops	  on	   its	  Congo	  border,	  fearful	   of	   mercenary	   incursions.	   This	   had	   the	   negative	   consequence,	   from	   an	  American	   point	   of	   view,	   that	   in	   backing	   Tshombe	   the	   United	   States	  was	   in	   effect	  involving	  itself	  much	  more	  deeply	  in	  Africa	  than	  ever	  intended	  by	  the	  Johnson	  team.	  Indeed,	   these	   border	   entanglements	   were	   to	   have	   at	   times	   extremely	   negative	   if	  peripheral	   fallout	   for	   the	   US	   itself	   when,	   for	   example,	   a	   US	   pilot	   crashed	   on	   the	  Rwandan	   side	  of	   the	  border	   in	  August	  1964	  or	   a	  Ugandan	   school	  was	  mistakenly	  targeted	  by	  an	  air	  attack	  in	  February	  1965.155	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   more	   immediate	   threat	   to	   Washington’s	   policies	   was	   the	   shift	   from	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  	  Telegram	  from	  Ambassador	  Botsio,	  Nairobi	  to	  Principal	  Secretary	  for	  African	  Affairs,	  Accra;	  SC-­‐	  BAA-­‐	  499-­‐	  Mixed	  up	  Letters-­‐	  22/12/60-­‐25/1/66,	  PRAAD	  153	  CIA	  Weekly	  Report,	  ‘The	  Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’	  27th	  January	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  154	  Godley	  reporting	  conversation	  with	  Tunisian	  Charge	  D’Affaires	  Guibliaoui,	  15th	  February	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  155	  Secretary	  of	  State	  to	  all	  African	  Posts,	  27th	  August	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  82,	  NSF,	  LBJL;	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  24th	  February	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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vociferous,	   if	   largely	   rhetorical,	   condemnations	   of	   Tshombe	   and	   his	   backers	   to	  actual	  material	  Soviet	  and	  African	  assistance	  to	  the	  rebels	  that	  began	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	   latter	  part	  of	  1964,	  no	  doubt	   in	  response	  to	  the	   increasingly	  active	  US-­‐Belgian	  role	  in	  Congo.	  By	  mid	  November	  the	  first	  firm	  evidence	  of	  an	  Ilyushin-­‐18	  delivery	  of	  small	   arms	   from	  Algeria,	   possibly	  with	  Ugandan,	  Tanzanian	   and	  Kenyan	  approval	  was	  recorded	  by	  the	  CIA.	  By	  January	  19th	  the	  CIA	  had	  counted	  over	  forty	  planeloads	  of	   arms	   received	   by	   the	   rebels	   from	   Algeria	   and	   Egypt	   with	   the	   assistance	   of	  Congo’s	  neighbours.	  Over	  five	  thousand	  rebels	  were	  reportedly	  receiving	  training	  in	  Uganda,	   Sudan	   and	   Tanzania	   and	   the	   Chinese	   continued	   to	   offer	   peripheral	  assistance	   in	   the	   form	   of	   weapons	   and	   technical	   advice	   from	   Brazzaville	   and	  Bujumbura.	   It	   was	   also	   the	   Kisangani	   intervention	   that	   appears	   to	   have	   finally	  spurred	   the	  Communist	  Bloc	   into	  active	  assistance	   to	   the	   rebel	   cause.	   In	   this	  way	  the	   German	   Democratic	   Republic,	   having	   first	   assured	   itself	   that	   both	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   and	   the	   Czechoslovak	   Socialist	   Republic	   were	   also	   committed	   to	   material	  assistance,	   approved	   a	   request	   for	   arms,	   uniforms	   and	   boots,	   radios,	   typewriters	  and	   photographic	   material,	   as	   well	   as	   sending	   seven	   technicians	   (two	   radio	  specialists	   and	   five	   military	   instructors	   to	   operate	   from	   the	   UAR	   and	   Sudan)	   in	  December	  1964.	  An	  agreement	  to	  this	  effect	  was	  signed	  on	  the	  13th	   January	  1965.	  Clearly	   this	  was	   a	   significant	   development	   as	   it	   brought	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   its	  allies	   once	  more	   to	   Congo.156	  Nevertheless,	  Washington	  was	   not	   panicked	   by	   this	  sharp	  increase	  in	  material	  aid.	  The	  air-­‐supported	  mercenaries	  were	  doing	  a	  fine	  job	  and	  the	  CIA	  concluded,	  ‘it	  does	  not	  appear	  at	  the	  present	  time	  that	  arms	  alone	  will	  be	  enough	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  rebel	  regime.’157	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Of	   greater	   concern	   to	   Washington	   than	   this	   limited	   aid	   was	   the	   prospect	   of	  increased	   active	   intervention	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Simba	   cause,	   something	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   was	   still	   reluctant	   to	   do.	   Throughout	   February	   1965	   unconfirmed	   reports	  were	  mounting	  that	  African,	  Chinese	  and	  even	  Arab	  volunteers	  were	  cited	  amongst	  the	  rebels.	  The	  keenly	  felt	  fear	  was	  that,	  in	  Godley’s	  words,	  this	  would	  wipe	  out	  the	  one	   very	   real	   advantage	   the	   ANC	   had	   over	   the	   rebels;	   ‘leadership	   of	   hard-­‐hitting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  A	  renewed	  request	  for	  arms	  was	  made	  by	  the	  rebels	  on	  the	  14th	  December	  1964	  and	  exactly	  on	  month	  later	  the	  GDR	  consented	  to	  the	  delivery	  of	  2000	  machine-­‐pistols	  with	  60,000	  rounds	  of	  ammunition,	  100	  “Panzerbücksen”,	  2	  RPGs	  with	  2000	  grenades,	  10	  transportable	  receivers,	  5	  grenade	  launchers	  with	  360	  grenades,	  30,000	  pairs	  of	  boots,	  2000	  tent	  frames,	  10	  cameras	  with	  laboratory	  equipment,	  500	  films	  and	  10	  typewriters.	  ‘Protokoll	  der	  Verhandlungen	  zwischen	  Mitglied	  des	  Zentral	  Komitees	  der	  CNL,	  M’Bagira,	  und	  Genosse	  Georg	  Stibi,	  Stellvertretender	  Außenminister,	  Berlin’,	  14	  Januar	  1965;	  Mikrofiche	  A14593,	  	  Unterstützung	  der	  bewaffneten	  Befreiungskämpfe	  des	  Kongolesischen	  Volkes	  durch	  die	  DDR,	  1964-­‐65,	  MfAA,	  DDR	  157	  The	  details	  of	  the	  paragraph	  are	  taken	  from	  CIA	  Weekly	  Report,	  ‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’	  10th	  November	  1964-­‐27th	  January	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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non-­‐Congolese	  volunteers.’158	  As	  Gleijeses	  had	  conclusively	  shown,	  the	  only	  troops	  that	   would	   deploy	   to	   Congo	   were	   sent	   by	   Cuba.	   Ché	   Guevara	   and	   some	   114	  volunteers	   arrived	   at	   Kibamba	   from	   Tanzania	   from	   the	   end	   of	   April	   1965	   to	  strengthen	  the	  Simba	  rebels.	  Remarkably,	  they	  remained	  undetected	  by	  the	  United	  States	   until	   the	   following	   September	   when	   Godley	   dispatched	   a	   spate	   of	   excited	  telegrams	   warning,	   ‘Several	   hundred	   non-­‐African	   advisors	   reported	   throughout	  area,	  of	  which	  approx	  160	  are	  Cubans	   located	   in	  each	   rebel	   centre	  and	  with	  each	  unit.’	  The	  Cubans	  not	  only	  gave	   tactical	   advice	  but	  also	  engaged	   in	  actual	   fighting	  alongside	   the	   rebels	   and	   undoubtedly	  made	   their	   presence	   felt,	   as	   Godley	   noted,	  ‘impact	   on	   military	   situation	   unarguable.’159	  Nevertheless,	   neither	   the	   arrival	   of	  weapons	  or	  even	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  Cubans	  themselves	  would	  prove	  sufficient	  to	  sustain	  the	  crumbling	  Simba	  movement.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   above	   paragraphs	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	  American	  policy	  was	   ineffective	   in	   dealing	  with	   the	   insurgency.	   As	   has	   been	   seen,	   both	   the	  FAC	   and	   the	  mercenary	   columns	   devastated	   the	   Simba	   rebellion.	   The	  majority	   of	  the	   hostages	   had	   been	   rescued,	   difficulties	  with	   the	   OAU	   had	   been	  managed,	   the	  negative	  publicity	  of	  American	  intervention	  had	  been	  contained	  and	  by	  July	  1965	  an	  Intelligence	   Memorandum	   concluded,	   ‘the	   Congo	   is	   quieting	   fitfully’. 160 	  While	  perhaps	   not	   a	   primary	   US	   concern,	   even	   Belgian	   economic	   stakes	   appeared	  unharmed	   as	   industrial	   diamond	   production	   was	   unhindered,	   copper	   production	  was	   above	   pre-­‐independence	   levels	   and	   Union	   Miniere’s	   annual	   report	   of	   1964	  stated,	   ‘the	   wave	   of	   rebellion	   which	   steeped	   vast	   areas	   of	   the	   Congo	   in	   blood,	  happily	  did	  not	  reach	  us.’161	  Furthermore,	  Belgium	  had	  even	  finally	  acquiesced	  to	  a	  more	   direct	   military	   role	   as	   Belgian	   regular	   officers	   reportedly	   volunteered	   to	  remain	  in	  Congo	  to	  support	  and	  lead	  the	  mercenaries	  after	  Stanleyville.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nevertheless,	   the	   above	   analysis	   suggests	   a	  more	   nuanced	   picture.	  While	   the	  short	  term	  successes	  were	  undeniable,	  some	  questions	  should	  be	  asked	  with	  regard	  to	   American	   policy.	   Even	   as	   the	   limited	   threat	   assessment	   of	   actual	   Communist	  interference	   remained	   unchanged,	   the	   United	   States	   growing	   commitments	   had	  entangled	  it	  ever	  further	  in	  Congo.	  	  Washington	  had	  at	  the	  very	  least	  played	  a	  hand	  in	  Tshombe’s	  rise	  to	  power	  in	  July.	  It	  subsequently	  increased	  the	  military	  assistance	  to	  his	  government,	   continued	   to	   furnish	  and	  pay	   for	  both	   the	  planes	  and	  pilots	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  Godley	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  September	  21	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  159	  Ibid.	  160	  CIA	  Intelligence	  Memorandum,	  ‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  1	  July	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  161	  Ibid.	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the	  FAC	  and	  was	  instrumental	  in	  the	  formation,	  financing,	  equipping	  and	  ferrying	  of	  the	  white	  mercenary	  column.	  The	  decision	  not	   to	  negotiate	  a	  peaceful	  outcome	  to	  the	  Kisangani	  hostage	  situation	  also	  appears	  questionable,	  as	  Washington	  abdicated	  decision	   making	   to	   Belgium	   in	   this	   instance	   and	   the	   subsequent	   loss	   of	   life	   at	  Wamba	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  direct	  extension	  of	   this.	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Ralph	  Bunche	  made	  exactly	   this	  point	  on	  the	  very	  next	  day	  charging	  that	   the	  Para-­‐troop	  drop	  ‘caused	  a	  loss	  of	  life	  that	  would	  not	  otherwise	  have	  occurred’.162	  Furthermore,	  it	   was	   this	   increased	   involvement,	   combined	   with	   the	   direct	   intervention	   in	  Kisangani,	  that	  ensured	  the	  transition	  from	  an	  indigenous	  uprising	  fuelled	  by	  local	  discontent	  to	  a	  return	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  Congo	  in	  which	  the	  US	  found	  itself	  siding,	  perhaps	   inadvertently,	   with	   the	   reactionary	   elements	   of	   former	   colonial	   powers	  and	  white	  minority	  regimes.	  Indeed,	  despite	  its	  often-­‐accurate	  assessment	  of	  events	  in	   Congo,	   under	   Johnson	   the	   American	   reluctance	   to	   take	   a	   decisive	   lead,	   while	  nevertheless	   escalating	   its	   commitments	   in	   the	   name	   of	   its	   superpower	   rivalry,	  established	   a	   pattern	   of	   superficial	   engagement	   that	   neglected	   both	   Congo’s	  immediate	  problems	  and	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  wider	  region.	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  Bromley	  Smith,	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  11’,	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Conclusion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   American	   Congo	   policy	   under	   President	   Johnson	   was	   marred	   by	   its	  inability	  to	  transcend	  prevalent	  Cold	  War	  anxieties	  despite	  the	  seemingly	  accurate	  intelligence	  at	  hand	  and	  a	  willingness	  defer	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  coherent	  strategy	  to	  its	  Belgian	  allies.	  Various	  explanations	  can	  be	  advanced	  for	  this	  rather	  blinkered	  approach	   to	   a	   complex	   situation	   in	   Congo.	   First	   of	   all,	   any	   discussion	   of	  Western	  intervention	   in	   Congo	   cannot	   ignore	   the	   role	   of	   racial	   prejudices	   prevalent	   in	  contemporary	  minds	  in	  the	  early	  1960s.	  Much	  has	  been	  written	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	   on	   race-­‐relations	   both	   in	   US	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   politics.163	  Indeed,	   a	  degree	   of	   racism	   was	   at	   times	   dimly	   concealed	   beneath	   the	   surface	   of	   the	   cable	  traffic	  with	  Kinshasa	   and	   the	   reports	  drafted	   in	  Washington.	  The	   scornful	   tone	  of	  Bill	   Brubeck’s	   note	   to	   the	   President	   referring	   to	   ‘pygmies	   carrying	   spears	   and	  machetes’164	  was	  noted	  earlier.	  By	  contrast,	   the	  Ghanaian	  ambassador	   in	  Kinshasa	  appears	   to	   have	   given	   rather	   more	   credit	   to	   the	   insurgents,	   their	   ability	   to	   use	  rudimentary	  weaponry	   in	  their	   fight	  against	  government	   forces	  and	  at	   times	   their	  intricate	   guerrilla	   tactics. 165 	  Similarly,	   both	   the	   African	   press	   and	   political	  leadership	   noted	  with	   dismay	   the	   importance	   placed	   on	   saving	   the	   lives	   of	  white	  hostages	   in	   Kisangani,	   while	   the	   at	   times	   indiscriminate	   slaughter	   of	   Congolese	  civilians	   and	   the	   atrocities	   committed	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   both	   the	   ANC	   and	   the	  mercenary	   Fifth	   Column	   received	   far	   less	   attention.	   In	   exactly	   this	   way,	  Borstelmann	  points	   to	  a	  Time	  Magazine	  article	   following	   the	  Kisangani	  airlift	   that	  ran	  a	  picture	  of	   the	  murdered	  American	  missionary,	  Dr.	  Paul	  Carson,	  on	   the	   front	  cover	  and	  argued,	  ‘African	  civilisation…	  is	  largely	  a	  pretence…	  The	  sane	  part	  of	  the	  world	   could	   only	  wonder	  whether	  Black	  Africa	   could	   be	   taken	   seriously	   at	   all,	   or	  whether,	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  reason.’166	  Not	  only	  did	  this	   article	   conveniently	   overlook	   the	   atrocities	   committed	   by	   the	   ANC	   and	   the	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  Mary	  L.	  Dudziak	   and	  Harold	   Isaacs	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   interesting	   studies	  of	   the	   impact	   of	   international	  public	  opinion	  on	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  in	  America,	  while	  Thomas	  Borstelmann	  gives	  perhaps	  the	  most	  encapsulating	  overview	  of	   the	   interplay	  between	  domestic	   race-­‐relations,	   the	   civil	   rights	  movement	  and	  Cold	  War	  politics.	  Mary	  L.	  Dudziak	   ‘Desegregation	  as	  a	  Cold	  War	  Imperative’	  and	  Harold	  R.	  Isaacs	  
‘American	  Race	  Relations	  and	  the	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  in	  World	  Affairs’	  in	  Michael	  L.	  Krenn	  (ed.)	  Race	  and	   US	   Foreign	   Policy	   During	   the	   Cold	  War	   (Garland	   Publishing	   Inc.,	   London	   &	   New	   York,	   1998);	  Thomas	  Borstelmann,	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  Color	  Line;	  American	  Race	  Relations	  in	  the	  Global	  Arena	  (Harvard	  Uni.	  Press,	  Cambridge	  Massachusetts,	  2001)	  164	  Brubeck,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  the	  President’,	  15th	  June	  1964,	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  165	  Ambassador	  Quashie,	  Kinshasa	  to	  African	  Secretary,	  Kinshasa,	  11th	  June	  1964;	  SC-­‐	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  Thomas	  Borstelmann,	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  Cold	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  Cambridge	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white	  mercenaries	  in	  particular	  leading	  up	  to	  and	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  November	  operation,	  but	  it	  actually	  pointed	  to	  race	  as	  the	  underlying	  factor	  behind	  the	  atrocities	  committed	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Simbas.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  articles	  in	  the	  New	   York	   Times	   revelled	   in	   the	   gory	   details	   of	   Congolese	   atrocities,	   the	   use	   of	  sorcery	   and	   supposed	   incidents	   of	   cannibalism,	   while	   the	   rare	   mentions	   of	   the	  mercenaries	  were	  confined	  to	  either	  brief	  anodyne	  references	  or	  even	  remarkably	  sympathetic	  and	   likeable	  portrayals	  of	  supposedly	  professional	  soldiers	  caught	  up	  in	   a	   sea	   of	   horrific	   violence	   between	   the	   ANC	   and	   the	   insurgents.167	  As	   Piero	  Gleijeses	   has	   shown,	   the	   European	   press	   was	   not	   as	   uncritical	   when	   it	   came	   to	  Michael	  Hoare’s	  Fifth	  Column.168	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  When	  Lloyd	  Garrison,	   the	  New	  York	  Times	   reporter	   in	   Congo	   for	   this	   period,	  was	   interviewed	  about	   the	   role	  of	   racism	   in	   the	  press	  he	  commented	   that	  he	  was	  never	   aware	   of	   any	   editorial	   bias	   driven	   by	   racial	   ideology	   but	   contemporary	  journalism	  may	   have	   at	   times	   been	   informed	   by	   engrained	   cultural	   prejudices.169	  Perhaps	   a	   similar	   distinction	   should	   be	   made	   for	  Washington’s	   policy	   makers.	   A	  valid	  criticism	  of	  some	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  racism	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy	  is	  the	  tendency	   to	   mistake	   underlying	   tensions	   with	   primary	   motivations.	   There	   is	  nothing	   in	   the	   evidence	   at	   hand	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  United	   States	  was	  pursuing	   a	  deliberately	  racial	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  Congo.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	   suppose	   that	   policymakers	   in	  Washington	   and	  Kinshasa	  were	   informed	   by	   the	  same	  cultural	  biases	  that	  shaped	  contemporary	  journalism	  and	  ensured	  that	  white	  lives	   were	   valued	   above	   those	   of	   black	   Africans	   and	   mercenary	   atrocities	   were	  accepted	  and	  played	  down,	  while	  the	  apparent	  blood	  and	  gore	  of	  indigenous	  ‘tribal’	  rituals	   were	   reviewed	   with	   relative	   glee.	   More	   importantly	   still,	   while	   its	   exact	  impact	   is	  difficult	   to	  calibrate,	   these	  engrained	  prejudices	  no	  doubt	  contributed	  to	  Washington’s	   Cold	   War	   paranoia	   and,	   ultimately,	   its	   reluctance	   to	   permit	   the	  presumed	   backward	   leadership	   of	   the	   ‘Dark	   Continent’	   to	   take	   charge	   of	   its	   own	  political	   destiny	   as	   the	   rebel	   leadership	  was	   ignored	   and	  Nkrumah,	  Kenyatta	   and	  the	  OAU’s	  mediation	  efforts	  were	  cynically	  bypassed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   more	   readily	   discarded	   interpretation	   places	   American	   economic	  considerations	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   its	   Congo	   policies.	   Nkrumah	   himself	   wrote	   to	   the	  Belgian	  Prime	  Minister	  complaining	  of	   ‘outside	   foreign	  powers	  who	  seem	  to	  want	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  Example,	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  Times	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  Gleijeses,	  	  Conflicting	  Missions	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  Interview	  with	  Lloyd	  Garrison,	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nothing	  more	  than	  confusion	  in	  our	  midst	  so	  they	  can	  continue	  to	  fish	  in	  troubled	  waters.’170	  More	   specifically	   about	   the	   United	   States	   he	   wrote,	   ‘America’s	   main	  interest…	  is	  to	  secure	  complete	  economic	  domination	  with	  the	  object	  of	  keeping	  out	  all	   other	   influences.’171	  As	   has	   been	   seen,	   this	   Ghanaian	   view	   of	   a	   neo-­‐colonial	  America	  with	  economic	  designs	  on	  Congo’s	  resources	  is	  no	  more	  rooted	  in	  fact	  than	  the	   American	   tendency	   to	   view	   events	   in	   terms	   of	   threatening	   communist	  subversion.	   In	   fact,	   during	   this	   period	   the	   United	   States	  was	   not	   competing	  with	  Belgium	   for	   resources	   and	   control	   over	   the	   territory.	   Nowhere	   did	   economic	  considerations	  play	   a	  major	   role	   in	   the	   correspondence	  between	  Washington	  and	  Kinshasa.	   More	   to	   the	   point,	   during	   two	   pivotal	   moments,	   the	   return	   of	   Moise	  Tshombe	  and	  the	  Kisangani	  intervention,	  Washington	  was	  quite	  prepared	  to	  allow	  Belgium	   to	   take	   the	   lead	   and	   very	   much	   wanted	   it	   to	   assume	   the	   burden	   of	  responsibility;	   no	   doubt	   viewing	   their	   NATO	   ally	   as	   the	   most	   predictable	   and	  dependable	   source	  of	   stability	   for	  Congo.	  As	   such,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   justify	   this	   strictly	  economic	  neo-­‐colonial	  interpretation	  of	  Johnson’s	  Congo	  policies	  with	  the	  evidence	  at	  hand.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  not	  looking	  to	  exert	  its	  dominance	   over	  Congo.	   In	   fact,	  Washington	  was	  practicing	   a	  more	   subtle	   form	  of	  subjugation	   as	   it	   sought	   to	   control	   the	  political	   processes	   in	  Kinshasa	   and	  dictate	  the	  emergence	  and	  survival	  of	  a	  Congolese	  government	  acceptable	   to	  Washington	  and	  malleable	  to	  Western	  Cold	  War	  designs.	  In	  other	  words,	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	   active	   Soviet	   role	   in	   Congo,	   as	   the	   Johnson	   administration	   surveyed	   Congo	   it	  once	  more	   interpreted	   events	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   superpower	   confrontation	  with	   the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  combined	  weight	  of	  its	  Cold	  War	  preoccupations	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  being	  drawn	  into	  a	  direct	  role	  in	  another	  Third	  World	  conflict	  remained	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  American	  motivations	  at	  this	  stage	  and	  ensured	  that	  Washington	  entirely	   failed	  to	  engage	  the	  more	  fundamental	  issues	  of	  ending	  colonial	  occupation	  and	  minority	  white	  rule	   in	  a	  continent	  still	   struggling	   for	   independence.	  As	  a	  result,	   it	   is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  Nkrumah	  and	  other	  African	  onlookers	  did	  not	  distinguish	  between	  the	  economic	  agenda	  of	  the	  old	  colonial	  order	  and	  the	  more	  political	  motivations	  of	  this	  peculiar	  American	  Cold	  War	  brand	  of	  neo-­‐colonialism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  These	   unpalatable	   associations,	   of	   course,	   contributed	   to	   the	   most	   deeply	  negative	   implication	   of	   the	   Johnson	   line	   for	   American	   standing	   throughout	   the	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region.	  Rather	  than	  addressing	  Congo’s	  troubles	  through	  the	  regional	  forum	  of	  the	  OAU	  under	   the	  diplomatic	   initiatives	   of	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  and	   Jomo	  Kenyatta,	   the	  United	   States	   subverted	   these	   efforts	  weakening	   both	   the	   prestige	   and	   resolve	   of	  this	  fledgling	  organisation.	  Moreover,	  this	  inability	  to	  work	  with	  African	  leaders	  to	  devise	   a	   regional	   solution	   to	   the	   Congo	   crisis	   was	   simply	   a	   symptom	   of	   a	   more	  fundamental	   problem	   and	   the	   greatest	   shortcoming	   of	   Johnson’s	   Congo	   policies.	  Before	  his	  untimely	  death,	  Kennedy	  had	  realised	  that	  a	  new	  wind	  was	  sweeping	  the	  African	  continent	  and,	  rhetorically	  at	  least,	  had	  looked	  to	  place	  America	  on	  the	  side	  of	  progress	  and	  change	  towards	  African	  independence	  and	  majority	  rule.	  From	  the	  very	   outset	   of	   its	   foray	   into	   Congo	   and	   Africa	   at	   large,	   however,	   the	   Johnson	  administration	   utterly	   failed	   to	   devise	   a	   strategy	   for	   engaging	   the	   gathering	  momentum	  of	  African	  independence.	  Much	  rather,	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  and	  reactive	  series	  of	  policy	  decisions,	  at	  times	  following	  the	  lead	  of	  its	  country	  team	  while	  often	  simply	  relying	   on	   its	   Belgian	   counterparts,	   assured	   that	   Washington	   both	   assumed	   a	  growing	  role	  in	  Congo	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  failing	  to	  address	  local	  grievances	  or	  underlying	  regional	  tensions.	  In	  the	  on	  going	  struggle	  of	  African	  independence,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  once	  more	  emerged	  on	   the	   side	  of	   the	   reactionary	  old	  order	  of	  white	  minority	  rule.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   American	   position	   in	   turn	   had	   repercussions	   for	   the	   broader	   Cold	   War.	  Most	  immediately,	  the	  popular	  backlash	  of	  the	  Kisangani	  operations	  finally	  moved	  the	  Soviet	  Bloc	  to	  offer	  material	  assistance	  to	  the	  rebels	  and	  even	  saw	  Cuban	  troops	  assume	  an	  active	  role	  in	  Congo’s	  civil	  war	  as	  has	  been	  seen.	  As	  such,	  the	  American	  intervention	   directly	   contributed	   to	   once	   more	   internationalising	   a	   largely	  parochial	   uprising	   in	   Congo	   into	   a	   global	   dispute.	   This	   was	   the	   paradox	   of	   the	  Johnson	  Africa	   policy	   that	  was	   at	   once	   seen	   as	   effectively	   dealing	  with	   spreading	  turmoil	   in	   Congo,	   while	   it	   inadvertently	   brought	   a	   resurgence	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	  rivalry	   to	   the	   region	   and	   by	   extension	   increased	   American	   stakes	   in	   a	   successful	  conclusion	   and	   pro-­‐Western	   outcome	   to	   the	   Congolese	   power	   struggle.	   Violence	  continued	  to	  simmer	  and	  Kinshasa	  was	  beset	  with	  political	   infighting	  as	  1964	  and	  much	   of	   1965	   remained	   fraught	   with	   difficulties.	   It	   was	   only	   the	   emergence	   of	  Mobutu	  as	  Congo’s	   sole	  political	   voice	   the	   following	  year	   that	   allowed	   Johnson	   to	  ultimately	   claim	   a	   Cold	   War	   victory	   in	   Africa	   borne	   out	   of	   its	   short-­‐term	  manipulations	  during	  the	  1964	  escalation.	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  While	   the	   combination	   of	   white	   mercenaries	   and	   US-­‐supplied	   air	   power	  appeared	   to	   master	   the	   eastern	   rebellion,	   Congo	   continued	   to	   simmer	   as	   the	  political	  infighting	  between	  Tshombe	  and	  Kasavubu	  intensified	  throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1965.	  Just	  as	  in	  1960,	  as	  the	  politicians	  wrangled,	  Mobutu	  took	  charge	  of	  the	  country	  with	  a	  bloodless	  coup	  on	  the	  25th	  November	  1965,	  much	  to	  the	  relief	  of	  the	  Johnson	   administration.	   This	   time,	   however,	   he	  would	   retain	   power	   and	  move	   to	  strengthen	   his	   hold	   over	   Congolese	   politics	   in	   the	   subsequent	   years.	   Official	  Ghanaian	   reports	   and	   correspondence	   from	   Kinshasa,	   Accra	   and	   the	   letters	   of	  Nkrumah	   himself	   offer	   a	   good	   indication	   of	   Mobutu’s	   standing	   in	   independent	  Africa;	  consistently	  pointing	  to	  his	  cruelty,	   ineffective	  command	  and	  his	  fratricidal	  role	  in	  Patrice	  Lumumba’s	  murder	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  neo-­‐colonialism.172	  In	  1965,	  however,	   Washington	   looked	   to	   Joseph	   Désiré	   Mobutu	   to	   resolve	   its	   Congo	  dilemma.	   Indeed,	   the	  coup	  of	   the	  ANC’s	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   is	  usually	  mentioned	  as	  an	  addendum	  to	   the	  US-­‐Lumumba	  saga,	  with	  American	   involvement	   implied	  as	  the	   final	   part	   of	   a	   successful	   covert	   intervention	   in	   Africa	  wrapped	   up.	  Mobutu’s	  long	   standing	   ties	   to	   the	   CIA	   dating	   back	   to	   his	   role	   in	   the	   pre-­‐independence	  negotiations	  in	  Brussels	  where	  he	  both	  reported	  to	  the	  Belgian	  Sûreté	  and	  made	  his	  first	   contacts	  with	  Lawrence	  Devlin,	   as	  well	   as	   their	   collaboration	  during	  his	   first	  coup	   in	  1960,	   certainly	   lends	   itself	   to	   such	  an	   interpretation.173	  The	  United	  States	  was	   certainly	   integral	   to	   Mobutu’s	   eventual	   rise	   to	   political	   pre-­‐eminence	   and	  intimately	   involved	   in	   his	   coup	   plotting	   as	  will	   be	   seen.	   Examining	   the	   American	  effort	  to	  contain	  Kinshasa’s	  political	  turmoil	  in	  the	  immediate	  build	  up	  to	  the	  coup	  reveals	  an	  altogether	  more	  complex	  picture,	  however.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Before	  delving	  into	  the	  coup	  itself,	  the	  final	  death	  throws	  of	  the	  Simba	  rebellion	  and	  the	  success	  of	   the	  combined	  military	  and	  diplomatic	  effort	   that	  sealed	   its	   fate	  will	   first	   be	   briefly	   considered.	   Alongside	   the	   clear	   superiority	   of	   the	   mercenary	  units	  with	  aerial	   support	   from	   the	  FAC	   in	   the	   field,	   the	   increasing	   isolation	  of	   the	  insurgents	   as	   foreign	   backers	   withdrew	   support	   in	   response	   to	   the	   incessant	  infighting	   of	   its	   flawed	   leadership	   ultimately	   ensured	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   Simbas.	  Beyond	   this,	   a	  more	   detailed	   study	   of	  Mobutu’s	   coup	   reveals	   a	   strong,	   if	   at	   times	  circumstantial,	  case	   for	  a	  high	   level	  of	  US	   involvement	   in	  Mobutu’s	  power	  seizure.	  Considering	   both	   how	   American	   officials	   viewed	   Congo’s	   emerging	   leader	   before	  his	  sudden	  rise	  and	  their	  policy	  deliberations	  in	  the	  immediate	  build-­‐up	  to	  the	  coup	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suggest	   that,	   while	   Washington	   was	   intimately	   involved,	   its	   collusion	   was	   borne	  once	   more	   out	   of	   a	   series	   of	   reactive	   intriguing	   in	   line	   with	   the	   Johnson	  administration’s	   approach	   towards	   Congo	   throughout	   this	   period.	   Finally,	   a	   third	  section	  explores	  Mobutu’s	  stick-­‐and-­‐carrot	  tactics	  to	  retain	  his	  at	  first	  tenuous	  hold	  on	  Congo.	  While	  the	  initial	  years	  of	  his	  rule	  exposed	  an	  authoritarian	  and	  ruthless	  leader	   with	   little	   interest	   in	   addressing	   the	   complex	   challenges	   actually	   facing	  Congo,	   even	   on	   the	   pages	   of	   contemporary	   intelligence	   reports,	   the	  United	   States	  enthusiastically	   embraced	  Mobutu	   and	   on	   several	   occasions	  moved	   to	   ensure	   his	  survival.	   The	   final	   sub-­‐chapter	   thus	   explores	   the	   genesis	   of	   the	   rationale	   of	  supporting	   Congo’s	   emerging	   despot	   in	   the	   name	   of	   pro-­‐Western	   stability	   that	  would	  colour	  the	  US	  relationship	  with	  Congo	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War,	  regardless	  of	   the	   cost	   to	   his	   subjects.	   As	   such,	   and	   a	   little	   paradoxically,	   it	   was	   out	   of	   the	  somewhat	  ill	  defined	  and	  reactive	  approach	  of	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  to	  Congo	  that	  Mobutu	  emerged	  as	  a	  cornerstone	  to	  American	  strategy	  towards	  the	  region	  for	  decades	  to	  come.	  	  	  
The	  Emergence	  of	  Congo’s	  ‘Big	  Man’:	  	  
The	  United	  States	  and	  Mobutu’s	  Military	  Coup	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Even	  before	  Mobutu’s	  ascension	  to	  political	  prominence	  in	  Kinshasa	  the	  Simba	  rebellion	   was	   breathing	   its	   last	   gasps.	   The	   single	   greatest	   asset	   in	   quelling	   the	  Congolese	   revolt	  was	  undoubtedly	   the	   combined	   strength	  of	   the	  mercenaries	   and	  FAC,	   both	   paid	   for	   and	   equipped	   by	   the	   United	   States	   as	   has	   been	   seen.	   Having	  overcome	  problems	  of	  dwindling	  numbers	  and	  low	  morale	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  1964	  with	  Michael	  Hoare’s	  recruitment	  drive	  in	  South	  Africa	  the	  following	  Spring,	  Godley	  remarked	   that	   by	   September	   1965	   the	   Fifth	   Column	   was	   the	   best	   trained	   and	  equipped	  it	  had	  ever	  been.174	  While	  the	  Cubans	  were	  a	  worry	  both	  to	  Hoare	  himself	  and	   the	   American	   embassy,	   Godley	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   government	   forces	   still	  dominated	  the	  air	  and	  had	  the	  advantage	  of	  greater	  logistical	  flexibility	  beyond	  the	  area	  of	   immediate	   fighting.	  As	  a	   result,	  while	  encountering	   fiercer	   resistance	   than	  before,	   as	   the	   report	   of	   the	   Baraka	   siege	   indicates,	   the	  mercenaries	   continued	   to	  recapture	  town	  after	  town.175	  This	  alone	  would	  not	  suffice,	  however,	  as	  the	  embassy	  pointed	   out	   that	   Hoare’s	   Column	   would	   not	   be	   enough	   to	   both	   pin	   down	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	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Congolese	  bush	  and	  garrison	  the	  towns.	  As	  the	  ANC	  remained	  as	  ineffective	  as	  ever	  there	   was	   a	   danger	   that	   the	   rebellion	   would	   fester	   indefinitely.	   Success	   lay	   in	  isolating	   the	   rebels	   and	  by	  March	   the	   embassy	   reported	   that	  with	   the	   retaking	  of	  Aru,	  Aba	  and	  Wats	  the	  supply	  lines	  from	  Uganda	  and	  Sudan	  had	  been	  cut.176	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  following	  requests	  from	  the	  Belgian	  Michael	  Struelens	  to	  this	  effect,	  the	  CIA	  organised	  eight	  patrol	  boats	  on	  Lake	  Tanganyika	  to	  cut	  off	  arms	  supplies	  from	  Tanzania.177	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	   military	   success	   to	   isolate	   the	   rebellion	   was	  matched	   with	   a	   diplomatic	  effort	   to	   bring	   Congo’s	   African	   neighbours	   inline.	   As	   the	   mercenaries	   continued	  their	  drive,	  the	  British	  government	  lent	  a	  hand	  in	  pressuring	  its	  former	  dependents	  in	  East	  Africa	  to	  cut	  their	  backing	  to	  the	  insurgents.	  In	  Congo	  too,	  Tshombe	  began	  to	  make	  the	  right	  noises	  at	  the	  OAU	  and	  the	  US	  was	  pleased	  to	  note	  the	  arrival	  of	  its	  Ad	  Hoc	   Commission	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   1965	   and	   the	   participation	   of	   OAU	   election	  observers	  that	  spring.178	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Probably	  more	   important	   than	  Congolese	  politics,	  however,	  was	   the	   failure	  of	  the	  rebels	  themselves.	  As	  the	  rebels	  floundered	  so	  did	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  various	  benevolent	  onlookers	   to	   continue	   their	   support.	   Indeed,	   the	  East	  German	  reports,	  by	   contrast	   to	   the	   American	   accounts,	   tend	   to	   focus	   more	   heavily	   on	   the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  rebel	  movement	  than	  the	  military	  prowess	  of	  their	  mercenary	  foe.	  Throughout	  1965,	  reports	  emanating	  from	  the	  East	  German	  embassies	  in	  Cairo	  in	  particular,	  but	  also	  in	  Dares	  Salaam,	  Moscow	  and	  Havana,	  describe	  meetings	  with	  representatives	   of	   the	   various	   rebel	   factions;	   each	   seeking	   to	   discredit	   the	   other,	  each	   claiming	   to	   be	   the	   true	   voice	   of	   the	   Congolese	   people	   and	   each	   looking	   to	  secure	   backing	   for	   its	   particular	   purpose.179	  In	   this	   way,	   Soumialot’s	   entourage	  sought	   to	   tarnish	   Gbenye	   as	   insincere	   and	   in	   league	  with	   both	   Tshombe	   and	   the	  Americans	   while	   the	   latter’s	   followers	   accused	   Soumialot	   of	   opportunistic	  corruption	   and	   personal	   enrichment	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   rebel	   cause.	   The	   truth	  behind	  these	  accusations	  is	  uncertain	  but	  throughout	  the	  sense	  of	  suspicion	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  31st	  March	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  177	  Struelens	  was	  the	  Belgian	  government’s	  public	  relations	  man	  and	  confidant	  of	  Tshombe’s	  in	  Washington	  already	  during	  the	  1960	  Congo	  crisis.	  CIA	  Intelligence	  Memorandum,	  ‘Tanzanian	  Support	  for	  the	  Congo	  Rebels’	  7th	  April	  1965,	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL;	  Memo	  for	  Record	  of	  Conversation	  with	  Struelens,	  18th	  February	  1965,	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL;	  Also	  see	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions	  pp.	  134-­‐135	  	  178	  There	  is	  considerable	  cable	  traffic	  between	  the	  British	  Embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  and	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  urging	  Tshombe	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  diplomatic	  stance	  towards	  the	  OAU	  and	  noting	  with	  satisfaction	  his	  invitation	  for	  Diallo	  Telli,	  its	  Guinean	  Secretary	  General,	  to	  visit	  Kinshasa	  in	  January	  1965;	  371/181808-­‐	  Congo	  1965,	  FO,	  Kew	  179	  Microfiche	  790,	  Aktenvermkerke:	  Gespräch	  DDR	  Konsul	  in	  Kairo	  und	  Freiheitsbewegung	  im	  Kongo,	  1963-­‐67;	  MfAA,	  DDR	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sincerity	  of	  their	  motives	  and	  the	  frustration	  of	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  rebel	  movement	  to	   unite	   is	   palpable	   amongst	   both	   the	   GDR	   officials	   and	   their	   Soviet	   partners.180	  Throughout	  the	  second	  half	  of	  1965,	  then,	  material	  assistance	  from	  Congo’s	  African	  neighbours	  began	   to	  dry	  up.	  181	  Gleijeses	   compellingly	   tells	   the	   story	  of	   the	  Cuban	  column	  agonising	  over	  its	  role	  in	  Congo	  before	  abandoning	  their	  cause	  that	  October	  for	  similar	  reasons.182	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  the	  6th	  January	  1966,	  the	  GDR	  embassy	  in	  Cairo	  noted	  that	  even	  the	  Gbenye	  revolutionary	   government	  had	  pragmatically	   called	   for	   a	   cessation	  of	   the	  military	  struggle	  in	  order	  to	  guard	  their	  arms	  for	  a	  later	  time.183	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  pathetic	  image	  of	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  rebel	  movement	  into	  individuals	  trying	  to	  salvage	  some	  scraps	  of	  personal	  support	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  report	  of	  the	  fierce	  rural	  militia	  leader	  ‘General’	  Olenga	  enlisting	  GDR	  embassy	  officials	  in	  Cairo	  to	  help	  pay	  his	  hotel	  bills	  and	  grant	  asylum	  to	  his	  wife	  and	  children	  in	  East	  Germany.	  184	  Thus,	  by	  the	  end	  of	   1965	   the	   rebellion	   had	   collapsed	   and	   the	   CIA	   report	   the	   following	   February	  accurately	   concluded,	   ‘The	   insurgents’	   outside	   supporters,	   including	   Communist	  China	  and	  Cuba,	  have	  grown	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  erratic	   fighting	  qualities	  of	   the	  rebels	   and	   the	   perennial	   squabbling	   among	   rebel	   leaders.	   They	   have	   drastically	  reduced	   their	   aid,	   and	   Cuba	   at	   least	   has	   withdrawn	   most	   of	   its	   advisers.’185	  The	  combined	  might	  of	  the	  mercenary	  military	  prowess,	  the	  increasing	  isolation	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  Certainly	  the	  criticism	  that	  Soumialot	  was	  looking	  to	  conduct	  his	  opposition	  from	  beyond	  Congo’s	  borders	  casts	  doubt	  on	  his	  sincerity	  and	  the	  calls	   for	  aid	  from	  the	  various	  corners	  of	  the	  rebel	  camp	  after	  1966	  are	  nothing	  short	  of	  opportunistic	  attempts	  of	  personal	  enrichment.	  Even	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Stanleyville	  intervention	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  remained	  skeptical	  of	  the	  true	  intentions	  of	  the	   fractious	   rebel	   leadership.	  A	   report	   from	   the	  GDR	  embassy	   in	  Moscow	  even	   reported	   the	  Soviet	  suspicion	   that	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Stanleyville	   revolutionary	   government	  was	   an	  American	   plot	   to	  further	   split	   the	   rebels	   and	  divide	   the	  OAU.	  Aktenvermerk,	  2nd	  December	  1964,	   ‘Gespräch	  zwischen	  Genosse	  Quilitzsch	  und	  Genosse	  Kurdjokow,	  stellvertretender	  Leiter	  der	  2.	  Afrikanischen	  Abteilung	  in	  der	   MID,	   Moskau,	   27	   November,	   1964’,	   Microfiche	   C793/74,	   Gespräche	   mit	   Spezialisten	   und	  akkreditierten	  Diplomaten	  zur	  Lage	  im	  Kongo,	  1960-­‐62.	  1964-­‐66,	  1969,	  MfAA,	  DDR	  On	  28th	   January	  1966,	  a	  certain	  D.	  Bocheley	   introduced	  himself	  as	   the	  new	   legitimate	  president	  of	  a	  newly	  united	  CNL	  but	  both	  the	  GDR	  and	  Soviet	  officials	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  his	  claims	  and	  his	  requests	   for	   assistance	   were	   ignored,	   Microfiche	   C791/74,‘Gespräche	   mit	   der	   Vertretung	   der	  Kongolesischen	  Freiheitsbewegung	  in	  Bamoko,	  Conakry,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Havana,	  Moskau,	  Prag,	  1963-­‐64;	  1966-­‐68;	  MfAA,	  DDR	  181	  On	  the	  3rd	  February	  1966,	  the	  Soviet	  ambassador	  Lutzki	  informed	  the	  GDR	  Vice	  Consul	  Hentschel	  in	  Dares	  Salaam	  about	  Soumialot’s	   failure	  to	  meet	  President	  Nyerere’s	  demand	  to	  establish	  a	  workable	  rebel	  leadership	  and	  Tanzania’s	  subsequent	  withdrawal	  of	  aid.	  Ibid.	  Similarly	  in	  July	  1965	  the	  CIA	  reported	  that	  Uganda	  and	  Sudan,	  while	  continuing	  to	  harbor	  large	  numbers	  of	  rebels,	  was	  no	  longer	  providing	  arms	  to	  the	  Simbas.	  CIA	  Intelligence	  Memorandum,	  
‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’	  1st	  July	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  182	  Gleijeses	  Conflicting	  Missions	  pp.	  150-­‐155	  183	  Minutes	  of	  meeting	  between	  E.	  German	  ambassador	  in	  Cairo,	  Dr.	  Scholz,	  and	  Gbenye’s	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Major	  Wembo,	  6th	  January	  1966;	  Microfiche	  790-­‐	  Aktenvermerke:	  Gespräch	  DDR	  Konsul	  in	  Kairo	  und	  Freiheitsbewegung	  im	  Kongo,	  1963-­‐67;	  MfAA,	  DDR	  184	  Minutes	  of	  meeting	  between	  Comrade	  Schmid	  and	  Olenga,	  GDR	  Embassy	  in	  Cairo,	  7.12.1965,	  in	  Ibid.	  185	  CIA	  Intelligence	  Memorandum,	  ‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’	  23rd	  February	  1966;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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Simbas,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  inherent	  flaws	  of	  the	  disparate	  rebel	  movement	  itself	  ensured	  its	  ultimate	  failure.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  further	  crisis	  was	  brewing	  in	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Even	  as	  the	  rebellion	  was	  quieting	  fitfully	  in	  the	  provinces,	  political	  infighting	  in	  the	  capital	  resumed	  as	  the	  already	  tense	  relationship	  between	  the	  president	  and	  his	  prime	  minister	   soured	   further,	   giving	  Mobutu	   his	   chance	   at	   another	   power	   grab.	  Concerned	  as	  ever	  that	  a	  weakening	  central	  authority	  might	  reignite	  the	  rebellion,	  US	   policy	   makers	   initially	   did	   their	   utmost	   to	   maintain	   the	   status	   quo	   as	   Bundy	  wrote	   to	   Johnson	   that	   August,	   ‘Since	   the	   current	   Kasavubu-­‐Tshombe	   sparring	  started	   in	   earnest	   last	   February,	  we’ve	   been	   turning	   ourselves	   inside	   out	   to	   keep	  Kasavubu	   from	   firing	   Tshombe	   and	   to	   keep	   Tshombe	   from	   trying	   to	   take	   the	  presidency	   from	   Kasavubu.’186 	  By	   autumn,	   however,	   American	   pressuring	   and	  backstage	  manoeuvrings	  had	  failed	  and	  the	  State	  Department’s	  nightmares	  became	  reality	  as	  Kasavubu	  dismissed	  Tshombe	  from	  his	  position	  as	  premier.	  The	  NSC’s	  Hal	  Saunders	   surmised	   that	   the	   American	   initiative	   failed	   because	   Kasavubu,	   who	  maintained	   his	   position	   by	   ‘manipulating	   the	   leavers	   of	   tribal	   politics’,	   simply	  wasn’t	  ‘sensitive	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  leverage	  we	  have’	  and	  ‘couldn’t	  care	  a	  less	  whether	  we	  cut	  aid	  or	  pull	  out	  some	  planes.’	  187	  In	  the	  immediate	  term	  this	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  disaster.	  Indeed,	  a	  crisis	  appeared	  to	  be	  brewing	  as	  politics	  in	  Kinshasa	  took	  a	  turn	  towards	   the	   farcical	   with	   Kasavubu	   unable	   to	   win	   a	   majority	   for	   his	   candidate,	  Evariste	  Kimba,	  but	  unwilling	  to	  nominate	  an	  alternative.	  In	  a	  familiar	  sequence	  of	  events,	   just	   as	   in	   1960	   as	   two	   politicians	   were	   wrangling	   for	   power,	   Mobutu	  stepped	  in	  with	  a	  bloodless	  military	  coup	  on	  November	  25th	  1965.	  Unlike	  his	  timely	  intervention	   in	   1960,	   however,	   this	   time	   there	  were	   no	   signs	   of	   his	   relinquishing	  power	  as	  he	  appointed	  himself	  president	  and	  his	  deputy,	  Col.	  Leonard	  Mulamba,	  as	  premier,	   initially	   for	   a	   five-­‐year	   period.	   The	   question	   remains	   to	  what	   extent	   the	  United	  States	  and	  Mobutu’s	   longstanding	  CIA	  contacts	  were	  integral	  to	  his	  sudden	  political	  ascension?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	   be	   sure,	   early	   assessments	   of	   the	   ANC’s	   Chief	   of	   Staff	   amongst	   American	  officials	  ahead	  of	  the	  coup	  were	  far	  from	  glowing	  and	  do	  not	  suggest	  that	  Mobutu’s	  sudden	   rise	   was	   the	   culmination	   of	   a	   carefully	   planned	   long-­‐term	   strategy	   in	  Washington.	   In	   the	   early	  months	   of	   the	   Simba	   rebellion	   he	   was	   characterised	   as	  vain,	   lazy,	   stubborn	   and	   indecisive,	   more	   of	   a	   problem	   than	   an	   asset	   in	   the	   ANC	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  Bundy,	  Memorandum	  to	  the	  President,	  25th	  August	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  187	  Saunders,	  Memorandum	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  Bundy,	  16th	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  1965;	  Country	  File,	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  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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leadership.188	  At	  the	  end	  of	  May	  as	  the	  Simbas	  gathered	  momentum,	  the	  US	  military	  attaché	  chastised	  him	  for	  his	  gallivanting	  around	  Europe,	  saying	  that	  a	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief’s	   place	   was	   with	   his	   troops	   ‘not	   drinking	   wine	   in	   Rome	   or	   beer	   in	  Germany.’189	  More	   to	   the	   point,	   he	   was	   not	   all	   that	   malleable	   to	   the	   American	  position,	   consistently	   scuppering	   American	   efforts	   to	   ‘Africanize’	   the	   security	  situation	  in	  Congo	  by	  refusing	  to	   let	  his	  ANC	  serve	  alongside	  other	  African	  troops.	  His	  Prince	  Hal-­‐like	  ‘redemption’	  appears	  to	  have	  come	  a	  mere	  two	  weeks	  later	  with	  the	   successful	   defence	   of	   Bukavu.	   Thus	   on	   June	   19th,	   Godley	   reported	  enthusiastically,	   ‘his	   demonstration	   of	   personal	   bravery	   and	   leadership,	   in	  reversing	   situation	   considered	   so	   desperate	   that	   resort	   to	   UN	   seemed	   essential,	  would	  appear	  now	  to	  have	  strengthened	  his	  place	  as	  key	  governmental	  figure,’	  and	  even	   went	   on	   to	   speculate	   over	   the	   plausibility	   of	   another	   Mobutu	   coup.190	  Following	   this	   the	  assessments	  begin	   to	  be	  more	   favourable	  and	  by	  1965	  Mobutu	  was	  viewed,	  by	  Godley	  at	  least,	  as	  a	  calming	  influence	  and	  source	  of	  moderation,	  in	  particular	   on	   Kasavubu.191	  Nevertheless,	   Mobutu	   had	   not	   positioned	   himself	   as	   a	  prospective	  leader	  from	  the	  American	  vantage	  for	  long.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nor	  did	  the	  telegram	  traffic	  between	  Washington	  and	  Kinshasa	  suggest	  that	  the	  coup	   was	   a	   long-­‐devised	   strategy	   in	   Washington	   any	   more	   than	   the	   above	  consideration	   of	   Mobutu’s	   personality.	   Indeed,	   as	   late	   as	   three	   days	   before	   his	  power	  seizure	  NSC	  staffer	  Robert	  ‘Blow	  Torch’	  Komer	  wrote	  to	  Bundy	  deliberating	  on	   Washington’s	   choice	   between	   Kasavubu	   and	   Tshombe,	   and	   siding	   with	   the	  latter.192	  Similarly,	  Mobutu	  apparently	  gave	  no	  early	  indication	  of	  his	   intentions	  as	  Komer	   noted,	   ‘Himself	   suspicious	   of	   Tshombe,	   Mobutu	   nonetheless	   thinks	   the	  Congo	   is	   safer	  with	   Tshombe	   in	   the	   premier	   post	   than	   out	   of	   it.’193	  In	   fact,	   in	   the	  earlier	  stages	  of	  the	  political	  crisis,	  Mobutu	  acted	  as	  a	  useful	  go-­‐between	  for	  the	  US	  mission	  in	  Kinshasa	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  reconcile	  president	  and	  premier,	  keeping	  in	  particular	  close	  contact	  with	  CIA	  Station	  Chief	  Lawrence	  Devlin.	  All	  this	  would	  seem	  to	  support	  Devlin’s	  own	  line,	  adamantly	  denying	  any	  CIA	  role	  in	  Mobutu’s	  decision	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  For	  example,	  Harriman	  to	  Embassy,	  Kinshasa,	  4th	  June	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  189	  Reported	  by	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  31st	  May	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  190	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  19th	  June	  1964;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  81,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  191	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  8th	  October	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  192	  Komer	  is	  better	  known	  for	  his	  role	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  ‘Pacification’	  program	  and	  briefly	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  Bundy’s	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  Security	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  president.	  Komer,	  Memorandum	  for	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  Congo,	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  NSF,	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  193	  CIA	  Intelligence	  Memorandum,	  ‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’	  26th	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  1965;	  Country	  File,	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  NSF,	  LBJL	  
	   70	  
to	  launch	  his	  coup	  in	  1965	  in	  his	  recent	  memoirs.194	  Just	  because	  it	  was	  not	  a	  long-­‐conceived	   strategy,	   however,	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   United	   States	   was	   not	  involved.	  In	  fact,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  consistent	  and	  long-­‐term	  policy	  is	  simply	  in	  keeping	  with	  Washington’s	  entire	  approach	  towards	  Congo	  in	  this	  period.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	   it	   is	   impossible	   with	   the	   evidence	   available	   to	   belie	   Devlin’s	   claim	  outright,	  a	  relatively	  strong	  circumstantial	  case	  for	  US	  collusion	  in	  the	  coup	  can	  be	  put	  together	  from	  the	  documents	  at	  hand.	  As	  has	  been	  seen,	  Mobutu	  had	  strong	  ties	  with	   the	  US	  and	   the	  CIA	   in	  particular	   since	  1960.	  Godley	   reaffirmed	   this	  point	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  coup	  stating	  that,	  ‘Devlin	  is	  as	  close	  to	  Mobutu	  as	  any	  non-­‐Congolese	  I	  know.’195	  Robert	  Komer	  too	  referred	  to	  exactly	  this	  in	  an	  offhand	  remark	  that	  more	  ‘baksheesh’	  would	  probably	  be	  needed	  to	  retain	  Mobutu’s	  support	  in	  the	  Kasavubu-­‐Tshombe	   affair.196	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   American	   policy	  makers	  were	   in	   a	   quandary	  over	  the	  Kasavubu-­‐Tshombe	  split.	  The	  US	  lacked	  the	  necessary	  leverage	  to	  control	  the	   president	   but	   backing	   Tshombe	   would	   have	   meant	   abandoning	   the	  longstanding	  policy	  of,	  at	  least	  overtly,	  backing	  the	  legitimate	  government.	  Initially,	  contacts	  with	  Mobutu	  were	   indeed	   to	  enlist	  him	   in	   the	  effort	   to	  maintain	  political	  unity.	   Nevertheless,	   as	   the	   political	   situation	   became	   more	   and	   more	   untenable,	  Washington	  began	  to	  look	  around	  for	  alternatives.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	   unwillingness	   to	   permit	   the	   Congolese	   to	   work	   out	   their	   own	   political	  destiny	   is	   clearly	   borne	   out	   by	   a	   note	   from	   Komer	   to	   Harriman	   at	   the	   end	   of	  October,	  	  ‘As	  the	  toughest	  Congo-­‐fighter	  of	  them	  all,	  you’re	  the	  one	  with	  whom	  I	  want	  to	  share	  my	  mounting	  worries…	  I	  feel	  it	   in	  my	  bones	  that,	   just	  as	  we	  close	  off	  the	  tag	  end	  of	  the	  last	  rebellion,	  we’re	  sliding	  into	  another	  all	   too	  familiar	  political	  crunch	  that	  could	  tear	  the	  Congo	  wide	  open	  again…	  So	  without	  prejudice	  to	  our	  ultimate	  decision,	  wouldn’t	  you	  agree	  that	  we	  should	  start	  contingency	  planning	  now	   to	   anticipate	   this	   problem.	   Otherwise	   we	   are	   at	   the	   mercy	   of	   the	  Congolese.’197	  	  Just	   as	   earlier	   the	   OAU	  was	   an	   inconceivable	   partner	   to	  Washington,	   the	   idea	   of	  leaving	   Congo’s	   problems	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   its	   own	   politicians	   was	   simply	   not	   an	  option	  and	  the	  thinly	  veiled	  prejudices	  entailed	  in	  this	  assumption	  are	  again	  all	  too	  apparent.	  That	  US	  contingency	  planning	  was	  to	  include	  Mobutu	  is	  clear.	  In	  fact,	  on	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  Devlin,	  Chief	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  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  25th	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  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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the	   23rd	   November	   Saunders	   reviewed	   the	   situation	   in	   Congo	   for	   Komer	   and	   the	  NSC	   and,	   having	  weighed	   up	   the	   alternatives	   of	   inaction	   or	   supporting	   Tshombe,	  clearly	   recommended	   backing	   a	   Mobutu	   coup.	   Indeed,	   his	   exact	   words	   deserve	  some	  attention,	  	  ‘3.	   We	   can	   back	   Mobutu.	  We	   could	   either	   back	   him	   in	   a	   coup	   or	   let	   him	   put	  together	  the	  best	  formula	  he	  can	  and	  get	  behind	  it.	  This	  is	  where	  I	  come	  out	  for	  the	   moment	   (as	   does	   Godley).	   He	   controls	   the	   army	   (with	   our	   help).	   He	   has	  shown	  himself	  the	  most	  sensible	  leader	  in	  the	  current	  mess.	  At	  the	  moment,	  he	  knows	  the	  ins	  and	  outs	  of	  the	  situation	  better	  than	  we	  do…	  I’d	  also	  recommend	  going	  back	  to	  the	  tougher	  line	  Godley	  recommended.	  With	  authority	  in	  hand	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  end	  of	  our	  aid,	  Godley	  should	  have	  a	  frank	  talk	  with	  Mobutu.	  This	  isn’t	   radically	  different	   from	  what	  we’re	  doing,	   but	   thinking	   this	  way	  does	   (a)	  make	  doubly	   important	  the	  case	  that	  will	  be	  made	  to	  [classified]	  and	  (b)	  focus	  our	  pressures	  on	  the	  guy	  who	  can	  accomplish	  most	  rather	  than	  hoping	  for	  too	  much	  form	  Kasa(vubu)…’198	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  paper	  trail	  ends	  here	  and	  no	  firm	  orders	  for	  Godley	  to	  actually	  have	  this	   talk	  or	  reports	   to	  the	  same	  have	  been	  declassified.	   It	   is	   telling,	  however,	  that	   only	   two	   days	   before	   the	   actual	   event,	   on	   the	   23rd	   November	   the	   national	  security	   aides	   in	   the	   White	   House	   and	   the	   ambassador	   in	   Kinshasa	   were	  considering	  the	  exact	  scenario	  that	  was	  to	  unfold.	  The	  very	  next	  day	  Mobutu	  called	  together	   the	   fourteen	   members	   of	   the	   army	   high	   command	   for	   an	   emergency	  session	  in	  Kinshasa	  and	  the	  coup	  was	  formally	  proclaimed	  and	  Mobutu	  endorsed	  as	  the	  new	  head	  of	  state	  by	  a	  summoned	  parliament	  on	  the	  25th	  November.	  That	   the	  embassy	  was	   in	  extremely	  close	  contact	  with	  Mobutu	  during	   these	  critical	  days	   is	  borne	   out	   by	   a	   cable	   from	   Godley	   on	   the	   morning	   of	   the	   coups	   stating	   that	   an	  embassy	  officer	   (presumably	  Devlin)	  had	  gone	   to	   see	  Mobutu	  unobserved.199	  As	  a	  result,	   the	   high	   level	   of	   contact	   between	  Mobutu	   and	   American	   embassy	   officials	  combined	  with	  the	  almost	  prophetic	  contingency	  planning	  in	  Washington	  only	  days	  before	  the	  event	  suggest	  either	  an	  uncanny	  coincidence	  or,	  indeed,	  a	  deeper	  level	  of	  US	  complicity	  in	  Mobutu’s	  rise	  to	  power	  than	  previously	  apparent.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	   the	   day	   of	   the	   coup,	   Godley	   did	   not	   express	   surprise	   and	  Mobutu	   did	   not	  hesitate	   to	   stress	   that	   he	   was	   counting	   on	   his	   American	   allies.200	  Furthermore,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  Saunders,	  Memorandum	  for	  Komer,	  22nd	  November	  1965;	  Files	  of	  Edward	  K.	  Hamilton,	  “Congo	  (B)”,	  Box	  2,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  199	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Washington,	  25th	  November	  1965;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  200	  Ibid.	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whatever	   the	   accuracy	   of	   the	   above	   inferences,	   that	   the	   US	  was	   at	   the	   very	   least	  indirectly	  involved	  in	  Mobutu’s	  ascendancy	  is	  without	  doubt.	  Mobutu’s	  powerbase	  was	   the	   army,	   which	   in	   turn	   drew	   its	   strength	   from	   the	   very	   tangible	   American	  military	  aid,	  as	  Hal	  Saunders	  had	  indicated.	  More	  generally,	  rather	  than	  a	  long-­‐term	  strategy	   to	   consolidate	   its	   domination	   over	   Congo,	   the	   American	   collusion	   in	  Mobutu’s	   coup	   was	   again	   borne	   out	   of	   short-­‐term	   expediency	   and	   improvised	  manipulation.	  The	  fact	  that	  American	  officials	  worked	  hard	  initially	  to	  maintain	  the	  Kasavubu-­‐Tshombe	  coalition	   in	  place	   flies	   in	   the	   face	  of	  any	  claim	  that	   the	  United	  States	  was	   deliberately	   looking	   to	   usurp	   the	   position	   of	   its	   Belgian	   ally	   in	   Congo.	  Once	  in	  power,	  however,	  the	  United	  States	  through	  its	  weight	  behind	  protecting	  and	  bolstering	  its	  man	  in	  Kinshasa	  thus	  eventually,	  and	  a	  little	  inadvertently,	  becoming	  the	  key	  foreign	  influence	  in	  Kinshasa.	  	  
With	  a	  Little	  Help	  from	  his	  Friends:	  the	  Early	  Years	  of	  Mobutism	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  new	  president	  was	  fortunate	  that	  the	  rebellion	  was	  in	  its	  last	  gasps	  as	  has	  been	  seen,	  but	  he	  faced	  enormous	  challenges	  in	  trying	  to	  establish	  some	  measure	  of	  stability	  while	  ensuring	  his	  own	  survival	  in	  the	  revolving-­‐door-­‐politics	  of	  a	  country	  that	  had	  not	  been	  without	  conflict	   for	  more	   than	  a	   few	  months	  at	  a	   time	  since	   its	  independence.	  Mobutu	   set	   about	   this	   task	  with	   ruthless	   single-­‐mindedness	   or,	   as	  British	  ambassador	  John	  Cotton	  put	  it,	   ‘In	  his	  haste	  to	  set	  the	  Congo	  on	  the	  way	  to	  recovery	  of	   its	  prosperity	  and	  self-­‐respect,	  Mobutu	  has	  proceeded	  with	  directness	  and	  vigour,	  limited	  only	  in	  considerations	  of	  self-­‐preservation.’201	  Well	  aware	  of	  his	  increasingly	   tyrannical	   qualities,	   the	   United	   States	   continued	   its	   support	   and	   on	  various	  occasions	  moved	  to	  intervene	  directly	  upon	  his	  behalf	  and	  ensure	  Mobutu’s	  survival.	   The	   insights	   of	   the	  British	  Ambassador	  offer	   a	   fascinating	   contemporary	  analysis	  of	  American	  policies	  as	  they	  unfolded	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  Congo.	  As	  such,	   the	   final	   years	   of	   the	   Johnson	   administration	   saw	   both	   the	   consolidation	   of	  Mobutu’s	   growing	   authoritarian	   grip	   on	   the	   country	   and	   the	   genesis	   of	   the	  reasoning	  behind	  America’s	  unerring	  support	  of	  the	  emerging	  despot,	   irrespective	  of	   the	   human	   cost	   of	   his	   rule,	   which	  would	   haunt	  Washington’s	   Congo	   approach	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   the	   political	   sphere,	   immediately	   following	   the	   coup	   Mobutu	   put	   a	  nationwide	  ban	  on	  all	  political	  activity	  to	  put	  an	  end,	  in	  the	  CIA’s	  words,	  to	  ‘six	  years	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  201	  Cotton,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  ‘Congo	  Republic:	  Annual	  Report	  for	  1966’,	  17th	  January	  1967,	  FCO	  25/55,	  Kew	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of	   intrigue	   that	  marked	   Congolese	   politics’.202	  He	   skilfully	   dealt	  with	   troublesome	  provincial	   politics	   by	   reducing	   the	   number	   of	   provinces	   and	   switching	   their	  governors,	   effectively	   undermining	   their	   local	   powerbases.203	  In	   November	   1966,	  Mobutu	   fired	   his	   long-­‐term	   deputy	   Leonard	   Mulamba	   and	   simply	   absorbed	   the	  powers	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  into	  his	  office.	  He	  also	  showed	  considerable	  cunning	  in	  dealing	  with	  potential	  political	  rivals	  as	  politicians	  were	  either	  so	  closely	  tied	  to	  the	   regime	   that	   they	   could	   barely	   present	   themselves	   as	   realistic	   alternatives,	   as	  was	   the	   case	   with	   his	   long	   term	   ‘Binza’	   cohorts	   Bomboko	   and	   Nendaka,	   now	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Transport	  respectively,	  or	  doomed	  to	  political	  exile,	  such	  as	  Adoula’s	  appointment	  as	  ambassador	  in	  Washington	  and	  Mulamba	  in	  New	  Delhi.204	  The	   following	   spring	   he	   created	   the	   Popular	   Revolutionary	   Movement	  (MPR)	  as	  Congo’s	  sole	  political	  party,	  despite	  provisions	  for	  a	  two	  party	  system	  in	  the	  new	  constitution.	  By	   June	  1967,	  a	  referendum	  approved	  this	  new	  constitution	  that	   essentially	   centralized	   power	   with	   the	   president.	   That	   patronage	   and	  corruption	  were	   to	  be	  his	  principle	   tools	   for	   ensuring	   loyalty	  was	  also	   clear	   from	  the	   appointment	   of	   his	   cousin,	   Jean	   Litho,	   as	   Finance	   Minister	   who	   according	   to	  Cotton,	  ‘shocked	  with	  the	  blatancy	  of	  his	  corruption.’205	  Thus,	  while	  pleased	  with	  his	  successful	   consolidation	   of	   power,	   it	   was	   hard	   not	   to	   note	   the	   increasingly	  authoritarian	   streak	   of	   Mobutu’s	   leadership	   or,	   as	   one	   CIA	   report	   pointed	   out,	  within	  a	  few	  months	  of	  his	  takeover	  Mobutu	  was	  ruling	  by	  a	  ‘mixture	  of	  decrees	  and	  wishful	  thinking’.206	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	   even	  more	   important	   in	   securing	   the	   new	  president’s	   grip	   on	   power	  than	  these	  measures	  in	  the	  political	  sphere	  was	  the	  wave	  of	  violent	  repression	  that	  became	  a	  hallmark	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  The	  very	  public	  execution	  of	  four	  would-­‐be	   conspirators	   in	  Kinshasa	   in	   June	  1966	   left	   the	  population	   at	   large	   in	  no	  doubt	  about	  how	  opposition	  would	  be	  treated.	  Ambassador	  Cotton	  noted	  that	  the	  motives	  behind	  ‘staging	  this	  barbaric	  farce’	  probably	  included	  his	  ‘persecution	  mania’	  and	  ‘a	  strong	   impulse	   to	   show	  himself	   to	   be	   a	   strong	  man.’207	  Nor	  was	   violence	  directed	  only	  against	  open	  dissent	  as	   it	   also	   coloured	  politics	  at	   large.	  Disapproving	  of	   the	  election	  of	  Tshombe’s	   former	  deputy,	  Godefroid	  Munongo,	  as	  governor	  of	  Katanga	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  CIA	  Weekly	  Review,	  ‘Mobutu	  and	  the	  Congo’,	  23	  June	  1967;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  203	  Cotton,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  ‘Congo	  Republic:	  Annual	  Report	  for	  1966’,	  17th	  January	  1967;	  FCO	  25/55,	  Kew	  204	  Ibid;	  Cotton,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Michael	  Stewart	  ‘Reflection	  on	  the	  Political	  Stability	  of	  President	  Mobutu	  and	  his	  Regime’,	  20th	  August	  1968;	  FCO	  25/55,	  Kew	  205	  CIA,	  Memo,	  ‘Situation	  in	  the	  Congo’,	  23rd	  February	  1966,	  LBJL-­‐	  NSF-­‐	  Country	  File-­‐	  Africa-­‐	  Congo-­‐	  Box	  85	  206	  	  Ibid.	  207	  Cotton	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  2nd	  June	  1966;	  FO-­‐	  1100/26-­‐	  Congo	  Internal	  Political	  Situation	  1966,	  Kew	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province,	  Mobutu	  simply	  had	  him	  arrested.	  Similarly,	  an	  overwhelming	  majority	  for	  the	   1967	   constitution	   was	   secured	   by	   methods	   ranging	   from	   ‘fraud,	   open	  intimidation	  and	  violence	  in	  the	  Katanga	  and	  the	  lukewarm	  regions	  to	  the	  murder	  of	  the	  mayor	  of	  Matadi,’	  according	  to	  the	  British	  embassy.208	  The	  results	  were	  clear	  and	   one	   CIA	   intelligence	   report	   summarised,	   not	   entirely	   critically,	   ‘By	   draconian	  methods,	   including	   liberal	  use	  of	   the	  Sûreté	   and	   the	  ANC,	  he	  has	   gained	   far	  more	  control	  over	   the	  provinces	   than	  his	  predecessors	  enjoyed.’209	  Thus,	  when	  asked	  to	  give	   an	   overall	   assessment	   of	   the	   Mobutu	   regime	   after	   its	   first	   three	   years	  Ambassador	  Cotton	  noted,	  ‘by	  European	  standards	  it	  is	  not	  an	  attractive	  regime	  and	  as	   regards	   to	   repression	   it	   probably	   compares	   unfavourably	   with	   other	   similar	  dictatorships.’210	  The	  cynical	  racist	  implications	  of	  such	  a	  statement	  are	  clear	  when	  African	  standards	  were	  not	  seen	  as	  matching	  those	  of	  Europe,	  as	  if	  the	  former	  were	  not	  as	  deserving	  of	  fair	  and	  functional	  governance	  and	  the	  latter	  had	  not	  had	  more	  than	  its	  share	  of	  ‘unattractive’	  regimes	  in	  recent	  history.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	   doubt	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  match	   ‘stick’	  with	   ‘carrot’,	  Mobutu	   also	   undertook	   a	  series	  of	  populist	  measures	  to	  secure	  a	  broader	  base	  of	  support.	  In	  an	  early	  prelude	  to	  the	  ‘authenticity’	  program	  that	  was	  to	  follow	  in	  1971,	  Mobutu	  began	  to	  espouse	  an	   increasingly	   nationalist	   line	   as	   well	   as	   a	   vitriolic	   campaign	   both	   against	   the	  former	   Belgian	   colonial	  masters	   and	   the	   persona	   of	   Tshombe	   himself,	   by	   now	   in	  exile	  in	  Madrid.	  This	  was	  the	  rationale	  behind	  renaming	  Leopoldville	  as	  Kinshasa	  in	  1966.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Mobutu	  denounced	  the	   ‘Contentieux	  Agreement’	  struck	  in	  February	  1965	  with	   its	   former	   colonial	  masters	   over	  Congo’s	   assets	   and	  debts	   as	  gross	  treachery	  by	  Tshombe	  and	  the	  Belgian	  government.	  Tshombe	  was	  eventually	  sentenced	   to	  death	   in	  absentia	   in	  March	  1967	  and	   the	  Belgians,	   and	   foreigners	   in	  general,	   bore	   the	   brunt	   of	   xenophobic	   attacks	   during	   the	   turbulent	   days	   of	   1967	  when	  mutinous	  mercenaries	   threatened	   the	   regime.211	  During	   this	  period	  of	   crisis	  Mobutu	  even	  turned	  on	  the	  foreign	  diplomatic	  corps,	  restricting	  the	  movements	  of	  foreigners	   and	   trying	   to	   shut	   down	   the	   channels	   of	   communications	   of	   outlying	  consulates.212	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  Belgian	  government	   turned	   to	  American	  diplomats	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208	  Cotton,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  ‘Congo	  Republic:	  Annual	  Report	  for	  1967’	  16th	  January	  1968;	  FCO	  25/55,	  Kew	  209	  CIA,	  Office	  of	  National	  Estimates,	  ‘Implications	  of	  the	  Latest	  Congo	  Crisis’	  4th	  August	  1966,	  LBJL-­‐	  NSF-­‐	  Country	  File-­‐	  Africa-­‐	  Congo-­‐	  Box	  85	  210	  Cotton	  to	  Stewart,	  20th	  August	  1968,	  ‘Reflection	  on	  the	  Political	  Stability	  of	  President	  Mobutu	  and	  his	  Regime’;	  FCO	  25/55,	  Kew	  	  211	  This	  culminated	  in	  the	  sacking	  of	  the	  Belgian	  embassy	  and	  the	  murder	  of	  seven	  Europeans	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Congo’s	  urban	  centres.	  Ambassador	  Cotton,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  London,	  ‘Congo	  Republic:	  Annual	  Report	  for	  1967’,	  16th	  January	  1968;	  FCO	  25/55,	  Kew	  212	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  United	  States	  alone	  was	  exempted	  from	  these	  measures	  caused	  considerable	  resentment	  amongst	  its	  European	  allies	  as	  is	  evidenced	  both	  by	  the	  cable	  traffic	  between	  the	  British	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in	  Kinshasa	   for	   help	   in	   reigning	   in	  Mobutu’s	   xenophobic	   campaign	   only	   serves	   to	  demonstrate	   how	   it	   was	   with	   the	   emergence	   of	   Mobutu	   at	   Congo’s	   helm	   that	  Belgian	  influence	  in	  Congo	  had	  finally	  been	  supplanted	  by	  the	  United	  States.213	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	   these	   populist	   overtones	   spilled	   over	   into	   Mobutu’s	   economic	  policies	   where,	   borrowing	   from	   one	   of	   Lumumba’s	   earlier	   themes,	   Mobutu	  espoused	  a	  line	  of	  economic	  independence	  from	  foreign	  influence	  and	  made	  a	  direct	  attack	  on	   the	  Belgian	  grip	  on	  Congo’s	   economy	  and	   resources.	   It	  was	  with	   this	   in	  mind	   that	   Mobutu	   pressured	   foreign	   businesses	   to	   move	   their	   headquarters	   to	  Kinshasa.	  When	  the	  Belgian	  mining	  giant	  Union	  Minière	  du	  Haut-­‐Katanga	  (UMHK)	  refused	  to	  comply	  he	  simply	  moved	  to	  nationalise	  the	  company	  and	  expropriate	  its	  assets	  into	  the	  newly	  founded	  Congolese	  ‘Gécamines’	  (La	  Générale	  des	  Carrières	  et	  des	  Mines)	  on	  the	  31st	  December	  1966.214	  Immediately	  this	  had	  a	  disastrous	  impact	  on	  the	  Congolese	  economy	  in	  the	  first	  two	  months	  of	  1967	  as	  UMHK	  protested	  the	  actions	  as	  illegal,	  froze	  copper	  exports	  and	  threatened	  to	  withdraw	  its	  workforce	  of	  some	   1500	   expert	   technicians.	   This	   would	   have	   left	   Mobutu	   in	   an	   untenable	  position	  and	  brought	  the	  Congo	  to	  its	  knees	  and	  a	  deal	  was	  worked	  out	  in	  which	  the	  Société	   Générale	   de	   Belgique,	   a	   thinly	   disguised	   substitute	   for	   UMHK,	   would	  continue	   to	   operate	   the	   mines	   for	   a	   substantial	   percentage	   of	   the	   revenue	   from	  mineral	  exports.	  215	  Ultimately,	  this	  allowed	  Mobutu	  to	  save	  face	  but	  placed	  UMHK	  in	  a	  better	  position	   than	  even	   the	  previous	   ‘Contentieux’	  agreement	  had	   foreseen.	  While	   copper	   production	   now	   continued	   at	   previous	   levels,	   this	   debacle	  was	   not	  without	   consequences	   as	   the	   interruption	   of	   exports	   left	   Congo	   short	   of	   foreign	  exchange	  vital	   for	  meeting	   its	   import	  quotas	   and	   resulted	   in	   an	  overall	   decline	   in	  production,	  rising	  unemployment	  and	  a	  severe	  devaluation	  of	  the	  Congolese	  Franc.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Again	   Mobutu	   responded	   swiftly	   by	   simply	   replacing	   the	   Franc	   with	   a	   new	  currency	   in	   the	   form	  of	   the	  Zaire	  on	  the	  24th	   June	  1967,	  with	  an	  effective	  330	  per	  cent	   devaluation	   of	   the	   currency.	   He	   reacted	   to	   the	   corresponding	   rise	   in	   living	  expenses	  with	  simple	  statutory	  twenty-­‐five	  per	  cent	  increase	  in	  wages	  the	  following	  October.	   Nevertheless,	   while	   these	   ill-­‐thought	   out	   inflationary	   measures	   were	  certainly	   felt	   amongst	   the	   population	   at	   large,	   ambassador	   Cotton	   noted	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  and	  London	  (see	  Cotton’s	  1967	  Annual	  Report	  in	  Ibid)	  and	  the	  German	  ambassador	  von	  Müllenheim-­‐Rechberg’s	  memoirs,	  Entführung	  und	  Tod	  des	  Moise	  Tshombe:	  Das	  Ende	  einer	  Hoffnung	  für	  den	  Kongo.	  (LIT,	  1998)	  p.	  55	  213	  Telegram	  no.	  184,	  Belgian	  Foreign	  Minister	  Pierre	  Harmel	  to	  Belgian	  Embassy,	  Washington,	  8th	  July	  1967;	  File	  18293	  II	  (d),	  Congo	  Départ	  a	  Ambabel	  Washington1967,	  BDA	  214	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  British	  insurance	  companies	  were	  simply	  nationalised.	  Cotton,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  ‘Congo	  Republic:	  Annual	  Report	  for	  1967’,	  16th	  January	  1968;	  FCO	  25/55,	  Kew	  215	  At	  this	  time	  UMHK	  represented	  no	  less	  than	  60%	  of	  Congo’s	  entire	  exports	  and	  the	  industrial	  sector	  made	  up	  some	  32%	  of	  Congo’s	  entire	  GDP.	  David	  Renton,	  David	  Seddon	  and	  Leo	  Zeilig,	  The	  Congo:	  Plunder	  and	  Resistance	  (Zed	  Books,	  London	  &	  New	  York,	  2007)	  pp.	  120-­‐21	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Mobutu	   was	   able	   to	   escape	   serious	   damage	   through	   the	   fortuitous	   rise	   in	   world	  copper	   prices	   that	   coincided	   with	   his	   first	   foray	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   economic	  policy.216	  	   Ultimately,	   however,	   these	   initial	   years	   revealed	   the	   new	   president’s	  reactive	  and	  short-­‐sighted	  approach	  to	  economic	  matters	  or,	  as	   the	  CIA	  put	   it,	   ‘An	  unsophisticated	  soldier,	  he	  has	   little	  grasp	  of	  economic	  and	  administrative	  details,	  and	   is	   impatient	   with	   political	   problems.	   He	   often	   acts	   impulsively,	   without	  weighing	  alternatives	  or	  consequences.’217	  That	   this	   flurry	  of	  activity	  was	  as	  much	  part	  of	  overt	  political	  posturing	  by	  the	  new	  leader	  as	  a	  sincere	  attempt	  at	  economic	  reform	  only	  serves	  to	  highlight	  Mobutu’s	  willingness	  to	  risk	  the	  material	  welfare	  of	  the	  Congolese	  people	  when	  it	  came	  to	  ensuring	  his	  personal	  political	  survival.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   picture	   that	   emerges,	   then,	   is	   one	   of	   a	   leader	   with	   scant	   regard	   for	   the	  actual	  betterment	  of	  Congo	  and	  increasingly	  inclined	  to	  centralise	  authority	  around	  his	  own	  persona	  by	  draconian	  and	  at	  times	  inhumane	  means.	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  this	  was	  clearly	  apparent	  to	  contemporary	  observers	  and	  Washington	  policy	  makers	  in	  particular.	  Indeed,	  as	  Mobutu	  stumbled	  through	  the	  first	  eighteen	  months	  of	  office	  his	   survival	  was	  by	  no	  means	  guaranteed	  and,	   in	  his	   first	  annual	   report	   following	  the	   November	   coup,	   Ambassador	   Cotton	   was	   increasingly	   sceptical	   whether	   the	  ‘good	  luck’	  that	  had	  kept	  him	  from	  disaster	  was	  set	  to	  continue.218	  More	  than	  good	  luck,	   however,	   Mobutu	   received	   an	   unqualified	   endorsement	   from	   the	   Johnson	  administration,	   no	   doubt	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   their	   relief	   of	   having	   a	   partner	  who	  seemed	  to	  at	  least	  stand	  a	  chance	  of	  exercising	  some	  semblance	  of	  control	  over	  this	  vast	  territory.	  When	  he	  faltered,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  there	  to	  catch	  him	  and	  ensure	  his	   survival.	  This	  endorsement	  was	  reflected	   in	  US	  policy	  primarily	   in	  two	   ways.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   military	   and	   economic	   assistance	   continued	  uninterrupted,	  albeit	  tied	  to	  an	  IMF	  program.	  In	  addition,	  on	  three	  known	  occasions	  America	   intervened	   in	   Congolese	   internal	   affairs	   on	   behalf	   of	  Mobutu	   in	   order	   to	  assure	  his	  position	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  country.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   two	   separate	   incidents	   the	   CIA	   gained	   intelligence	   concerning	   potential	  coups	   to	  overthrow	  Mobutu.	  Both	  occurred	  within	   the	   first	  year	  of	  his	  presidency	  and	  on	  both	  occasions	  it	  was	  deemed	  appropriate	  to	  warn	  Mobutu	  of	  the	  potential	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  Much	  of	  the	  above	  discussion	  on	  Mobutu’s	  economic	  policies	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  British	  Ambassador	  Cotton’s	  annual	  situation	  reports	  on	  Congo	  from	  1966-­‐68,	  FCO-­‐	  25/55.	  See	  also	  David	  Renton,	  David	  Seddon	  and	  Leo	  Zeilig,	  The	  Congo:	  Plunder	  and	  Resistance	  (Zed	  Books,	  London	  &	  New	  York,	  2007)	  pp.	  116-­‐129;	  Jeanne	  M.	  Haskin,	  The	  Tragic	  State	  of	  the	  Congo;	  from	  Decolonization	  to	  Dictatorship	  (Algora	  Publishing,	  New	  York,	  2005)	  217	  CIA,	  Office	  of	  National	  Estimates,	  ‘Implications	  of	  the	  Latest	  Congo	  Crisis’	  4th	  August	  1966;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  218	  Cotton,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  London,	  ‘Congo	  Republic:	  Annual	  Report	  for	  1966’,	  17th	  January	  1967;	  FCO	  25/55,	  Kew	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threat	  to	  ensure	  both	  his	  political	  survival	  and	  his	  gratitude	  to	  the	  benefactor.	  The	  first	   incident	  is	  mentioned	  by	  Devlin	  in	  his	  memoirs	  and	  relates	  to	  four	  Congolese	  politicians	   plotting	   a	   coup	   in	   Kinshasa.	   According	   to	   Devlin,	   they	   included	   the	  foreign	   minister	   and	   three	   previously	   anti-­‐Lumumbist	   politicians.	   As	   the	   plot	  thickened,	  he	  decided	  to	  tell	  Mobutu	  as,	   ‘…	  it	  was	  clearly	  not	   in	  the	   interest	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  have	  central	  government	  collapse	  or	  be	  debilitated	  to	  the	  delight	  of	  the	  Stanleyville	   (Kisangani)	   rebels.’219	  This	   is	  a	   little	  disingenuous	  as	   the	  rebellion	  had	  collapsed,	  there	  was	  no	  imminent	  threat	  facing	  Congo	  and	  nothing	  concrete	  to	  suggest	   that	   this	   coup	  would	   cause	   any	  more	   chaos	   than	  Mobutu’s	   had	   done	   six	  months	   earlier.220	  The	   four	   politicians	   involved	   in	   what	   would	   become	   known	   as	  the	   ‘Whitsun	   Plot’	   were	   publicly	   hanged	   as	   has	   been	   mentioned	   earlier	   in	   this	  paper.	   This	   sequence	   of	   events	   is	  more	   or	   less	   corroborated	  by	  National	   Security	  Staffer	  Edward	  Hamilton’s	  similar	  suggestion	  to	  reveal	  a	  supposed	  plot	  of	  Tshombe,	  with	   the	   backing	   of	   the	   South	   African	   government,	   to	   use	   a	   small	   number	   of	  mercenaries	   to	   overthrow	  Mobutu.	   On	   13th	   July	   1966	  Hamilton	  wrote	   to	   Bundy’s	  replacement,	   National	   Security	   Adviser	   Walt	   Rostow,	   ‘Thus	   I	   agree	   to	   Palmer’s	  suggestion	  that	  we	  very	  quietly	  give	  Mobutu	  the	  information	  we	  have	  (as	  we	  did	  six	  weeks	   ago	   when	   he	   stifled	   another	   incipient	   coup),	   and	   advise	   him	   to	   take	  precautionary	  steps	  to	  head	  the	  rebels	  off.’221	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	   the	   following	   year,	  when	   some	   two	  hundred	  mercenaries	  mutinied	   in	  eastern	  Congo,	  Mobutu	  and	  the	  United	  States	  were	  faced	  with	  an	  actual	  rather	  than	  potential	   threat.	   Some	   controversy	   remains	   over	   the	   motivations	   of	   the	  mercenaries;	   whether	   they	   were	   simply	   responding	   to	   irregular	   pay	   and	  diminishing	   supplies,	   reacting	   to	   Moise	   Tshombe’s	   kidnap	   and	   imprisonment	   in	  Algeria	   on	   the	   30th	   of	   June	   or	   motivated	   by	   the	   corresponding	   desire	   to	   replace	  Mobutu’s	   leadership.222	  Whatever	   the	  case,	   the	   towns	  of	  Kisangani,	  Bukavu,	  Kindu	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  219	  Larry	  Devlin,	  Chief	  of	  Station,	  Congo	  (Public	  Affairs	  Perseus	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2007)	  pp.	  236-­‐7	  220	  Devlin	  also	  fails	  to	  mention	  than	  one	  of	  these	  politicians	  was	  the	  very	  same	  Jerome	  Anany	  who	  had	  previously	  been	  considered	  by	  US	  embassy	  officials	  themselves	  as	  a	  viable	  candidate	  for	  the	  country’s	  leadership,	  as	  was	  noted	  earlier	  in	  this	  paper.	  Cotton,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  n,	  1st	  June	  1966;	  FO	  1100/26-­‐	  Congo	  Internal	  Political	  Situation	  1966,	  Kew	  221	  Joseph	  Palmer	  II	  was	  appointed	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  African	  Affairs	  that	  year.	  Hamilton,	  Memorandum	  to	  Rostow,	  13th	  July	  1966;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  NB.	  Ambassador	  Cotton	  also	  mentioned	  his	  strong	  suspicions	  that	  the	  American	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  Mission	  Blake	  had	  passed	  on	  this	  information	  to	  Mobutu	  in	  a	  cable	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  London	  on	  2nd	  June	  1966;	  FO	  1100/26-­‐	  Congo	  Internal	  Political	  Situation	  1966,	  Kew	  222	  The	  German	  ambassador	  von	  Müllenheim-­‐Rechberg	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  of	  the	  former	  opinion	  (cable	  from	  Kinshasa	  to	  Bonn	  on	  17th	  July	  1967,	  B34-­‐	  Band	  703-­‐	  Kongo	  Kinshasa,	  Kongo	  Krise	  &	  Söldner,	  Januar-­‐Dezember	  1967),	  while	  British	  Ambassador	  Cotton	  prescribed	  to	  the	  latter	  (Annual	  Report	  for	  1967).	  	  Müllenheim-­‐Rechberg	  came	  round	  to	  seeing	  the	  mercenary	  mutiny	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  plot	  in	  his	  memoirs,	  ‘Entführung	  und	  Tod	  des	  Moise	  Tshombe:	  Das	  Ende	  einer	  Hoffnung	  für	  den	  Kongo.’	  (LIT,	  1998)	  pp.	  55-­‐56	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and	  Goma	  fell	  without	  resistance	  from	  the	  ANC	  to	  the	  mercenaries	  and	  some	  eight	  hundred	  former	  Katangan	  gendarmes	  in	  the	  first	  ten	  days	  of	  July.	  Combined	  with	  a	  campaign	  of	   industrial	  sabotage	  in	  Katanga,	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  looked	  threatened	  once	   more.	   Thus,	   concerned	   by	   these	   developments	   and	   the	   fragility	   of	   its	   new	  found	   ally,	   the	   decision	   to	   agree	   to	   Mobutu’s	   request	   for	   assistance	   by	   offering	  logistical	   support	   to	   the	   ANC	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   unanimously	   endorsed	   by	  Secretary	   of	   State	   Dean	   Rusk,	   Deputy	   Secretary	   of	   Defence	   H.	   Paul	   Nitze,	   CIA	  Director	   Dick	   Helms	   and	   the	   Joint	   Chief	   of	   Staffs.223	  As	   a	   result,	   on	   July	   10th	   the	  United	   States	   dispatched	   three	   C-­‐130	   airplanes,	   accompanied	   by	   150	   air	   service	  men,	  to	  ferry	  the	  ANC	  to	  and	  from	  the	  fighting.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  decision	  for	  renewed	  American	  assistance	  was	  motivated	  by	  three	  factors.	  First	   and	   foremost	   was	   the	   desire,	   whatever	   his	   shortcomings,	   to	   see	   Mobutu’s	  reign	   continue	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   cultivating	   a	   pro-­‐Western	   Congo.	   Beyond	   this,	  with	  Mobutu’s	   populist	   rhetoric	   came	   a	   backlash	   against	  white	   civilians	   in	   Congo	   that	  was	  greatly	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  mercenary	  mutiny.	  By	  7th	  July,	  seven	  Europeans	  had	  reportedly	   been	   killed	   in	   the	   streets	   around	   Congo	   following	   further	   government	  race	   baiting.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   C-­‐130s	  were	   effectively	   used	   as	   leverage	   to	   reign	   in	  Mobutu’s	   inflammatory	   language	   and	   pressure	   the	   Kinshasa	   government	   to	   take	  measures	   to	   protect	   European	   and	   American	   lives	   in	   Congo.224	  Finally,	   the	   US	  mission	  served	  an	   important	  diplomatic	  purpose	  as	   it	  seemed	  to	  heal	  some	  of	   the	  wounds	  of	   the	  earlier	  entanglements	  of	   the	   Johnson	  administration	   in	  Congo.	  The	  irony	  must	  have	  been	  plain	  to	  all,	  but	  by	  1967	  the	  United	  States	  was	  flying	  missions	  alongside	  Ghanaian	  and	  Ethiopian	  pilots	   against	   the	   same	  white	  mercenaries	   that	  had	  originally	  operated	  as	  American	   financed	  proxies	   to	   the	   condemnation	  of	   the	  same	  African	  nations.	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  the	  maximum	  political	  mileage	  and	  appease	  any	   domestic	   rumblings	   over	   further	   US	   commitments	   beyond	   Vietnam,	  ambassador	   McBride,	   Godley’s	   replacement,	   ensured	   that	   a	   number	   of	  humanitarian	  missions	  were	  flown	  and	  the	  C-­‐130s	  eventually	  joined	  the	  Red	  Cross	  (ICRC)	   mission	   before	   leaving	   in	   December.225	  The	   official	   review	   of	   the	   C-­‐130	  operation	   was	   thus	   able	   to	   conclude,	   ‘In	   retrospect,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   quick	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  223	  Rostow,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  the	  President:	  Help	  for	  the	  Congo’,	  6th	  July	  1967;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  86,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  224	  Rostow,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  the	  President:	  Help	  for	  the	  Congo’,	  7th	  July	  1967;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  86,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  225	  Rostow,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  the	  President:	  Help	  for	  the	  Congo’,	  12th	  July	  1967;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  86,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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despatch	  of	  the	  three	  C-­‐130	  planes	  was	  a	  skilful	  political	  investment.’226	  In	  all	  three	  of	   the	   above	   cases	   then,	   whether	   the	   threat	   was	  military	   or	   political,	   the	   United	  States	  firmly	  backed	  its	  man.	  With	  regards	  to	  the	  mercenaries,	  having	  held	  out	  for	  the	  best	  part	  of	  half	  a	  year,	   they	  slipped	  over	   the	  border	   into	  Rwanda	  unopposed	  that	  December.	  In	  April	  1968	  a	  deal	  was	  brokered	  by	  the	  United	  States	  between	  the	  African	   Union	   and	   the	   Red	   Cross	   to	   have	   them	   flown	   to	   Europe	   and	   Rostow	  informed	  the	  President,	  ‘a	  stormy	  chapter	  has	  quietly	  closed	  in	  the	  Congo.’227	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	   is	   worth	   pausing	   briefly	   to	   further	   explore	   the	   United	   States’	   unwavering	  support	  for	  Mobutu	  in	  the	  first	  years	  of	  his	  rule.	  As	  has	  been	  seen,	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  various	   assessments	   emanating	   from	   the	   State	   Department,	   CIA	   and	   American	  embassy	   reveal	   considerable	  anxiety	  both	  over	  Mobutu’s	   authoritarian	   leadership	  style,	  his	  ruthless	  and	  cruel	  repressive	  tactics,	  his	  complete	  lack	  of	  understanding	  of	  economic	  policies	  and	  his	  rash	  and	  erratic	  nature.	  On	  the	   last	  point,	  the	  American	  Kinshasa	   embassy’s	   Deputy	   Chief	   of	   Mission,	   Robert	   Blake,	   even	   consulted	   two	  doctors	   known	   to	   the	   president	   in	   this	   regard	   to	   gain	   assurances	   over	   Mobutu’s	  mental	  health	  and	  Godley	  blamed	  his	  eventual	  eviction	  from	  Congo	  on	  exactly	  this	  ‘inclination	   to	   fly	   off	   half-­‐cocked’.228	  The	   British	   ambassador	   Cotton	   concurred	   to	  this	   view	   describing	   his	   ‘persecution	   mania	   or	   paranoia’	   and	   bouts	   of	   heavy	  drinking.229	  Furthermore,	  while	  the	  political	  scene	  may	  have	  become	  slightly	  more	  predictable,	   contemporary	   onlookers	   were	   well	   aware	   that	   the	   fundamental	  problems	  of	  Congo	  remained	  essentially	  unresolved.	  Thus,	  a	  CIA	  intelligence	  report	  concluded	   two	   years	   after	   Mobutu’s	   coup,	   ‘All	   of	   the	   problems	   which	   have	  traditionally	  plagued	   the	  Congo	  still	   remain.	  Tribal	  conflict	  has	  been	  subdued,	  but	  mainly	   because	   of	   weariness	   and	   fear;	   basic	   antagonisms	   continue	   to	   ferment	  beneath	   the	   surface.’230	  While	   these	  may	  have	  been	  ominous	  and	  clearly	  apparent	  warning	  signals	   for	  what	  was	  to	  come,	  at	  no	  point	  were	  they	  deemed	  sufficient	  to	  suggest	  a	  change	  in	  policy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   the	   Johnson	   administration	   was	   relieved	   that	   finally	   a	   strong	   central	  force	  was	  emerging	  in	  Congo	  and	  more	  elaborate	  modernising	  strategies	  espoused	  by	   the	  president’s	  National	   Security	  Adviser	   elsewhere	   remained	  absent	   from	   the	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  H.J.	  Cohen,	  ‘Review	  of	  the	  C-­‐130	  Operation	  in	  the	  Congo’;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  86,	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  LBJL	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  Cotton	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  2nd	  June	  1966;	  FO-­‐	  1100/26-­‐	  Congo	  Internal	  Political	  Situation	  1966,	  Kew;	  H.J.	  Cohen,	  ‘Review	  of	  the	  C-­‐130	  Operation	  in	  the	  Congo’;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  86,	  NSF,	  LBJL	  228	  Blake,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  86,	  NSF,	  LBJL;	  Godley,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  18th	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  1966,	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  85,	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  229	  Cotton	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  2nd	  June	  1966;	  FO-­‐	  1100/26-­‐	  Congo	  Internal	  Political	  Situation	  1966,	  Kew	  230	  CIA	  Weekly	  Review,	  ‘Mobutu	  and	  the	  Congo’,	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  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  87,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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agenda.231	  Not	  only	  was	  Mobutu	  a	  willing	  ally	  but	  he	  also	  actually	  appeared	  able	  to	  exert	   some	   measure	   of	   control	   over	   this	   vast	   and	   divided	   territory,	   albeit	   with	  American	  backing.	  Despite	   its	   inherent	  warning,	   the	  very	  same	   intelligence	  report	  quoted	  above	  was	  coloured	  by	  a	  much	  more	  optimistic	  tone	  overall	  as	  it	  stated,	  	  ‘Although	   the	  Congo	   still	   faces	  hard	   times,	   its	   future	   looks	  brighter	   at	   present	  than	   at	   any	   time	   since	   independence…	   the	   central	   government	   is	   exercising	  reasonable	  control	  over	  disparate	  regional	  elements,	  and	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  independence	  seems	   to	  be	  directing	  or	   influencing	  events	   throughout	   the	  vast	  interior.’	  	  	  Perhaps	  their	  readiness	  to	  see	  the	  emerging	  despot	  as	  the	  answer	  to	  their	  perceived	  Congo	   problem	   was	   understandable	   and	   it	   is	   not	   the	   purpose	   here	   to	   offer	   a	  teleological	   argument	   suggesting	   that	   American	   policy	   makers	   should	   have	  foreseen	  Mobutu’s	  thirty-­‐two	  year	  rule	  of	  ‘state	  kleptocracy’	  and	  sought	  to	  avert	  its	  disastrous	  consequences	  for	  Congo	  at	  this	  early	  stage	  of	  his	  career.	  Much	  rather,	  the	  commentary	  of	  the	  British	  ambassador	  makes	  plain	  that	  even	  with	  the	  information	  available	  at	  the	  time,	  a	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  readily	  suggested	  itself.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   telegram	  on	   the	  22nd	  August	  1967	   from	  ambassador	  Cotton	  concerned	  with	  the	   direction	   US	   policy	   was	   taking	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   mercenary	   mutiny	   is	  particularly	  illuminating,	  	  ‘As	   we	   see	   the	   situation,	   although	   there	   is	   ample	   evidence	   that	   the	   Mobutu	  regime	   is	   quite	   unfit	   to	   govern	   the	   country,	   the	   Americans	   will	   continue	   to	  support	   him	   because	   of	   their	   obsession	   that,	   if	   he	   goes,	   a	   left	   wing	  administration	  will	   follow.	  They	  are	   therefore	  prepared	   to	  overlook	   the	  whole	  gamut	  of	  his	  misdeeds	  and	  the	  probability	  that	  there	  is	  even	  worse	  to	  come.’232	  	  This	  assessment	  appears	  to	  be	  extremely	  accurate	  as	  is	  illustrated	  by	  Walt	  Rostow’s	  recommendation	  for	  the	  president	  to	  approve	  the	  C-­‐130	  Airlift	  in	  1967,	  	  ‘There	  is	  little	  visceral	  satisfaction	  in	  helping	  Mobutu.	  He	  is	  irritating	  and	  often	  stupid.	  By	  our	  standards,	  he	  can	  be	  cruel	  to	  the	  point	  of	  inhumanity…There	  is	  no	  other	  Congolese	  leader	  in	  sight	  who	  stands	  a	  reasonable	  chance	  of	  holding	  the	  country	   together,	   much	   less	   maintaining	   the	   present	   friendly	   relations	   with	  us.’233	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  231	  Walt	  Rostow,	  Stages	  of	  Economic	  Growth:	  A	  Non-­‐Communist	  Manifesto	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press;	  Cambridge,	  1960)	  232	  Cotton,	  Kinshasa	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Office,	  22nd	  August	  1967;	  FCO	  38/126,	  Kew	  233	  Rostow,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  President,	  ‘Help	  for	  the	  Congo’,	  6th	  July	  1967;	  Country	  File,	  Africa,	  Congo,	  Box	  86,	  NSF,	  LBJL	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The	   racist	   subtext	   of	   juxtaposing	   ‘American	   standards’	   with	   the	   cruelty	   of	   the	  Congolese	  leader	  is	  again	  implicit.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Importantly,	  Cotton	  did	  not	  take	  issue	  with	  American	  backing	  of	  Mobutu	  itself,	  however,	  but	  with	  the	  unconditional	  nature	  of	  this	  support.	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  urgently	  recommended	  that	  any	  assistance	  should	  be	  tied	  to	  political	  reform,	  ‘in	  my	  view	  the	  American	  solution	  of	  the	  mercenary	  problem	  no	  longer	  suffices	  in	  itself	  to	  cure	  the	  ills	  of	  the	  Congo.	  What	  is	  additionally	  required	  is	  the	  complete	  and	  urgent	  reform	  of	  sections	   of	   the	   central	   government	   and	   provincial	   authorities.’234	  To	   be	   sure,	   it	   is	  unclear	   from	   the	   evidence	   at	   hand	  whether	   these	   demarches	  made	   it	   to	   Cotton’s	  American	  counterparts.	  Considering	  the	  high	  level	  of	  cooperation,	  particularly	  over	  the	  mercenary	   issue	  and	   the	   fact	   that	  America	   requested	  British	  assistance	   in	   the	  airlift	   operation,	   it	   seems	   likely	   that	   these	   views	  would	   have	   been	   aired	   at	   some	  point,	   if	   in	   a	   watered	   down	   form.	  This	   American	   failure	   to	   tie	   their	   assistance	   to	  political	  reform,	  however,	  simply	  reflected	  a	  different	  set	  of	  priorities.	  While	  some	  of	  his	   failings	  may	  have	  been	  regrettable,	  viewed	   through	   the	  Cold	  War	  paradigm	  prevalent	   in	   Washington	   it	   was	   far	   more	   important	   to	   have	   a	   western	   oriented	  authority	  keeping	  a	  lid	  on	  Congo	  in	  the	  here	  and	  now	  than	  it	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  long-­‐term	   viable	   strategy	   for	   the	   development	   of	   an	   independent,	   self-­‐sufficient	   and	  prospering	  country	  for	  the	  future.	  Thus,	  a	  line	  of	  reasoning	  that	  would	  be	  criticised	  by	   academics	   and	   sustained	   by	   policy	   makers	   well	   into	   the	   nineties	   was	   born;	  Mobutu	   should	   be	   upheld	   and	   his	   shortcomings	   ignored	   because	   there	   was	   no	  immediately	   apparent	   Dauphin	   to	   replace	   him	   and	   chaos	   threatened	   without	  him. 235 	  Ambassador	   Cotton	   clearly	   felt	   that	   the	   United	   States	   had	   a	   moral	  responsibility	   to	   use	   their	   leverage	   in	   exerting	   a	   positive	   influence	   on	   Congo’s	  political	  destiny,	  not	  least	  because	  ‘the	  Americans	  helped	  place	  Mobutu	  where	  he	  is	  and	  to	  maintain	  him	  there.’236	  Unfortunately,	  neither	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  in	  Washington	  nor	  its	  diplomatic	  corps	  in	  Kinshasa	  shared	  this	  sentiment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   result	   was	   clear.	   The	   United	   States	   had	   ensured	   the	   survival	   of	   their	  protégé	  and	  no	  attempts	  were	  made	  to	  curb	  his	  personal	  quest	  for	  power.	  By	  1968	  his	  position	  appeared	  unassailable.	  Cotton	  was	  under	  no	  illusions	  what	  this	  entailed	  for	   the	   Congolese	   people,	   ‘The	   ordinary	  man	   in	   the	   street,	   and	   particularly	   those	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  He	  went	  on	  to	  name	  a	  number	  of	  characters	  in	  Congolese	  politics	  who	  needed	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  Mobutu’s	  inner	  circle	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  create	  a	  more	  inclusive	  government.	  These	  included	  Information	  Minister	  J.J.	  Kande,	  head	  of	  the	  ANC	  General	  Bobozo,	  governor	  of	  Katanga	  Manzikale,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Sûreté	  Mika	  and	  the	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  MPR	  Mungul	  Diaka.	  Cotton,	  Kinshasa	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Office,	  22nd	  August	  1967,	  FCO	  38/126,	  Kew	  235	  Most	  notably,	  Schraeder,	  Mobutu	  or	  Chaos	  236	  Cotton	  to	  Stewart,	  20th	  August	  1968,	  ‘Reflection	  on	  the	  Political	  Stability	  of	  President	  Mobutu	  and	  his	  Regime’,	  FCO	  25/55,	  Kew	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who	   live	   in	   the	   capital	   and	   in	   the	   other	   big	   urban	   centres,	   are	   undoubtedly	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  regime	  and	  contrast	  their	  lot	  with	  the	  gross	  extravagance	  of	  the	   president	   and	   of	   his	   collaborators.’ 237 	  Nevertheless,	   he	   acknowledged	   the	  successful	  outcome	  of	  American	  policy	  over	  the	  past	  four	  years	  concluding,	  	  ‘In	  spite	  of	  these	  misgivings	  and	  the	  heart	  searching	  which	  is	  undoubtedly	  going	  on	  about	  the	  Congo	  and	  its	  President,	  it	  is	  my	  firm	  conviction	  that	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  no	  longer	  any	  satisfactory	  alternative	  to	  Mobutu	  and	  that,	  taking	  all	  the	  factors	  into	  consideration,	  he	  is	  probably	  as	  good	  a	  Chief	  of	  State	  as	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  country	  which	  has	  in	  the	  brief	  period	  of	  existence	  thrown	  up	  so	  many	  aspirants	  to	   power	   but	  who	   have	   as	   quickly	   relapsed	   into	   obscurity	   or	   been	   otherwise	  disposed	  of.’238	  	  Thus,	  by	  1968	  the	  American	  mantra	  that	  Mobutu	  was	  the	  only	  viable	  alternative	  to	  anarchy	  in	  Congo	  had	  become	  a	  grim	  reality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	   summarise,	   having	   briefly	   examined	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   Simba	   rebels,	   this	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	  there	  is	  considerable,	  if	  circumstantial,	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  a	   high	   level	   of	   US	   involvement	   in	   Mobutu’s	   power	   seizure.	   Subsequently,	   while	  intelligence	   reports	   and	   the	   assessments	   emanating	   from	   the	   Kinshasa	   embassy	  expressed	   considerable	   doubt	   over	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   Mobutu’s	   leadership,	  America	  embraced	  Congo’s	  new	  president	  and	  did	  all	   it	   could	   to	  sustain	  his	  grasp	  on	   power.	   On	   three	   separate	   incidents	   the	   United	   States	   actively	   intervened	   to	  ensure	   the	   survival	   of	   their	   ally.	   From	   the	  Cold	  War	  point	   of	   view	  of	   the	   Johnson	  administration,	   this	   appeared	   to	  make	   good	   strategic	   sense	   and	   some	   diplomatic	  ground	  could	  be	  regained	  following	  the	  1964	  debacle	  as	  America	  once	  more,	  and	  a	  little	  fortuitously,	  found	  itself	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  a	  fight	  against	  white	  oppression	  in	  the	   form	   of	   the	   mutinous	   mercenaries.	   Beyond	   this,	   however,	   a	   qualitative	  difference	   to	   the	   intrigues	   of	   the	   Lumumba	   years	   can	   again	   be	   noted	   in	   the	  assessment	  of	  this	  period.	  By	  November1965	  the	  rebellion	  was	  in	   its	   final	  throws,	  the	  Cubans	  had	   left	  and	  at	  no	  point	  did	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  show	  anywhere	  near	  the	  level	   of	   interest	   of	   the	   1960-­‐1	   showdown,	   as	   US	   officials	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	  Atlantic	  were	  well	   aware.	   As	   a	   result,	   it	   is	   harder	   to	   see	   the	   immediate	   strategic	  need	   to	   again	   meddle	   in	   Congolese	   politics	   and	   these	   choices	   must	   be	   viewed	  critically.	   Furthermore,	   early	   warnings	   for	   what	   was	   to	   come	   in	   Mobutu’s	   reign	  were	   apparent	   to	   policy	  makers	   already	   at	   this	   early	   stage.	   This	   neither	   deterred	  the	   United	   States	   from	   its	   unconditional	   support	   nor	   did	   it	   cause	   it	   to	   use	   its	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  Ibid.	  	  238	  Ibid.	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leverage	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  direct	  Congo’s	  new	  leader	  in	  a	  more	  positive	  direction.	  Thus	  a	   line	  of	   reasoning	  was	  conceived	   in	   the	   final	  years	  of	   the	   Johnson	  administration	  that	   would	   tie	   America	   firmly	   to	   this	   questionable	   leader	   and	   haunt	   American-­‐Congolese	  relations	  for	  the	  next	  32	  years;	  Mobutu	  was	  deemed	  the	  only	  viable	  and	  tested	   alternative	   to	   Congo	   once	  more	   descending	   into	   chaos.	   The	   Johnson	   years	  thus	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  era	  in	  US-­‐Congolese	  relations.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Congo	   was,	   of	   course,	   never	   the	   most	   urgent	   priority	   for	   Johnson,	   more	  comfortable	   in	  domestic	  politics	  and	   increasingly	  weighed	  down	  by	   the	  burden	  of	  Vietnam.	   Nevertheless,	   time	   and	   again	   his	   administration	   deemed	   turmoil	   in	   this	  vast	  African	  interior	  worthy	  of	  renewed	  intervention.	  Indeed,	  a	  rather	  short	  sighted	  Cold	  War	  myopia	  dominated	  the	  American	  approach	  to	  Congo	  as	  a	  fear	  of	  potential	  communist	   exploitation	   coloured	   even	   accurate	   readings	   of	   the	   country’s	   more	  parochial	  disturbances.	  Perhaps	  a	  degree	  of	  executive	  inattention	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  failure	  to	  develop	  a	  coherent	  Africa	  strategy	  throughout	  his	  presidency.	  The	  result	   was	   a	   stream	   of	   short-­‐term	   opportunistic	   manipulations	   to	   control	   the	  Kinshasa	  political	   scene	  and	  contain	   the	  spread	  of	  violence	   that	   filled	  Washington	  with	   apprehension.	   Responding	   to	   immediate	   events	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   a	  hodgepodge	  of	  opinions	  at	  varying	  times	  from	  its	  country	  team,	  its	  European	  allies	  and	  a	  few	  dominant	  voices	  in	  the	  State	  Department;	  this	  produced	  its	  initial	  support	  for	  Moise	   Tshombe,	   the	   thinly	   veiled	   covert	  mercenary	   operations,	   the	   Kisangani	  intervention	  with	  Belgium,	  and,	  finally,	  Mobutu’s	  power	  grab.	  Far	  from	  a	  long-­‐term	  strategy,	   as	   was	   demonstrated	   both	   by	   its	   support	   for	   a	   Tshombe-­‐dominated	  government	   and	   its	   initially	   critical	   view	   of	   Mobutu	   in	   1964,	   it	   was	   this	   final	  development	   and	  Mobutu’s	   sudden	   rise	   that	   also	   saw	   the	   United	   States	   begin	   to	  usurp	   the	   role	   of	   the	   former	   colonial	   masters	   as	   Congo’s	   dominant	   foreign	  influence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Again,	  while	   it	   is	   tempting	  to	   interpret	  American	  actions	  as	   long-­‐standing	  and	  economically	   motivated	   plan	   to	   exploit	   Congo,	   a	   distinction	   should	   be	   made	  between	   American	   ambitions	   to	   dominate	   political	   outcomes	   in	   Congo	   and	   the	  continued	   hold	   of	   Belgian	   economic	   interests	   such	   as	   UMHK	   over	   the	   country’s	  mineral	   resources.	   In	   other	   words	   and	   a	   little	   paradoxically,	   it	   was	   a	   policy	   of	  opportunistic	  meddling	  in	  line	  with	  American	  Cold	  War	  aims,	  while	  perhaps	  no	  less	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imperial	   in	   its	  efforts	  to	  shape	  Kinshasa	  politics,	   that	   finally	  saw	  the	  United	  States	  displace	  Belgium	  as	  the	  key	  influence	  on	  Congo’s	  elite.	  Nothing	  illustrated	  this	  more	  powerfully	  than	  Tshombe’s	  swift	  demise	  and	  the	  desperate	  Belgian	  appeals	  to	  their	  American	   counterparts	   to	   reign	   in	   Mobutu’s	   increasingly	   xenophobic	   campaigns	  against	   Congo’s	   former	   rulers.	   While	   the	   entire	   administration	   in	   Washington	  appeared	  well	  pleased	  with	   its	  successful	  Congo	   intervention,	  early	  warning	  signs	  for	  the	  turbulent	  road	  ahead	  for	  its	  new	  Mobutu	  partnership	  abounded.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Congo	   itself	   appeared	   to	  breathe	  a	   sigh	  of	   relief	  as	   the	   rebellion	  shrunk	  away	  into	   the	   eastern	   bush	   and	   Mobutu	   restored	   a	   degree	   of	   calm	   to	   Kinshasa’s	  tempestuous	   politics.	   Following	   five	   years	   of	   intermittent	   chaos	   and	   violence	  throughout	   the	   country	   whose	   greatest	   victims	   were	   ordinary	   Congolese,	   the	  restoration	   of	   a	   semblance	   of	   order	  was	   no	   doubt	  welcomed.	   Nevertheless,	   early	  indications	   of	   Mobutu’s	   authoritarianism	   that	   painted	   a	   troubling	   picture	   for	  Congo’s	   future	   were	   in	   ready	   supply.	   Almost	   immediately,	   the	   new	   president	  centralised	  power	  tightly	  in	  his	  own	  hands	  and	  displayed	  a	  willingness	  to	  use	  both	  violent	   repression	   and	   corrupt	   patronage	   to	   ensure	   his	   dominance.	   Equally	  troubling	  was	   his	   readiness	   to	   take	   crass	   economic	  measures	   to	   further	   his	   own	  political	   goals,	   indicative	   of	   a	   permanent	   neglect	   of	   the	   lot	   of	   ordinary	   Congolese	  that	   would	   characterise	   his	   regime.	   Of	   course,	   the	   full-­‐fledged	   exploitation	   of	  Mobutu’s	   ‘state	   kleptocracy’	   was	   not	   yet	   visible,	   but	   the	   British	   ambassador’s	  commentary	   and	   Walt	   Rostow’s	   assessment	   cited	   earlier	   indicate	   that	  contemporary	   observers,	   and	   American	   policy	   makers	   in	   particular,	   were	   well	  aware	  of	  his	  shortcomings.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  cessation	  of	  violence	  and	  the	  fortuitous	  rise	  in	  copper	  prices	  ensured	  that	  even	  Congo	  was	  offered	  a	  brief	  respite	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   impact	   of	  Mobutu’s	   rise	   on	  American	   regional	   standing	   initially	   also	   lent	  itself	  to	  a	  tentatively	  optimistic	  appraisal.	  Of	  course,	  Mobutu’s	  name	  was	  tarnished	  by	   his	   collaboration	  with	  Western	   forces	   during	   the	   turbulent	   years	   immediately	  following	   independence,	   and	   the	  murder	  of	  Lumumba	   in	  particular,	   as	  well	   as	  his	  willingness	  to	  resort	  to	  white	  mercenaries	  to	  bolster	  his	  floundering	  ANC.	  That	  said,	  during	   the	   early	   years	   of	   his	   rule	   Mobutu	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   moderately	  successful	   in	  wooing	  the	  OAU	  and	  positioning	  himself	  as	  a	  genuine	  African	   leader.	  No	   doubt	   his	   strident	   nationalistic	   rhetoric	   and	   virulent	   attacks	   on	   his	   former	  Belgian	  allies	  helped	  enhance	  these	  credentials.	  Most	  important	  from	  an	  American	  perspective,	  however,	  was	  the	  forceful	  ejection	  of	  the	  mutinous	  white	  mercenaries,	  formerly	   the	  mainstay	   of	  Mobutu’s	   own	  military	   power,	   from	   eastern	   Congo.	   The	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fact	   that	  American	  C-­‐130s	  were	   flying	  alongside	  Ethiopian	  and	  Ghanaian	  pilots	   to	  defeat	  the	  hated	  white	  mercenary	  foe	  helped	  at	  least	  partially	  restore	  the	  tarnished	  American	   image,	  and	  Washington	  made	   the	  most	  of	   this	   slightly	   ironic	  diplomatic	  triumph.	  As	  such,	  not	  only	  did	  Mobutu	  appear	  to	  offer	  a	  modicum	  of	  stability	  for	  a	  pro-­‐Western	   Congo,	   but	   this	   final	   episode	   during	   the	   last	   year	   of	   the	   Johnson	  administration	   also	   permitted	   the	   United	   States	   to	   reclaim	   some	   ground	   as	   the	  supporter	  of	  a	  ‘moderate’	  African	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   from	  the	  embassy	  and	  Congo	  country	  team,	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  Central	   Intelligence	   Agency	   to	   the	   White	   House;	   all	   corners	   of	   the	   Johnson	  administration	  seemed	  well	  pleased	  with	  their	  Congo	  intervention	  and	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	   a	   critical	   opinion	   amongst	   policy	   makers	   over	   the	   course	   taken.	   With	   the	  restoration	  of	  a	  measure	  of	  order	  to	  Congo,	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  proclaimed	  its	   successive	   interventions	   a	   well-­‐executed	   success	   (having	   kept	   at	   bay	   the	  communist	  forces	  that	  by	  its	  own	  reckoning	  were	  never	  much	  interested	  in	  Congo	  during	   this	   latter	   period,	   at	   least	   until	   the	   popular	   outcry	   over	   the	   Kisangani	  intervention).	  Moreover,	  Mobutu	   had	   long	   enjoyed	   close	   ties	   to	   the	  United	   States	  and	  his	   gaze	  was	   firmly	   fixed	  on	   the	  West.	  Even	   into	   the	  present	   the	  CIA’s	  Congo	  foray	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  Cold	  War	  success	  story	  in	  the	  Third	  World	  as	  a	   seemingly	   loyal	   ally	   was	   called	   into	   being.	   With	   a	   little	   more	   distance,	   these	  developments	  had	  a	  worrying	  side	  effect	   for	  the	  American	  position	  in	  the	  broader	  super	  power	  rivalry,	  however.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Having	  apparently	  grasped	  that	  black	  rights	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  contained	  in	  the	  domestic	  arena,	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  was	  singularly	  devoid	  of	  a	  vision	  for	  the	  clamour	  of	  African	  voices	  desperate	  to	  complete	  their	  continent’s	  independence	  from	  white	  minority	   subjugation.	   Congo	   remained	   a	   symbol	   of	   neo-­‐colonial	   meddling	   and	  superpower	  manipulation	  from	  its	  independence	  in	  1960.	  Under	  Johnson,	  however,	  no	  attempt	  was	  made	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  country’s	  very	  real	  and	  deep-­‐rooted	  domestic	  problems,	  as	  the	  CIA	  itself	  noted,	  and	  regional	  organisations	  were	  bulldozed	  by	  an	  administration	  favouring	  short-­‐term	  and	  clandestine	  manipulations	  for	  controlling	  renewed	  turmoil	  in	  Congo.	  Precisely	  these	  ad-­‐hoc	  policies,	  however,	  first	  effectively	  defeated	   the	  Simba	  uprising	  and	   then	  played	  an	   integral	   role	   in	   the	  emergence	  of	  Mobutu	  and	  ensuring	  his	  survival	  as	  he	  scrambled	  to	  consolidate	  his	  rule.	  As	  such,	  a	  seemingly	  low-­‐cost	  modus	  operandi	  of	  co-­‐opting	  Congo’s	  narrow	  elite	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  more	   fundamental	   engagement	  of	   the	   country’s	   economic	  and	  political	   challenges	  was	   established	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   Mobutu	   was	   greeted	   with	   relief	   and	  satisfaction,	  just	  as	  his	  self-­‐serving	  agenda	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  visible.	  Such	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  Against	   overwhelming	   odds,	   and	   with	   considerable	   help	   from	   his	   American	  backers,	   Mobutu	   had	   survived	   the	   turbulent	   1960s	   and	   returned	   a	   modicum	   of	  peace	  and	  stability	  to	  Congo.	   If	   the	  crisis	  years	  were	  over,	  perhaps	   it	  was	  time	  for	  Congo	  to	  fulfil	   its	  much-­‐anticipated	  potential?	  For	  Mobutu,	  however,	  this	  need	  not	  involve	  Congo’s	  ordinary	  citizens	  whom	  he	  increasingly	  used	  as	  vassals	  in	  his	  quest	  for	  personal	  power	  and	  enrichment.	  Growing	   in	  stature	  and	  self-­‐confidence	  as	  his	  first	  official	  term	  drew	  to	  a	  close,	  the	  increasingly	  assertive	  president	  began	  to	  force	  his	   own	  agenda	   in	   all	   facets	  of	  Congolese	   life	  with	   almost	   immediately	  disastrous	  consequences	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  country	  at	  large.239	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Congo’s	  metamorphosis	  into	  the	  peculiarly	  Mobutist	  form	  of	  a	  totalitarian	  state	  coincided	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	   the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  team	  in	  the	  White	  House.	   Just	  as	  Lyndon	   Johnson	   saw	   himself	   as	   a	   domestic	   reformer,	   Richard	   Nixon	   sought	   to	  portray	  himself	  as	  a	  masterful	  statesman	  whose	  presidency	  would	  revolutionise	  the	  American	   approach	   towards	   foreign	   policy	   and	   usher	   in	   an	   era	   of	   peace	   and	  stability.	   He	  was	   joined	   by	   the	   lauded	  Harvard	   academic,	   Henry	   Kissinger,	   as	   his	  National	  Security	  Adviser.	  The	  antagonism	  of	  these	  two	  egos	  that	  jealously	  guarded	  foreign	   policy	   as	   the	   sole	   domain	   of	   the	  White	   House	   (an	   arrangement	   that	   was	  formalised	  with	  Kissinger	  occupying	  the	  dual	  positions	  of	  National	  Security	  Adviser	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  from	  September	  1973)	  makes	  for	  a	  dramatic	  study	  in	  itself.240	  Focused	   on	   developing	   grand	   strategies	   to	   extract	   the	   United	   States	   from	   the	  Vietnam	  War,	  deal	  with	  renewed	  violence	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  find	  a	  modus	  vivendi	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	   in	   the	  much-­‐vaunted	  détente	  and	  develop	  a	  rapprochement	  with	   China,	   the	   pair	  was	   seemingly	   united	   in	   their	   failure	   to	   refine	   the	   American	  approach	  towards	  Africa.241	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Rather	   than	   simply	   lacking	   strategic	   appeal,	   two	   main	   reasons	   suggest	  themselves	   for	   this	   apparent	   disregard.	   First	   of	   all	   and	   perhaps	   most	   obviously,	  despite	   the	   remaining	   white	   minority	   governments	   in	   southern	   Africa	   and	  simmering	   troubles	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   colonies,	   no	   sudden	   crisis	   demanded	   their	  immediate	  attention	  during	  Nixon’s	  first	  term.	  Perhaps	  equally	  important,	  however,	  was	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Congolese	  dictator	  to	  seemingly	  fit	  perfectly	  into	  Nixon’s	  vision	   of	   harnessing	   and	   strengthen	   regional	   powers	   as	   bulwarks	   against	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Two texts stand out for a discussion on the evolution of Mobutu’s oppressive regime are Schatzberg, The 
Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire and Crawford Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian 
State, See also Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo From Leopold to Kabila 
240 See, for example, Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy 
(Oxford University Press, 2004); Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (Harper Collins, 
2008); Richard Reeves, Richard Nixon: Alone in the White House (Simon Schuster; NY & London, 2001) 
241 Frederick Logevall and Andrew Preston (eds.). Nixon and the World; American Foreign Relations, 1969-
1977 (Oxford Uni. Press, 2008)	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communist	  subversion	  (the	   ‘Nixon	  Doctrine’).	  Mobutu,	  for	  his	  part,	  was	  more	  than	  willing	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  the	  loyal	  and	  trusted	  ally	  in	  return	  for	  continued	  favours	  from	  Washington.	  The	  return	  to	  a	  semblance	  of	  order	  in	  Congo	  was	  viewed	  as	  the	  triumphant	   conclusion	   of	   a	   strategy	   that	   had	   successfully	   contained	   the	   crisis	  spreading	   through	   Congo	   in	   the	  mid	   1960s.	  Much	  was	   left	   to	   do	   if	   Congo	  was	   to	  continue	   its	   path	   towards	   stability	   and	   prosperity,	   however.	   Far	   from	   cultivating	  Congo	  further,	  their	  preponderance	  to	  view	  the	  South	  as	  peripheral	  to	  their	  grand	  strategies	   and	   only	   important	   in	   terms	   of	   preserving	   stability	   and	   American	  credibility	  around	  the	  world	  ensured	  that	  the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  team	  viewed	  Congo	  strictly	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  posturing	  in	  the	  global	  arena	  and	  utterly	  failed	  to	  engage	  their	  African	  protégé’s	  growing	  domestic	  transgressions.242	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	   third	   chapter	   thus	   divides	   into	   two	   parts.	   A	   first	   section	   considers	   the	  internal	  developments	  in	  Congo	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  Mobutist	  state	  filtered	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  contemporary	  American	  intelligence.	  This	  reveals	  that,	  even	   at	   the	   time,	   US	   observers	   were	   well	   aware	   of	   the	   many	   alarming	   turns	  Mobutu’s	   growing	   megalomania	   was	   taking;	   from	   his	   subversion	   of	   the	   first	  genuine	  national	   elections	  and	   the	   creation	  of	   a	   single	  party	   state,	   his	   crass	   foray	  into	   mass	   political	   mobilisation	   with	   the	   ‘Authenticity’	   and	   ‘Zairianisation’	  campaigns,	   to	   the	   rampant	   corruption	  of	   an	   institutionalised	   system	  of	  patronage	  and	   the	   ever-­‐present	   threat	   of	   violence	   of	   a	   repressive	   security	   apparatus.	   At	   the	  same	  time,	  however,	  these	  often	  detailed	  and	  accurate	  appraisals	  did	  not	  translate	  into	   a	   more	   critical	   American	   stance	   towards	   its	   Kinshasa	   ally.	   A	   second	   section	  thus	   explores	   the	   American	   policy	   reaction	   to	   these	   precarious	   developments	   in	  Congo.	   Not	   only	   did	   military	   assistance	   continue,	   unchecked	   even	   by	   the	   stark	  warnings	  of	   the	   IMF	  over	  Mobutu’s	   increasing	  economic	  mismanagement,	  but	   the	  White	   House	   also	   went	   considerably	   further.	   Kinshasa’s	   despot	   received	   a	   full	  presidential	   endorsement,	   meeting	   Nixon	   on	   two	   separate	   occasions,	   and	  Washington	  proved	  instrumental	  in	  encouraging	  a	  growing	  interest	  from	  American	  businesses	   looking	   for	   investment	   opportunities	   in	   Congo	   to	   garner	   favour	   with	  Mobutu.	   This	   willingness	   to	   harness	   the	   private	   sector	   to	   the	   administration’s	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  was	  an	  important	  component	  of	  the	  system	  of	  state	  corruption	  that	  came	  to	  haunt	  Congo.	  As	  such,	  during	  the	  Nixon	  years	  the	  United	  States	  proved	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  242	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  dismissive	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  approach	  towards	  the	  Third	  World	  see,	  for	  example,	  Jussi	  M.	  Hahnimäki,	  ‘An	  Illusive	  Grand	  Design’	  in	  Frederik	  Logewall	  and	  Andrew	  Preston,	  Nixon	  and	  the	  World:	  American	  Foreign	  Realations,	  1969-­‐1977	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  and	  Mark	  Attwood	  Lawrence,	  ‘Containing	  Globalism:	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Developing	  World	  in	  the	  
1970s’	  in	  Nial	  Ferguson,	  Charles	  S.	  Maier,	  Erez	  Manela	  and	  Daniel	  J.	  Sargent	  (eds.),	  The	  Shock	  of	  the	  Global:	  The	  1970s	  in	  Perspective	  (Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press;	  Cambridge	  MA,	  2010)	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a	  key	  and	  willing	  ally	  in	  the	  development	  of	  Mobutu’s	  repressive	  ‘State	  Kleptocracy’	  and	   it	   was	   no	   coincidence	   that	   Mobutu	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	   Congo’s	   state	  collapse	  during	  this	  period.	  	  	  
From	  Roar	  to	  Whimper:	  Mobutism	  Asserted	  in	  Congo	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	   the	   first	   decade	   of	   Congolese	   independence	   and	   President	   Mobutu’s	  inaugural	   term	   drew	   to	   a	   close,	   Congo	   appeared	   to	   be	   settling	   into	   a	   period	   of	  relative	  political	  stability	  and	  a	  tentatively	  hopeful	  eye	  could	  indeed	  be	  cast	  towards	  a	  more	   prosperous	   future	   for	   Congo	   for	   the	   first	   time	   since	   1960.	   Between	   1967	  and	   1970	   the	   Congolese	   economy	   grew	   by	   an	   estimated	   ten	   per	   cent	   annually	  following	   massive	   increases	   in	   the	   world	   copper	   price.243	  On	   the	   political	   front,	  while	  undoubtedly	  fraudulent	  and	  illegitimate,	  the	  elections	  of	  1970	  appeared	  to	  at	  least	  confirm	  Mobutu’s	  personal	  popularity	  with	  the	  Congolese	  population	  at	  large	  as	  the	  president	  was	  credited	  with	  the	  relatively	  positive	  developments	  of	  the	  past	  five	   years.	   The	  American	   ambassador	   in	  Kinshasa,	   Sheldon	  B.	   Vance,	   summarised	  these	   sentiments	   as	   follows,	   ‘Economic	   conditions	   in	   his	   [Mobutu]	   five	   years	   in	  power	  have	  improved	  a	  great	  deal,	  and	  stability,	  safety	  and	  order-­‐	  especially	  in	  the	  interior-­‐	   have	   been	   restored.	   Citizens	   who	   are	   at	   all	   informed	   tend	   to	   give	   him	  credit	   for	   bringing	   them	   about.’244	  Thus,	   1970	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   the	   high	  watermark	   for	  post-­‐independence	  Congo	  and	   the	  American	   country	   team	  and	   the	  wider	   Congolese	   population	   viewed	   the	   future	   with	   considerable	   expectations.	  Rather	  than	  a	  genuine	  effort	  towards	  political	  and	  economic	  development,	  however,	  the	   subsequent	   years	   would	   see	   Congo	   descend	   into	   a	   quagmire	   of	   political	  patronage,	  repression	  and	  economic	  folly.	  Perhaps	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1970s,	  then,	  was	  the	  most	  significant	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Congo’s	  failed	  development	  in	   the	   post-­‐independence	   period,	   as	   optimism	   was	   gradually	   replaced	   with	   the	  increasingly	  assertive	  personality	  cult	  of	  President	  Mobutu	  and	  his	  whimsical	  and	  at	  times	  foolhardy	  policies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	  suggest	  that	  all	  was	  well	  in	  Congo	  by	  1970	  would	  be	  an	  overly	  sanguine	  and	  inaccurate	  portrayal	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  country,	  however.	  Indeed,	  while	  no	  longer	  a	  significant	   threat	   to	   the	   regime	   in	  Kinshasa,	   the	  pattern	  of	   sporadic	   and	   localised	  rebellion	   against	   government	   authority	   coupled	  with	   a	   heavy-­‐handed,	   brutal	   and	  ineffective	   response	   from	   the	  national	   army	   continued	   from	   the	   previous	   decade.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Nzongola-Ntalaja, ‘The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila, a People’s History’ p. 148 
244 Vance, Kinshasa to Secretary of State, Washington D.C. ‘Monthly Economic Review’, 17th December 
1970; RG 59, Economic, Box 1116, Department of State, National Archives, College Park, MD (hereafter 
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The	   American	   consulate	   in	   Bukavu	   offers	   compelling	   accounts	   of	   continued	  insurgent	   marauding,	   ANC	   atrocities	   and	   the	   suffering	   of	   a	   civilian	   population	  caught	   between	   the	   two	   in	   the	  Kivus	   during	   the	   early	   part	   of	   the	   decade.	   In	   part	  these	  were	   a	   continuation	   of	   local	   grievances	   and	   banditry,	  while	   a	   slightly	  more	  sophisticated	  or	  at	  least	  organised	  rebel	  movement	  under	  Laurent	  Kabila,	  the	  latter	  day	   president	   protecting	   an	   apparently	   lucrative	   gold	   and	   ivory	   business,	   also	  continued	   to	  operate	   in	   the	   remoter	  areas	  of	   the	  eastern	  provinces.	  245	  	  Thus	  both	  the	  national	  army	  and	  various	  rebel	  factions	  were	  essentially	  ‘petty	  thieves’	  preying	  off	   the	   local	   population	   in	   a	   depressing	   pattern	   that	   survives	   into	   twenty-­‐first	  century	  Congo.246	  Neither	  foreign	  powers	  nor	  the	  Congolese	  government	  appear	  to	  have	   made	   any	   sincere	   effort	   to	   influence	   either	   side	   or	   bring	   this	   lingering	  situation	   under	   control	   as	   the	   American	   Consul	   in	   Bukavu,	   Raymond	   Seitz,	  summarised	  barely	  half	  a	  year	  after	  the	  much	  vaunted	  elections	  of	  1970,	  	  ‘As	  with	  most	  similar	  situations,	  it	  is	  the	  people	  in	  the	  two	  territories	  [North	  and	  South	  Kivu]	  who	  suffer	  most…	  The	  road	  north	  of	  Fizi	   is	  a	  string	  of	  burned	  out	  villages,	   some	  decimated	   by	   the	   rebels	   and	   others	   by	   the	  military…	  Whatever	  the	  case,	  the	  population	  has	  lost	  its	  homes,	  tools,	  and	  way	  of	  life…	  The	  region	  is	  in	   Bosch-­‐like	   limbo,	   and	   for	   the	   people	   who	   try	   to	   live	   there,	   a	   nightmare	   to	  which	  they	  have	  become	  strangely	  accustomed.’247	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Not	   only	   does	   this	   quotation	   illustrate	   the	   on	   going	   misery	   of	   the	   local	  population	   and	   the	   apparent	   neglect	   of	   the	  Kinshasa	   government	   to	   the	   festering	  situation	   in	  parts	  of	   the	  provinces,	  but	   it	  also	  demonstrates	  a	  remarkably	  detailed	  and	  candid	  reporting	  of	  the	  American	  country	  team.	  More	  than	  simply	  a	  hangover	  from	   a	   turbulent	   period,	   the	   unceasing	   exploitation	   of	   an	   abused	   populace	   in	   the	  more	  disparate	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  was	  an	  early	   indication	  of	  a	  government	  both	  inept	   at	   administering	   to	   the	   actual	   needs	   of	   its	   citizens	   and	   uninterested	   in	  pursuing	  anything	  but	   the	  designs	  of	   the	  narrow	  elite	  defined	  by	  Mobutu	  and	  his	  chosen	  and	  constantly	   shifting	  circle	   in	  Kinshasa.	   Indeed,	   it	  was	   this	   feature	  of	  an	  increasingly	   authoritarian	   and	   self-­‐serving	   government	   that	   would	   dominate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Seitz, Bukavu to Secretary of State, ‘Kivu: Secteur Tanganika: Rebels and Soldiers’, 31st July, 1971; RG 
59, Political & Defense, Box 2627, Department of State, NARAII 
The French ambassador described a similar isolation of the provinces. Ambassadeur	  Claude	  Chayet,	  Kinshasa,	  ‘Rapport	  de	  Fin	  de	  Mission’,	  15	  Décembre	  1972;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Etrangères,	  Rapport	  de	  Fin	  de	  Mission	  de	  l’Ambassadeur,	  Carton	  14,	  Centres	  Archives	  Diplomatiques	  de	  Nantes	  (hereafter	  CADN) 246	  See reports from ICG, HRW, MONUSCO	  
247 Seitz, Bukavu to Secretary of State, ‘Kivu: Secteur Tanganika: Rebels and Soldiers’, 31st July, 1971; RG 
59, Political & Defense, Box 2627, Department of State, NARAII 
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Congolese	   politics	   during	   the	   Nixon	   administration	   and	   shape	   the	   future	   of	   the	  country	  into	  the	  present.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  most	   immediately	  apparent	  manifestation	  of	  Mobutu’s	   intentions	  was	   the	  process	  of	  the	  national	  elections	  itself	  as	  his	  official	  five-­‐year	  term	  drew	  to	  a	  close.	  No	  doubt	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  more	  democratic	  government	  presented	  a	  dilemma	  for	  Congo’s	  leader	  and	  his	  American	  allies,	  fearful	  of	  a	  dilution	  of	  power	  and	  a	  return	  to	  the	  chaos	  of	  the	  early	  1960s.	  Nevertheless,	  Mobutu	  remained	  overtly	  committed	  to	  holding	   elections	   and	   Congo’s	   elite	   at	   least	   harboured	   genuine	   hope	   for	   a	   more	  inclusive	   political	   system	   by	   1970.	   The	   process	   that	   actually	   unfolded	   that	   year	  ensured	   that	   any	   initial	   enthusiasm	  was	   short	   lived	   and	   a	   sincere	  move	   towards	  popular	   participation	   remained	   untried,	   however.	   National	   Assembly	   candidates	  were	   selected	   from	  above	  by	   the	  Kinshasa	  government	   according	   to	  party	   loyalty	  rather	   than	   genuine	   positions	   of	   community	   stature	   or	   popular	   renown,	   Mobutu	  remained	   the	   sole	   candidate	   for	   the	  presidency	  and	  voters	   could	   simply	  affirm	  or	  reject	   the	   list	   of	  National	  Assembly	   candidates	   and	  president	  with	   a	   green	  or	   red	  ballot	   respectively.	   American	   intelligence	   reports	   from	   Kinshasa	   and	   the	   various	  provinces	   indicate	   that	   clumsy	   efforts	   of	   mass	   mobilisation	   by	   the	   Party	   (MPR),	  ranging	   from	   excessive	   rhetorical	   hyperbole-­‐	   such	   as	   Kinshasa’s	   governor	  comparing	  Mobutu	  to	  Jesus	  and	  his	  mother	  to	  the	  Virgin	  Mary	  in	  a	  radio	  address	  -­‐	  to	  implicit	   intimidation	   and	   cajoling,	   failed	   to	   impress	   the	  bemused	  populace	   and	   at	  times	  had	  quite	  the	  opposite	  effect.248	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Overall,	   the	   results	   of	   the	   fraudulent	   1970	   elections	   in	   which	   Mobutu	   won	   a	  predictable	   and	   overwhelming	   endorsement	   (of	   up	   to	   a	   one	   hundred	   per	   cent	  ‘green	  endorsement’	  in	  some	  areas)	  were	  twofold.249	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  simply	  underlined	   the	   extent	   of	   Mobutu’s	   personal	   grip	   on	   Congolese	   politics,	   with	   the	  extension	   of	   another	   seven-­‐year	   presidential	   term	   flanked	   by	   a	   largely	   ‘advisory’	  National	   Assembly	   whose	   makeup	   signalled	   a	   remarkable	   continuity	   from	   the	  previous	   five	  years	  and	  did	   little	   to	  represent	   the	  provinces	   they	  were	  selected	   to	  stand	  for.	  As	  such	  Ambassador	  Vance	  noted,	  	  ‘An	   opportunity	   for	   President	   Mobutu	   to	   demonstrate	   his	   genuine	   popularity	  and	  to	  enter	  on	  his	  new	  seven-­‐year	  mandate	  enjoying	  the	  increased	  confidence	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of	  the	  Congolese	  people	  has	  been	  far	  from	  fully	  utilized	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  excess	  of	  zeal	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  October	  31st-­‐November	  1st	  Presidential	  elections.’250	  	  This	   not	   only	   demonstrated	   the	   unwillingness	   of	   the	   regime	   to	   contemplate	   a	  more	   inclusive	   politics	   but	   also	   a	   marked	   Mobutu’s	   failure	   to	   harness	   the	  popular	  goodwill	  he	  did	  enjoy	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  country	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  first	  term.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   one	   sided	   nature	   of	   the	   election	   process	   ensured	   that	   Mobutu	   now	  assumed	  personal	  responsibility	   for	  Congo’s	  progress	   towards	  modernity.	  Various	  reports	  from	  American	  consulates	  in	  the	  provinces	  and	  the	  embassy	  itself	  illustrate	  how,	   exasperated	   with	   corrupt	   officials	   and	   the	   inefficacy	   of	   their	   government,	  ordinary	  citizens	  increasingly	  looked	  to	  Mobutu	  personally,	  not	  yet	  associated	  with	  these	  governmental	  shortcomings,	  to	  secure	  a	  path	  towards	  political	  and	  economic	  development	  for	  Congo	  and	  meet	  the	  growing	  aspirations	  of	  its	  population.251	  These	  sentiments	  were	  perhaps	  most	   clearly	   articulated	   in	   a	   report	   on	   the	   aftermath	  of	  the	  elections	  in	  Kivu	  from	  Consul	  Seitz,	  ‘The	  good	  things	  that	  have	  happened	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years,	  particularly	  a	  steady	  peace,	  are	  identified	  with	  Mobutu	  while	  the	  bad	  things	   are	   identified	   with	   his	   government.’252	  Ambassador	   Vance	   noted	   a	   similar	  sentiment	   in	  Kwilu,	   ‘The	  people	  of	   the	  Kwilu	  do	  not	   look	   to	   the	  politicians	  or	   the	  National	   Assembly	   for	   help;	   they	   look	   only	   to	   the	   President.’253 	  Furthermore,	  throughout	   1970	   it	   had	   become	   abundantly	   clear	   that	   the	   dubious	   but	   elaborate	  electoral	   process	   was,	   in	   Vance’s	   words,	   simply	   ‘designed	   to	   ensure	   that	   all	   real	  power	  continues	   to	   flow	   from	  a	   single	   source,	   the	  president.’254	  As	  a	   result,	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Congolese,	  Mobutu	  had	  staked	  his	  personal	  prestige	  and	  popularity	  on	  fulfilling	   the	   increasingly	   hopeful	   outlook	   for	   Congo	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   decade.	   A	  failure	   to	   come	   to	   terms	   with	   the	   more	   pressing	   needs	   of	   his	   citizens	   would	  therefore	  directly	   impact	  the	  president’s	  owns	  standing	  and	  his	   image	  soon	  began	  to	  tarnish.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   the	  above	  analysis	   indicates	  that	  American	  observers	  were	  well	  aware	  of	  Mobutu’s	  subversion	  of	  the	  political	  process	  and	  the	  risks	  entailed	  therein	  for	  his	  personal	   standing	   and	   the	   regime	   at	   large.	   Far	   from	   critical,	   however,	   this	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seemingly	   accurate	   reading	   of	   Mobutu’s	   increasingly	   authoritarian	   streak	   was	  couched	   in	   relativizing	   and	   accepting	   overall	   tenor	   of	   these	   very	   reports.	   In	  precisely	   this	   way	   Consul	   Strand,	   having	   described	   the	   mockery	   of	   the	   1970	  election	  debacle	  in	  the	  Kisangani	  region,	  continued	  with	  the	  much	  more	  optimistic	  conclusion	   that,	   ‘Viewed	   not	   as	   an	   exercise	   of	   choice,	   however,	   but	   as	   an	   act	   of	  allegiance	  or	  a	  swearing	  of	  fealty	  to	  Mobutu,	  the	  paramount	  chief,	  it	  did	  constitute	  a	  significant	  act	  of	  participation.’255	  Ambassador	  Vance	  also	  tempered	  his	  assessment	  along	   these	   lines,	   ‘As	  contrived	  and	  as	  circumscribed	  as	   the	  coming	  elections	  may	  be,	   they	   represent	   a	   necessary	   first	   step	   if	   the	   Congo	   is	   to	  move	   toward	   political	  activity	  on	  a	  national	  scale	  and	  away	  from	  tribal	  and	  regional	  based	  politics.’256	  The	  racist	   undertones	   of	   these	   statements	   are	   again	   plainly	   visible,	   as	   if	   ‘tribal’	   Africa	  could	   do	   no	   better	   than	   rely	   on	   a	   strong	   ‘chief’	   to	   administer	   its	   territories.257	  Moreover,	  these	  assessments	  were	  an	  early	  indication	  of	  a	  readiness	  to	  dismiss	  the	  more	   sinister	   aspects	   of	   Mobutu’s	   rule.	   Thus,	   having	   reinforced	   his	   grip	   on	   the	  levers	   of	   power	   with	   a	   duplicitous	   election,	   it	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   how	   the	  ‘paramount	  chief’	  would	  actually	  set	  about	  shaping	  Congo’s	  much	  anticipated	  future	  and	  the	  impact	  this	  had	  on	  his	  popular	  standing.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  pressure	  was	  mounting	  for	  the	  president	  to	  deliver	  on	  Congo’s	  much	  touted	   economic	   promise.258	  Already	   by	   1970,	   however,	   warning	   signals	   were	  clearly	   being	   sounded	   by	   experts	   familiar	   with	   the	   details	   of	   the	   Congolese	  economy.	   The	   country	   was	   fast	   falling	   into	   what	   development	   economists	   now	  commonly	   label	   the	   “resource	   trap”	  of	  poverty.259	  In	  other	  words,	  high	  rents	   from	  copper	  production	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  decade,	  while	  presenting	  a	  Potemkin	  village	  of	  prosperity	  in	  Kinshasa,	  were	  simply	  being	  siphoned	  out	  of	  the	  country	  without	  any	  real	  investment	  into	  the	  much	  needed	  infrastructure	  and	  rural	  development	  in	  the	  provinces.	  Thus,	  Lamberto	  Dini,	  the	  Italian	  economist	  and	  latter	  day	  prime	  minister	  heading	  an	  IMF	  mission	  to	  Congo	  in	  May	  1970,	  gave	  an	  extremely	  sombre	  long-­‐term	  prognosis	  already	  at	  this	  time	  based	  on	  exactly	  this	  drain	  of	  resources,	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  Nor	  was	  this	  a	  purely	  American	  phenomenon,	  of	  course,	  and	  reports	  of	  the	  W.	  German	  embassy	  revealed	  a	  similar	  appraisal	  of	  the	  fraudulent	  elections	  as	  a	  useful	  exercise	  in	  legitimation	  and	  rejecting	  the	  application	  of	  ‘Western	  democratic	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  to	  Congo.	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‘The	   chief	   element	   in	   the	   longer-­‐term	   outlook	   was	   gross	   misallocation	   of	  Congolese	   resources.	   The	   country	   has	   little	   to	   show	   for	   the	   vast	   sums	  purportedly	   spent	   on	   investment…	   There	   is	   no	   investment	   to	   offset	   the	  depletion	   of	   natural	   resources	   like	   copper.	   Instead	   of	   building	   up	   productive	  capacity,	  the	  proceeds	  of	  copper	  and	  other	  exports	  go	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  enormously	   expensive	   political	   structure,	   far	  more	   costly	   than	   that	   in	   similar	  countries.’260	  	  Reports	  emanating	  from	  the	  various	  US	  consulates	  in	  the	  provinces	  confirmed	  this	  economic	  stagnation,	  neglect	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Kinshasa	  government	  to	  fulfil	  its	  promises	  for	  development	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  decade.261	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  many	  Congolese	  as	  well	  as	  Ambassador	  Vance	  himself	  now	  hoped	  for	  Mobutu	  to	  take	  the	  country	  into	  a	  new	  direction	  as	  he	  embarked	  on	  his	  second	  term	  in	  office.262	  Unfortunately	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Congo,	  however,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  marked	  departure	  from	  the	  follies	  of	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  Indeed,	  the	  policies	  that	  unfolded	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  a	  continued	  and	  ever	  increasing	  misallocation	   of	   resources	   and	   an	   endemic	   institutionalised	   top-­‐down	   corruption	  that	  would	  destroy	  all	  prospects	  for	  development.	  The	  previous	  chapter	  described	  how	  American	  intelligence	  reports	  had	  little	  regard	  for	  Mobutu’s	  grasp	  of	  economic	  matters	   and	   throughout	   his	   presidency	   it	   became	   increasingly	   clear	   that	   he	  preferred	   very	   visible	   prestige	   projects	   to	   concentrating	   on	   the	   more	   mundane	  details	  of	  rural	  development.	  Thus,	  at	  the	  very	  time	  when	  copper	  prices	  were	  falling	  and	  Congo	  was	  beginning	  to	  have	  considerable	  budgeting	  and	  balance	  of	  payment	  problems,	  the	  president	  preferred	  to	  allocate	  much	  needed	  capital	  to	  his	  penchant	  for	  military	  equipment	  and	  infamous	  white	  elephant	  projects	  such	  as	  the	  Inga	  Dam,	  the	   Inga-­‐Shaba	   power	   line	   and	   the	   twenty-­‐two-­‐story	   conference	   centre	   and	  MPR	  party	  headquarters	  at	  Nsele	  (the	  monstrous	  dimensions	  of	  which	  were	  eloquently	  described	   by	   Norman	   Mailer	   in	   his	   Kinshasa	   visit	   in	   1974);	   rather	   than	   allocate	  funds	  for	  reviving	  the	  country’s	  infrastructure	  and	  much	  needed	  transport	  links	  to	  bring	  its	  vast	  hinterland	  out	  of	  economic	  isolation.263	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Vance, Kinshasa to Secretary of State, ‘Dini on Prospects of Congolese Economy’, 2nd July 1970; RG 59, 
Economic, Box 787, Department of State, NARAII 
261 Strand, Kisangani to Secretary of State, ‘Orientale: Rehabilitation Program Fiasco’, 15th February 1971; 
Seitz, Bukavu to Secretary of State, ‘Kivu: the View from the Bleaches’, 15th March 1971; Vance, Kinshasa 
to Secretary of State, ‘The Kwilu: A Case Study in Contemporary Congolese Politics’, 17th September 1970; 
RG 59, Political & Defense, Box 2627, Department of State, NARAII 
262 Vance, Kinshasa, ‘Monthly Economic Review’, 19th November 1970; RG 59, Economic, Box 788, 
Department of State, NARAII 
263 Inaugurated in November 1972, this hydroelectric dam was to make the mining region of Katanga 
dependent on the government for power through the Inga-Shaba power line from the Inga Dam in Western 
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  A	   reported	   conversation	   between	  American	   Consul	   Strand	   in	  Kisangani	   and	  Minister	   Yvon	   Bonghoy,	   charged	   with	   the	   development	   of	   Orientale	   Province,	  demonstrates	   not	   only	   exactly	   such	   foolhardy	   investment	   priorities	   but	   also	  illustrates	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   population	   at	   large	  was	   becoming	   increasingly	  aware	  of	  the	  government’s	  willingness	  to	  squander	  funds	  that	  might	  have	  been	  put	  to	  better	  use.	  According	  to	  Bonghoy,	  less	  than	  ten	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  six	  million	  dollars	  pledged	   by	   the	   president	   personally	   for	   this	   region’s	   development	   in	   1969	   had	  actually	  been	  made	  available	  by	  the	  time	  of	  his	  departure	  from	  office	  in	  December	  1970.	   The	  majority	   of	   the	   promised	   capital	   had	   been	   redirected	   to	   items	   ranked	  higher	  on	  the	  presidential	  budget,	  ‘principally	  the	  plush	  convention-­‐resort	  complex	  built	   for	   MPR	   conferences	   at	   N’Sele	   near	   Kinshasa...’	   While	   recognising	   that	   a	  certain	  amount	  of	   ‘self-­‐serving	  embellishment’	   from	  the	  exiting	  Minister	  may	  have	  coloured	  this	  recounting,	  Strand	  concluded	  his	  report	  with	  the	  candid	  assessment,	  	  ‘A	   perhaps	   questionably	   devised	   public	   works	   program,	   but	   one	   that	   would	  have	  met	  real	  economic	  and	  social	  needs	   in	  a	  badly	  depressed	  province	  of	   the	  country,	  has	  been	  shunted	  aside	  to	  make	  way	  for	  prestige	  projects	  and	  political	  expenditures.	  This	  kind	  of	  trade-­‐off	  is	  recognised	  and	  resented	  here,	  not	  only	  by	  the	   educated	   elite	   but	   also	   by	   unlettered	   villagers,	   who	   hear	   quickly	   enough	  about	  such	  excesses	  of	  conspicuous	  consumption	  as	  N’Sele.’264	  	  In	  other	  words,	  Mobutu	  dictated	  investment	  priorities	  personally	  and	  his	  focus	  was	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  genuine	  needs	  of	  the	  country	  or	  its	  citizens.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  More	  than	  simply	  fiscally	  irresponsible,	  this	  drain	  on	  the	  government’s	  budget	  was	   further	   expounded	  by	   the	  unbelievable	   level	   of	   state	   corruption	   that	   became	  institutionalised	   in	  Mobutu’s	   system	  of	   governance.	   The	   IMF’s	   Lamberto	  Dini	   had	  already	  noted	  the	  president’s	  personal	  pilfering	  of	  the	  state	  coffers	  in	  his	  May	  1970	  assessment,	  estimating	  that	  his	  private	  spending	  for	  1969	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  sixty	  million	  dollars	  of	  the	  annual	  budget.265	  The	  following	  years	  would	  see	  regular	  public	   pronouncements	   declaring	   ever-­‐tougher	   measures	   against	   corruption	   and	  the	   firing	   of	   key	   ministers	   for	   apparent	   abuses.	   The	   plain	   truth	   that	   emerged,	  however,	  was	  that	  corruption	  was	  more	  than	  simply	  an	  unpalatable	  side	  effect	  of	  a	  heavy-­‐handed	  authoritarian	  regime.	  It	  was	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  Mobutu’s	  system	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Congo, just north of Kinshasa, to Shaba province. Ambassador Vance, Monthly Economic Review, 
December 28th 1972; RG 59, Economic, Box 788, Department of State, NARAII Norman	  Mailer,	  The	  Fight	  (Penguin	  Books;	  London,	  2000-­‐	  1st	  published	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governance.	   Power	   was	   tightly	   centralised	   with	   the	   president	   personally	   and	   he	  bought	   off	   potential	   detractors	   by	   sharing	   out	   pieces	   of	   the	   pie	   and	   regularly	  replacing	  those	  in	  key	  positions.	  Thus	  Vance	  noted,	  ‘Any	  incipient	  dissident	  is	  kept	  in	   check	   mainly	   by	   massive	   doses	   of	   presidential	   largess.’266	  Much	   as	   one	   would	  imagine	  a	  medieval	  court,	  factions	  competing	  for	  their	  share	  in	  Congo’s	  riches	  were	  played	  off	  against	  each	  other	   in	   their	  effort	   to	  secure	  a	  portion	  of	   the	  presidential	  hand	  outs.	  They,	  in	  turn,	  would	  ensure	  their	  own	  position	  by	  similar	  means	  creating	  a	  top-­‐down	  institutionalised	  system	  of	  patronage	  as	  the	  very	  mechanism	  for	  ruling	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  much-­‐vaunted	   ‘Zairianisation’	  of	   foreign	  owned	  businesses,	  coinciding	  with	  the	  1973	  oil	  shock	  and	  corresponding	  downturn	  in	  world	  copper	  prices	  at	  a	  time	  of	  global	   economic	   stagnation,	   should	   also	   be	   seen	   in	   exactly	   the	   above	   light.	   The	  nationalisation	  of	  foreign	  enterprises	  was,	  of	  course,	  nothing	  new	  for	  a	  Third	  World	  country	   looking	   to	  break	   the	  economic	   stranglehold	  of	   foreign	   capital	   and	  Patrice	  Lumumba	  had	  hinted	  already	  in	  this	  direction	  in	  1960.267	  Mobutu’s	  strategy	  was	  all	  together	   more	   cynical,	   however,	   as	   he	   simply	   sought	   to	   replace	   foreign	  entrepreneurs	  with	  his	  own	  cohort	  of	  profiteers	   in	  another	  round	  of	  patronage.268	  Thus,	   on	   November	   30th	   1973,	   he	   announced	   the	   expropriation	   of	   foreign	   held	  small-­‐businesses	   and	   agriculture	   and	   decreed	   that	   future	   mineral	   concessions	  would	  have	  to	  be	  at	  least	  fifty	  per	  cent	  Congolese	  owned.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Reports	   from	   the	   American	   embassy’s	   Deputy	   Chief	   of	   Mission	   in	   Kinshasa,	  Michael	  H.	  Newlin,	   indicated	  that	   theses	  presidential	  edicts	  was	  suitably	  vague	  on	  who	  was	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  new	  business-­‐seizures	  to	  cause	  ‘great	  and	  widespread	  expectations’	  and	  give	  Mobutu	  sufficient	   flexibility	  to	  not	  only	  extend	  his	  personal	  control	   over	   the	   economy	   but	   to	   use	   this	   to	   ensure	   the	   loyalty	   of	   an	   eagerly	  anticipating	  entourage.269	  On	  26th	  December,	   the	  president	   announced	   that	  due	   to	  their	   	   ‘strategic	   importance’	   the	   enterprises	   would	   be	   reserved	   for	   his	   ‘close	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11th February, 1971; RG 59, Political & Defense, Box 2627, Department of State, NARAII 267	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  the	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  of	  Patrice	  Lumumba	  (Little,	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  &	  Co.;	  Boston,	  1972);	  Georges	  Nzongola-­‐Ntalaja,	  The	  Congo:	  from	  Leopold	  to	  Kabila,	  a	  People’s	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  (Zed	  Books;	  London	  &	  New	  York,	  2002)	  pp.	  147-­‐51	  268	  The	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  East	  German	  Embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  for	  1974	  noted	  exactly	  this	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  espoused	  anti-­‐imperial	  nature	  of	  Zairianisation	  and	  its	  actual	  effect	  of	  exacerbating	  inequality	  in	  the	  elitist	  distribution	  that	  followed.	  Botschafter	  Weidemann,	  ‘Jahresbericht	  1974’,	  Jan	  1975;	  Jahresberichte	  der	  Botschaft	  der	  DDR	  in	  Zaire	  für	  1973-­‐76	  über	  die	  Innen-­‐	  und	  Außenpolitik	  Zaires	  sowie	  über	  die	  Beziehungen	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collaborators’.	   Initially	   the	   civil	   service	   and	   armed	   forces	  were	   to	   be	   disqualified	  from	   a	   portion	   in	   the	   new	   wealth	   but,	   after	   some	   grumbling,	   a	   telegram	   a	   few	  months	  later	  confirmed	  that,	  ‘subsequently	  it	  became	  evident	  officers	  had	  not	  been	  excluded	  from	  sharing	  spoils	  in	  redistribution	  of	  small	  businesses.	  Wives,	  relatives	  and	  friends	  of	  at	  least	  some	  top-­‐ranking	  officers	  have	  been	  beneficiaries.’270	  In	  other	  words,	  moving	   the	  above-­‐described	   institutionalised	  corruption	   to	  a	  new	   level,	   as	  the	  Congolese	  economy	  was	  sagging	  Mobutu	  sought	  to	  buy	  security	  for	  his	  regime	  by	  seizing	  private	  businesses	  and	  portioning	  out	   the	  spoils	  according	  to	   loyalty	   to	  him	   personally.	   Furthermore,	   this	   ill-­‐devised	   scheme	   was	   executed	   without	  particular	  regard	  or	  forethought	  to	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  productivity	  of	  the	  Congolese	  economy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  actual	  results	  were	  predictably	  disastrous.	  The	  Congolese	  budget	  was	  facing	  mounting	   balance	   of	   payment	   issues	   throughout	   the	   early	   1970s,	   expounded	   by	  falling	  copper	  prices	  from	  April	  1970	  and	  issues	  of	  capital	  flight	  as	  the	  corrupt	  elite	  amassed	   private	   fortunes	   beyond	   Congo’s	   borders.	   At	   a	   time	   of	   a	   declining	   gross	  domestic	  product,	  the	  country’s	  infrastructure	  was	  falling	  into	  disrepair	  and	  much	  needed	   investments	   into	   the	   provincial	   economies	   were	   cut	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  Mobutu’s	   pet	   prestige	   projects	   and	   bloated	   ‘administrative’	   costs.	   Even	   more	  worryingly,	  the	  ‘Zairianisation’	  program	  ensured	  that	  nervous	  foreign	  shop	  owners	  withdrew	  capital	   and	  no	   longer	   replenished	   stocks	   causing	  both	  widespread	   food	  shortages	   and	   correspondingly	   massive	   price	   hikes	   at	   a	   time	   of	   growing	  unemployment.	   The	   mismanagement	   that	   followed	   the	   expropriations	   by	   new	  owners	   ill-­‐equipped	   to	  run	   the	   inherited	  businesses,	  and	  often	  more	   interested	   in	  withdrawing	   as	   much	   capital	   as	   possible	   in	   the	   short-­‐term	   than	   developing	  sustainable	  enterprises,	  only	  further	  exacerbated	  these	  problems.271	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Commenting	  on	  their	  effects	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  ‘Zairianisation’	  measures,	   the	   American	   consul	   in	   Lubumbashi,	   Lewis	   Junio,	   described	   precisely	  such	   developments	   warning	   that,	   ‘the	   high	   level	   of	   disruption	   is	   an	   accurate	  indication	   of	   the	   validity	   and	   size	   of	   the	   problem	  President	  Mobutu	   is	  wrestling.’	  The	  report	  went	  on	  to	  note	  that,	  while	  foreigners	  would	  clearly	  be	  hurt,	  it	  was	  the	  local	  Congolese	  population	  who	  would	  be	  hardest	  hit,	  ‘…	  If	  unemployment	  rises,	  the	  distribution	  system	  deteriorates,	  food	  shortages	  intensify,	  all	  of	  which	  seems	  a	  fair	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Newlin, American Embassy Kinshasa to Department of State, Washington D.C.; 9th March 1974; NSC, 
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271 In addition to the American reports cited, the French Consul in Lubumbashi, Yves Bernard, offers 
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  Affaires	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bet	  at	   this	  point,	   it	  will	  be	   the	  native	  populace	  which	  will	  be	  more	  disadvantaged	  that	   the	   residual	   foreign	   community.’	   At	   least	   from	   the	   vantage	   of	   the	   reporting	  consulate,	  these	  were	  extremely	  worrying	  developments	  that	  could	  potentially	  even	  throw	   the	   country	   back	   into	   civil	   strife	   and	   violent	   unrest.272	  As	   the	   economy	  slumped,	   Mobutu	   responded	   with	   a	   further	   round	   of	   ‘nationalisation’	   under	   the	  banner	  of	   the	   ‘Radicalisation	  of	   the	  Revolution’	   in	  December	  of	   the	   following	  year	  that	   again	   benefited	   his	   cronies,	   now	   as	   managers	   of	   state	   enterprises,	   with	  exorbitant	  salaries,	  embezzled	  funds,	  kickbacks	  and	  expense	  accounts.273	  In	  sum,	  all	  this	  illustrates	  the	  disastrous	  impact	  on	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  Congolese	  and	  the	  longer	  term	   development	   of	   the	   country	   of	   an	   economic	   policy	   that	   ultimately	   aimed	   at	  little	   more	   than	   ensuring	   Mobutu’s	   personal	   power	   and	   the	   enrichment	   of	   the	  leader	  and	  his	  cohorts.274	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  while	  American	  observers	  in	  Congo	  were	  accurately	  reporting	  the	  darker	   implications	   of	   Mobutu’s	   pilfering	   of	   Congo’s	   coffers	   for	   his	   personal	  enrichment	   and	   political	   entrenchment,	   once	   again	   this	   sobering	   analysis	   was	  tempered	  by	  a	  much	  more	  optimistic	  overall	  tenor.	  When	  it	  came	  to	  the	  dangers	  of	  Mobutu’s	  policies	  to	  Congo’s	  economy,	  the	  much	  less	  critical	  American	  ambassador	  diluted	   even	   the	   damning	   IMF	   assessments	   described	   earlier.	   Despite	  acknowledging	  that	  Dini’s	  twenty-­‐six	  IMF	  tours	  of	  Congo	  probably	  gave	  him	  ‘better	  access	   to	   information	   than	   anyone	   else	   outside	   the	   top	   ranks	   of	   the	   Congolese	  government’,	   Vance	   concluded	   his	   assessment	   of	   the	   IMF	   report	   with,	   ‘even	  granting	   them	  substantial	  validity,	  Dini’s	  views	  seem	  overly	  pessimistic.’275	  He	  did	  not	   elaborate	   on	  why	   he	   deemed	   this	   seemingly	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   as	   excessively	  glum.	  Retaining	  a	  fundamentally	  more	  positive	  stand	  towards	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime,	  however,	  no	  doubt	  helped	  ensure	  that	  no	  efforts	  were	  made	  to	  pressure	  Mobutu	  to	  reign	   in	   some	   of	   his	   more	   extravagant	   excesses	   even	   as	   the	   lot	   of	   ordinary	  Congolese	  deteriorated.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   as	   it	   became	   increasingly	   clear	   that	   Mobutu’s	   self-­‐serving	   economic	  agenda	   would	   do	   little	   to	   satisfy	   the	   aspirations	   of	   the	   Congolese	   population	   at	  large,	   the	   president	   sought	   to	  mobilise	   the	  masses	   by	   constructing	   his	   particular	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Junior, Lubumbashi to American Embassy, Kinshasa ‘New Economic Measures’, 18th December 1973; 
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  Kabila	  p.	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  Equally	  critical	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  Lubumbashi.	  French	  Consul	  Yves	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  Shaba	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  économiques’,	  23	  Décembre	  1973;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Etrangères,	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Carton	  45,	  CADN	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brand	  of	  national	   identity.	  No	  doubt	   looking	   to	   stake	  his	   claim	  as	  a	   grand	  African	  statesman,	   his	   appeal	   to	   Zairian	   ‘Authenticity’	   appeared	   to	   borrow	   from	   the	  Senegalese	  poet-­‐turned-­‐politician	  Léopold	  Sédar	  Senghor’s	  call	   for	  greater	  African	  cultural	   awareness	   in	   his	   concept	   of	   ‘Negritude’.276	  The	   rhetorical	   vision	   Mobutu	  conjured	  up	  for	  Congo,	  however,	  was	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  a	  meaningful	  coherent	  ideology.	  In	   fact,	   the	   pronouncements	   that	   emerged	   were	   an	   all	   too	   transparent	   effort	   to	  distract	  from	  the	  country’s	  more	  pressing	  material	  concerns	  with	  a	  hodgepodge	  of	  chauvinistic	   decrees	   and	   populist	   propaganda.	   As	   such,	   Mobutu’s	   exploration	   of	  mass	   political	   mobilisation	   constituted	   little	   more	   than	   a	   further	   aspect	   of	   his	  overall	   drive	   to	   keep	   Congo’s	   citizens	   in	   check	   while	   ensuring	   increasingly	  unrivalled	   political	   dominance	   and	   control	   of	   the	   country’s	   revenue	   for	   the	  president	  and	  his	  immediate	  circle.	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  mobilisation	  effort	  were	  twofold.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Mobutu’s	   diktats	   served	   as	   a	   measure	   of	   presidential	  power	   demonstrating	   his	   ability	   to	   enforce	   his	  whims	   even	   in	   the	  most	   personal	  spheres	  of	  his	  subjects.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  apparent	  that	   the	  population	  at	   large	   remained	  essentially	  unimpressed	  by	   these	   contrived	  diversionary	  tactics.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  ‘Authenticity’	  campaign	  that	  began	  in	  October	  1971	  was	  thus	  little	  more	  than	  a	  contrived	  propaganda	  effort.	  As	  one	  CIA	  intelligence	  report	  noted,	  ‘Economic	  deterioration	  could	  have	  a	  damaging	  psychological	   impact	   that	  Mobutu	  seemingly	  hopes	   to	   offset	   by	   recourse	   to	   chauvinism.’277	  Apparently	   acting	   out	   of	   a	   ‘new	  respect	   for	   Zaire’s	   authentic	   African	   heritage’,	   the	   steps	   towards	   ‘Authenticity’	  included	   renaming	   Congo	   as	   ‘Zaire’	   on	   October	   27th;	   creating	   a	   new	   flag	   and	  national	   anthem;	   renaming	   street,	   city	   and	   geographic	   features;	   erasing	   Belgian	  monuments	   and	   demanding	   that	   all	   Congolese	   citizens	   adopt	   new	   ‘Christian’	  names.278	  Mobutu’s	   fancies	   even	   permeated	   the	   realm	   of	   fashion	   as	   he	   devised	   a	  supposedly	   African	   style	   of	   dress	   known	   as	   the	   ‘Abacost’	   (A-­‐bas-­‐le-­‐costume)	   to	  replace	  the	  western	  suit-­‐and-­‐tie	  combination.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  More	   than	   simply	   a	   positive	   effort	   towards	   nation	   building,	   this	   jingoistic	  rhetoric	   and	   symbolism	   was	   matched	   with	   darker	   xenophobic	   undertones.	  Naturally,	   the	   former	   colonists	   made	   an	   obvious	   target	   and,	   despite	   a	   reported	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  276	  The	  French	  ambassador	  saw	  no	  coincidence	  that	  it	  was	  during	  a	  state	  visit	  in	  Dakar	  that	  Mobutu	  first	  evoked	  the	  return	  to	  ‘Authenticity’	  in	  February	  of	  1971.	  Ambassadeur	  Claude	  Chayet,	  Kinshasa,	  ‘Rapport	  de	  Fin	  de	  Mission’,	  15	  Décembre	  1972;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Etrangères,	  Rapport	  de	  Fin	  de	  Mission	  de	  l’Ambassadeur,	  Carton	  14,	  CADN	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warming	   of	   relations	   with	   Belgium	   following	   Prince	   Albert’s	   state	   visit	   in	   March	  1969,	   at	   a	   time	   of	   economic	   downturn	   Mobutu	   would	   sporadically	   renege	   on	  agreements	  made	  with	   Société	   Générale	   in	   the	   Union	  Minière	  mining	   concession	  dispute	  and	  use	  the	  occasion	  to	  whip	  up	  feelings	  against	  the	  former	  metropolis,	  as	  he	  did	   in	  1972	  and	  1974.279	  These	   racial	  diatribes	  were	  not	   reserved	   for	  Belgians	  alone,	   as	   a	   report	   on	   the	   new	  mayor	   of	   Lubumbashi’s	   campaign	   to	  make	   his	   city	  truly	  Congolese	  and	  insure	  a	  new	  ‘respect’	  for	  the	  indigenous	  authorities	  under	  the	  threat	   of	   violence	   indicated.280	  Indeed,	   even	   other	   African	   nationals	   came	   under	  attack	   as	   the	   economic	   downturn	   was	   increasingly	   blamed	   on	   apparent	   acts	   of	  economic	   ‘sabotage’	   of	   dissident	   Congolese	   as	   well	   as	   foreign	   irregulars	   and	  ‘chômeurs’.281	  Apparently	   designed	   to	   both	   deflect	   criticism	   from	   the	   regime’s	  faulty	  economic	  program	  and	  present	  further	  opportunities	  for	  shake-­‐downs,	  it	  was	  such	   xenophobic	   accusations	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	   arbitrary	   deportation	   of	   some	  three	  hundred	  African	  foreigners	  in	  April	  1972.282	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nor	   was	   Mobutu’s	   enthusiastic	   interpretation	   of	   Congo’s	   national	   character	  confined	   by	   geographic	   borders.	   Applying	   his	   ‘Authenticity’	   rhetoric	   to	   the	  diplomatic	  sphere,	  Mobutu	  sought	  to	  rehabilitate	  his	  own	  personal	  image	  and	  that	  of	  his	  country	  by	  declaring	  that,	  ‘by	  discovering	  its	  Authenticity	  Zaire	  recovered	  its	  soul,	   and	   has	   been	   freed	   to	   choose	   friends	   and	   policies	   without	   emotional	   or	  ideological	   hang-­‐ups.’ 283 	  While	   a	   longstanding	   member	   of	   the	   Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement,	  an	   increasingly	  assertive	  Mobutu	  was	  keen	  to	  stress	  his	   independence	  from	   the	  western	   fold	  with	   his	   call	   for	   a	   diplomacy	   that	  was	   ‘neither	   “Right”	   nor	  “Left”’	   as	   he	   eyed	   a	   place	   amongst	   African	   leaders.	   This	   facilitated	   a	   thawing	   of	  relations	  with	  his	  neighbours	  and	  raised	  Mobutu’s	  stature	  in	  Africa	  as	  he	  managed	  reconciliation	  with	  Congo	  (Brazzaville),	  Guinea	  and	  Algeria;	  as	  well	  as	  successfully	  resolving	   Congo’s	   refugee	   problems	  with	   Sudan	   and	   engaging	   in	   a	   flurry	   of	   state	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visits	   around	   Africa.284	  A	   further	   aspect	   of	   Mobutu’s	   desired	   recognition	   as	   a	  regional	   power	   and	   independent	   voice	   in	   world	   affairs,	   however,	   was	   his	  rapprochement	  with	  the	  communist	  powers	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	  conversation	  between	  Congo’s	  Foreign	  Minister	  Nguza	  Karl-­‐I-­‐Bond	  and	  the	  Polish	   ambassador	   in	   Kinshasa	   in	   May	   1973	   illustrated	   that	   Congolese	   officials	  openly	  touted	  Mobutu’s	  ‘Authenticity’	  rhetoric	  as	  evidence	  of	  Congo’s	  rediscovered	  non-­‐aligned	   orientation.285	  	   Mobutu	   had	   longstanding	   ties	   with	   Romania.	   Long	  standing	   ties	   to	   Romania	   were	   now	   matched	   by	   enthusiastic	   responses	   from	  Hungary	   and	   the	   German	   Democratic	   Republic	   to	   Congo’s	   open	   door	  announcement,	  with	  East	  Germany	  setting	  up	  an	  embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  that	  January	  and	   dispatching	   a	   delegation	   to	   study	   the	   potential	   for	   strengthening	   mutual	  economic	   ties.286	  The	   Soviet	   Union	   too	   was	   treated	   to	   renewed	   advances	   from	  Mobutu	  by	  1973,	  although	  the	  Congolese	  leader	  would	  remain	  disappointed	  by	  the	  low	   level	  of	  aid	  offered	   from	  this	  corner.	  Most	  noticeable,	  however,	  was	  Mobutu’s	  rapprochement	   with	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   China.	   In	   November	   1972	   Mobutu	  accorded	  China	  full	  diplomatic	  recognition	  and,	  perhaps	  following	  the	  lead	  of	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  in	  this	  area,	  embarked	  upon	  a	  state	  visit	  the	  following	  January	  while	  touring	  Asia.	  During	   this	  visit	  Mobutu	  met	  with	  Chairman	  Mao	  and	  Premier	  Zhou	  Enlai,	   reportedly	   secured	   a	   one	   hundred	   million	   USD	   interest-­‐free	   loan	   and	  returned	   visibly	   impressed	   with	   the	   Chinese	   approach	   to	   running	   their	   affairs	  (installing	   the	   Salongo	   forced	   public	   works	   program	   not	   long	   after).287	  No	   doubt	  these	   efforts	   reflected	   as	  much	  Mobutu’s	   need	   for	   new	   sources	   of	   income	   during	  Congo’s	  growing	  economic	  worries	  as	  his	  desire	  to	  project	  his	  personal	  image	  as	  a	  grand	  African	  statesman.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Visits included Uganda in January, Togo in May, Guinea in June, Rwanda, Tanzania and Ethiopia in 
October 1972. Various telegrams throughout 1972 from US Embassy Kinshasa to Washington D.C.; RG 59, 
Political & Defence, Box 2841, Department of State, NARAII; Ambassadeur	  Claude	  Chayet,	  Kinshasa,	  ‘Rapport	  de	  Fin	  de	  Mission’;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Etrangères,	  Rapport	  de	  Fin	  de	  Mission	  de	  l’Ambassadeur,	  Carton	  14,	  CADN 285	  3.	  Sekretär	  Hübsch,	  ‘Aufenthalt	  Rumänischer	  Parlamentsdelegation	  in	  Zaire,	  Mai	  1973,	  Politisches	  Archiv,	  Abteilung	  Ost	  und	  Zentralafrika,	  Mikrofiche	  C784/74,	  MfAA,	  DDR	  286	  In	  1972	  President	  Nicolae	  Ceausescu	  returned	  the	  compliment	  of	  Mobutu’s	  visit	  two	  years	  earlier	  with	  a	  state	  visit	  to	  Congo.	  By	  1973	  ten	  Romanian	  professors	  were	  teaching	  in	  Congo	  and	  the	  departing	  Romanian	  ambassador	  was	  awarded	  the	  ‘Order	  of	  the	  Leopard’	  that	  September	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  the	  president’s	  affection.	  Mobutu’s	  advances	  were	  by	  no	  means	  one-­‐sided	  overtures	  as	  the	  German	  Democratic	  Republic	  had	  been	  looking	  to	  woo	  Congo	  and	  secure	  support	  for	  its	  bid	  to	  join	  the	  UN,	  WHO	  and	  World	  Bank;	  all	  in	  Arbeits-­‐	  und	  Maßnahme-­‐Pläne	  und	  Konzeptionen	  der	  Abt.	  Afrika	  zur	  Entwicklung	  der	  Beziehungen	  der	  DDR	  zu	  Zaire,	  Juli	  1960-­‐	  April	  1963,	  Oktober	  1970-­‐	  Dezember	  1971,	  Politisches	  Archiv,	  Abteilung	  Ost	  und	  Zentralafrika,	  Mikrofiche	  C947/78,	  MfAA,	  DDR	  
287 Vance, Kinshasa to Secretary of State, ‘President Mobutu’s Account of Far East Trip’, 29th January 1973; 
RG 59, Political & Defence, Box 2841, Department of State, NARAII 
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  Indeed,	   the	   Congolese	   president’s	   diplomatic	   drive	   into	   international	   politics	  illustrates	   three	   aspects	   of	   Mobutu’s	   rule.	   First	   of	   all,	   as	   the	   French	   ambassador	  pointed	   out,	   the	   fact	   that	   Mobutu	   indulged	   in	   lengthy	   absences	   from	   his	   domain	  while	  touring	  Africa,	  Europe	  (on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Iron	  Curtain),	  Asia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  served	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  how	  secure	  he	  felt	  in	  his	  power	  base	  in	  Congo	  by	  the	  early	  1970s.288	  Secondly,	  this	  growing	  self-­‐assurance	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  his	  desire	  to	   attain	   greater	   recognition	   around	   the	   globe	   and	   Mobutu’s	   efforts	   in	   the	  international	   arena	   were	   a	   further	   indication	   of	   the	   Congolese	   leader’s	   growing	  hubris	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  his	  second	  term.	  Finally,	  and	  most	   importantly,	   it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  ascribe	  Mobutu’s	  opening	  to	  the	  communist	  powers	  as	  a	  genuine	  ideological	  reorientation.	   The	   dual	   aims	   of	   raising	   Mobutu’s	   status	   and	   diversifying	   Congo’s	  sources	  of	  economic	  assistance	  were	  quite	  transparent	  to	  contemporary	  observers.	  Even	   the	   newly	   arrived	   East	   German	   officials	   and	   their	   Soviet	   counterparts	   in	  Kinshasa	   remained	   sceptical	   over	   the	   sincerity	   of	  Mobutu’s	   reorientation	   as	   they	  pointed	   to	   the	   superficial	   and	   largely	   symbolic	   nature	   of	   the	   rapprochement	   and	  Congo’s	   primary	   interest	   in	   increasing	   access	   to	   economic	   aid. 289 	  A	   similar	  reasoning	  no	  doubt	  permitted	  American	  commentators	  to	  view	  these	  developments	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  detachment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  such,	   the	  Nixon	  administration	  set	   itself	  apart	   from	  its	  predecessors	   in	   its	  apparent	   willingness	   to	   indulge	   Mobutu’s	   open	   rapprochement	   with	   various	  communist	   powers	   during	   his	   ‘Authenticity’	   foray	   into	   diplomacy.	   Such	   open	  flirtations	   with	   the	   Eastern	   Bloc	   would	   have	   thrown	   all	   three	   of	   the	   previous	  administrations	  in	  Washington	  into	  crisis,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  that	  little	  more	  than	  an	  appeal	   to	   Soviet	   assistance	   by	   Patrice	   Lumumba	   in	   1960	   had	   caused	   President	  Eisenhower	   to	   infamously	   label	   Congo’s	   first	   premier	   an	   ‘African	   Castro’	   and	  authorise	  his	  planned	  assassination.	  By	   contrast,	   during	   the	  Nixon	  years	  both	   the	  Kinshasa	   embassy	   and	   the	   State	   Department	   in	   Washington	   dismissed	   this	  posturing	   simply	   as	   outgrowths	   of	   Mobutu’s	   ambitions	   to	   advance	   his	   personal	  stature	  on	   the	  world	   stage,	   as	  well	   as	   efforts	   to	   seek	  assistance	   from	  all	   available	  corners	  of	   the	  globe	  at	   a	   time	  of	  worsening	  economic	  downturn.	  290	  No	  doubt	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  288	  Chayet,	  Kinshasa,	  ‘Rapport	  de	  Fin	  de	  Mission’,	  15	  Décembre	  1972;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Etrangères,	  Rapport	  de	  Fin	  de	  Mission	  de	  l’Ambassadeur,	  Carton	  14,	  CADN	  289	  Botschafter	  Weidemann,	  Kinshasa,	  ‘Über	  Gespräch	  mit	  dem	  sowjetischen	  Botschafter	  Genosse	  Lawrow,	  12.7.73;	  Aktenvermerke	  über	  Gespräche	  zw.	  Diplomaten	  der	  DDR	  und	  Diplomaten	  Zaires,	  1973-­‐1976,	  Politisches	  Archiv,	  Abteilung	  Ost	  und	  Zentralafrika,	  Mikrofiche	  C6246,	  MfAA,	  DDR	  
290 Vance, Kinshasa to Secretary of State, ‘Mobutu’s opening to the left’, 3rd March 1972; RG 59, Political & 
Defence, Box 2841, Department of State, NARAII; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David 
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merely	  reflected	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  by	  the	  1970s	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  tied	  in	  with	  Nixon’s	  own	  China	  policy	  and	  efforts	  towards	  détente.	  Ultimately,	  positioning	  himself	  as	  an	  assertive	  African	  leader	  perfectly	  aligned	  Mobutu	  with	  the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  strategy	  of	  fostering	  strong	  regional	  allies	  in	  the	  global	  Cold	  War.291	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  From	   a	   Congolese	   perspective	   too,	   certain	   elements	   of	   this	   chauvinistic	  campaign	  seemed	  to	  appeal	   to	  a	  genuine	  popular	  desire	  to	  rid	  Congo	  of	   the	  sights	  and	  symbols	  of	  the	  old	  colonial	  order.	  His	  corresponding	  diplomatic	  initiatives	  also	  proved	   successful	   in	   briefly	   and	   superficially	   rehabilitating	   Congo	   and	   Mobutu	  personally	   to	   some	   extent	   within	   the	   wider	   African	   community.	  292	  Beyond	   these	  self-­‐serving	  effects,	  however,	  Mobutu’s	  ‘Authenticity’	  campaign	  failed	  to	  capture	  the	  popular	   imagination.	   With	   his	   all	   too	   transparent	   diversion	   from	   the	   material	  concerns	  of	  most	  Congolese,	   it	  became	  clear	   that	   the	  president	  was	  doing	   little	  of	  substance	  to	  actually	  improve	  their	  lot	  and	  his	  own	  image	  soon	  began	  to	  suffer.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Thus,	   as	   early	   as	   March	   1972,	   Consul	   Seitz	   reported	   the	   first	   dissident	  grumblings	   amongst	   ordinary	   Congolese	   from	   Bukavu	   that	   ranged	   from	  expressions	   of	   concern	   for	   Mobutu’s	   health	   to	   exasperation	   over	   his	   growing	  megalomania,	   ‘From	  many	   quarters,	  Mobutu	   is	   accused	   of	   delusions	   of	   grandeur,	  napoleonism,	   and	   ambrosial	   appetites.’ 293 	  The	   following	   year	   the	   American	  consulate	   in	  Kisangani	   recounted	   a	   seemingly	   representative	   conversation	  with	   a	  local	  newspaper	  editor,	  regional	  director	  of	  the	  Zairian	  Press	  Agency	  and	  a	  former	  administration	  official	  under	  the	  title	   ‘The	  President:	  Meglomania,	  Hypocrisy,	  Lack	  of	  Direction’,	   concluding	   that	   ‘The	  president’s	  hypocrisy	   in	   talking	   ‘Salongo’	  while	  stashing	   away	   a	   fortune	   outside	   the	   country,	   and	   talking	   ‘authenticity’	   while	  sending	   his	   children	   to	   Belgian	   Catholic	   schools,	   was	   also	   criticised	   by	   many	   of	  these	   individuals.’294Ambassador	   Vance	  went	   even	   further	   hinting	   at	   doubts	   over	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  regime	  itself	  that	  were	  beginning	  to	  emerge	  in	  Kinshasa,	  	  ‘The	  “authenticity”	  campaign	  and	  Mobutu’s	  travels	  look	  to	  some	  to	  be	  forms	  of	  escapism	  which	  allow	  the	  president	  to	  avoid	  the	  hard	  decisions	  which	  must	  be	  made	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  economy	  has	  turned	  sluggish	  and	  social	  problems	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Indeed, in a strange role-reversal it was Mobutu who initially expressed concern over American overtures 
to China, which he had always regarded as a troublesome source of aid to rebel factions within Congo. 
Newsom, Embassy Kinshasa to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 12th May 1971; RG 59, Political & 
Defense, Box 2627, Department of State, NARAII; Vance, Kinshasa to Washington D.C., 16th December 
1971; RG 59, Political & Defence, Box 2841, Department of State, NARAII 
292 Newlin, Kinshasa to Department of State, Washington D.C., ‘Authenticity and the Radicalization of the 
Revolution’, 14th December 1972; RG 59, Political & Defense, Box 2628, Department of State, NARAII 
293 Seitz, Bukavu to Secretary of State, ‘Kivu: Mobutu Out of Joint’, 13th March, 1972; RG 59, Political & 
Defense, Box 2841, Department of State, NARAII  
294 Strand, Kisangani to Secretary of State, ‘Some Dissident Views of the Mobutu Regime’, 26th April 1973; 
RG 59, Political & Defense, Box 2842, Department of State, NARAII  
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mounting.	   For	   the	   first	   time	   we	   have	   heard	   knowledgeable	   Zairians	   begin	   to	  question	  the	  long-­‐term	  survivability	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.’295	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Even	   these	   devastating	   assessments	   of	   a	   growing	  popular	   exasperation	  with	  Mobutu’s	   rather	   crass	   political	   ploys	   were	   refracted	   through	   the	   prism	   of	   an	  altogether	  more	  positive	  appraisal	   from	   the	  Kinshasa	  embassy,	  however.	  As	   such,	  Newlin’s	   summary	  of	   the	   cynically	   concocted	   ‘Authenticity’	  program	  at	   the	  end	  of	  1972,	  for	  example,	  having	  accurately	  described	  Mobutu’s	  drive	  for	  political	  mastery	  and	   the	   fusion	  of	   state	  and	  party	   in	  his	   ‘radicalisation’	   agenda,	   concluded	  with	  an	  overall	  more	  optimistic	   tenor,	   ‘It	   lends	   itself	  well	   to	  nation	  building.	   Its	  emotional	  appeal	   and	   its	   ease	   of	   adaption	   to	   official	   policy	  will	  make	   it	   a	   useful	   vehicle	   for	  Mobutu	  for	  a	   long	  time.	  Moreover,	   the	  authenticity	  campaign	   is	  an	  effort	   to	   install	  pride	   in	   the	  population	   in	   its	  African	  heritage.’296	  Neither	  Mobutu’s	  Abacost	  or	  his	  exuberant	   renaming	   campaign	   had	   much	   to	   do	   with	   African	   heritage,	   of	   course.	  Again,	   the	   tolerance	   and	   willingness	   of	   his	   American	   backers	   to	   entertain	   even	  Mobutu’s	   more	   absurd	   political	   endeavours	   was	   remarkable,	   especially	   in	   view	  their	  visible	  failure	  to	  actually	  penetrate	  the	  popular	  imagination.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Having	   already	   awarded	   himself	   such	   titles	   as	   ‘the	   Father	   of	   the	  Nation’	   and	  ‘the	   Guide’,	   just	   at	   the	   population	   was	   beginning	   to	   feel	   the	   full	   force	   of	   the	  economic	   downturn	   Joseph	   Désiré	   Mobutu	   adopted	   his	   own	   ‘authentic’	   name,	  ‘Mobutu	  Sese	  Seko	  Nkuku	  Ngbenda	  Wa	  Za	  Banga’	  or	  ‘the	  all	  powerful	  warrior	  who,	  because	  of	  his	  inflexible	  will	  to	  win,	  goes	  from	  conquest	  to	  conquest,	  leaving	  fire	  in	  his	  wake.’	  While	  a	  further	  expression	  of	  his	  growing	  hubris,	  this	  renaming	  campaign	  was	   not	   coincidental.	   Forcing	   all	   Congolese	   to	   change	   their	   ‘European’	   Christian	  names	  into	  ‘authentic’	  Congolese	  names	  was	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  regime’s	  ability	  to	  impose	  its	  will	  even	  in	  the	  most	  private	  aspects	  of	  ordinary	  people.	  Thus,	  even	  as	  his	  personal	   popularity	  waned	  under	   the	   social	   and	   economic	   strains	   endured	  by	  the	   population	   at	   large,	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   regime	   was	   reinforced	   with	   an	  increasingly	   repressive	   state	   apparatus.	   The	   final	   but	   devastating	   aspect	   of	  Mobutu’s	   increasingly	   assertive	   regime,	   then,	   was	   its	   repressive	   capabilities	  through	  its	  pervasive	  military,	  police	  and	  Sûreté	  services	  combined	  with	  a	  ruthless	  rejection	   of	   all	   dissenting	   voices	   from	   any	   corner	   of	   Congo.	   The	   most	   obvious	  manifestation	   of	   Mobutu’s	   growing	   authoritarianism	   can	   be	   found	   in	   his	   clashes	  with	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  the	  student	  movement,	   two	   independent	  voices	   that	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had	  largely	  remained	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  influence	  of	  the	  state	  during	  Mobutu’s	  first	  term.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Catholic	   Church	  was	  national	   organisation	   comparable	   to	   the	   state	   in	   its	  penetration	   of	   the	   population	   but	  more	   effective	   in	   supplying	   social	   services.	   	   By	  1974,	  for	  example,	  Catholic	  schools	  enrolled	  61.7	  per	  cent	  of	  Congo’s	  primary	  pupils	  and	  42.1	  per	  cent	  of	  its	  secondary	  students	  (compared	  to	  13.8	  per	  cent	  and	  35.4	  per	  cent	   in	   state	   schools	   respectively).297	  Unsurprisingly,	   the	   church,	   and	   Cardinal	  Joseph	   Albert	   Malula	   in	   particular	   (the	   Archbishop	   of	   Kinshasa	   since	   1964),	   was	  outspokenly	   critical	   of	   the	   ‘Authenticity’	   campaign	   to	   rid	   Congolese	   of	   their	  Christian	  names,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  more	  general	  drive	  of	  the	  MPR	  to	  infiltrate	  all	  facets	  of	  daily	  life	  in	  Congo.	  Despite	  the	  best	  efforts	  of	  Congo’s	  bishops	  to	  reason	  and	  reach	  a	  compromise	  with	  their	  president,	   following	  his	  critical	  stance	  Malula	  was	  forced	  into	  exile	  while	  Catholic	  seminaries	  were	  simply	  absorbed	  by	  the	  JMPR	  (the	  youth	  movement	  of	  the	  sole	  political	  party)	  under	  the	  threat	  of	  mandatory	  closure.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  was	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  state	  power	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  even	  an	  old	  established	  institution	  to	  resist	  its	  will.	  More	  than	  this,	  however,	  the	  clash	  with	  the	  church	  was	  a	  further	  measure	  of	  Mobutu’s	  apparent	  disregard	  for	  popular	  opinion.	  As	   Consul	   Seitz	   pointed	   out	   from	   Bukavu,	   ‘A	   President	   reshuffling	   his	   cabinet,	  negotiating	   a	  World	   Bank	   loan,	   or	   touring	   Japan	   has	   little	   effect	   on	   Kivuites,	   but	  when	  the	  church	  shudders,	  the	  people	  feel	   it…	  The	  people	  are	  now	  fed	  up	  with	  all	  the	   ballyhoo	   and	   bunting	   from	   Kinshasa.’ 298 	  Regardless	   of	   this	   exasperation,	  however,	   Mobutu	   had	   decisively	   demonstrated	   the	   extent	   of	   his	   reach,	   his	  willingness	   to	   use	   it	   and,	   in	   so	   doing,	   eliminated	   one	   of	   the	   few	   remaining	  independent	  voices	  in	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  student	  demonstrations	  that	  occurred	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  1969	  appeared	  to	  be	  less	  directed	  against	  specific	  government	  policies	  than	  borne	  out	  of	  material	   grievances	   over	   student	   living	   conditions	   and	   the	   education	   system	   in	  general.299	  The	  West	   German	   embassy,	   for	   example,	   reported	   that	   ninety-­‐five	   per	  cent	  of	  Lovanium	  University	  students	  in	  Kinshasa	  were	  dependent	  on	  government	  grants	  of	  only	  some	  seven	  Zaires	  (ca.	   fourteen	  dollars)	  per	  month	  despite	  Congo’s	  ever	  rising	  living	  costs.300	  The	  protests	  that	  erupted	  in	  June	  1969	  at	  the	  university	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when	   close	   to	   a	   thousand	   students	   took	   to	   the	   streets	   were	   met	   with	   a	   heavy-­‐handed	  ANC	  response	  that	  left	  twelve	  students	  dead	  and	  some	  thirty	  subsequently	  imprisoned	   for	   up	   to	   twenty	   years.301	  As	   the	   anniversary	   of	   the	   ‘4th	   June	  Martyrs’	  approached	   in	   the	   following	   years,	   protests	   pitting	   the	   students	   against	   the	  government	   erupted	   again	   on	   university	   campuses	   in	   1970	   and	   1971.	   This	   was	  compounded	   by	   student	   groups	   apparently	   mocking	   the	   elaborate	   national	  mourning	   following	   the	   death	   of	  Mobutu’s	  mother	   in	   1971.302	  No	   doubt	   stung	   by	  this	   very	   public	   personal	   attack	   and	   as	   ever	   intolerant	   of	   any	   openly	   dissident	  group,	   Mobutu	   responded	   by	   closing	   Lovanium	   University	   in	   Kinshasa	   and	  forcefully	   conscripting	   all	   its	   students	   into	   the	   army	   for	   two	   years,	  whether	   they	  were	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  demonstrations	  or	  not.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	   these	   draconian	  measures	  were	   accompanied	   by	   the	   usual	   claims	   that	  outside	   influence	  and	   threats	   to	   the	  government	  were	  behind	   the	  disturbances,	   it	  was	  plain	  for	  all	  to	  see	  that	  this	  was	  a	  vendetta	  against	  a	  group	  that	  had	  challenged	  Mobutu	   personally. 303 	  Unlike	   its	   wrangling	   with	   the	   church,	   however,	   this	  government	   crackdown	   did	   not	   evoke	  widespread	   popular	   sympathy	   for	   a	   group	  viewed	  by	  many	  as	  a	  privileged	  and	  pampered	  elite.	  While	   some	  of	   the	  sentences	  were	  partially	  commuted,	  this	  was	  a	  further	  cynical	  demonstration	  of	  government	  power	   at	   a	   time	   of	   economic	   downturn	   and	   increasing	   grumblings	   against	   the	  regime.304	  Thus	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  Mission	  King	  reported,	  ‘In	  the	  political	  atmosphere	  of	   the	  Congo	   at	   this	   time	   the	   government	   could	  not	   afford	   to	   allow	  a	  high	  profile	  sector	  of	  society	  to	  get	  away	  with	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  President’s	  authority’305	  and	  it	  was	  this	  sentiment	  that	  ensured	  Mobutu	  felt,	  ‘compelled	  to	  react	  strongly	  and	  avoid	  any	  impression	  of	  hesitancy	  or	  weakness.’306	  In	  other	  words,	  within	  a	  few	  years	  of	  the	   resumption	   of	   Mobutu’s	   second	   term	   it	   was	   clear,	   not	   least	   to	   American	  observers,	  that	  a	  regime	  was	  now	  in	  place	  that	  would	  not	  tolerate	  dissent,	  whether	  motivated	   by	   political	   disagreements	   or	   simple	   material	   concerns.	   More	   to	   the	  point,	  alongside	  a	  miscellany	  of	  populist	  rhetoric	  lay	  the	  threat	  of	  physical	  violence	  to	  ensure	  conformity	  when	  this	  was	  deemed	  necessary.	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  Even	  these	  unpalatable	  coercive	  measures	  were	  cast	  in	  relatively	  favourable	  or	  at	  least	  apologetic	  terms	  on	  the	  pages	  of	  American	  official	  reports,	  as	  the	  above	  citations	  indicate.	  The	  American	  embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  justified	  Mobutu’s	  draconian	  response	   to	   the	   student	   disturbances	   along	   similar	   lines,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   political	  realities	  in	  Congo	  making	  it	  ‘necessary	  for	  the	  leadership	  to	  reassert	  itself	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  even	  at	   the	  risks	  of	  opening	  new	  channels	  of	  political	  vulnerability	  and	  of	  harming	  friends	  and	  innocents.’307	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  silencing	  of	  dissenting	  voices	  and	  complete	   eradication	   of	   any	   form	   of	   political	   plurality	   could	   be	   rationalised	   as	   a	  necessary	   sacrifice	   to	   stability	   and	   order	   as,	   ‘In	   sum,	   the	   amorphous	   Congolese	  society	   is	   still	   too	   vulnerable	   to	   permit	   any	   group,	   even	   university	   students,	   the	  luxury	   of	   its	   own	   parochial	   path.’308	  Again,	   relief	   at	   Mobutu’s	   ability	   to	   install	   a	  semblance	   of	   order,	   and	   perhaps	   a	   willingness	   to	   attribute	   his	   less	   palatable	  tendencies	   to	   a	   supposed	   Congolese	   backwardness,	   conspired	   in	   an	   overall	  uncritical	  stance	  towards	  the	  Kinshasa	  despot.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  above	  dissection	  of	  Congolese	  domestic	  politics	  has	  been	  to	   illustrate	   the	   swift	   progression	   of	   Mobutu’s	   government	   into	   a	   fully-­‐fledged	  authoritarian	   regime	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1970s.	   In	   a	   relatively	   short	   period,	  Mobutu	  had	  misspent	  much	  of	  his	  personal	  political	  capital	  earned	  by	  the	  end	  of	  his	  first	  term	  in	  office	  and	  ensured	  that	  any	  fragile	  hope	  that	  was	  emerging	  for	  Congo’s	  future	  had	  once	  more	  been	  replaced	  with	  a	  depressing	  resignation	  to	  the	  hardships	  of	  daily	   life.	  Centred	  very	  much	  on	   the	  persona	  of	   the	  president	  himself,	   a	   regime	  had	  emerged	  bent	  on	  absolute	  political	  control	  and	  an	  economic	  system	  of	   largess	  that	   benefited	   only	   the	   few	   fortunate	   enough	   to	   be	   in	   the	   good	   grace	   of	   the	  uncontested	  despot.	   This	   regime	  was	  built	   on	   three	  basic	   tenets	   of	   crass	  populist	  political	   manipulations	   such	   as	   the	   ‘Authenticity’	   campaign,	   a	   systemic	   top-­‐down	  corruption	   encapsulated	   in	   the	   ruinous	   	   ‘Zairianisation’	   program	   and	   the	   naked	  threat	   of	   aggression	   as	   felt	   by	   the	   student	   movement	   between	   1969-­‐71.	  Unfortunately,	  despite	  much	  huffing	  and	  puffing	  from	  Kinshasa,	  none	  of	  the	  devised	  policies	   had	   much	   to	   do	   with	   a	   coherent	   strategy	   towards	   bettering	   the	   lives	   of	  ordinary	  Congolese.	  With	   the	   excuse	  of	   the	   emergency	  measures	   and	   a	  necessary	  period	  of	   consolidation	   following	  years	  of	   rebellion	   and	  upheaval	   fading,	   the	   self-­‐serving	   nature	   of	   the	   Mobutu	   regime	   was	   becoming	   painfully	   obvious	   to	  contemporary	  observers	  from	  within	  and	  beyond	  Congo’s	  border.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 Ibid. 
308 King, Kinshasa to Secretary of State, ‘Lovanium Student Disorders’, June 17th 1971; RG 59, Political & 
Defense, Box 2627, Department of State, NARAII 
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  Indeed,	  the	  true	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  all	  found	  ample	  expression	  on	  the	  pages	  of	  American	  official	  reports.	  While	  apparently	  relatively	  well	  informed,	  it	  is	  remarkable,	  however,	  how	  time	  and	  again	   this	  accurate	  reporting	  was	  coloured	  by	  a	  much	  more	  sympathetic	  reading	  of	   the	  policies	  of	   the	  Congolese	  government	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  Mobutu	  personally.	  No	  doubt	  this	  was	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  relief	  felt	  at	   having	   a	   seemingly	  workable	   partnership	  with	   a	   Kinshasa	   government	   able	   to	  maintain	   a	   degree	   of	   order	   and	   stability	   in	   Congo	   for	   the	   first	   time	   since	   the	  turbulent	   1960s.	   Once	   again,	   an	   element	   of	   racial	   prejudice	   also	   appears	   to	   have	  contributed	   to	   a	   willingness	   to	   dismiss	   the	   more	   unpalatable	   aspects	   of	   the	  Kinshasa	   regime	   as	   simply	   inherent	   to	   a	   backward	   part	   of	   the	   world	   in	   need	   of	  strong	  central	  guidance	  and	  manipulation,	  as	  if	   little	  more	  could	  be	  expected	  from	  Congo.	   Perhaps	   the	   increasingly	   close	   rapport	   between	   Ambassador	   Vance	  personally	  and	  President	  Mobutu	  also	  contributed	  to	  a	  certain	  myopia	  that	  stood	  in	  the	   way	   of	   a	   more	   critical	   overall	   view	   of	   developments	   in	   Congo.309	  Ultimately,	  while	  all	  these	  factors	  no	  doubt	  contributed	  to	  the	  American	  indulgence	  of	  Mobutu	  Sese	   Seko,	   it	   was	   his	   ability	   to	   fit	   perfectly	   into	   the	   Nixon-­‐Kissinger	   Cold	   War	  strategy	  in	  the	  Third	  World	  that	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  his	  success	  in	  securing	  on	  going	  and	  unconditional	  American	  support.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mobutu	   had	   begun	   the	   early	   1970s	   by	   promoting	   symbols	   of	   modernity	   in	  Congo,	  from	  his	  nationalist	  rhetoric	  the	  grand	  industrial	  projects	  of	  which	  the	  Inga	  Dam	  was	  the	  most	  glaring	  manifestation.	  Scratching	  beneath	  the	  surface,	  however,	  reveals	  a	  state	  geared	  towards	  the	  exploitation	  of	  ordinary	  Congolese	  by	  a	  narrow	  elite	  syphoning	  off	  the	  profits	  of	  the	  country’s	  resources	  akin	  to	  the	  most	  rapacious	  colonial	   rule.	   The	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  Nixon	   administration	   proved	   a	  willing	   and	  encouraging	   ally	   throughout	   these	   developments,	   and	   how	   far	   the	   White	   House	  executive	  directed	  this,	  forms	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  309	  Mobutu	  even	  mentioned	  his	  close	  ties	  to	  Sheldon	  Vance	  in	  his	  second	  encounter	  with	  Nixon	  in	  October	  1973.	  Kissinger, ‘Memcon: Meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko’, October 10th 1973; FRUS 
Volume E-6	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The	  Nixon	  Approach	  Towards	  Congo:	  	  
Presidential	  Endorsements	  and	  the	  Business	  Interest	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  That	   the	   Nixon	   administration	   was	   not	   averse	   to	   dealing	   with	   right	   wing	  dictators	   was	   amply	   demonstrated	   by	   its	   much-­‐cited	   encouragement	   of	   General	  Augusto	  Pinochet’s	  coup	  and	  the	  overthrow	  of	  Salvador	  Allende	  Gossens	  in	  Chile	  in	  September	   1973.	   Indeed,	   in	   his	   analysis	   of	   Nixon’s	   Latin	   America	   policies,	   Mark	  Attwood	   Lawrence	   eloquently	   encapsulates	   how	   the	   Nixon-­‐Kissinger	   vision	   of	  foreign	   policy	   had	   little	   interest	   in	   the	   global	   ‘South’	   beyond	   preserving	   stability	  and	   avoiding	   blows	   to	   American	   prestige.	   Kissinger	   himself	   reportedly	   told	   the	  Chilean	  Foreign	  Minister	  in	  1969,	  ‘Nothing	  of	  importance	  can	  come	  from	  the	  South.	  History	  has	  never	  been	  produced	  in	  the	  South.	  The	  axis	  of	  history	  starts	  in	  Moscow,	  goes	   to	   Bonn,	   crosses	   over	   to	   Washington	   and	   finishes	   in	   Tokyo.’310	  To	   leave	  Washington	  free	  to	  pursue	  its	  grand	  strategies	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  and	   focus	   on	   areas	   deemed	   strategically	  more	   significant	   such	   as	   Europe	   and	   the	  Middle	  East	  (and	  in	  line	  with	  his	  ‘Vietnamisation’	  of	  the	  war	  in	  South	  East	  Asia),	  the	  president’s	   ‘Nixon	   Doctrine’	   thus	   sought	   to	   bolster	   friendly	   local	   regimes	   to	  shoulder	  more	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  containing	  communist	  advances	  while	  Washington	  pursued	   its	   diplomacy	   of	   détente.	   The	   Congolese	   leader	   for	   his	   part	   appeared	   to	  offer	   exactly	  what	   the	   ‘Nixon	  Doctrine’	   sought	   in	   a	   Third	  World	   ally	   and	  Mobutu	  was	  more	   than	  willing	   to	   portray	   himself	   as	   a	   staunch	   regional	   voice	  who	   could,	  with	   American	   support,	   stand	   tall	   against	   communist	   subversion	   in	   Africa.	  While	  not	   particularly	   revolutionary	  when	   compared	   to	   the	   Johnson	   approach	   to	   Congo	  during	   the	   1960s,	   these	   extremely	   limited	   aims	   in	   the	   Third	   World	   and	   the	  concomitant	   disregard	   for	   the	   internal	   machinations	   of	   friendly	   allies	   coincided	  with	  the	  growing	  domestic	  transgression	  of	  an	  increasingly	  assertive	  Mobutu.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  previous	  section	   illustrated	  how	  essentially	  accurate	  readings	  of	  events	   in	  Congo	   were	   coloured	   by	   an	   altogether	   sanguine	   and	   positive	   appraisal	   of	   the	  Mobutu	   regime	   by	   the	   American	   country	   team.	   Rather	   than	   simply	   reflecting	   the	  failings	   of	   an	   uncritical	   embassy	   staff,	   however,	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	   policies	  pursued	  by	   the	  Washington	   executive	   towards	  Congo	   suggests	   that	   this	  was	   very	  much	   in	   line	  with	   the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  vision	   for	   the	   ‘South’.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   the	  Military	   Assistance	   Program	   and	   economic	   aid	   of	   the	   Johnson	   administration	  continued	  uninterrupted.	  In	  addition,	  however,	  three	  key	  innovations	  also	  emerged	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  310	  Quoted	  by	  Mark	  Attwood	  Lawrence,	  	  ‘History	  from	  Below:	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  
Nixon	  Years’	  	  in	  Frederick	  Logevall	  and	  Andrew	  Preston	  (eds.).	  Nixon	  and	  the	  World;	  American	  Foreign	  Relations,	  1969-­‐1977	  (Oxford	  Uni.	  Press,	  2008)	  p.	  269	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with	   the	  arrival	  of	   the	   foreign	  policy	  expertise	  of	   the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	   team	   in	   the	  White	  House.	  First	  of	  all,	  after	  the	  incessant	  meddling	  in	  Congolese	  internal	  politics	  during	  the	  1960s,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  very	  much	  proclaimed	  a	  policy	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  in	  the	  internal	  workings	  of	  the	  Congolese	  state.	  Far	  from	  reflecting	  any	  deeper	   scruples	  over	   infringing	   the	  sovereignty	  of	   its	  African	  partner,	   this	  merely	  illustrated	  the	  extent	   to	  which	  the	  United	  States	  under	  Nixon	  viewed	  Mobutu	  as	  a	  worthy	   ally	   who	   should	   not	   be	   unnecessarily	   riled	   over	   seemingly	   minor	  transgressions	   in	   his	   domestic	   affairs.	   Secondly,	  while	   Johnson	  was	   keen	   to	   keep	  Congolese	   matters	   very	   much	   at	   arms	   length,	   Nixon,	   by	   contrast,	   embraced	   his	  Congolese	  counterpart	  with	  an	  unfettered	  presidential	  endorsement	  in	  the	  form	  of	  two	  personal	  meetings	  with	  Mobutu	  Sese	  Seko.	  Finally,	  and	  as	  a	  direct	  extension	  of	  this	  presidential	  backing,	   this	  period	  saw	  an	  emerging	  American	  business	   interest	  in	  Congo.	  It	  was	  not	  private	  business	  that	  shaped	  American	  official	  policy,	  however,	  as	   a	   closer	  examination	   reveals	   that	  during	   the	  early	  1970s	   it	  was	  very	  much	   the	  politicians	  who	  courted	  American	  businesses	   to	  pique	   their	   interest	   in	  Congo	  and	  attract	  investments	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  strengthening	  its	  African	  ally.	  All	  of	  this	  suggests	  that	   it	  was	   the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  White	  House	   that	  was	   the	   central	  driving	   force	   in	  defining	  the	  American	  line	  towards	  Congo	  during	  this	  formative	  period.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Before	  delving	  deeper	  into	  the	  actual	  policies	  pursued	  towards	  Congo,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  one	  area	  entirely	  ignored	  by	  the	  Nixon	  administration.	  At	  no	  point	  was	  any	  effort	  made	  to	  influence	  the	  Congolese	  leader	  on	  the	  internal	  political	  developments	  within	   the	   country,	   no	   matter	   how	   obvious	   their	   detrimental	   impact	   on	   the	  population	   at	   large	   became.	   That	   this	   was	   part	   of	   a	   conscious	   strategy	   of	   non-­‐intervention	  is	  borne	  out	  by	  two	  particular	  incidents	  during	  which	  actors	  both	  from	  within	  Congo	  and	   from	  beyond	   its	  borders	  actively	  sought	  American	  assistance	   in	  reigning	  in	  Congo’s	  president.	  First	  of	  all,	  following	  the	  student	  repressions	  of	  1971	  the	  local	  Katangan	  leadership	  under	  the	  Mwant	  Yav	  (a	  Lunda	  title),	  David	  Tshombe,	  wrote	   a	   letter	   appealing	   for	   help	   to	   the	   local	   US	   consulate	   in	   Lubumbashi	   as	   the	  measures	  taken	  against	  students	  were	  both	  opposed	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  country	  and	  contrary	  to	  Mobutu’s	  own	  stated	  ‘Development	  ’80	  Goals’.	  Having	  described	  the	  negative	   impact	  of	   these	  measures	  himself,	  American	  Consul	  Linton	  scoffed	  at	   the	  suggestion	   of	   a	   US	   intervention	   and	   concluded	   his	   report	   of	   the	   letter	   with	   the	  rather	   disparaging	   assessment	   that,	   ‘This	   approach	   of	   the	   Lunda	   Emperor	   to	   a	  foreign	   government	   suggesting	   intervention	   in	   domestic	   affairs	   illustrates	   the	  remoteness	  of	  the	  Lundas	  from	  the	  government	  in	  Kinshasa	  in	  1971…	  It	  shows	  also	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that	  old	  Tshombists	  never	  die	  and	  never	  cease	  hoping.’311	  Similarly,	  an	  appeal	  from	  the	  Vatican	  for	  the	  US	  government	  to	  intervene	  on	  behalf	  of	  Cardinal	  Malula’s	  plight	  during	  Mobutu’s	   clash	  with	   the	  Catholic	   Church	  was	   flatly	   rejected	   as	   impractical	  and	   without	   hope	   of	   success	   by	   both	   the	   US	   Kinshasa	   embassy	   and	   the	   State	  Department	  in	  Washington.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   non-­‐interventionism	   espoused	   by	   American	   officials	   in	   the	   above	   two	  examples	   is	  a	   little	  disingenuous,	  of	   course,	  when	   the	  American	  hand	   in	  Mobutu’s	  rise	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   his	   regime	   continued	   to	   rely	   on	   US	   backing	   is	  considered.	  That	  on	  going	  military	  assistance	  was	  strengthening	   the	  power	  of	   the	  state,	   as	  much	   against	   internal	   dissent	   as	   against	   any	  potential	   foreign	   aggressor,	  was	   also	   abundantly	   clear.	   Again,	   the	   reports	   from	   the	   American	   consulate	   in	  Lubumbashi,	   for	   example,	   illustrate	   how	   the	   Kinshasa	   government	   responded	   to	  popular	  discontent	  against	  economic	  hardship	  and	  ANC	  brutality	  by	  dispatching	  its	  air	  force	  and	  Consul	  Leonardo	  Neher	  noted,	  ‘Their	  mission	  was	  reconnaissance	  and	  an	   exhibition	   of	   government	   power…	  T28s	  were	   used	   against	   the	   rebels	   in	   1964,	  and	  are	  still	  feared	  in	  the	  area.’312	  	  The	  United	  States	  was	  thus	  still	  providing	  much	  of	   the	   firepower	   underpinning	   Mobutu’s	   rule.	   To	   the	   Nixon	   administration,	  however,	   this	   leverage	   never	   translated	   into	   a	   perceived	   need	   to	   prod	   Kinshasa	  towards	   a	  more	   sustainable	   and	  effective	   form	  of	   government.	   In	   fact,	   the	   signals	  from	  Washington	  were	  quite	  the	  opposite.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	  the	  4th	  August	  1970	  President	  Nixon	  welcomed	  his	  Congolese	  counterpart	  on	   the	   lawns	   of	   the	   White	   House	   with	   all	   the	   trappings	   of	   a	   state	   visit	   and	   an	  enthusiastic	   endorsement	   as	   he	   proclaimed,	   ‘You	   have	   moved	   forward	  economically,	  you	  have	  established	  unity	   in	  your	  country,	   and	  you	  have	  a	  vitality,	  which	   impresses	   every	   visitor	   when	   he	   comes	   to	   the	   Congo.’313	  This	   was	   the	  beginning	  of	  Mobutu’s	  ten-­‐day	  tour	  of	  the	  East	  and	  West	  coasts	  of	  the	  United	  States	  designed	   to	   garner	   further	   support	   from	   the	   American	   government	   and	   woo	  investments	   from	   private	   businesses	   into	   Congo.	   It	   also	   marked	   the	   most	   public	  association	  of	  any	  American	  president	  with	   the	  Congolese	   leader	  up	   to	   that	  point,	  and	  the	  private	  meeting	  that	  followed	  between	  Nixon,	  Kissinger	  and	  Mobutu	  in	  the	  White	  House	  merits	  closer	  examination.	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  Immediately	  apparent	  from	  the	  record	  of	  this	  meeting	  was	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Cold	  War	  prism	  dominated	  proceedings,	  as	  well	  as	  Mobutu’s	  ability	   to	  control	  the	   direction	   of	   this	   encounter	   by	   steering	   conversation	   away	   from	   issues	   of	  development	   and	   stressing	   the	   continuation	   of	   a	   supposed	   ‘CHICOM’	   threat	   to	  Africa.	  That	   this	  emphasis	  on	  Congo’s	  security	  needs	  held	  particular	  appeal	   to	   the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	   foreign	  policy	  prism	  was	  highlighted	  by	   the	  American	  president’s	  response,	  ‘Many	  in	  Congress	  and	  the	  government	  would	  say	  that	  the	  Congo	  needed	  to	  emphasise	  development,	  build	  schools	  etc.,	  but	  President	  Nixon	  understood	  that	  there	   was	   not	   sense	   in	   cultivating	   something	   that	   could	   be	   snatched	   away	   from	  you.’314	  As	   such,	  Mobutu	   played	   the	   role	   of	   the	   stoic	  military	   leader	   as	   a	   bulwark	  against	   communism	   in	   Africa	   with	   aplomb	   and	   Nixon	   responded	   with	   further	  assurances	   for	   military	   aid,	   agreeing	   to	   sell	   Congo	   another	   three	   C-­‐130	   military	  transport	  airplanes	  and	  a	  navy	  patrol	  boat	  package	  while	  wavering	  some	  350,000	  USD	   fees	   and	   a	   US	   Navy	   training	   and	   maintenance	   program	   as	   gestures	   of	  goodwill.315	  This	   was	   particularly	   noteworthy	   as	   the	   arms	   sale	   was	   agreed	   only	  shortly	   after	   Lamberto	   Dini	   and	   the	   IMF	   had	   specifically	   fingered	   the	   growing	  balance	  of	  payment	  issues	  and	  the	  gross	  misallocation	  of	  capital	  as	  a	  grave	  danger	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Congolese	  economy,	  illustrating	  Washington’s	  continued	  willingness	  to	  subvert	  economic	  matters	  to	  Mobutu’s	  perceived	  security	  needs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  Congo	  was	  apparently	  to	  be	  left	  entirely	  to	   the	   private	   sector.	   As	   such,	   the	   second	   notable	   feature	   of	   this	   presidential	  encounter	   was	   the	   willingness	   of	   the	   White	   House	   to	   assist	   Mobutu’s	   efforts	   to	  encourage	  American	   businesses	   to	   invest	   in	   Congo	   during	   his	   subsequent	   tour	   of	  the	   States.	   In	   this	   way,	   Nixon	   offered	   advice	   on	   how	   best	   to	   entice	   the	   business	  community	   in	   New	   York	   and	   noted	   that	   he	   himself	   had	   been	   encouraging	  investment	   in	   Congo	   since	   1967.316	  Nor	   was	   this	   mere	   rhetoric	   as	   the	   American	  president	   had	   publically	   prodded	   the	   US	   business	   community	   already	   during	  Mobutu’s	  welcome	  on	  the	  lawn	  of	  the	  White	  House,	  as	  he	  addressed	  them	  directly	  with,	  	  ‘My	  advice	  to	  them	  (the	  business	  leaders)	  very	  simply	  would	  be	  this:	  The	  Congo	  is	   a	   good	   investment	   not	   only	   because	   of	   its	   natural	   wealth	   but	   because	   of	   a	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wealth	  even	  more	   important	   than	   its	  natural	   resources,	   a	   strong	  and	  vigorous	  and	  progressive	  people,	  and	  a	  stable	  leadership.’317	  	  No	   strings	  were	   attached	   to	   either	   the	   agreed	  military	   assistance	   package	   or	   this	  encouragement	  of	  the	  private	  sector,	  however,	  and	  the	  final	  feature	  of	  this	  meeting	  was	  the	  remarkable	  absence	  of	  any	  pressure	  for	  reform,	  or	  indeed	  mention,	  of	  the	  less	  palatable	  aspects	  of	  Mobutu’s	  corrupt	  regime.	  Quite	   the	  opposite	  was	   true,	   in	  fact,	   as	   both	   Nixon	   and	   Kissinger	   treated	   Congo’s	   leader	  with	   sycophantic	   praise	  and,	  in	  a	  clear	  effort	  to	  appeal	  to	  his	  vanity,	  a	  secret	  back	  channel	  of	  communication	  was	   set	   up	   between	   President	   Mobutu	   and	   the	   White	   House’s	   much	   vaunted	  National	  Security	  Adviser.	  318	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mobutu’s	   visit	   some	   three	   years	   later	   while	   attending	   the	   United	   Nations	  General	  Assembly	  was	  remarkably	  similar	  in	  tenor;	  despite	  the	  collapse	  of	  Congo’s	  economy	   in	   the	   meantime,	   Mobutu’s	   growing	   assertiveness	   in	   the	   international	  arena	  and	  the	  increasingly	  brazen	  domestic	  transgressions	  of	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime.	  Once	   again,	   both	   in	   his	   private	   meeting	   with	   Kissinger	   in	   New	   York	   on	   the	   5th	  October	  1973	  and	  during	  his	  official	  visit	  with	  Nixon	  five	  days	   later,	   the	  American	  president	  and	  his	  newly	  appointed	  Secretary	  of	  State	  flattered	  and	  kowtowed	  to	  the	  Congolese	   leader’s	   vanity.	   Indeed,	   the	   most	   notable	   feature	   of	   his	   renewed	  encounters	  was	  the	  muted	  reaction	  from	  his	  American	  counterparts	  over	  Mobutu’s	  posturing	  at	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Declaring	   that,	   ‘between	   a	   brother	   and	   a	   friend	   the	   choice	   is	   clear,’	   Congo’s	  president	  had	  ruptured	  relations	  with	  Israel	  to	  align	  himself	  with	  African	  and	  Arab	  voices	   at	   the	  General	  Assembly.319	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  Mobutu	  was	  quick	   to	   offer	   a	  reassuring	  titbit	  in	  his	  meeting	  with	  Kissinger	  the	  following	  day	  to	  illustrate	  that	  he	  was	  not	  erring	  far	  from	  the	  American	  fold.	  With	  the	  United	  States	  under	  pressure	  at	  the	   UN	   over	   its	   Cambodia	   policies,	  Mobutu	   postulated	   on	   his	   particular	   brand	   of	  Non-­‐Alignment,	  	  ‘You	  can	  count	  on	  your	  friends.	  When	  there	  are	  problems	  there	  is	  always	  a	  way	  of	   taking	   care	   of	   them…	   I	   had	   dinner	   last	   night	   with	   an	   old	   friend	   in	   the	   US	  government.	   We	   talked	   about	   Cambodia.	   He	   said	   that	   Zaire	   has	   its	   political	  problems,	   and	   the	  US	  has	   its	   problems.	  He	   explained	   that	   a	   Zaire	   vote	   to	   seat	  Prince	  Sihanouk	  at	   the	  General	  Assembly	  would	  make	  additional	  problems	   for	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President	  Nixon.	  He	  asked	  us	  to	  abstain	  on	  the	  vote	  even	  though	  we	  recognise	  Sihanouk	  at	  Algeria.	  We	  agreed	  to	  abstain.	  This	   is	  our	  method	  of	  collaborating	  with	  friends.’320	  Brazenly	   manipulative,	   Mobutu’s	   quite	   transparent	   manoeuvres	   nevertheless	  impressed	   his	   American	   counterparts	   and	   contributed	   to	   the	   entirely	   uncritical	  stance	  adopted	  by	  Kissinger	  and	  Nixon.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  Kissinger	  did	  little	  more	  than	  voice	  his	  gratitude	  for	  Congo’s	  continued	  collaboration	  and	  in	  the	  presidential	  meeting	  five	  days	  later	  he	  went	  even	  further	  in	  praise	  of	  Mobutu’s	  performance,	   ‘Mr.	  President,	  your	  speech	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  a	  masterpiece.	  It	  sounded	  critical	  of	  the	  United	  States	  but,	  when	  one	  read	  it,	  it	  was	  not	  so	  bad.’321	  To	  be	  sure,	  further	  military	  assistance	  packages	  were	  not	  agreed	  during	   this	   meeting	   and	   Mobutu’s	   concerns	   over	   the	   PL-­‐480	   wheat	   sales	  agreements	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  US	  mineral	  stockpile	  sales	  on	  world	  copper	  and	  cobalt	  prices	  remained	  unresolved.	  This	  was	  probably	  more	  a	  reflection	  of	  America’s	  own	  economic	  dilemmas	  during	  the	  global	  downturn	  and	  the	  by	  now	  lame-­‐duck	  White	  House’s	  inability	  to	  deepen	  its	  commitments	  to	  Congo	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  Watergate	  crisis,	   however,	   rather	   than	   any	   more	   profound	   shift	   in	   priorities.	   No	   doubt	   to	  illustrate	   that	   this	   did	   no	   mark	   any	   cooling	   of	   relations,	   Kissinger	   acquiesced	   to	  granting	   Mobutu’s	   ambassador	   in	   Washington	   special	   access	   to	   his	   personal	  assistant.	   Nixon	   chimed	   in	   that	   this	  was	   a	   privilege	   reserved	   only	   for	   the	   closest	  friends,	  a	  status	  apparently	  not	  yet	  achieved	  by	  any	  other	  African	  head	  of	  state.	  In	  other	   words,	   Mobutu’s	   manipulative	   ability	   was	   complimented	   by	   the	   White	  House’s	   reluctance	   to	   risk	   any	   confrontation	   with	   its	   Congolese	   ally.	   Neither	   his	  domestic	   misdemeanours	   nor	   his	   diplomatic	   grandstanding	   thus	   evoked	   even	   a	  critical	  mention	  throughout	  these	  talks.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   significance	   of	   the	   Nixon	   White	   House’s	   very	   public	   and	   unwavering	  presidential	  endorsement	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  was	  twofold.	  First	  of	  all,	  Mobutu’s	  hobnobbing	  with	  Washington’s	  finest	  and	  the	  captains	  of	  American	  industry	  during	  his	  first	  tour	  of	  the	  United	  States	  no	  doubt	  served	  to	  raise	  his	  prestige	  at	  home	  as	  he	  basked	   in	   Nixon’s	   superpower	   embrace.	   Indeed,	   the	   American	   embassy	   noted	  precisely	   this	   impact	  upon	  Mobutu’s	   return	   to	  Kinshasa,	   ‘From	  the	  Kinshasa	  optic	  the	  president’s	  accomplishments	  were	  impressive	  indeed…	  and	  of	  course	  enhanced	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  320	  Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: President Mobutu Sese Seko, Presidential Counselor Mkolo, 
Ambassador Lombo, Secretary of State Kissinger, Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom, NSC 
Member Harold Horan, ‘US-Zaire Relations’, Waldorf Towers Suite 10 R, 5th October 1973; NSC, Country 
Files, Africa, Box 746, RN	  321	  Kissinger, ‘Memcon: Meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko’, October 10th 1973; FRUS, Volume E-6	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his	   stature	   as	   statesman	   and	   leader.’322	  The	   first	   presidential	   visit	   coming	   shortly	  before	  Congo’s	  national	  elections,	  there	  can	  be	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  team	  openly	   sought	   to	   bolster	   the	   domestic	   credentials	   of	   their	  man	   in	  Kinshasa.	  Secondly,	   from	   the	   outset	   it	   was	   Mobutu’s	   ability	   to	   fit	   precisely	   into	   the	   Nixon	  strategy	  of	   looking	   to	  regional	   leaders	   in	   the	  global	   fight	  against	  communism	  that	  ensured	   him	   unqualified	   support	   and	   an	   uncritical	   ally	   even	   as	   his	   domestic	  situation	   soured.	   In	   other	   words,	   during	   the	   Nixon	   years	   it	   was	   very	   much	   the	  Washington	  executive	  that	  defined	  the	  American	  approach	  towards	  Congo.	  Indeed,	  the	   political	   leadership	   in	   both	   countries	   was	   even	   the	   driving	   force	   behind	   the	  effort	  to	  attract	  American	  private	  business	  investment	  to	  Congo.	  This	  latter	  point	  is	  particularly	  important,	  not	  least	  because	  of	  the	  role	  attributed	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  shaping	  the	  American	  government’s	  Congo	  agenda	  in	  the	  existing	  literature,	  and	  merits	  further	  discussion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  With	   internal	   conflict	   receding	   and	   a	  measure	   of	   political	   stability	   established	  under	  President	  Mobutu,	  by	  1970	  Congo	  was	  increasingly	  depicted	  as	  an	  attractive	  investment	  opportunity	  by	  both	  the	  White	  House	  and	  the	  American	  country	  team.	  Thus	  Vance	  noted	  in	  November	  1970,	  	  ‘Congo,	   after	   a	   shaky	   beginning	   as	   a	   nation,	   is	   now	   entering	   a	   period	   when	  economic	  and	  social	  progress	  can	  be	  achieved	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  political	  stability	  and	  strong	  national	  leadership.	  The	  business	  community	  of	  course	  has	  duly	  noted	  these	  important	  elements	  in	  the	  Congo	  situation	  which	  prop	  up	  the	  courage	  of	  the	  timid	  and	  add	  bristles	  to	  the	  bears.’323	  	  Indeed,	   the	   embassy	   began	   to	   play	   an	   integral	   role	   in	   looking	   to	   assist	   the	  establishment	   of	   American	   business	   ties	   to	   Congo	   and	   much	   of	   the	   cable	   traffic	  between	  Kinshasa	  and	  Washington	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  progress	  reports	  on	  the	  various	   trade	   missions	   and	   study	   groups	   from	   diverse	   companies	   ranging	   from	  Ford,	   General	  Motors,	   Firestone,	   Goodyear,	   First	  National	   City	  Bank	   of	  New	  York,	  Price	  Waterhouse	  Coopers,	  Gulf	  Oil,	  Pan	  Am,	  and	  McDonnel	  Douglas.	  Furthermore,	  American	   firms	   also	   began	   to	   make	   inroads	   into	   Congo’s	   mining	   sector.	   In	  particular,	  a	  consortium	  headed	  by	  Standard	  Oil	  of	  Indiana	  (the	  Société	  Minière	  du	  Tenke	   Fungurume	   consisting	   of	   Charter	   Consolidated,	   Mitsui,	   BRGM-­‐	   a	   French	  government	   research	  and	  engineering	  group-­‐	  and	  Leon	  Templesman	  &	  Sons)	  was	  awarded	   the	  copper-­‐rich	  Tenke-­‐Fungurume	  copper	  and	  cobalt	  mining	  concession.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 King, Kinshasa to Secretary of State, ‘Monthly Economic Review’, 7th September 1970; RG 59, 
Economic, Box 788, Department of State, NARAII 
323 Vance, Kinshasa to Secretary of State, ‘Monthly Economic Review’, 19th November 1970; RG 59, 
Economic, Box 788, Department of State, NARAII 
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Crawford	   Young	   points	   out	   that	   exploratory	   ventures	   by	   Texaco	   and	   Exxon	   Oil,	  Union	  Carbide	  and	  Bethlehem	  steel,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  propensity	  to	  equate	  bank	  loans	  and	   contracted	   services	   with	   actual	   investment	   into	   Congo,	   fuelled	   a	   slightly	  inflated	   picture	   of	   the	   extent	   of	   American	   private	   investment.	   Indeed,	   even	   the	  vaunted	  the	  Tenke-­‐Fungurume	  concession	  never	  came	  into	  production	  throughout	  the	   period	   under	   consideration	   as	   the	   projected	   250	   million	   dollar	   (USD)	  investment	  was	  mothballed	  by	  1976	  due	  to	  the	  downturn	  in	  copper	  prices.324	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nevertheless,	   by	   May	   1973,	   Vance	   estimated	   that	   private	   US	   investment	   in	  Congo	  had	  reached	  close	  to	  160	  million	  dollars	  from	  a	  mere	  thirty	  million	  dollars	  in	  1970.325	  That	   the	  American	  private	  sector	  now	  had	  a	  growing	   interest	   in	  Congo	   is	  also	  borne	  out	  by	  a	  memorandum	  prepared	   for	  President	  Nixon	   in	  advance	  of	  his	  October	   presidential	   meeting	   advising	   that,	   ‘Our	   objectives	   are	   to	   maintain	  Mobutu’s	   favourable	   attitude	   towards	   the	   US	   private	   sector	   and	   to	   reinforce	   his	  inclination	  to	  support	  our	  policy	  objectives.’326	  Similarly,	  the	  ‘Zairianisation’	  decrees	  in	  1973	  provoked	  considerable	  concern	  from	  Washington	  and	  a	  memorandum	  for	  the	  Assistant	  National	  Security	  Adviser,	  General	  Brent	  Scowcroft,	  noted	  with	  relief	  that	   American	   businesses	   remained	   unaffected.327	  In	   other	  words,	   throughout	   the	  Nixon	  presidency	  American	  business	  interests	  established	  themselves	  in	  Congo	  and	  became	   a	   factor	   in	   the	   US	   government	   approach	   towards	   the	   country.	  Moreover,	  while	   perhaps	   not	   centrally	   coordinated,	   this	   was	   very	   much	   part	   of	   a	   US	  government	  effort	   to	  assist	   the	  continued	  development	  of	  Congo’s	  economy	  while	  tying	   it	   further	   to	   its	  American	   ally.	  As	   such,	   both	   the	  president	   and	   the	   embassy	  played	  a	  role	  in	  facilitating	  this	  emerging	  business	  relationship.	  It	  is	  significant,	  for	  example,	  that	  while	  companies	  such	  as	  Good	  Year	  and	  Ford	  had	  sent	  delegations	  in	  early	   1970,	   actual	   deals	   were	   only	   struck	   following	   Mobutu’s	   return	   from	   the	  official	   state	   visit	   to	   Washington	   and	   the	   very	   public	   White	   House	   endorsement	  entailed	  therein.328	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  At	   first	  glance,	   then,	   it	  would	  seem	  logical	   to	  assume	  that	   this	  growing	  role	  of	  private	  American	  enterprise	  also	  began	  to	   influence	  policy	  makers	   in	  Washington.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  324	  M.	  Crawford	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  ‘The	  Zairian	  Crisis	  and	  American	  Foreign	  Policy’	  in	  Gerald	  J.	  Bender,	  James	  S.	  Coleman,	  Richard	  L.	  Sklar	  (eds.),	  African	  Crisis	  Areas	  and	  US	  Foreign	  Policy	  (University	  of	  California,	  Berkley;	  London	  and	  Los	  Angeles,	  1985)	  pp.	  215-­‐216	  	  	  325	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  of	  State,	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  the	  Zaire	  and	  their	  Implications	  for	  the	  US’,	  10th	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  1973;	  RG	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  State,	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The	  strongest	  proponent	  of	   this	   line	  of	  reasoning	   is	  David	  Gibbs	  and	  his	   ‘Business	  Conflict	   Model’,	   asserting	   through	   a	   somewhat	   theoretical	   approach	   that	   it	   was	  private	  business	  groups	  that	  very	  much	  shaped	  US	  policy	  towards	  Congo	  from	  the	  early	  1960s	  and	  during	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  in	  particular.	  Through	  this	  prism,	  the	   United	   States	   relied	   upon	   its	   partnership	  with	  Mobutu	   to	   further	   the	   ends	   of	  various	  private	  business	  groups	  and	  would	  not	  endanger	  this	  relationship	  for	   fear	  of	   losing	   its	   advantage.	   As	   such,	   Gibbs	   sees	   the	  Mobutu	   coup,	   the	   quelling	   of	   the	  mercenary	   rebellion	   of	   1967	   and	   the	   subsequent	   arms	   support	   and	   presidential	  meetings	  during	  the	  Nixon	  years	  as	  a	  single	  thread	  of	  government	  policy	  to	  displace	  the	   Belgian	   Union	   Minière	   de	   Haut	   Katanga	   with	   American	   companies	   (most	  notably	  the	  Templesman	  mining	  group).	   	  As	  evidence	  he	  cites	  the	  awarding	  of	  the	  Tenke	   concession	   to	   the	   Templesman-­‐led	   consortium	   in	   favour	   of	   Belgian	  competitors	  in	  September	  1970,	  shortly	  after	  Mobutu’s	  visit	  to	  Washington	  and	  the	  resulting	   arms	   deals.	   In	   this	   way,	   Gibbs	   states,	   ‘The	   United	   States,	   it	   is	   argued,	  sought	   to	   reduce	   influence	   of	   Union	   Minière	   in	   the	   Congo	   in	   order	   to	   open	  investment	   opportunities	   for	   American	   business.’ 329 	  Upon	   closer	   inspection,	  however,	   this	   teleological	   argument	   appears	   a	   simplistic	  misreading	   of	   events	   as	  they	  transpired.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Contradicting	   this	   narrow	   interpretation	   of	   government	   policy	   driven	   by	   the	  rivalries	   of	   the	   business	   community	   was	   the	   on	   going	   cooperation	   between	   the	  United	   States	   and	   Belgium,	   both	   in	   the	   governmental	   and	   private	   spheres.	   Thus,	  Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   African	   Affairs	   David	   Newsom	   was	   keen	   to	  emphasise	  to	  Viscount	  Davignon	  (attaché	  to	  the	  Belgian	  Foreign	  Minister	  since	  the	  post	   independence	   days	   of	   Paul	  Henri	   Spaak)	   that	   the	  United	   States	  was	   entirely	  ambivalent	  over	   the	  awarding	  of	   the	  Tenke	  mining	  concession	  stating	   that,	   	   ‘since	  Union	   Minière’s	   group	   has	   American	   participation,	   we	   had	   no	   reason	   to	   favour	  either	   side.’330	  Joint	   private	   commercial	   ventures	   of	   this	   kind	   also	   continued	   in	  other	  spheres	  as	  Gulf	  Oil	  partnered	  with	  the	  Belgian	  firm	  ‘Solico’	  to	  erect	  a	  drilling	  rig	   to	   explore	   potential	   oil	   reserves	   off	   the	   narrow	   Congolese	   coast	   and	   an	  American-­‐Belgian	   consortium	  was	   awarded	   the	   Inga	   II	   dam	  project	   in	   1972.331	  In	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the	   diplomatic	   sphere	   too,	   cooperation	   continued	   despite	   an	   evident	   Belgian	  wariness	   of	   US	   intentions.	   Newsom	   met	   with	   Viscount	   Davignon	   while	   touring	  Congo	   in	   1970	   and	   Ambassador	   Vance	   met	   twice	   with	   Count	   Jean	   D’Ursel	   (the	  Belgian	   Foreign	   Ministry’s	   Director	   for	   African	   Affairs)	   in	   an	   obvious	   effort	   to	  uphold	   bilateral	   consultations	   over	   Congo.	   Ultimately,	   throughout	   all	   this	   the	  various	  American	  officials	  were	  at	  pains	  to	  stress	  that	  the	  overall	  aim	  of	  a	  stable	  and	  peaceful	   Congo	   was	   dependent	   on	   the	   continued	   Belgian	   primacy	   in	   Congo’s	  economy,	   as	   Newsom	   surmised,	   ‘Our	   objectives	   in	   the	   Congo,	   of	   course,	   are	  predicated	  on	  the	  continuation	  of	  Belgium’s	  role	  as	  the	  major	  supplier	  of	  technical	  assistance	  for	  the	  government,	  and	  managerial	  expertise	  for	  the	  private	  sector.’332	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  an	  obvious	  flaw	  appears	  in	  Gibbs’s	  reading	  of	  the	  evidence	  at	  hand.	  Simply	   pointing	   to	   the	   apparent	   business	   ties	   of	   various	   administration	   officials	  does	   not	   sufficiently	   explain	   how	   this	   served	   to	   shape	   government	   policy	   in	  Washington.	   Indeed,	   this	  approach	  mistakes	   cause	   for	  effect.	  The	  desire	  of	   the	  US	  government	   to	   encourage	   the	  business	   community	   stemmed	   from	  a	   larger	   aim	  of	  supporting	   the	   Kinshasa	   government.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   relied	   upon	   a	   degree	   of	  cooperation	  with	   the	   Belgian	   government	   and	   a	  more	   nuanced	   relationship	   than	  Gibbs’s	   simplistic	   theoretical	   reading	   can	   account	   for.	   Throughout	   all	   this,	   the	  fostering	   of	   a	   stable,	   strong	   and	   pro-­‐American	   African	   ally	   in	   the	   perceived	   Cold	  War	  struggle	  on	  the	  continent	  was	  the	  fundamental	  goal	  of	  US	  strategy.	  At	  no	  point	  did	   the	  business	   interests	   replace	  or	   subvert	   this	   agenda.	  As	   such,	  while	  business	  played	   an	   increasing	   role	   in	   Congo,	   the	   administration’s	   failure	   to	   take	   more	  seriously	   Mobutu’s	   administrative	   shortcomings	   cannot	   be	   explained	   in	   such	  reductionist	   terms.	   Furthermore,	   the	   impression	   given	   by	   a	   close	   reading	   of	   the	  State	  Department	  records	  is	  that	  the	  business	  community	  was	  very	  much	  harnessed	  by	  the	  government	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  round.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Rather	   than	   private	   businesses	   pushing	   policy	   makers,	   it	   was	   policy	   makers	  themselves	   who	   actively	   sought	   to	   promote	   Congo	   as	   a	   viable	   investment	   to	  influence	  private	  businesses.	  For	  the	  Nixon	  administration,	  this	  was	  simply	  part	  of	  humouring	  Mobutu	  and	   the	  next	  phase	  of	   strengthening	   their	  pivotal	  African	  ally.	  Particularly	   revealing	   in	   this	   regard	   is	   a	  memorandum	   for	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	  entitled	   ‘Mobutu’s	   Interest	   in	   Private	   Investment’	   deliberating	   on	   precisely	   this	  government-­‐led	   effort	   to	   attract	  US	   businesses	   already	   in	  March	   1970	   as	   follows,	  ‘the	  next	  step	  is	  to	  identify	  new	  investment	  opportunities	  in	  Congo	  and	  to	  publicise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Newsom to Secretary of State, ‘Storm Clouds over Congo (K)- Belgian Relations’; 6th October 1970; RG 
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these	  opportunities	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  favourable	  investment	  climate)	  among	  potential	  investors.’333	  While	  it	  was	  the	  respective	  governments	  in	  Washington	  and	  Kinshasa	  that	  actively	  sought	  to	  harness	  the	  business	  community	  to	  their	  own	  wider	  political	  aims,	  the	  implicit	  assumption	  that	  the	  arrival	  of	  private	  enterprise	  would	  naturally	  foster	  development	  was	  deeply	  flawed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   fact,	   this	   governmental	   guidance	   of	   private	   sector	   investment	   into	   Congo	  brought	   with	   it	   an	   unintended	   side	   effect	   with	   sinister	   implications.	   In	   his	   ‘Les	  Safaris	  Technologiques	  au	  Zaire,	  1970-­‐80’,	  Benoit	  Verhaegan	  eloquently	  illustrates	  how	  government	  guaranteed	  financing	  and	  private	  businesses	  combined	  to	  deliver	  any	  number	  of	   goods	  and	   services	   to	  Congo	   that	  had	   little	   to	  do	  with	   actual	   local	  demands	  or	  necessities	  of	   the	  country’s	  development	  as	  has	  been	  seen.334	  Instead,	  grossly	   wasteful	   prestige	   projects,	   and	   the	   corresponding	   rents	   from	   awarding	  contracts,	   fed	   both	   the	   ambrosial	   appetites	   and	   the	   delusions	   of	   grandeur	   of	   the	  Kinshasa	   dictator.	   Rather	   than	   having	   to	   search	   out	   sustainable	   business	  opportunities	   for	   themselves,	   private	   corporations	   could	   deal	   with	   the	   president	  directly	  to	  secure	  large	  orders	  for	  their	  products	  and	  services	  with	  relatively	   little	  risk	  to	  all	  except	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  economic	  viability	  of	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   glaring	   example	   of	   such	   a	   project	   was	   the	   second	   phase	   of	   the	   Inga	   Dam	  construction	   announced	   in	   1973	   and	   completed	   by	   1977	   at	   a	   cost	   of	   some	   260	  million	  dollars	  (twice	  that	  of	  the	  initial	  phase	  of	  the	  project)	  and	  without	  a	  market	  for	   the	   additional	   seven	  hundred	  megawatts	  now	  available.335	  Ambassador	  Vance,	  however,	   boasted	   that	   the	   awarding	   of	   the	   construction	   of	   this	   project	   to	   a	  consortium	   consisting	   of	   Belgian	   (ACEC-­‐	   wholly	   owned	   by	   Westinghouse),	  American	   (Westinghouse	   Electric)	   and	   Austrian	   (Voest)	   firms	   had	   been	   made	  possible	  by	  the	  favourable	  terms	  of	  financing	  offered	  by	  the	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  of	  the	   United	   States.336	  Similarly,	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   Inga-­‐Shaba	   power	   line	  was	  awarded	   largely	   to	   American	   firms	   (Morrison-­‐Knudsen	   and	   Fishback	   &	   Moore)	  despite	   both	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   the	   Belgian	   government	   having	   declared	   no	  interest	   in	   financing	   such	   projects,	   ‘based	   more	   on	   political	   than	   economic	  considerations’. 337 	  	   As	   such,	   Mobutu	   accumulated	   a	   burden	   of	   national	   debt	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(estimated	  at	  2.6	  billion	  USD	  between	  1973-­‐5	  alone)	  with	  very	  little	  value	  added	  to	  the	  country’s	  economy	  or	   infrastructure	  to	  show	  for	   it,	  all	   the	  while	  syphoning	  off	  huge	  rents	  from	  these	  investments	  to	   line	  his	  own	  pockets.338	  When	  viewed	  in	  the	  light	   of	   the	   increasingly	   blatant	   corruption	   of	   the	  Mobutist	   state	   then,	   the	   Nixon	  administration’s	   encouragement	   for	   the	   American	   private	   sector	   to	   deal	   with	  Mobutu	   directly	   as	   a	   portal	   to	   Congo’s	   investment	   opportunities	   (while	   offering	  government	   guaranteed	   financing	   at	   the	   same	   time)	   appears	   decidedly	  questionable,	   further	   exacerbating	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   ‘kleptocratic’	   state	   and	  securing	  the	  regime’s	  grip	  on	  the	  economy.339	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   sum,	   it	   was	   in	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   1970s	   that	   Mobutu	   Sese	   Seko	  successfully	  transformed	  Congo	  into	  his	  peculiar	  version	  of	  a	  totalitarian	  state.	  Civil	  society	  and	  social	  ties	  were	  gradually	  eroded	  as	  much	  by	  the	  threat	  of	  government	  repression	   as	   by	   the	   all-­‐pervasive	   corruption	   that	   was	   fast	   becoming	   the	   only	  means	   of	   advancement	   in	   an	   economic	   system	   dominated	   by	   the	   patronage	   of	   a	  narrow	  political	  elite.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  explored	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	   the	   Mobutist	   state;	   from	   the	   subverted	   electoral	   process,	   his	   foray	   into	   mass	  politics	  with	  the	  ‘Authenticity’	  campaign,	  his	  increasingly	  fraudulent	  exploitation	  of	  Congo’s	   economy	   epitomised	   in	   the	   ‘Zairianisation’	   program,	   and	   the	   evermore	  invasive	   nature	   of	   state	   security	   apparatus	   permeating	   all	   corners	   of	   daily	   life	   in	  Congo.	  Moreover,	  well	  aware	  of	   its	  ally’s	  growing	  transgressions,	   this	  process	  was	  all	   the	   while	   backstopped	   by	   the	   support	   of	   an	   uncritical	   and	   indulgent	   Nixon	  administration.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   second	   section	  of	   this	   chapter	   thus	   illustrated	   that	   the	  White	  House	   took	  the	  lead	  in	  defining	  this	  accepting	  stance	  towards	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  approach	  lay	  the	  twin	  pillars	  of	  the	  ‘Nixon	  Doctrine’	  and	  the	  administration’s	  willingness	   to	   look	   to	   private	   businesses	   to	   bolster	   its	   Congolese	   ally.	   Mobutu’s	  ability	   to	   fit	  perfectly	   into	   the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  world-­‐view	  and	   their	  desire	   to	   see	  strong	   regional	   leadership	   bearing	   more	   of	   the	   burden	   in	   the	   global	   Cold	   War	  ensured	   that	   he	   not	   only	   offered	   a	   ready,	   if	   superficial,	   solution	   to	   quell	   the	  worrying	  disturbances	  of	  the	  fitful	  1960s	  in	  Congo,	  but	  also	  presented	  himself	  as	  a	  valuable	   ally	   to	   contain	   communist	   subversion	   in	   Africa.	   Even	   his	   diplomatic	  opening	  to	  the	  communist	  bloc	  and	  his	  break	  with	  Israel	  were	  readily	  accepted	  as	  necessary	   to	   bolstering	   his	   regional	   credentials,	   with	   the	   Congolese	   despot	   ever	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quick	   to	   reassure	   his	   American	   benefactors	   that	   he	   remained	   committed	   to	   their	  relationship.	   The	   second	   aspect	   of	   the	   American	   approach	   saw	   the	   Nixon	  administration	   actively	   prodding	   private	   businesses	   to	   consider	   investments	   in	  Congo.	   While	   this	   could	   create	   a	   superficial	   impression	   of	   the	   government	   as	   a	  lackey	   to	  private	   investors,	   a	  more	  careful	   reading	  of	   the	  evidence	   illustrates	   that	  this	  was	  actually	  part	  of	  a	  government	  effort	  to	  lend	  a	  further	  hand	  to	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  by	  pushing	  the	  business	  community	  in	  his	  direction.	  The	  inadvertent	  result	  of	   these	  private	   investment	   inflows	   into	  a	   country	   that	   lacked	  both	   the	  necessary	  structures	   and	   rules	   to	   direct	   them,	   and	  whose	   finances	   the	   president	   viewed	   as	  extensions	  of	  his	  private	  purse,	  was	  to	  further	  exacerbate	  the	  endemic	  corruption,	  patronage	  and	  mismanagement	  gripping	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  blinkered	  focus	  on	  Congo’s	  president	  as	  a	  useful	  strategic	  partner,	  rather	  than	   the	   country	   as	   a	   whole,	   was,	   of	   course,	   a	   short	   sighted	   and	   unsustainable	  approach	  towards	  the	  region	  and	  the	  cracks	  in	  Congo’s	  stability	  soon	  began	  to	  show	  under	   its	   increasing	  economic	  strains.	   Just	  as	  Mobutu’s	  economic	  mismanagement	  had	  been	  camouflaged	  by	  a	  fortuitous	  rise	  in	  copper	  prices	  during	  his	  first	  term	  in	  office,	  as	  world	  copper	  prices	  sagged	   in	  subsequent	  years	  Congo	  was	   increasingly	  facing	   balance	   of	   payment	   problems	   and,	   even	   before	   Nixon’s	   ignoble	   departure	  from	  office,	  the	  outlook	  for	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime	  was	  bleak.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Washington’s	   failure	   to	   respond	   to	   its	  own	  accurate	   intelligence	  and	   the	  clear	  signs	   that	  Mobutu	  was	   leading	   his	   domain	   towards	   bankruptcy	   and	   collapse	  was	  puzzling.	   Clearly	   the	   ‘Nixon	  Doctrine’	  would	  not	  be	   served	  by	   a	  moribund	   regime	  struggling	   with	   the	   decay	   of	   its	   own	   corruption.	   As	   has	   been	   seen,	   David	   Gibbs’	  reductionist	   explanation	   that	   attributes	   the	   interventions	   of	   successive	  administrations	   up	   to	   and	   including	   the	   Nixon	   White	   House	   in	   Congo	   to	   the	  underhand	   influence	   of	   private	   businesses	   is	   wholly	   inadequate.	   Far	   from	   the	  corporate	  world	  pulling	  the	  strings	  of	  government	  policy,	  it	  was	  the	  politicians	  who	  sought	  to	  harness	  private	  businesses	  to	  their	  own	  ends	  of	  strengthening	  the	  as	  yet	  fragile	  Mobutist	  state	  as	  a	  regional	  partner	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Indeed,	  President	  Nixon	  and	  Ambassador	  Vance’s	  willingness	  to	  act	  as	  prominent	  salesmen	  for	   ‘Congo	  Inc.’	  was	  the	  clearest	  example	  of	  this.	  No	  doubt	  various	  private	  businesses	  were	  eager	  to	  use	   this	   advantage	   to	   their	   own	  ends	   (and	  Maurice	  Templesman’s	   ties	   to	  Mobutu	  and	   enlistment	   of	   the	   former	   CIA	   Station	   Chief	   Lawrence	   Devlin	   are	   the	   clearest	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example	   of	   this),	   but	   there	   is	   little	   evidence	   that	   they	   actually	   influenced	   the	  direction	  taken	  by	  the	  American	  government	  in	  its	  dealings	  with	  Congo	  throughout	  this	  period.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   more	   meaningful	   explanation	   for	   this	   willingness	   to	   support	   Mobutu’s	  destructive	   regime	   while	   shrinking	   from	   a	   more	   beneficial	   role	   in	   constructing	  Congo’s	  future	  can	  again	  be	  found	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  racial	  prejudice	  that	  continued	  to	  haunt	   the	  American	  approach	   towards	  Africa.	   Indeed,	   there	   is	   ample	  evidence	   for	  the	   racist	   undertones	   resonating	   throughout	   parts	   of	   Washington	   and	   the	  commentary	  of	  the	  Kinshasa	  country	  team	  as	  has	  been	  noted.	  Perhaps	  the	  clearest	  evidence	  of	   such	  distorted	   thinking	   can	  be	   found	   in	   ambassador	  Vance’s	   effort	   to	  juxtapose	  American	  and	  Congolese	  values	  in	  a	  report	  discussing	  supposed	  cultural	  communication	  barriers	  along	  such	  lines,	  	  ‘Some	   American	   values	   also	   puzzle	   Zairians.	   Loyalty	   to	   the	   extended	   family	  increases	   the	   Zairian’s	   tolerance	   of	   nepotism,	   embezzlement	   and	  misrepresentation	   where	   their	   own	   relatives	   are	   concerned…	   Zairians	   find	   it	  hard	   to	   take	   seriously	   American	   concepts	   of	   self-­‐reliance	   and	   personal	  honesty.’340	  	  The	  notion	  that	  personal	  honesty	  and	  self-­‐reliance	  are	  specifically	  American	  values	  is	   absurd,	   of	   course,	   and	   the	   reader	   is	   perhaps	   left	   hoping	   that	   Vance	   had	   this	  particular	  report	  at	  hand	  when	  the	  Watergate	  crisis	  exploded	  in	  Washington	  only	  a	  few	  months	  later.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Again,	  it	  would	  be	  overstating	  the	  case	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  deliberately	  pursuing	  racial	  policies	  towards	  Congo	  but,	  as	  the	  above	  examples	  indicate,	   such	   prejudices	   at	   least	   coloured	   the	   American	   view	   of	   Congo	   and	  contributed	   to	   some	   extent	   to	   its	   apparent	   inability	   to	   take	   a	  more	   critical	   stand	  towards	  Mobutu’s	  transgressions.	  Moreover,	  portraying	  Congo’s	  problems	  as	  alien	  and	   innate	   presumably	   presented	   a	   psychologically	   comforting	   abdication	   of	  responsibility	   for	   the	   American	   role	   in	   the	   country’s	   deterioration.	   Congo’s	  president,	  for	  his	  part,	  pandered	  to	  these	  preconceived	  notions	  as	  best	  he	  could	  by	  claiming	   time	   and	   again	   to	   derive	   legitimacy	   from	   his	   interpretation	   of	   a	   tribal	  chieftaincy.341	  As	  such,	  both	  the	  corruption	  and	  the	  heavy-­‐handed	  repression	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  could	  be	  dismissed	  as	  traits	  specific	  to	  Congo	  rather	  than	  results	  of	  an	   illegitimate	   regime	   imposed	   from	   outside.	   There	   is,	   however,	   little	   to	   suggest	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Vance, Kinshasa to Secretary of State, Washington DC, ‘Communication between the US and Zaire’, 7th 
May 1973; RG 59, Political & Defense, Box 2841, Department of State, NARAII 341	  An	  excellent	  elaboration	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Kevin	  C.	  Dunn,	  Imagining	  Congo	  (Pallgrave	  Macmillan;	  New	  York,	  2003)	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that	   there	  was	  anything	  conscious	  or	  deliberate	   in	   these	  bigoted	  dismissals	  of	   the	  country’s	   very	   serious	   and	   urgent	   troubles.	   In	   other	   words,	   just	   as	   during	   the	  Johnson	   years,	   these	   racist	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   American	   approach,	   while	  relevant,	  were	  not	  a	  central	  motivating	  factor	  behind	  American	  policy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   fact,	   the	   principal	   theme	   throughout	   the	   Nixon	   engagement	   with	   Congo	  remained	  the	  Cold	  War.	  While	  it	  is	  often	  and	  undeniably	  argued	  that	  Africa	  was	  not	  the	   central	   priority	   in	   Nixon	   and	   Kissinger’s	   grand	   strategies,	   at	   least	   part	   of	   the	  reason	  for	  this	  relatively	  low	  level	  interest	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  apparent	  assumption	  in	   Washington	   that	   Mobutu	   provided	   a	   readymade	   answer	   to	   communist	  infiltration	  on	  the	  continent.	  As	  such,	  his	  emergence	  as	  Congo’s	  ‘strongman’,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere,	  probably	  impressed	  his	  American	  benefactors	  as	  a	  useful	  if	  slightly	   unpalatable	   tool	   in	   the	   global	   Cold	   War.	   As	   the	   record	   of	   Nixon’s	   own	  encounters	  with	  Mobutu	   illustrated,	   the	  White	  House	   took	   the	   lead	   in	  defining	  an	  approach	   that	   ensured	   security	   concerns	   (despite	   the	   apparent	   absence	   of	   any	  Soviet	   interest	   in	   Congo)	   trumped	   broader	   development	   considerations	   while	  fanning	  both	  the	  personal	  vanity	  and	  the	  appetite	  for	  prestigious	  military	  hardware	  of	   Congo’s	   self-­‐declared	   ‘father’	   and	   ‘guide’.	   Ambassador	   Vance	   and	   his	   country	  team	   took	   their	   lead	   from	   this	   and	   it	   is	   remarkable	  how	   time	   and	   again	  damning	  intelligence	  was	  couched	   in	  overall	  optimistic	  readings	  of	   the	  country’s	  prospects.	  Notably	   absent	   from	   any	   dissenting	   voices	   or	   whistle-­‐blowers,	   the	   entire	   Nixon	  administration	  appeared	  united	  in	  its	  view	  of	  Mobutu	  as	  a	  valuable	  regional	  ally	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  struggle	  and	  its	  corresponding	  uncritical	  support	  of	  his	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  For	  Congo,	  America’s	  embrace	  of	  the	  Kinshasa	  despot	  spelled	  disaster,	  both	  in	  the	   immediate	   and	   the	   longer-­‐term.	   As	   has	   been	   noted,	   the	   popular	   relief	   and	  goodwill	   reportedly	   felt	   throughout	  much	   of	   society	   towards	   the	   leader	  who	   had	  restored	   a	   semblance	   of	   calm	   following	   the	   stormy	   1960s	   was	   short-­‐lived.	   The	  optimism	   felt	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   decade	   was	   soon	   displaced	   by	   exasperation	   and	  foreboding	  amongst	  ordinary	  Congolese	  as	   it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  Mobutist	  state	  would	  serve	  only	  the	  interests	  of	   its	   leader	  and	  the	  narrow	  few	  of	  his	   inner	  circle.	  This	   process	   was	   greatly	   assisted,	   of	   course,	   by	   the	   American	   executive	  endorsement	  that	  sought	  to	  funnel	  private	  investment	  into	  Congo	  directly	  through	  the	  Kinshasa	  political	  elite	  and	  Mobutu	  personally.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   certain	   sinister	   irony	   or	   	   ‘poetic	   injustice’	   resonates	   through	   the	  ‘Authenticity’	   rhetoric,	   as	  Mobutu	   appealed	   to	   a	   particular	   and	   perhaps	   cynically	  constructed	   version	   of	   African	   identity	   in	   order	   to	   enhance	   a	   parasitic	   rule	   not	  unlike	  the	  previous	  colonial	  state,	  essentially	  geared	  towards	  extracting	  maximum	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revenue	  for	  a	  narrow	  elite	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  Congolese.342	  Mobutu’s	  administration,	   however,	   appeared	   to	   do	   even	   less	   for	   ordinary	   citizens	   and	  completely	   neglected	   its	   basic	   governing	   responsibilities.	   Undoubtedly	   buoyed	   by	  his	  early	  success	  of	  quelling	  rebellion	  and	  overseeing	  the	  return	  of	  a	  semblance	  of	  order	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  a	  modicum	  of	  prosperity	  following	  the	  soaring	  copper	  prices	  of	  the	  late	  1960s,	  the	  previously	  self-­‐conscious,	  almost	  reluctant	  leader	  increasingly	  began	   to	   assert	   his	   own	   agenda.	   Apparently	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   hubris	   was	   the	  perception	  that	  Congo	  was	  an	  unending	  source	  of	  riches	  ripe	  for	  the	  picking,	  and	  it	  was	  this	  basic	  assumption	  that	  underpinned	  the	  developing	  ideology	  of	  ‘Mobutism’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  There	   is	   a	   strange	   paradox	   between	   this	   national	   pride	   in	   Congo’s	   professed	  wealth,	   in	  part	  successfully	  evoked	  by	  Mobutu,	  and	   the	  notion	   that	   this	   justified	  a	  self-­‐help	   form	   of	   corruption	   throughout	   all	   levels	   of	   Congolese	   society.	   This	  may	  indeed	  have	  been	   a	   rudimentary	   form	  of	   nation	  building	   through	   largess,	   but	   the	  ‘state	  kleptocracy’	  that	  emerged	  presented	  a	  fragmented	  society	  of	   individuals	   left	  to	  fend	  for	  themselves	  within	  an	  institutionalised	  framework	  of	  corruption.	  Sadly,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  this	  feature	  of	  Mobutu’s	  rule	  more	  than	  any	  other	  that	  survives	  into	  the	  present.	   Even	   today	   after	   over	   a	   decade	   of	   civil	   war,	   ordinary	   Congolese	   can	   be	  heard	   commenting	   on	   Congo	   as	   a	   treasure	   chest	   of	   resources	   while	   corruption,	  petty	  thievery	  and	  government	  shakedowns	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  reality	  of	  daily	  life.343	  In	  other	  words,	   if	   one	  had	   to	  pick	  a	   single	   factor	   that	   contributes	   to	   the	  on	  going	  strife	   in	   today’s	   Congo	   and	   the	   resulting	   impoverishment	   of	   its	   people,	   most	  informed	   observers	   would	   point	   to	   this	   endemic	   scourge	   of	   corruption.344	  This	  debilitating	  political	  culture	  in	  turn	  is	  a	  clear	  legacy	  of	  Mobutu’s	  rule	  formed	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  From	   the	   immediate	   vantage	   of	   Nixon	   and	   his	   team,	   Mobutu	   offered	   some	  tangible	  gains	  for	  the	  United	  States	  as	  their	  ally’s	  regional	  standing	  improved	  with	  his	   diplomatic	   drive	   of	   ‘Authenticity’	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   Congo	   as	   a	   more	  acceptable	   voice	   in	   Africa.	   The	   consequence	   of	   this	   short-­‐lived	   success,	   however,	  was	   to	   seemingly	   vindicate	   this	   somewhat	   myopic	   approach	   to	   Congo.	   Satisfied	  with	   the	   noises	   made	   by	   the	   Kinshasa	   despot	   in	   the	   international	   arena,	   Nixon	  courted	  Mobutu	  personally	  and	  ignored	  his	  domestic	  transgressions.	  In	  essence	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  342	  For	  an	  excellent	  comparative	  study	  see	  Crawford	  Young,	  The	  African	  Colonial	  State	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (Bookscraft	  Inc.;	  Michigan,	  1994)	  
343 Based on a conversation between the author and a Congolese army captain, a navy officer and two 
businessmen on a ferry from Goma to Bukavu, January 2010. Mark John and Thomas Hubert, ‘Minerals, 
Graft and Miles of Red Tape’ New York Times, 20-21st February 2010, p.9 
344 For example, Thomas	  Turner,	  The	  Congo	  Wars	  (Zed	  Books;	  New	  York	  &	  London,	  2007);	  esp.	  chapter	  two	  ‘The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Pillage’	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  Shackled	   by	   a	   hostile	   Congress	   and	   the	   tacit	   acceptance	   of	   defeat	   in	   Vietnam	  and	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   Nixon’s	   ignoble	   resignation	   following	   Watergate,	   the	   Ford-­‐Kissinger	  White	  House	  appeared	  to	  be	   facing	  a	  crisis	  of	   legitimacy	  throughout	   the	  world.345	  No	  doubt	  the	  SALT	  and	  Vladivostok	  negotiations,	  shuttle	  diplomacy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  deteriorating	  situation	   in	  Vietnam	  were	  enough	  to	  preoccupy	  Kissinger	  when,	  on	  the	  25th	  April	  1974,	  a	  group	  of	  officers	  in	  Lisbon	  staged	  a	  coup	  to	   oust	   Premier	   Marcello	   Caetano	   in	   what	   became	   known	   as	   the	   Carnation	  Revolution.	   It	  was	  the	  subsequent	  chain	  of	  events	  that	  unfolded	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colony	   Angola	   that	   would	   eventually	   bring	   Africa	   back	   into	   sharp	   relief	   for	  Washington.	  Much	  has	  been	  written	  on	  the	  superpower	  confrontation	  in	  Angola	  in	  the	  mid	   1970s.	   Zaki	   Laidi	   offers	   a	   lucid	   analytical	   framework	   of	   the	   crisis,	   while	  Piero	   Gleijeses	   and	   O.A.	   Westad	   give	   excellent	   accounts	   of	   the	   details	   of	   the	  unfolding	   conflict	   based	   on	  Cuban	   and	   Soviet	   sources	   respectively.346	  A	   first	   hand	  and	   seemingly	  open	   appraisal	   of	   the	  CIA	   role	  by	   John	  Stockwell,	   the	  CIA’s	   former	  chief	   of	   the	   Angolan	   task	   force,	   helps	   add	   colour	   to	   this	   picture.347	  The	   impact	   of	  events	   in	   Angola	   on	   the	   US-­‐Congolese	   relationship	   remains	   less	   considered,	  however.	  It	  is	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  this	  chapter	  primarily	  seeks	  to	  remedy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Thus	   far	  we	  have	   seen	  how	   the	  Lyndon	   Johnson	  administration	   responded	   to	  spreading	   violence	   and	   political	   turmoil	   in	   Congo	   by	   forcefully	   crushing	   the	  growing	  rebellion	  with	  a	  covert	  mercenary	  operation,	  playing	  an	  instrumental	  part	  in	  the	  Mobutu	  coup	  of	  1965	  and	  subsequently	  coming	  to	  the	  rescue	  of	  the	  initially	  flimsy	  dictator	  on	  numerous	  occasions	  as	  he	  consolidated	  his	  regime.	  By	  the	  1970s,	  buoyed	  by	   the	  boom	  of	   high	   copper	  prices,	   an	   increasingly	   self-­‐confident	  Mobutu	  had	  firmly	  established	  himself	  in	  a	  position	  of	  unrivalled	  power	  in	  Congo	  through	  a	  combination	   of	   crass	   political	   manoeuvring,	   a	   corrupt	   system	   of	   patronage,	   a	  shameless	   and	   pervasive	   personality	   cult	   and	   the	   liberal	   use	   of	   repression	  when	  this	   was	   deemed	   necessary.	   Washington	   responded	   to	   Mobutu’s	   ascendancy	   in	  Congo,	   and	   bid	   for	   regional	   leadership	   in	   Africa,	   with	   an	   unfettered	   public	  endorsement	   from	   the	   Nixon-­‐Kissinger	   White	   House,	   continued	   military	   and	  economic	  assistance	  and	  the	  active	  encouragement	  of	  growing	  private	   investment	  from	  the	  United	  States	  in	  Congo.	  As	  such,	  by	  the	  time	  crisis	  was	  brewing	  Angola	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  345	  Mark	  Attwood	  Lawrence,	  ‘Containing	  Globalism’,	  in	  Ferguson,	  Maier,	  Manela	  &	  Sergent	  (eds.)	  The	  Shock	  of	  the	  Global:	  The	  1970s	  in	  Perspective	  (Belknap	  Press;	  Harvard,	  MA,	  2010)	  p.	  208	  346	  Butler,	  Into	  the	  Storm;	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions;	  Laidi,	  Superpowers	  and	  Africa;	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War	  	  347	  Stockwell,	  In	  Search	  of	  Enemies:	  A	  CIA	  Story;	  For	  another	  colourful	  eye-­‐witness	  rendering	  see	  Ryszard	  Kapuscinski,	  Another	  Day	  of	  Life	  (Penguin	  Classics;	  London,	  2001)	  	  
	   129	  
the	  mid	  1970s,	  Washington’s	  erstwhile	  protégé	  should	  surely	  have	  proved	  a	  natural	  ally	   to	   stem	   a	   hostile	   tide	   in	   the	   region.	  More	   than	   simply	   another	   square	   in	   the	  chessboard	  of	  superpower	  rivalry,	  then,	  the	  Angolan	  conflict	  was	  also	  the	  first	  real	  test	   for	   America’s	   carefully	   nurtured	   Mobutu	   alliance	   as	   Congo	   was	   no	   doubt	  intended	  as	  the	  natural	  bulwark	  against	  communist	  subversion	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  According	  to	  CIA	  analysts,	  the	  Portuguese	  revolution	  of	  April	  1974	  had	  given	  a	  fresh	   lease	   of	   to	   Angola’s	   independence	   movements	   with	   the	   new	   leadership	   in	  Lisbon	   committed	   to	   ending	   over	   five	   hundred	   years	   of	   colonial	   rule.348	  Angola’s	  black	  population	  remained	  subject	  to	  forced	  labour	  as	  late	  as	  1961	  and,	  as	  Gleijeses	  describes,	   ‘They	   were	   the	   unlucky	   charges	   of	   Europe’s	   most	   backward	   colonial	  power.’349	  Nevertheless,	   since	   their	   initial	   uprising	   in	   Luanda	   in	   March	   1961	   the	  fragmented	   independence	   movements,	   while	   looking	   to	   garner	   international	  support	  for	  their	  respective	  causes,	  had	  been	  unable	  and	  unwilling	  to	  form	  a	  united	  position	   towards	   independence.	   Thus	   the	   three	   main	   Angolan	   independence	  movements	  were	  split	  along	  geographic,	  ethnic	  and	  ideological	  lines	  and	  infighting	  continued	  in	  the	  build	  up	  to	  independence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  FNLA	   (National	   Front	   for	   the	  Liberation	  of	  Angola)	  was	  borne	  out	   of	   the	  political	   upheaval	   of	   the	   Bakongo	   people	   of	   ‘Lower	   Zaire’	   (or	   Bas-­‐Congo)	   and	  northern	  Angola	  in	  the	  1950s.	  It	  was	  the	  attacks	  from	  Congo	  into	  Northern	  Angola	  in	  March	  1961	  that	  both	  marked	  the	  real	  beginnings	  of	  the	  rebellion	  and	  earned	  its	  leader,	   Holden	   Roberto,	   a	   reputation	   for	   cruelty.	   By	   1975,	   American	   observers	  estimated	   its	   military	   strength	   at	   about	   10,000	   troops.	   Having	   established	   a	  revolutionary	  government	  in	  exile	  in	  Kinshasa	  (GRAE)	  in	  1962,	  its	  key	  weaknesses	  lay	   in	  Roberto’s	   refusal	   to	   re-­‐enter	  Angolan	   territory	   for	   fear	  of	  assassination	  and	  its	  narrow	  ethnic	  identification.	  As	  a	  State	  Department	  Study	  Memorandum	  noted,	  the	  movement’s	  ‘tribal	  identification	  has	  limited	  its	  popularity…	  It	  has	  less	  support	  in	  Luanda	  than	  does	  the	  MPLA	  or	  even	  UNITA;	  it	  has	  virtually	  no	  following	  south	  of	  Luanda-­‐	  an	  area	  that	  includes	  about	  three	  fourths	  of	  the	  country.’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   MPLA	   (Popular	   Movement	   for	   the	   Liberation	   of	   Angola)	   by	   contrast	  promoted,	  with	   some	  success,	   a	  broader	  appeal	   from	  all	   segments	  of	   the	  Angolan	  population-­‐	   including	  whites-­‐	   by	   stressing	   the	   national	   and	  multi-­‐racial	   nature	   of	  the	   movement.	   According	   to	   the	   above-­‐cited	   National	   Security	   Memorandum,	   a	  large	  part	  of	  this	  success	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	   ‘the	  ability	  and	  high	  motivation	  of	  its	   well-­‐educated,	   Marxist	   orientated	   leaders.’	   No	   doubt	   Agostinho	   Neto,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  348	  CIA	  Staff	  Notes,	  Middle	  East,	  Africa,	  South	  Asia,	  11th	  February	  1975;	  CIA	  Research	  Search	  Tool	  (hereafter	  CREST),	  NARAII	  349	  Piero	  Gleijes,	  Conflicting	  Missions:	  Havana,	  Washington	  and	  Africa	  p.	  234	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Portuguese	  educated	  physician	  and	  poet,	  grasped	  that	  a	  nationalist	  appeal	  couched	  in	   the	   ideological	   terms	   of	   a	   broader	   class	   struggle	   could	  more	   readily	   transcend	  ethnic	   divisions	   and	  unite	   the	   country	   towards	   independence.	   As	   such,	   the	  MPLA	  enjoyed	   stronger	   support	   around	   urban	   centres	   (and	   Luanda	   in	   particular),	   the	  labour	   unions	   and	   even	   Angola’s	   white	   intellectuals	   and	   professionals.	   On	   the	  military	  front,	  Washington	  estimated	  its	  strength	  to	  be	  numerically	  comparable	  to	  the	  FNLA.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  UNITA	   (National	   Union	   for	   the	   Total	   Independence	   of	   Angola),	   the	   third	   and	  least	   powerful	   of	   the	   three	   movements,	   drew	   support	   from	   the	   Ovimbundu,	  Angola’s	   largest	   ethnic	   group.	   This	   organisation	  was	   essentially	   an	   offshoot	   from	  the	  FNLA	  following	  Jonas	  Savimbi’	  split	  with	  Roberto	  in	  1966	  with	  a	  comparatively	  limited	   fighting	   strength	   estimated	   by	   the	   CIA	   at	   some	   three	   thousand	   in	   1975.	  Finally,	   following	   almost	   a	   decade	   of	   inactivity,	   the	   fractious	   FLEC	   (Front	   for	   the	  Liberation	   of	   the	   Enclave	   of	   Cabinda)	   remerged	   as	   two	  movements	   based	   in	   the	  capitals	   either	   side	   of	   the	   Congo	   River	   and	   drawing	   support	   from	   Kinshasa	   and	  Brazzaville	  respectively.350	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Thus,	   even	  without	   foreign	  meddling	   or	   the	   projection	   of	   Cold	  War	   rivalries,	  civil	   strife	   simmered	   in	   Angola.	   Added	   to	   the	   mix	   of	   this	   Angolan	   powder	   keg,	  however,	   were	   the	   stakes	   of	   various	   regional	   actors,	   and	   the	   two	   Congos	   in	  particular,	   supporting	   the	   respective	   movements	   from	   beyond	   Angola’s	   borders	  and	  fluctuating	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  the	  FNLA	  and	  MPLA	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  respectively	  since	  the	  early	  1960s.	  With	  its	  1,500-­‐mile	  border	  with	  Angola,	   its	   dependence	   on	   Angola’s	   Benguela	   railway	   for	   its	   copper	   exports,	  longstanding	  internal	  strife	  with	  the	  largely	  Lunda	  former-­‐gendarmes	  from	  Katanga	  now	  in	  exile	  in	  northern	  Angola	  and	  Mobutu’s	  ethnic	  and	  family	  ties	  with	  the	  FNLA	  leadership;	   Mobutu’s	   Congo	   had	   the	   most	   immediate	   stakes	   in	   the	   outcome	   of	  Angola’s	  civil	  war	  out	  of	  all	  the	  external	  parties	  looking	  to	  influence	  these	  events.351	  As	  a	  result,	  Washington	  and	  Kinshasa	  no	  doubt	  viewed	  the	  other	  as	  a	  natural	  ally	  with	  common	  if	  not	  synonymous	  interests	  in	  Angola.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  crisis	  loomed	  in	  Angola,	  however,	  Congo	  was	  facing	  economic	  ruin	  and	  even	  contemporary	  observers	  from	  within	  the	  US	  administration	  questioned	  how	  far	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  350	  Quotes	  and	  background	  on	  the	  Angolan	  independence	  movements	  are	  taken	  from	  a	  National	  Security	  Memorandum	  prepared	  by	  Nathaniel	  Davis,	  NSSM	  224:	  United	  States	  Policy	  Towards	  Angola,	  16th	  June	  1975;	  NSC,	  Institutional	  Files,	  NSSM224,	  Box	  36,	  Gerald	  Ford	  Library,	  Ann	  Arbor,	  Michigan	  (hereafter	  GFL)	  	  351	  Crawford	  Young	  clarifies	  Mobutu’s	  ‘quasi-­‐kinship’	  ties	  to	  Holden	  Roberto	  whose	  second	  wife	  came	  from	  the	  same	  village	  as	  Mobutu’s	  first	  spouse	  (but	  were	  not,	  as	  is	  at	  times	  claimed,	  sisters).	  Young	  and	  Turner,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Decline	  of	  the	  Zairian	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  p.	  376	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increasingly	  tense	  alliance	  with	  Mobutu	  and	  his	  hapless	  armed	  forces	  could	  reliably	  serve	   American	   regional	   designs.	   Nevertheless,	   and	   after	   much	   prodding	   from	  Secretary	  Kissinger	  personally,	  Mobutu	  became	   the	   lynchpin	  of	   the	  United	  States’	  Angola	  strategy.	  The	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  thus	  briefly	  consider	  the	  state	  of	   Congo	   in	   1974	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   its	   domestic	   woes	   on	   its	   relationship	   with	  Washington.	   Frustrated	  with	   the	   perceived	   inattention	   from	  Washington,	  Mobutu	  provoked	   a	   diplomatic	   crisis	   in	   an	   all	   too	   transparent	   effort	   to	   ensure	   Congo	   a	  central	   role	   in	   American	   regional	   designs.	   Indeed,	   these	   strains	   in	   America’s	  principle	  African	  alliance	  appeared	  to	  directly	  influence	  US	  policy	  in	  Angola	  and	  the	  strategy	  of	   Secretary	  Kissinger	   in	  particular.	  A	   second	   section	  examines	   events	   in	  Angola	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  the	  US-­‐Congo	  relationship.	  More	  than	  simply	  weak	  and	  unable	   to	   serve	  American	  designs	   in	  a	  meaningful	  way,	   there	   is	   some	  evidence	   to	  suggest	   that	   a	  wily	  Mobutu	   pursuing	   his	   own	   narrow	   interests	   actually	   drew	   the	  United	   States	   further	   into	   the	  Angolan	   quagmire.	   Perhaps	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   then,	  the	   relationship	   with	   its	   erstwhile	   protégé	   actually	   proved	   detrimental	   to	   the	  immediate	   material	   interests	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   A	   final	   sub-­‐chapter	   will	   thus	  consider	   the	   American	   reaction	   towards	   Congo	   following	   defeat	   in	   Angola.	   A	  fundamental	   reassessment	   of	   its	   close	   ties	   with	   Kinshasa	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   this	  complete	  undoing	  in	  Angola	  could	  have	  been	  expected.	  Once	  again	  Kissinger’s	  grip	  on	  policy,	  and	  very	  public	  efforts	  to	  shift	  blame	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  Congressional	  support	  for	   his	   Angola	   venture,	   prevented	   any	   critical	   reassessment	   or	   revision	   of	  Washington’s	  Congo	  relationship.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  an	  all	  too	  familiar	  line	  espoused	  for	  the	  past	  ten	  years,	  Mobutu	  was	  deemed	  the	   sole	   provider	   of	   pro-­‐Western	   stability	   in	   the	   region	   and	  mentor	   of	   American	  credibility	  in	  the	  third	  world.	  Rather	  than	  chastise	  him	  for	  his	  personal	  excesses	  or	  distance	   the	   United	   States	   from	   an	   increasingly	   unpalatable	   regime,	   Kissinger	  frantically	   sought	  ways	   to	  bolster	   the	   struggling	  Mobutu	  with	   typically	  disastrous	  consequences	   for	   the	   people	   of	   Congo.	   Ultimately,	   during	   the	   Angola	   conflict	   the	  United	   States’	   heavy	   reliance	   on	  Mobutu’s	   Congo	   as	   a	   viable	   strategy	   for	   dealing	  with	  the	  tide	  of	  independence	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  having	  defined	  the	  approaches	  of	  successive	  administrations	  since	  Lyndon	  Johnson,	  was	  finally	  shown	  as	  the	  weak	  reed	   that	   it	   was.	   Washington,	   dominated	   by	   Kissinger’s	   overbearing	   personality,	  neither	   anticipated	   the	   dangers	   inherent	   in	   its	   heavy	   dependence	   on	   Mobutu	  (despite	  the	  warnings	  of	   the	  State	  Department’s	  Africa	  hands	  and	  members	  of	   the	  embassy	  staff	  in	  Kinshasa)	  nor	  was	  it	  able	  to	  draw	  lessons	  from	  the	  Angola	  debacle	  to	  redirect	  its	  strategy	  towards	  Congo	  and	  the	  wider	  region	  for	  the	  future.	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The	  Rumblings	  of	  Discontent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	  was	  neither	   the	  events	   in	  Angola	  nor	  Congo’s	  economic	  plight,	  however,	  but	  the	  staging	  of	  the	  sporting	  event	  of	  the	  decade	  in	  Kinshasa	  on	  30th	  October	  that	  cast	  the	   international	   spotlight	   on	  Mobutu’s	   domain	   once	  more	   in	   1974.	   Billed	   as	   the	  ‘Rumble	   in	   the	   Jungle’,	   the	  much	   anticipated	   heavyweight	   title	   fight	   between	   the	  brawn	   and	   athleticism	   of	   the	   younger	   George	   Foreman	   seeking	   to	   fend	   off	   the	  legend	  of	  Mohammad	  Ali	  became,	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  many,	  both	  the	  greatest	  fight	  and	  most	  blatant	  piece	  of	  hyperbolic	   theatre	   in	   the	  history	  of	  boxing.	  Having	  allegedly	  promised	  each	  of	  the	  fighters	  five	  million	  dollars	  which	  he	  did	  not	  have	  to	  commit	  to	  the	  fight,	  the	  as	  yet	  little	  known	  boxing	  promoter	  Don	  King	  was	  wood	  by	  Mobutu	  to	  host	  the	  fight	  in	  Kinshasa.	  The	  crowds	  of	  onlookers,	  pundits	  and	  journalists	  that	  thronged	   to	   Congo’s	   capital	   were	   not	   disappointed.	   Employing	   his	   now	   historic	  ‘Rope-­‐a-­‐Dope’	  tactic,	  a	  seemingly	  slower	  and	  weaker	  Ali	  sapped	  the	  strength	  out	  of	  his	  opponent	  to	  deliver	  a	  defiant	  knock	  out	   in	  the	  eighth	  round	  that	  reclaimed	  his	  heavyweight	   title	   crown.	   While	   no	   doubt	   requiring	   a	   certain	   rhetorical	   leap,	  perhaps	  this	  display	  of	   tactical	  mastery	  and	  sheer	   force	  of	  will	  presaged	  Mobutu’s	  own	  resolve	  and	  strategic	  acumen	  to	  defy	  the	  odds	  and	  remain	  at	  the	  helm	  of	  Congo	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  in	  the	  subsequent	  months.352	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   from	   the	  Congolese	   leader’s	  perspective,	  hosting	   the	  heavyweight	   title	  fight	  in	  Kinshasa	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  further	  ostentatious	  display	  of	  Mobutu’s	  power	  as	   well	   as	   a	   magnanimous	   gift	   to	   his	   people.	   Scratching	   beneath	   the	   surface,	  however,	   the	   cracks	   in	   Mobutu’s	   display	   of	   political	   virility	   were	   fast	   appearing	  even	  to	  the	  casual	  contemporary	  observers	  who	  swarmed	  to	  Congo	  for	  the	  fight,	  as	  Norman	  Mailer’s	  now	  iconic	  account	  in	   ‘The	  Fight’	   indicates.	  The	  previous	  chapter	  has	  shown	  how	  Mobutu’s	  grip	  on	  Congo	  was	  based	  on	  a	  mixture	  of	  patronage	  and	  repression,	  while	   the	  majority	  of	   the	   country	  was	   left	   largely	  unimpressed	  by	   the	  blatant	  propaganda	  of	   the	  president’s	   increasingly	  pervasive	  personality	  cult.	  This	  stick-­‐and-­‐carrot	   rule	   in	   turn	   depended	   upon	   a	   functioning	   economy	   to	   ensure	  sufficient	  rewards	  for	  his	  loyal	  but	  interchangeable	  elite	  and	  the	  army	  in	  particular.	  As	  the	  decade	  reached	  its	  halfway	  mark,	  however,	  Congo’s	  economy	  was	  sputtering	  and	  this	  system	  appeared	  increasingly	  unviable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Throughout	  this	  period	  the	  Congolese	  economy	  was	  almost	  exclusively	  reliant	  on	   its	   extractive	   copper	   industry	   essentially	   run	   by	   foreign	   technicians.	   As	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  352	  Norman	  Mailer,	  The	  Fight;	  Leon	  Gast’s	  Documentary:	  When	  We	  Were	  Kings	  (1996,Polygram	  Entertainment)	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world	  copper	  price	  sagged	  and	  production	  costs	  rose	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  global	  energy	  crisis,	   the	   mining	   life	   raft	   that	   had	   kept	   afloat	   an	   otherwise	   badly	   mismanaged	  economy	   was	   rapidly	   deflating.	   The	   devastating	   impact	   of	   the	   ‘Zairianisation’	  program	   together	  with	   the	   foolhardy	  misallocation	   of	   capital	   has	   been	   discussed.	  Coupled	  with	  this	  was	  a	  growing	  urbanization	  and	  neglect	  of	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  that	   led	   to	   both	   sharp	   increases	   in	   the	   cost	   of	   living	   and	  made	   Congo	   ever	  more	  dependent	   on	   foreign	   imports. 353 	  Rather	   than	   reign	   in	   government	   excesses,	  however,	   Mobutu	   preferred	   to	   counteract	   the	   growing	   shortfall	   of	   capital	   with	  further	  borrowing.	  By	  March	  1975,	   the	  CIA	  was	  reporting	   increasing	  nervousness	  amongst	   creditors,	   especially	   from	   American	   and	   Belgian	   banks,	   and	   Congo’s	  economic	  plight	  was	  under	   scrutiny	   from	   the	   IMF	   likely	   to	   recommend,	   ‘stringent	  controls	   that	   Mobutu	   may	   find	   unpalatable.’354	  More	   than	   unpalatable,	   Mobutu	  resisted	   the	   IMF	   recommendations	   throughout	   1975	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   another	  resurgence	  of	  copper	  prices	  that	  had	  bailed	  him	  out	  before	  and	  managed	  to	  secure	  short-­‐term	  credit	  from	  Germany	  and	  France	  to	  keep	  Congo	  afloat,	  even	  if	  only	  on	  an	  interim	  basis.355	  This	  economic	  malaise,	  however,	  not	  only	  continued	  to	  undermine	  his	  domestic	  standing	  as	  has	  been	  considered	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  but	  it	  also	  put	  a	  new	  strain	  on	  his	  relationship	  with	  his	  American	  allies.	  Thus	  the	  CIA	  observed	  the	  tension	   between	   Mobutu’s	   economic	   dependence	   on	   the	   United	   States	   and	   his	  increasing	  frustration	  with	  a	  perceived	  neglect	  from	  his	  Washington	  partners.	  In	  an	  almost	  prophetic	  conclusion,	  the	  CIA	  summarized,	  ‘In	  his	  present	  mood,	  Mobutu	  is	  likely	   to	   translate	   this	  hesitancy	  (for	   further	  credit)	   into	   “economic	  sabotage”	  and	  fight	   back	   with	   diplomatic	   attacks,	   in	   which	   case	   the	   US	   would	   be	   a	   particularly	  inviting	  target.’356	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   by	   1975	   the	   cosy	   Kinshasa-­‐Washington	   relationship	   was	   palpably	  souring.	   The	   first	   clear	   indication	   of	   this	   occurred	   already	   in	   January	   when	   US	  ambassador	   Deane	   R.	   Hinton,	   who	   replaced	   Sheldon	   Vance	   in	   Kinshasa	   in	   1974,	  reported	   Mobutu’s	   calls	   for	   the	   Peace	   Corps	   to	   be	   removed	   from	   the	   country	   as	  certain	  members	  had	  been	  heard	  making	  disparaging	  remarks	  about	  the	  Kinshasa	  government.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Mobutu	   publically	   criticised	   the	   appointment	   of	  Nathaniel	  Davis	   as	   the	  new	  Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	  African	  Affairs	   for	   his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  353	  State	  Department	  analysts	  noted	  that	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  only	  received	  an	  estimated	  2%	  of	  government-­‐sponsored	  investment	  and	  food	  imports	  were	  increasing	  by	  some	  10%	  annually	  from	  the	  early	  1970s	  adding	  to	  the	  balance	  of	  payments	  crisis.	  State	  Department,	  Bureau	  of	  Intelligence	  and	  Research,	  ‘Zaire:	  A	  Poor	  Prognosis’,	  28th	  December,	  1976;	  FRUS	  Volume	  E-­‐6	  354	  CIA,	  Staff	  Notes:	  Middle	  East,	  Africa,	  South	  Asia,	  20th	  March	  1975;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  355	  CIA,	  Staff	  Notes:	  Middle	  East,	  Africa,	  South	  Asia,	  14th	  July	  1975;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  356	  CIA,	  Staff	  Notes:	  Middle	  East,	  Africa,	  South	  Asia,	  20th	  March	  1975;	  CREST,	  NARAII	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role	   as	   Ambassador	   in	   Chile	   at	   the	   time	   of	   Allende’s	   murder.357	  The	   subsequent	  cable	   traffic	   between	  Washington	   and	   Kinshasa	   saw	   the	   embassy	   caution	   against	  Kissinger’s	  desire	  for	  a	  strong	  demarche	  against	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  Mobutu’s	  meddling	  in	   American	   domestic	   politics,	   ‘Few	   things	   would	   give	   me	   greater	   personal	  gratification	   than	   conveying	   your	   views	   directly	   to	   President	   Mobutu,’	   Hinton	  wrote,	   ‘However,	   there	   are	   other	   considerations,	   including,	   but	   not	   limited	   to	   the	  selfish	  one	   that	   this	  place	   is	   just	  nutty	  enough	   that	   I	  would	   like	   to	   stay	  here	  a	  bit	  longer.’358	  Not	   only	   did	   this	   reveal	   Mobutu’s	   growing	   frustrations	   but	   it	   is	   also	  suggestive	   of	   the	   diminishing	   influence	   Washington	   could	   hope	   to	   exert	   on	  Kinshasa	   if	   its	   ambassador	   risked	   being	   sent	   packing	   over	   seemingly	   minor	  disagreements.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	  this	  incident,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  failure	  to	  respond	  from	  Washington,	  also	  tells	  of	  the	  difficulties	  in	  the	  personal	  relationship	  between	  Ambassador	  Hinton	  and	  the	  increasingly	  disgruntled	  Mobutu.	  Indeed,	  that	  June	  Hinton	  was	  the	  target	  of	  Mobutu’s	   next	   and	   most	   audacious	   denouncing	   of	   the	   United	   States	   when	  Kinshasa’s	  state	  controlled	  newspapers	  accused	  the	  ambassador	  of	  collusion	  in	  an	  apparent	   plot	   to	   assassinate	   Congo’s	   leader,	   expelled	   him	   from	   the	   country	   and	  declared	   him	   persona	   non	   grata.	   According	   to	   the	   US	   Embassy’s	   Deputy	   Chief	   of	  Mission	  in	  Kinshasa,	  Lannon	  Walker,	  it	  was	  the	  former’s	  lecturing	  tone	  on	  economic	  matters	   and	   the	   need	   for	   austerity	   that	   riled	   Mobutu	   and	   preceded	   the	   most	  significant	   diplomatic	   spat	   in	   US-­‐Congolese	   relations	   thus	   far.359	  	   The	   temerity	   of	  this	  accusation	   is	  all	   the	  more	  striking	   in	  view	  of	  Mobutu’s	  own	  rise	   to	  power	  ten	  years	   earlier.	  Thus,	   in	   a	   thinly	   veiled	   reference	   that	   conveniently	  omitted	   its	   own	  role	  in	  the	  coup	  of	  November	  1965,	  the	  CIA	  observed,	  	  ‘The	  Zairian	  leader	  began	  his	  political	  career	  in	  a	  period	  of	  intrigue	  and	  turmoil,	  and	  he	  participated	  in	  those	  intrigues.	  He	  no	  doubt	  accepts	  plots	  against	  a	  head	  of	  state	  as	  a	  fact	  of	  life-­‐	  a	  point	  of	  view	  probably	  sharpened	  by	  his	  awareness	  of	  growing	  restiveness	  in	  the	  army.’360	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  these	  incidents	  illustrated	  the	  huge	  expectations	  Mobutu	  had	  for	  his	   backers	   in	  Washington	   to	   continue	   their	   untrammelled	   support,	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   he	   depended	   on	   this	   as	   well	   as	   the	   corresponding	   exacerbation	   of	   the	  increasingly	   isolated	   leader’s	   perceived	   neglect.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Mobutu’s	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readiness	  to	  denounce	  his	  long-­‐term	  benefactor	  indicated	  the	  superficial	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  that	  could	  only	  last	  as	  long	  as	  he	  felt	  he	  was	  reaping	  direct	  material	  rewards	   and	   strategic	   benefits	   from	   his	   engagement	   with	   Washington.	   Most	  importantly,	   however,	   these	   episodes	   demonstrated	   the	   need	   for	   a	   united	   front	  within	   the	  Washington	   administration	   and	   the	   Congo	   country	   team	   if	   the	   United	  States	   was	   to	   translate	   its	   considerable	   leverage	   into	   a	   positive	   influence	   on	   the	  wily	   and	   wilful	   Kinshasa	   despot	   and	   his	   apparent	   efforts	   to	   manipulate	   his	  American	  ally.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  incredulous	  reactions	  from	  the	  CIA	  and	  State	  Department	  officials	  indicate	  that	   this	   time	   there	   was	   no	   truth	   in	   the	   claims	   of	   an	   American	   role	   in	   the	   coup	  plotting.	  In	  fact,	  reports	  on	  Congo	  were	  most	  usually	  couched	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  impact	  any	  particular	  event	  may	  have	  on	  Mobutu’s	  hold	  on	  power	  rather	  than	  any	  thoughts	  of	   his	   removal.	   The	   fact	   that	   Congo’s	   president	   provoked	   an	   open	   confrontation	  with	   his	   most	   significant	   patron	   at	   a	   time	   of	   mounting	   domestic	   unrest	   and	  increasing	  dangers	  from	  beyond	  Congo’s	  borders	  appears	  surprising	  at	  first	  glance.	  Far	   from	   irrational,	   however,	   the	  CIA	  noted	  a	   clear	   strategy	  behind	   these	   actions.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   any	   public	   criticism	   of	   the	   US	   served	   as	   a	   useful	   affirmation	   of	  Mobutu’s	   non-­‐aligned	   credentials	   in	   his	   quest	   for	   status	   as	   a	   leading	   African	  statesman.	  Furthermore,	  from	  a	  domestic	  point	  of	  view	  such	  a	  public	  confrontation	  served	   as	   a	   handy	   distraction	   providing	   an	   excuse	   for	   a	   strong	   government	  crackdown	  and	  yet	  another	  purge	  of	   the	  army	  under	  cries	  of	   ‘economic	  sabotage’.	  The	   most	   important	   calculation	   for	   Mobutu,	   however,	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   the	  reaction	  he	  was	  looking	  to	  provoke	  from	  Washington.361	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Time	  and	  again	  Mobutu	  had	  stressed	  his	  sense	  of	  vulnerability	  to	  his	  American	  allies	   as	   his	   domestic	   standing	   deteriorated	   and	   armed	   conflict	   spread	   across	  Congo’s	  southern	  border	  in	  Angola.	  Appeals	  for	  economic	  aid	  to	  alleviate	  budgetary	  constraints	   and	   military	   assistance	   both	   for	   his	   government	   directly	   and	   for	   the	  Congo	   based	   National	   Front	   for	   the	   Liberation	   of	   Angola	   (FNLA)	   were	   met	   with	  perceived	   indifference	  and	  empty	  promises.	  As	  such,	  neither	   the	  personal	  appeals	  to	  Kissinger	  as	  early	  as	  August	  1974	  nor	  Major	  General	  James	  M.	  Rockwell’s	  (Chief	  of	   the	  US	   Technical	   Advisory	   Team	   to	   Congo)	   first	  military	  mission	   the	   following	  March	   yielded	   any	   tangible	   results	   to	   satisfy	   Mobutu.362	  Like	   a	   neglected	   lover	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looking	   for	   acknowledgment,	   these	   increasingly	   shrill	   denouncements	   of	   the	   US	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  specifically	  designed	  to	  rouse	  some	  kind	  of	  reaction	  from	  the	  inattentive	   benefactor.	  Mobutu	   played	   his	   part	   as	   the	   spurned	   but	   loyal	   ally	  with	  considerable	   skill.	  On	   the	  one	  hand	  he	   appeared	   to	  be	   setting	   the	  United	   States	   a	  clear	  ultimatum:	  if	  Washington	  did	  not	  react	  to	  his	  pleas	  and	  the	  dire	  straights	  his	  country	  found	  itself	  in	  it	  could	  expect	  the	  loss,	  and	  potential	  collapse,	  of	  a	  vociferous	  ally	   in	  Africa.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Congo’s	   leader	  was	  careful	  not	  to	  close	  any	  doors,	  levelling	   his	   criticisms	   indirectly	   through	   the	   official	   newspapers	   at	   ambassador	  Hinton	  personally,	   rather	   than	   the	  Washington	  administration	  more	  broadly,	   thus	  maintaining	  open	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States	  throughout.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   sum	   then,	   as	   the	   1970s	   reached	   the	   halfway	   point,	   a	   decade	   of	   economic	  mismanagement,	  largess	  and	  corruption,	  exacerbated	  by	  plummeting	  copper	  prices	  and	  matched	  by	  a	  repressive	  state	  apparatus,	  combined	  to	  leave	  Congo	  ruined	  and	  the	  Kinshasa	  government	  deprived	  of	  legitimacy.	  Unwilling	  to	  address	  this	  internal	  decay	  head	  on,	  Mobutu	  continued	  to	  count	  on	  support	  from	  beyond	  his	  borders	  and	  the	   United	   States	   in	   particular.	   Indeed,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   he	   was	   willing	   to	  manipulate	   confrontations	  with	  his	   long-­‐term	  patron	   to	   this	   end	  was	   remarkable.	  Taking	  his	   lead	  from	  the	  resounding	  support	  voiced	  by	  the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  White	  House,	   Congo’s	   president	   seemingly	   felt	   secure	   that	   his	   calculations	   would	   pay	  dividend.	   As	   a	   result,	   no	   doubt	   the	  most	   interesting	   aspect	   of	   this	   story	   was	   the	  reaction	   from	   Washington.	   Walker	   expected	   a	   sharp	   reprimand	   from	   Kissinger	  similar	   to	   the	   rebuff	   following	   Mobutu’s	   attack	   on	   Nathaniel	   Davis	   earlier	   in	   the	  year.363	  Far	  from	  this,	  however,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  appeared	  to	  panic	  in	  the	  face	  of	   this	   Congolese	   pressure	   and	   immediately	   sent	   Ambassador	   Vance,	   the	   old	   and	  reliable	   confidant	   of	   Congo’s	   president,	   on	   a	   diplomatic	   reconciliation	  mission	   to	  Kinshasa.	  This	  placid	  reaction	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  events	  unfolding	  across	  Congo’s	  southern	  border	  in	  Angola.	  In	  other	  words,	  caught	  in	  an	  increasingly	  untenable	   domestic	   situation,	   Mobutu	   calculated	   that	   a	   Kissinger-­‐dominated	  Washington,	  with	   its	  preponderance	   for	  viewing	  events	   in	  Africa	   in	   terms	  of	   their	  geostrategic	   Cold-­‐War	   implications,	  would	   not	   abandon	   an	   ally	  who	  might	   play	   a	  key	  role	   in	  the	  conflict	  unfolding	  across	   its	  southern	  border.	  These	  considerations	  no	  doubt	  encouraged	  Mobutu	  in	  his	  own	  Angola	  foray	  and	  in	  turn	  shaped	  American	  strategy	  towards	  the	  conflict.	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Breakfast	  with	  Mobutu:	  the	  Genesis	  of	  Kissinger’s	  Angola	  Strategy	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Ambassador	   Hinton	   was	   declared	   a	   persona	   non	   grata	   by	   the	   Kinshasa	  government	  in	  June	  1974.	  By	  the	  time	  Sheldon	  Vance	  made	  his	  third	  reconciliation	  trip	   to	   Kinshasa	   that	   September,	   however,	   he	   was	   once	   more	   greeted	   with	   full	  diplomatic	   fanfare	   and	   corresponding	   press	   conferences	   and	   the	   embassy	   noted,	  ‘Mobutu	  has	  clearly	  decided	   to	   signal	   to	   the	  public	   that	   full	   reconciliation	  of	  good	  relations	  between	  US	  has	  occurred.’364	  It	  had	  taken	  a	  mere	  three	  months	  for	  Mobutu	  to	  make	  an	  about	   turn	   from	  accusing	  members	  of	   the	  American	  administration	  of	  plotting	   his	   downfall	   to	   once	  more	   publically	   posturing	   with	   his	   erstwhile	   allies.	  Earlier	   tensions	   were	   quickly	   and	   conveniently	   forgotten.	   The	   speed	   of	   this	  increasingly	  public	   reconciliation	  reflects	   the	  close	   interplay	  between	  Washington	  and	  Kinshasa	   from	   that	   summer	   in	   the	  unfolding	  Angolan	  conflict.	  Perhaps	   it	   also	  serves	   as	   an	   indication	   of	   how	   Mobutu’s	   brash	   but	   shrewd	   calculations	   utterly	  outmanoeuvred	   Kissinger	   on	   the	   African	   stage.	   The	   Congolese	   despot	   had	   ample	  reasons	  of	  his	  own	  for	  wishing	  to	  influence	  and	  control	  events	  across	  the	  Angolan	  border	   but	   from	   the	   American	   Secretary	   of	   State’s	   vantage	   this	   was	   viewed	   as	   a	  common	   interest	   in	   the	   global	   Cold	   War	   struggle.	   When	   Mobutu’s	   own	  interventions	  began	   to	   falter	   in	  Angola,	  he	   looked	   to	   the	  United	  States	   for	   further	  support	   and,	   when	   this	   was	   not	   immediately	   forthcoming,	   cried	   foul	   in	   the	  fabricated	   Hinton	   affair.	   It	   was	   out	   of	   this,	   and	   Kissinger’s	   somewhat	   hysterical	  reaction,	   that	   a	   renewed	   and	   fatally	   flawed	   partnership	   to	   direct	   the	   course	   of	  events	  in	  Angola	  was	  born.	  As	  such,	  the	  Angolan	  conflict	  that	  began	  in	  earnest	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  1974	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  distinct	  phases.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Initially,	   despite	   some	   low	   level	   support	   and	   the	   best	   efforts	   of	   the	   various	  factions	  to	  appeal	  to	  super	  power	  sensibilities,	  the	  civil	  war	  remained	  an	  essentially	  regional	   affair	   with	   Mobutu’s	   National	   Army	   (FAZ)	   the	   dominant	   foreign	   force	  embroiled	   in	   the	   turmoil.365	  Following	   the	   deteriorating	   prospects	   of	   Mobutu’s	  Angola	   venture	   and	   his	   very	   deliberate	   provocation	   of	   his	   American	   backer,	   the	  United	  States	  entered	  the	  fray	  in	  support	  of	  the	  FNLA	  just	  as	  South	  Africa	  launched	  its	   own	   direct	   military	   intervention	   to	   bolster	   UNITA	   in	   southern	   Angola.	  Correspondingly	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   escalated	   its	   military	   assistance	   while	   Cuba	  launched	  a	  direct	  military	  intervention	  in	  support	  of	  the	  MPLA	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  1975	   in	   the	   second	   phase	   of	   the	   conflict	   increasingly	   defined	   by	   the	   Cold	   War	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  364	  Vance,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Third	  Vance	  Mission:	  First	  Meeting	  with	  Mobutu’,	  September	  19th’	  19th	  September	  1975;	  NSA,	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  7,	  GFL	  365	  ‘Force	  Armées	  Zaïrois’	  (FAZ),	  the	  ANC’s	  new	  acronym	  following	  Congo’s	  renaming	  after	  1971.	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superpower	   confrontation.366	  As	   such,	   this	   section	   examines	   the	   role	   played	   by	  Mobutu	  in	  drawing	  his	  long-­‐term	  ally	  into	  the	  Angolan	  war	  that	  not	  only	  once	  more	  aligned	  Washington	  with	  the	  reactionary	  elements	  of	  white	  minority	  rule	  but,	  with	  its	  all	  too	  predictable	  inability	  to	  match	  the	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  escalation,	  resulted	  in	  the	  first	  notable	  Cold	  War	  defeat	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  Africa.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mobutu’s	   stakes	   in	  Angola	  were	   in	  part	   a	   result	   of	   historic	   constellations	   and	  allegiances,	  in	  part	  a	  reflection	  of	  immediate	  economic	  interests	  and	  in	  part	  simply	  an	   extension	   of	   Congo’s	   own	   domestic	   woes	   and	   the	   Kinshasa	   government’s	  increasingly	  fragile	  position.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Mobutu	  himself	  had	  personal	  ties	  to	  the	   FNLA	   leader	  Holden	  Roberto	  who	   operated	   from	  Kinshasa.	  While	   his	   familial	  loyalty	  proved	  dubious	  as	  Mobutu	  increasingly	  pursued	  his	  own	  narrow	  aims,	  since	  their	   defeat	   during	   the	   secessionist	   years	   in	   the	   early	   1960s	   the	   largely	   Lunda	  former	  gendarmes	   from	  Katanga	   in	   exile	   across	   the	  Angolan	  border	   constituted	  a	  permanent	   concern	   to	   the	   central	   government	   in	  Kinshasa.367	  In	   addition	   to	   these	  historic	  burdens,	  the	  chief	  route	  for	  Katanga’s	  copper	  exports	  was	  through	  Angola’s	  Benguela	  Railway	  link,	  placing	  Congo’s	  principle	  income	  dangerously	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	   events	   across	   its	   southern	   border.	   Mobutu’s	   personal	   ambitions	   to	   cultivate	  Congo	  as	  a	  powerful	  regional	  force	  in	  Africa	  no	  doubt	  ran	  parallel	  to	  these	  very	  real	  material	  interests.	  Indeed,	  his	  desire	  to	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  Angolan	  civil	  war	  was	  as	  much	  an	  effort	  to	  bolster	  his	  credentials	  as	  a	  grand	  African	  statesman	  as	  it	  was	   a	   seemingly	   conscious	   diversion	   from	   Congo’s	   own	   domestic	   woes	   and	   an	  engineered	   distraction	   for	   the	   restless	   FAZ,	   his	   power	   base	   at	   home.	   As	   a	   result,	  when	   simmering	   rivalries	   boiled	   over	   into	   armed	   confrontation	  with	   each	   of	   the	  rebel	  movements	   rushing	   to	   establish	   control	   over	   the	   fledgling	   country	   ahead	  of	  the	  newly	  set	  November	  11th	  1975	  deadline	  for	  independence,	  Mobutu	  was	  gripped	  perhaps	  as	  much	  by	  trepidation	  as	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  opportunity	  to	  exploit	  the	  turmoil	  to	  his	  south	  for	  his	  own	  ends.368	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  seeds	  for	  a	  broader	  Cold	  War	  escalation	  had	  been	  sown,	  of	  course,	  with	  the	  long-­‐standing	   if	   low-­‐level	   support	   for	   the	  MPLA	   and	   FNLA	   from	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  respectively	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  early	  1960s.	  Indeed,	  the	  MPLA	  appeared	   to	   receive	   some	  material	   assistance	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   even	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  366	  Butler,	  Into	  the	  Storm;	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions;	  Laidi,	  Superpowers	  in	  Africa;	  Westad,	  Global	  Cold	  War	  367	  CIA	  Staff	  Notes,	  Middle	  East,	  Africa,	  South	  Asia,	  No.	  0428/74,	  11th	  February	  1975;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  Also,	  Crawford	  Young	  and	  Thomas	  Turner,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Decline	  of	  the	  Zairian	  State	  (Madison,	  Wisconsin:	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  Press,	  1985)	  p.	  376	  368	  Kissinger,	  NSC	  Meeting,	  27th	  June	  1975;	  Institutional	  Files,	  NSSM	  24:	  United	  States	  Policy	  Towards	  Angola,	  Box	  36,	  NSC,	  GFL	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early	  stages	  of	  the	  conflict.369	  No	  doubt	  in	  part	  to	  counter	  this	  as	  relations	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  (PRC)	  deteriorated;	  at	  Mobutu’s	  behest	  the	  PRC	  had	  also	  been	   offering	   some	  military	   assistance	   and	   training	   to	   the	   FNLA	   in	   Congo.370	  The	  point	   is,	   while	   all	   this	   would	   have	   done	   little	   to	   assuage	  Washington’s	   Cold	  War	  preoccupations	   over	   the	   spreading	   turmoil	   in	   Angola,	   the	   above	   suggests	   that	  Mobutu’s	  priorities	   in	  Angola	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  American	  Cold	  War	  agenda.	  As	   such,	   a	   blinkered	   support	   of	   the	   Congolese	   president	   acting	   very	  much	   in	   his	  own	   narrow	   interest	   was	   fraught	   with	   dangers	   for	   American	   interests.	   Key	   to	  Mobutu’s	  ability	  to	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  spreading	  violence,	  however,	  was	  the	  continuing	  American	  military	  aid	  that	  constituted	  the	  mainstay	  of	  the	  FAZ.	  As	  such,	  the	   final	   but	   perhaps	  most	   significant	   ingredient	   in	  Mobutu’s	  Angola	   designs	  was	  tacit	  American	  support.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Mobutu	  did	  not	  wait	  for	  official	  marching	  orders	  from	   Washington	   but	   Kissinger’s	   readiness	   to	   give	   the	   green	   light	   to	   an	   active	  Congolese	   role	   in	   the	   troubles	   brewing	   in	   Angola	   must	   have	   delighted	   Congo’s	  leader.	   In	   this	  way,	   the	   Secretary	   told	   Congo’s	   Commissioner	   of	   State	   for	   Foreign	  Affairs	   Umba-­‐di-­‐Lutete	   already	   in	   August	   1974	   that,	   ‘If	   you	   (Congo)	   support	   one	  Angolan	   leader,	   and	   the	   communists	   support	   another,	   I	   have	   confidence	   you	  will	  succeed.’371	  This	  underlined	  not	  only	  Kissinger’s	  early	  willingness	  to	  rely	  on	  Mobutu	  to	   a	   considerable	   extent	   but	   also	   ensured	   that	   the	   United	   States	   was	   at	   least	  indirectly	   involved	   in	   the	   spreading	   violence	   in	   Angola	   as	   the	   FAZ	  made	   its	   first	  cross-­‐border	  raids.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Initially,	   Mobutu’s	   support	   of	   Roberto	   and	   his	   readiness	   to	   commit	   his	   own	  troops	   to	   fight	  alongside	   the	  FNLA	  appeared	  successful.	  While	   the	  exact	  events	  of	  the	   Angola	   conflict	   are	   difficult	   to	   reconstruct	   and	   considerable	   debate	   remains	  over	   the	   exact	   relative	   strength	   and	   assistance	   received	   by	   the	   respective	  movements,	   initially	  Mobutu’s	  gamble	  seemed	  to	  be	  paying	  off	  as	  the	  FNLA	  rallied	  in	  the	  early	  months	  of	  1975.	  For	  its	  part,	  the	  CIA	  clearly	  believed	  in	  the	  superiority	  of	  Roberto’s	  forces	  at	  this	  stage	  as	  memorandum	  that	  March	  confidently	  stated,	  ‘His	  (Neto)	  organisation	  (MPLA),	  however,	  is	  outmanned	  and	  outgunned	  by	  the	  National	  Front	   and	  would	   lose	   a	  military	   confrontation	   even	   if	   it	   were	   to	   receive	  massive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  369	  CIA	  Staff	  Notes,	  Middle	  East,	  Africa,	  South	  Asia,	  10th	  June	  1975;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  370	  According	  to	  the	  CIA,	  Congo	  was	  granted	  100	  million	  USD	  credit	  by	  China	  following	  Mobutu’s	  first	  visit	  and	  gifts	  of	  some	  30	  tanks,	  artillery	  pieces	  and	  small	  arms,	  as	  well	  as	  sending	  arms	  and	  instructors	  to	  the	  FNLA	  training	  camps	  in	  Congo.	  Pyongyang	  offered	  to	  sell	  light	  arms	  and	  artillery	  to	  equip	  12-­‐13,000	  men	  and	  provide	  a	  112-­‐man	  military	  advisory	  team	  for	  the	  FAZ.	  CIA,	  Staff	  Notes:	  Middle	  East,	  Africa,	  South	  Asia,	  20th	  March	  1975;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  371	  Cutler,	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation:	  ‘US-­‐Zaire	  Relations’,	  Participants:	  Commissioner	  of	  State	  for	  Foreing	  Affairs	  Umba-­‐di-­‐Lutete,	  Secretary	  Kissinger,	  Acting	  Assistant	  Secretary	  for	  Affrican	  Affairs	  Mulcahy,	  Director	  AF/C	  Cutler,	  12th	  August	  1974,	  Washington	  D.C.;	  FRUS,	  Volume	  E-­‐6	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assistance	   from	   Moscow	   or	   Lisbon,	   which	   seems	   unlikely.’372	  Indeed,	   by	   May	   a	  Portuguese	   delegation	   to	   Kinshasa	   sought	   to	   persuade	   Mobutu	   to	   desist	   from	  sending	  further	  troops	  into	  Angola.373	  Such	  optimism	  by	  the	  CIA	  would	  very	  swiftly	  prove	   to	   be	   misplaced	   and	   the	   military	   tied	   soon	   turned,	   as	   much	   due	   to	   more	  effective	   resistance	   from	   the	  MPLA	   as	   it	  was	   a	   result	   of	   the	   internal	   flaws	   of	   the	  FNLA-­‐Kinshasa	  alliance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Gleijeses	   stresses	   the	  MPLA’s	  organisational	   superiority	   in	  holding	  off	   further	  FNLA	   advances	   but	   by	   March	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   was	   also	   offsetting	   the	   military	  imbalance	  with	   its	   first	   airlifts	   of	   equipment.374	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   FNLA	  was	  weakened	  by	  Roberto’s	   refusal	   to	   leave	   the	   safety	  of	  Congo	  and	  head	   to	   the	   front	  while	   the	   organisational	   and	   operational	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   FAZ	   as	   an	   effective	  fighting	   force	  have	  been	  amply	  documented.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   increasingly	  under	  pressure	  from	  Congo’s	  own	  economic	  crisis,	  Mobutu’s	  Angola	  adventure	  was	  simply	  proving	  too	  expensive	  for	  the	  cash-­‐strapped	  leader	  and	  by	  June	  his	  aid	  was	  drying	  up.	  The	  CIA	  took	  note,	  	  ‘We	  are	  unable	  to	  determine	  how	  much	  Soviet	  military	  aid	  is	  now	  reaching	  the	  Movement,	   but	   it	   seems	   to	   have	   enabled	   the	   Movement	   to	   score	   some	   gains	  during	  the	  recent	  fighting…	  Recently	  Mobutu	  has	  cut	  back	  his	  assistance	  to	  the	  Front	  because	  of	  his	  governments	  serious	  financial	  problems.’375	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  shift	  in	  military	  balance	  presented	  Mobutu	  with	  a	  serious	  problem.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  having	  aligned	  himself	   so	  closely	  with	  Roberto	  and	   the	  FNLA,	  an	  MPLA	  victory	  would	  present	  the	  unpleasant	  possibility	  of	  a	  Soviet	  backed	  hostile	  regime	  to	  his	  immediate	  South.	  More	  immediately	  still,	  by	  committing	  his	  own	  FAZ	  troops	  to	  the	  FNLA	  cause	  in	  an	  unpopular	  war	  from	  a	  Congolese	  perspective,	  Mobutu	  had	  staked	  his	  personal	  prestige	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Angola	  crisis.	  As	  has	  been	  seen	  in	  previous	  chapters,	   the	  president’s	  grip	  on	  Congo	  was	  heavily	  dependent	  on	   the	  army.	  Thus,	  when	  the	  FAZ	  faltered	  so	  did	  the	  foundations	  of	  Mobutu’s	  rule	  in	  Congo.	  In	   other	  words,	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   coup	   allegations	   levelled	   at	   ambassador	  Hinton	  was	   calculated	   and	   immaculate.	   Just	   as	   Washington	   was	   taking	   note	   that	   the	  Angolan	   situation	   was	   deteriorating,	   the	   FNLA	   was	   suffering	   setbacks	   and	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  playing	  a	  hand	  in	  equipping	  the	  MPLA;	  America’s	  closest	  and	  most	  vaunted	   ally	   in	   the	   region	   cried	   foul	   and	  was	   publically	   questioning	   his	   ties	  with	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Washington.	  No	  doubt	  the	  cynical	  nature	  of	  these	  actions	  was	  plainly	  apparent	  and	  the	  first	  of	  a	  number	  of	  explanations	  given	  by	  the	  CIA	  ran	  as	  follows,	  ‘He	  (Mobutu)	  is	   alarmed	   by	   the	   rising	   violence	   in	   Angola	   and	   may	   feel	   his	   ability	   to	   influence	  developments	   there	   is	   slipping.	   He	   has	   been	   unable	   to	   convince	   the	   US	   to	   take	   a	  more	  active	  role	  there	  by	  supporting	  Roberto’s	  Liberation	  Front.’376	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	   understanding	   Mobutu’s	   ploy	   was	   one	   thing,	   finding	   an	   adequate	  response	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  deteriorating	  Angola	  situation	  was	  quite	  another,	  however.	  As	   a	   result,	   it	   is	   worth	   taking	   a	   step	   back	   and	   considering	   the	   wider	   debate	  unfolding	   over	   the	   US	   Angola	   policy	   at	   this	   time	   in	   Washington.	   Immediate	  American	   interests	   in	   Angola	   in	   1975	  were	   deemed	   ‘important	   but	   by	   no	  means	  vital’.	   On	   the	   economic	   sphere,	   private	   investments	   consisted	   some	   four	   hundred	  million	   dollars,	   of	   which	   Gulf	   Oil	   investments	   in	   Cabinda	   constituted	   the	   lion’s	  share,	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  noted	  the	  abundance	  of	  minerals	  in	  Angola.	  Angola	  also	   held	   some	   strategic	   importance	   as	   a	   communication	   link	   between	   the	  American	  East	  coast	  and	   the	   Indian	  Ocean,	  heightened	  by	   the	   lack	  of	  US	  access	   to	  ports	  and	  airfields	  in	  other	  nearby	  countries.377	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   in	   response	   to	   Assistant	   National	   Security	   Advisor,	   Lt.	   General	   Brent	  Scowcroft’s	   probing	   questions	   the	   Interdepartmental	   Group	   on	   Africa	   prepared	   a	  memorandum	  under	   the	  provocative	   if	   slightly	   long-­‐winded	  title,	   ‘Implications	   for	  US	  Interests	  if	  we	  were	  to	  do	  nothing	  and	  the	  MPLA	  were	  to	  come	  out	  on	  top’.378	  A	  somewhat	   ambivalent	   piece,	   this	   paper	   concluded	   that,	   with	   growing	  nationalisation	  trends	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  that	  the	  eventual	  loss	  of	  the	  Cabinda	  oil	  fields	  was	  likely	  irrespective	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Angola	  crisis.	  While	  the	  loss	  of	  access	  to	  ports	  and	  airfields	  may	  also	  result	  with	  an	  MPLA	  victory,	  relations	  both	  between	   Angola	   and	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Western	   Europe	   would	   most	   likely	  continue.	   The	   main	   concern	   flagged	   in	   this	   evaluation	   was	   the	   impact	   for	   the	  stability	  of	  the	  region	  and	  the	  consequences	  for	  détente	  in	  southern	  Africa.	  None	  of	  the	  above	  appeared	  to	  constitute	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  an	  active	  American	  involvement,	  however.	   Indeed,	  of	   the	  three	  options	  considered-­‐	  ranging	  from	  complete	   inaction	  and	  a	  policy	  of	  neutrality,	  a	  diplomatic	  effort	  to	  end	  outside	  meddling	  and	  facilitate	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  to	  an	  active	  covert	  support	  of	  the	  FNLA	  and	  UNITA-­‐	  the	  above	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paper	   concluded,	   ‘the	   uncertainties	   of	   the	   situation	   in	   Angola	   make	   the	   risks	   of	  becoming	   directly	   involved	   greater	   than	   probable	   gains	   derived	   there	   from…’379	  The	  State	  Department,	  and	  Nathaniel	  Davis	  and	  Edward	  W.	  Mulcahy	  (the	  assistant	  Secretary	   of	   State	   for	  African	  Affairs)	   in	  particular,	   concurred.	  On	   June	  16th	  Davis	  and	   the	   NSC	   Interdepartmental	   Group	   for	   Africa	   concluded	   its	   84	   page	   National	  Security	  Study	  Memorandum	  (NSSM	  224)	  with	  a	  stark	  warning	  over	  the	  high	  risk	  of	  exposure	   of	   any	   covert	   operation,	   the	   likelihood	   of	   a	   resulting	   increased	   level	   of	  violence	  in	  Angola	  (with	  all	  this	  entailed	  before	  Congress	  and	  the	  American	  public),	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  its	  outcome	  and	  that,	  even	  if	  successful,	  there	  was	  no	  guarantee	  that	  Roberto	  and	  Savimbi	  would	  act	  in	  the	  United	  States’	  interest	  once	  in	  power.380	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Kissinger	  did	  not	  agree.	  Mobutu’s	  manoeuvres	  had	  clearly	  caught	  his	  attention	  and	   from	   June	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   began	   to	   advocate	   an	   increasingly	   activist	  stance.	  In	  a	  meeting	  called	  to	  discuss	  Washington’s	  response	  to	  Hinton’s	  expulsion	  a	  slightly	   hysterical	   Kissinger	   stressed,	   ‘we	   are	   in	   the	   process	   of	   installing	   a	  communist	  regime	  by	  total	  default…	  The	  concept	  of	  free	  elections	  in	  Angola	  boggles	  my	  mind…	  It	  will	  end	  up	  in	  Angola	  as	  it	  did	  in	  the	  Congo.	  Someone	  will	  get	  on	  top	  by	  force.’381	  The	   impact	   of	   events	   in	   Angola	   on	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   Kinshasa	   regime	  remained	   a	   prevalent	   theme	   for	   policy	   makers	   and	   NSSM	   224	   itself	   considered	  these	   implications	   at	   length.	   Tied	   to	   this	   was	   Kissinger’s	   seemingly	   constant	  agonising	   over	   American	   credibility	   as	   he	   reflected	   on	   how	   Congo’s	   leader	  might	  interpret	   American	   inaction,	   ‘my	   concern	   is	   Mobutu	   must	   think	   that	   a	   country	  which	  permits	  a	  country	  as	  rich	  as	  Angola	  to	  go	  communist	  has	  written	  off	  the	  area.	  He	  has	  to	  be	  drawing	  his	  conclusions	  for	  himself.’382	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mobutu	  had	  successfully	  repositioned	  himself	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  American	  policy	  deliberations	  with	  his	  accusations	  of	  American	  plotting.	  Rather	  than	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Hinton	   to	   confront	   Congo’s	   President	   as	   proposed	   by	  Mulcahy,	   or	   indeed	   any	  other	  form	  of	  reprimand,	  Kissinger	  responded	  by	  sending	  the	  leader’s	  ‘close	  friend’,	  Ambassador	  Sheldon	  Vance,	  on	  a	  diplomatic	  reconciliation	  mission	  with	  the	  express	  intention	   of	   sounding	   Mobutu	   out	   on	   what	   could	   be	   done	   in	   Angola.	   Thus	   the	  Secretary	  exclaimed,	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‘I	  want	  to	  hear	  what	  he	  wants	  us	  to	  do	  there.	  He	  must	  think	  we	  are	  out	  of	  our	  damn	  minds	  to	  have	  Cabinda	  go	  and	  to	  have	  the	  whole	  country	  go	  communist	  without	   doing	   anything...	   I	   know	   the	  AF	   (African	  Affairs)	   view.	   I	  want	   to	   hear	  Mobutu’s	   view.	   I	  want	   to	   get	   an	   unvarnished	   view	   and	   I	  want	   him	   (Vance)	   to	  convey	   to	  Mobutu	   that	  we	  are	  not	  milktoasts.	   I	  want	  Mobutu	   to	  have	  an	  adult	  conversation	  with	  us.’383	  	  Three	  days	  later	  the	  former	  ambassador	  to	  Congo	  arrived	  in	  Kinshasa	  for	  this	  adult	  conversation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Vance’s	  Kinshasa	  visit	  produced	  exactly	  the	  results	  both	  Kissinger	  and	  Mobutu	  might	  have	  hoped	  for.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  his	  third	  meeting	  with	  Congo’s	  president	  in	  as	  many	   days,	   Vance	   reported	   on	   the	   26th	   June	   that	   Mobutu’s	   protestations	   were	  ‘palpably	   diminishing	   in	   fervour’	   and	   the	   disagreement	   over	   the	   alleged	   coup-­‐plotting	  had	  faded	  into	  the	  background.384	  From	  the	  very	  outset,	  however,	  Mobutu	  proposed	  a	   solution	   to	  what	  had	  now	  become	  a	   joint	  American-­‐Congolese	  Angola	  predicament	  that	  could	  have	  been	  scripted	  by	  Kissinger	  himself.	  In	  a	  telegram	  titled	  ‘Breakfast	   with	   Mobutu’,	   Vance	   paraphrased	   the	   Congolese	   leader’s	   plan,	   ‘Under	  today’s	  circumstances	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  US	  cannot	  help	  directly;	  but	  it	  is	  known	  that	   the	  US	  has	  helped	  Zaire	  militarily	   and	   that	  Zaire	  has	  helped	  Roberto,	   so	   that	  modalities	   for	   our	   possible	   assistance	   are	   clearly	   indicated.’385	  In	   other	   words,	  Mobutu	  was	  again	  calling	  for	  US	  assistance	  to	  the	  FNLA	  and	  UNITA	  and	  presenting	  Congo	  as	  the	  most	  obvious	  and	  convenient	  conduit	  for	  any	  such	  assistance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	   is	   likely,	   of	   course,	   that	   such	   a	   ploy	  was	   already	   at	   the	   back	   of	   Kissinger’s	  mind.	   Clearly	   he	   was	   thinking	   along	   these	   lines	   by	   the	   time	   of	   his	   emergency	  meeting	  on	  the	  expulsion	  of	  Hinton	  as	  he	  mused,	  ‘Money	  is	  not	  the	  problem	  but	  the	  degree	   of	   commitment.	   I’m	   not	   sure.	   Perhaps	   we	   can	   push	   Mobutu	   out	   front.	   It	  simply	  cannot	  be	   in	  our	   interest	  to	  have	  Angola	  go	  communist.’386	  What	   is	  certain,	  however,	   is	   that	   Mobutu	   effectively	   provoked	   a	   diplomatic	   crisis	   to	   bring	   Congo	  back	   into	   contention	   at	   exactly	   the	   time	  when	  Washington	  was	   deliberating	   over	  Angola.	   More	   than	   this,	   he	   then	   presented	   himself	   as	   a	   regional	   ally	   with	   a	  readymade	  solution	   to	   the	  Angola	  crisis	   in	  exactly	   the	   terms	  that	  would	  appeal	   to	  Kissinger’s	  vision	  of	  foreign	  affairs.	  For	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Mobutu	  appeared	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  383	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provide	  both	  the	  justification	  and	  the	  means	  for	  a	  successful	  Angola	  operation	  and	  Kissinger	   presented	   his	   views	   to	   the	   National	   Security	   Council	   in	   exactly	   these	  terms	  within	  a	  day	  of	  Vance’s	  trip,	  	  ‘If	  these	  diplomatic	  efforts	  fail	  where	  do	  we	  go?	  Do	  we	  fall	  back	  on	  a	  posture	  of	  neutrality,	  or	  become	  more	  actively	  involved,	  perhaps,	  as	  President	  Mobutu	  has	  suggested	   to	   Sheldon	   Vance,	   through	   a	   third	   party…	   One	   of	   the	   most	   viable	  options	   at	   this	   juncture,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   would	   be	   to	   extend	   aid	   to	   President	  Mobutu	   as	   an	   offset	   to	   enable	   him	   to	   provide	   military	   and	   other	   support	   to	  Holden	   and	   Savimbi.	   From	   his	   conversations	   with	   Vance,	   Mobutu	   appears	  prepared	   to	   cooperate	  with	   us.	   An	   important	   side-­‐benefit	  would	   be	   improved	  US-­‐Zairian	  relations.’387	  	  Mobutu’s	   posturing	   and	   timing	   had	   been	   flawless.	   With	   this	   the	   ‘missionary’	  doubters	   of	   the	   Africa	   bureau	   had	   been	   outmanoeuvred.	   On	   July	   17th	   the	   40	  Committee	  approved	  a	  covert	  CIA	  operation	  dubbed	  IAFEATURE	  to	  assist	  the	  FNLA	  and	   UNITA	   in	   Angola.388	  Two	   days	   later	   President	   Ford	   approved	   a	   fifty	   million	  dollar	  aid	  program	  to	  Zaire.389	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  For	  Congo’s	  president	  the	  rewards	  were	  immediate.	  He	  had	  brought	  his	  Congo	  back	  into	  the	  American	  fold	  and	  a	  string	  of	  diplomatic	  visits	  from	  American	  officials	  followed.	  Ambassador	  Vance	  returned	  twice	   in	  rapid	  succession	  the	  following	  July	  and	   September	   to	   hammer	   out	   details	   of	   their	   collaboration	   and	   William	   E.	  Schaufele	  (Nathaniel	  Davis’s	  replacement	  as	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  African	  Affairs)	  and	  his	  deputy	  Edward	  W.	  Mulcahy	  each	  followed	  suit	  later	  that	  year.	  More	  tangible,	  however,	  was	  the	  American	  commitment	  for	  economic	  aid	  so	  desperately	  needed	   in	   Congo.	   Again	   the	   details	   of	   the	   proposed	   aid	   package	   presented	   a	  difference	   of	   opinion	   between	   Kissinger	   and	   the	   technocrats	   of	   the	   Africa	  Department.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  July	  1975,	  Congo	  was	  approaching	  financial	  bankruptcy.	  In	  a	  memorandum	  on	  the	  propose	  aid,	  Nathaniel	  Davis	  summarised	  the	  situation	  as	  follows,	  	  ‘The	  precipitating	  cause	  of	  Zaire’s	  present	  financial	  difficulties	  is	  a	  huge	  run-­‐up	  in	   Zaire’s	   short-­‐term	   commercial	   indebtedness	   at	   the	   end	   of	   1974,	   largely	   to	  French	   and	   Belgian	   Banks.	   We	   estimate	   that	   Zaire’s	   short-­‐term	   indebtedness	  now	  stands	  at	  about	  $	  550	  million.	  Zaire’s	  current	  foreign	  earnings,	  reduced	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  387	  NSC	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  Kissinger’,	  27th	  June	  1975;	  Presidential	  Country	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  for	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  1974-­‐1977,	  Box	  1,	  NSA,	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  Nathaniel	  Davis,	  ‘The	  Angola	  Decision’	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (Fall	  1978);	  John	  Stockwell,	  In	  Search	  of	  Enemies;	  Piero	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions	  389	  Memorandum	  from	  Connor	  for	  Lynn	  (OMB)	  and	  Kissinger,	  19th	  July	  1975;	  Staff	  Secretary	  James	  E.	  Connor,	  Box	  37,	  GFL	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the	   sharp	   decline	   in	   copper	   prices	   over	   the	   past	   year,	   are	   not	   sufficient	   to	  service	  Zaire’s	  debt	  and	  to	  pay	  for	  essential	  goods	  and	  service	  imports.’	  	  In	  order	  to	  restore	  investor	  confidence	  and	  move	  the	  country	  back	  towards	  a	  path	  of	   recovery	   an	   IMF	   stabilisation	   program	   of	   austerity	   and	   fiscal	   prudence	   was	  required	   but	   remained	   unpalatable	   to	  Mobutu.	   As	   such,	   Davis	   commented	   on	   the	  IMF	  offer	  for	  105	  million	  dollars	  in	  balance	  of	  payment	  support,	  to	  be	  disbursed	  in	  thirty-­‐five	  million	  dollar	  instalments	  tied	  to	  stringent	  commitments,	  	  ‘Mobutu	   would	   probably	   not	   accept	   the	   financial	   restrains	   the	   Fund	   would	  require	  for	  Zaire	  to	  tap	  more	  than	  a	  $	  70	  million	  drawing,	  but	  IMF	  involvement	  is	   the	  key	   to	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	   confidence	  of	   the	   international	   financial	  community.	   Mobutu	   has	   opposed	   recourse	   to	   the	   IMF	   as	   unnecessary	   and	   a	  menace	  to	  Zaire’s	  national	  dignity.’	  	  Nevertheless,	   Davis	   concluded,	   ‘We,	   the	   IMF,	   and	   his	   creditors	   believe	   greater	  restraint	   in	   budgetary	   expenditures	   and	   better	   allocation	   of	   available	   foreign	  exchange	  are	  essential	  to	  restore	  Zaire’s	  economic	  health.’390	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   case	   for	   more	   stringent	   oversight	   of	   Mobutu’s	   financial	   dealings	   was	  overwhelming	   and	   both	   the	   Office	   of	   Management	   and	   Budget	   (OMB)	   and	   the	  Treasury	   concurred.	   OMB	   Director	   Lynn	   stressed	   precisely	   this	   need	   for	   IMF	  involvement	  in	  a	  memorandum	  directly	  to	  the	  President	  on	  July	  17th,	  	  ‘Secretary	  Simon	  (Treasury)	  and	  I	  believe	  that	  failure	  to	  tie	  US	  Assistance	  to	  an	  IMF	  agreement	  will	  undermine	  the	  IMF	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  leave	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  position	  of	  having	   to	  provide	  even	  more	  aid	   in	   the	   future.	   I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	   the	   short-­‐term	   creditors	   are	   in	   a	   position	   to	   impose	   reasonable	   financial	  reforms	   because	   they	   want	   to	   get	   their	   money	   back	   on	   payments	   which	   are	  already	  in	  default.’391	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  again	  did	  not	  agree.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Kissinger	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  jeopardise	  his	  rekindled	  relationship	  with	  Mobutu	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  Congo’s	  economic	  development.	  	  Lynn’s	  final	  decision	  memorandum	  presented	   to	   President	   Ford	   thus	   included	   an	   add-­‐on	   from	   Kissinger	   detailing	  Congo’s	  economic	  and	  political	  importance	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  concluding,	  ‘We	  realise	  that	   from	  a	  purely	  economic	  standpoint	   it	  makes	  sense	  to	   insist	  on	  an	  IMF	  stabilization	  program.	  However,	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  stakes	  in	  Zaire	  are	  so	  important	  that	  we	  must	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  offer	  Zaire	  assistance	  even	  if	  Mobutu	  continues	  to	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  Lynn,	  Memorandum	  for	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resist	   the	   IMF.’392	  Once	   again	   Kissinger	   dominated	   policy	   and	   on	   19th	   July	   Ford	  approved	   the	   fifty	  million	   dollar	   aid	   program	   (including	   a	   fourteen	  million	   dollar	  budget	  increase)	  to	  Congo	  without	  conditions.	  While	  Vance	  was	  to	  urge	  adoption	  of	  the	   IMF	   reform	   package,	   no	   such	   prodding	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   reports	   of	   his	  meetings	  with	  Mobutu	  the	  following	  week.393	  Remarkably,	  within	  little	  more	  than	  a	  month	   Mobutu	   had	   effectively	   engineered	   a	   diplomatic	   confrontation	   and	  harnessed	   the	   deteriorating	   situation	   in	   Angola	   to	   ensure	   his	   resurrection	   as	   the	  centrepiece	  of	  American	  policy	   towards	   the	   region.	  The	  obvious	  benefits	   from	  his	  perspective	  were	  not	  only	  the	  continuation	  of	  his	  military	  foray	  into	  Angola	  but	  the	  unconditional	  American	  economic	  support	  that	  came	  part	  and	  parcel	  with	  this	  and	  permitted	  Congo’s	  economically	  defunct	  government	   to	  continue	   to	  grind	  along,	   if	  only	  on	  an	  uncertain	  interim	  basis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  Mobutu’s	  success	  lay	  Kissinger’s	  consistent	  eagerness	  to	  see	  the	  fostered	  Mobutu	  regime	  as	  an	  effective	  regional	  ally.	  No	  doubt	  the	  Secretary	  viewed	  events	  in	  Angola	  and	  Congo	  very	  much	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  traditional	  Cold	  War	  rivalry	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  imagining	  Mobutu	  shared	  these	  exact	  concerns,	  rather	  than	  any	  more	  mundane	  but	  perhaps	   immediately	  pressing	  needs	  of	  his	  own,	  Kissinger	  neglected	  to	  appreciate	  the	  very	  specific	  circumstances	  under	  which	   his	   ally	   was	   operating.	   Unfortunately,	   the	   dissenting	   views	   of	   those	  members	   of	   the	   administration	   that	   perhaps	   had	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   these	  details	  were	  bulldozed	  or	   ignored	   in	   the	  Secretary	  of	  State’s	  complete	  domination	  over	   the	   formulation	  of	   the	  American	  Congo/Angola	  policy.	   It	   remains	   to	  be	   seen	  how	  effective	  this	  policy	  would	  prove	  in	  the	  following	  months.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   pitfalls	   for	   Congo	   of	   this	   unfettered	   support	   for	  Mobutu	  were	   clear	   even	  before	   the	   merits	   of	   Kissinger’s	   Angola	   venture	   could	   be	   gauged.	   Thus,	   in	  September,	   just	   as	   the	  CIA’s	   IAFEATURE	  was	   gaining	  momentum,	  Lannon	  Walker	  warned	   of	   the	   hazards	   in	   supporting	   a	   fragile	   but	   increasingly	   assertive	   and	  uncontrollable	  Mobutu,	  	  ‘I	  am	  concerned	  that	  under	  present	  circumstances	  Mobutu	  believes	  we	  can	  and	  will	  support	  him	  all	  the	  way.	  And	  I	  don’t	  believe	  we	  can.	  If	  it	  turns	  out	  we	  can’t	  I	  predict	   that	   he	   will	   have	   fatally	   overcommitted	   himself;	   he	   has	   wrecked	   his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  392	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  President:	  ‘Mr.	  Lynn’s	  Memo	  to	  the	  President	  Concerning	  a	  Foreign	  Aid	  Budget	  Amendment	  for	  Zaire-­‐	  Add	  On’,	  17th	  July	  1975;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐1977,	  Box	  1,	  NSA,	  GFL	  393	  Memorandum	  for	  George	  S.	  Springsteen:	  ‘Foreign	  Aid	  Budget	  Amendment	  for	  Zaire’,	  19th	  July	  1975;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐1977,	  Box	  1,	  NSA,	  GFL	  Three	  telegrams	  on	  22nd	  July	  1975	  from	  Vance,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐1977,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	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economy,	  alienated	   literally	  every	  power	  centre	   in	  Zaire	  and	  survived	   thus	   far	  by	  sheer	  political	  genius	  and	  force	  of	  will.’394	  	  Walker	   correctly	   assessed	   the	   dangers	   inherent	   in	  Mobutu’s	   assumption	   that	   his	  regime	  could	  once	  more	  rely	  on	  a	  steadfast	  and	  uncritical	  American	  backing,	   ‘The	  lesson	   is	   that	  Mobutu	   knows	  we	   have	   done	   very	  well	   by	   him,	   he	   also	   believes-­‐	   I	  repeat	  believes-­‐	  that	  he	  can	  and	  will	  do	  much	  more.	  All	  he	  has	  to	  do	  is	  pull	  the	  right	  strings.’ 395 	  As	   such,	   the	   Deputy	   Chief	   of	   Mission	   concluded	   with	   the	  recommendation,	  	  ‘Therefore,	   unless	   we	   are	   certain	   we	   can	   provide	   the	   increased	   financial	   and	  military	  resources	  which	  will	   inevitably	  be	  required	  by	  the	  current	  trends-­‐	  we	  had	  better	  tell	  Mobutu	  to	  slow	  down	  in	  Angola	  and	  Cabinda	  and	  turn	  to	  work	  on	  his	   economic	   problems.	   I	   do	   not	   meant	   that	   we	   should	   cease	   our	   support	   to	  Mobutu,	   the	   FNLA	   and	   UNITA,	   but	   rather	   that	   the	   limit	   of	   such	   support	   be	  clearly	  defined.’396	  	  Washington’s	   reaction	   to	   this	   sage	   advice	   was	   Sheldon	   Vance’s	   third	   visit	   to	  Kinshasa	   the	   following	   week,	   which	   produced	   a	   long	   shopping	   list	   for	   military	  supplies-­‐	   including	  a	   further	  C-­‐130	  transport	  plane,	  helicopters	  and	   jeeps-­‐	  and	  US	  approval	   for	   increased	  Foreign	  Military	  Sales	  (FMS)	  credits	   to	  Congo	  to	  assist	   this	  process.	   Any	   cautioning	   of	   Mobutu’s	   revived	   enthusiastic	   military	   expansionism	  was	   noticeably	   absent	   from	   the	   discussions.397	  In	   other	  words,	   Kissinger’s	   Angola	  program	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Mobutu’s	  resistance	  to	  domestic	  reform	  in	  this	  period.	  Moreover,	  any	  suggestions	  to	  use	  the	  leverage	  inherent	  in	  this	  partnership	  to	  reign	  in	   his	   excesses,	   or	   at	   least	   prevent	   future	   follies,	   were	   simply	   ignored	   by	  Washington.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  doubt	  of	  much	  greater	  concern	  to	  the	  Ford	  administration,	  however,	  was	  the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  US-­‐Congolese	  partnership	   in	  steering	   the	  Angolan	  civil	  was	  as	  operation	  IAFEATURE	  began	  in	  earnest	  from	  July.	  The	  exact	  events	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  Angola	  war	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  1975	  remain	  at	  least	  partially	  shrouded	  in	  mystery	  due	  to	  conflicting	  accounts.	  With	  their	  respective	  use	  of	  Cuban	  and	  Soviet	  sources,	   Gleijeses	   and	   Westad	   differ	   in	   their	   assessment	   of	   the	   MPLA’s	   military	  fortunes	  that	  autumn,	  the	  former	  offering	  a	  much	  more	  optimistic	  appraisal.	  What	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  394	  Walker,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Zaire	  Economic	  Situation/Angola	  War’,	  10th	  September	  1975;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐1977,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	  395	  Walker,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Mobutu’s	  Expectations’,	  12th	  September	  1975;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐1977,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	  396	  Walker,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Zaire	  Economic	  Situation/Angola	  War’,	  10th	  September	  1975;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐1977,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	  397	  Vance,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Third	  Vance	  Mission:	  First	  Meeting	  with	  Mobutu’,	  September	  19th’	  19th	  September	  1975;	  NSA,	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  7,	  GFL	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appears	  clear	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  increasing	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  conflict.	  Alongside	  the	  American	  efforts,	  several	  score	  of	  former	  officers	  and	  mercenaries	  from	  Portugal	  stiffened	  the	  FNLA	  while	  the	  South	  African	  government	  assisted	   Savimbi’s	  UNITA	   in	   the	   south	   from	   July	   and	   eventually	   launched	   its	   own	  direct	  military	  intervention	  from	  Namibia	  on	  October	  14th.398	  At	   least	  by	  this	  stage	  then	   the	   FNLA/UNITA	   drive	   for	   Luanda	   was	   gaining	   momentum	   and	   US	   policy	  appeared	  to	  be	  paying	  dividend.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  With	   the	   MPLA	   thus	   sandwiched	   around	   Luanda	   between	   the	   advancing	  CIA/FAZ	   supported	   FNLA	   in	   the	   North	   and	   the	   South	   African	   ‘Zulu’	   Column	   and	  UNITA	   in	   the	   South,	   however,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   Cuba	   also	   escalated	   their	  commitments.	   No	   doubt	   this	   was	   at	   least	   in	   part	   due	   to	   the	   growing	   clamour	  amongst	  African	  Heads	  of	  State	  against	  South	  Africa’s	  intervention.	  Again	  accounts	  vary	  on	  their	  emphasis	  of	  Soviet	  logistical	  support	  depending	  on	  the	  sources	  used,	  but	  that	  autumn	  Cuba	  was	  engaged	  in	  a	  massive	  military	  escalation	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  stave	  off	  an	  MPLA	  collapse	  ahead	  of	  the	  November	  11th	  deadline.399	  Having	  already	  provided	   military	   instructors	   from	   Congo	   Brazzaville,	   Cuba	   had	   increased	   its	  military	  assistance	  from	  July	  1975	  and	  by	  November	  Cuban	  soldiers	  began	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  fighting	  with	  an	  estimated	  twelve	  thousand	  troops	  ferried	  from	  Cuba	  to	  Africa	   between	   November	   1975	   and	   January	   1976.400	  Neither	   the	   CIA	   nor	   its	  Congolese	  or	  South	  African	  allies	  were	  able	  to	  match	  this	  escalation,	  thus	  fulfilling	  the	  predictions	  of	  Nathaniel	  Davis	  and	  the	  doubters	  of	  the	  Africa	  Bureau,	  albeit	  with	  a	  Cuban	  twist.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   FNLA	   was	   routed	   at	   the	   battle	   of	   Quifangondo	   north	   of	   Luanda	   on	  November	  11th	  and	  the	  Cuban	  forces	  could	  turn	  their	  attention	  on	  South	  Africa	  and	  UNITA	  to	  the	  South.	  Two	  decisive	  battles	  south	  of	  the	  Cuanza	  River	  that	  December	  essentially	  sealed	  Cuban/MPLA	  victory	  with	  Pretoria	  withdrawing	  its	  troops.	  China	  abandoned	   its	   military	   assistance	   of	   the	   FNLA	   that	   December	   in	   response	   to	   its	  increasingly	   public	   de	   facto	   collaboration	   with	   South	   Africa.	   A	   belated	   effort	   to	  forestall	   defeat	   by	   the	   familiar	   recourse	   to	   the	   use	   of	   mercenaries	   was	   also	  attempted	   by	   Mobutu	   without	   any	   tangible	   results.401	  Thus	   Neto’s	   victory	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  398	  Gleijeses	  muses	  over	  the	  likely	  cooperation	  between	  the	  CIA	  and	  South	  Africa’s	  BOSS	  intelligence	  services	  due	  to	  the	  striking	  congruence	  in	  timing	  of	  their	  respective	  covert	  operations.	  Conflicting	  Missions	  p.	  297	  399	  Westad	  describes	  this	  debate	  based	  on	  varying	  use	  of	  Soviet,	  Cuban,	  Western	  and	  South	  African	  sources.	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War	  (Cambridge	  Uni	  Press,	  2005)	  p.	  235	  400	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions	  p.	  259;	  Westad,	  Global	  Cold	  War	  p.	  236	  401	  According	  to	  information	  given	  by	  unnamed	  African	  specialists	  in	  the	  Belgian	  Ministry	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  to	  the	  US	  embassy	  in	  Brussels,	  Mobutu	  had	  hired	  some	  100	  British	  mercenaries	  who	  were	  transiting	  through	  Brussels	  for	  Kinshasa.	  While	  Mobutu	  was	  clearly	  funded	  by	  the	  US,	  this	  was	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complete	  by	  spring	  of	  the	  following	  year	  with	  Roberto	  returning	  to	  Zairian	  exile	  in	  February	  and	  Savimbi	  withdrawing	  to	  the	  bush	  territories	  of	  south	  eastern	  Angola	  with	   some	   two	   thousand	   guerrillas.	   A	   post	   facto	   American	   diplomatic	   effort	   to	  forestall	  recognition	  of	   the	  MPLA’s	  Peoples	  Republic	  of	  Angola	   through	  Mobutu	  at	  the	  Organisation	  of	  African	  Unity	  came	  to	  nothing	  with	  a	  majority	  of	   its	  members,	  and	   even	   France,	   granting	   official	   recognition	   to	   Neto’s	   government	   by	   February	  1976.	  402	  	   This	   then	   was	   the	   ignoble	   conclusion	   of	   what	   had	   been	   an	   all	   too	  predictable	  defeat	  of	  Kissinger’s	  Angola	  policy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   1975,	   then,	   Mobutu	   had	   engineered	   a	   diplomatic	   crisis	   with	   exceptional	  timing	  to	  ensure	  his	  position	  as	  the	  centrepiece	  of	  American	  regional	  designs.	  The	  rumblings	   from	  Kinshasa	  that	   followed	  no	  doubt	  echoed	  Kissinger’s	   long-­‐standing	  desire	  for	  a	  regional	  ally	  to	  shoulder	  much	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  any	  emerging	  American	  strategy.	   Mobutu’s	   manoeuvrings	   thus	   pushed	   on	   open	   doors	   in	   Washington.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   Congolese	   leader	   clearly	   influenced	   the	   aggressively	  interventionist	   direction	   taken	   with	   his	   own	   military	   forays	   into	   Angola	   and	   by	  presenting	  his	  Congo	  as	  the	  natural	  bulwark	  to	  control	  events	  on	  the	  ground	  when	  partnered	   with	   covert	   American	   aid.	   For	   all	   his	   posturing	   and	   chest	   beating,	  however,	  the	  Kinshasa	  ally	  was	  of	  little	  use	  in	  advancing	  US	  goals	  in	  Angola.	  Just	  as	  various	   dissenters	   in	   the	   Africa	   Bureau	   and	   the	   American	   Kinshasa	   embassy	   had	  warned,	   the	   predictable	   outcome	   of	   a	   strategy	   reliant	   on	   successful	   cooperation	  with	  Mobutu	  was	  an	  overwhelming	  defeat.	  The	  United	  States	  could	  not	  match	   the	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  commitments	  and,	  of	  the	  various	  Angolan	  independence	  movements,	  the	  MPLA	  proved	  the	  most	  reliable	  force	  on	  the	  ground.	  Furthermore,	  the	  bankrupt	  Congo	  with	   its	   rabble	   of	   undisciplined	   forces	  would	   prove	   a	  weak	   and	   unreliable	  partner.	   Thus,	   the	  Angola	   strategy	   conceived	   in	   an	   all	   too	   cosy	  breakfast	  meeting	  between	  Ambassador	  Vance	   and	  Mobutu	  both	  demonstrated	   the	   limits	   of	   the	  US-­‐Congo	  alliance	  and,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  saw	  this	  relationship	  have	  a	  tangible	  adverse	  impact	   on	   immediate	   American	   interests.	   It	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   how	  Washington	  would	  react	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  its	  carefully	  nurtured	  ally	  in	  this	  first	  regional	  test.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  apparently	  done	  without	  prior	  American	  knowledge.	  It	  provoked	  no	  reaction	  from	  the	  State	  Department;	  1st	  February	  1976,	  Intelligence	  Summary:	  ‘Will	  Mercenaries	  Defend	  Zairian	  Border’,	  1st	  February	  1976;	  Intelligence	  Chronological	  Fils,	  Dave	  Van	  Atta	  Papers,	  1975-­‐78,	  Box	  11,	  GFL	  402	  Schaufele,	  Kinshasa	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  &	  Mulcahy,	  ‘Angola:	  Meeting	  with	  Mobutu’,	  27th	  December	  1975;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	  Ambassador	  Kenneth	  Rush,	  Paris	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘France	  Plans	  to	  Recognise	  MPLA’,	  16th	  February	  1976;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Europe	  and	  Canada,	  Box	  5,	  NSA,	  GFL	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The	  Hollow	  Echoes	  of	  Defeat	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Following	  the	  Angola	  debacle	  one	  might	  have	  expected	  a	  self-­‐critical	  wringing	  of	   hands	   and	   complete	   overhaul	   of	   a	   defunct	   US	   policy	   towards	   the	   region	   by	   a	  dejected	  Ford	  administration.	  Perhaps	  the	  thought	  of	  being	  outflanked	  by	  Mobutu	  was	   too	  much	   to	  bear	  or	   the	  contemplation	  of	   such	  a	  personal	   failure	  was	  simply	  incompatible	  with	  his	  own	  sense	  of	  infallibility,	  but	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  proposed	  a	  very	  different	  line.	  From	  the	  Congressional	  hearings	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath,	  in	   his	   memoirs	   and	   into	   the	   present;	   Kissinger	   has	   consistently	   argued	   that	   the	  United	   States	   was	   necessarily	   reacting	   to	   counter	   a	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   escalation	   in	  Angola	   and	   that	   its	   covert	   operation	   was	   proving	   effective	   until	   a	   lily-­‐livered	  Congress	   withdrew	   funding	   and	   put	   a	   premature	   end	   to	   an	   initially	   successful	  operation	   with	   the	   Tunney	   Amendment.403	  On	   both	   counts	   this	   is	   a	   rewriting	   of	  history	   that	   distorts	   the	   facts.	   Aside	   from	   a	   complete	   abdication	   of	   personal	  responsibility,	   this	   smokescreen	   of	   disinformation	   also	   entailed	   problematic	   and	  immediate	   side	   effects	   for	   American	   policy	   towards	   Congo.	   If	   failure	   lay	   with	  Congress,	   and	  not	   in	   a	   the	   very	   essence	  of	   a	   flawed	   strategy	   conceived	  under	   the	  influence	  and	  executed	  in	  partnership	  with	  a	  problematic	  ally,	  then	  a	  fundamental	  reassessment	  of	   the	  US-­‐Congo	   relationship	  was	  unnecessary.	  This	  was	   clearly	   the	  Kissinger	  line.	  The	  following	  pages	  will	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  reasoning	  on	  the	  US-­‐Congo	  policy	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Angola.	  Ultimately,	  despite	  the	  overwhelming	  defeat	  in	   Angola	   that	   clearly	   underscored	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   its	   Congo	   alliance,	   the	  United	  States	  would	  remain	  steadfast	   in	  its	  uncritical	  endorsement	  and	  support	  of	  Mobutu.	   At	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   lay	   the	   remarkably	   familiar	   reasoning	   consistently	  upheld	   by	   successive	   Washington	   administrations	   that	   a	   collapse	   of	   the	   Mobutu	  regime	   would	   constitute	   an	   untenable	   blow	   to	   American	   credibility	   in	   the	   third	  world.	  	  	  	  	  	  With	  regards	  to	  the	  first	  claim	  over	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  crisis,	  both	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  had	  been	  involved	  with	  the	  respective	  Angolan	  independence	  movements	   from	   the	   early	   sixties.	   Both	   gradually	   escalated	   their	   commitments	  throughout	  1974-­‐75,	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  through	  increased	  military	  assistance	  while	  America	  offered	  some	  funding	  through	  the	  CIA	  and,	  of	  course,	  indirectly	  supported	  Mobutu’s	  forays.	  Furthermore,	  the	  previous	  section	  has	  shown	  that	  Kissinger,	  while	  certainly	  concerned	  over	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  Angola,	  was	  reacting	  more	  to	   the	   ineffectiveness	   of	   the	   Mobutu	   sponsored	   FNLA-­‐FAZ	   operations	   in	   Angola	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  403	  Formalized	  in	  the	  Clark	  amendment	  the	  following	  June;	  Kissinger,	  Years	  of	  Renewal	  p.	  832	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than	   any	   concrete	   Soviet	   escalation	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1975.	   Indeed,	   large	   scale	  Cuban	   troop	   involvement	   only	   followed	   the	   combined	   CIA	   and	   BOSS	   covert	  operations	   launched	   from	   July	   1975.	   As	   such	   and	   until	   further	   documents	   to	   the	  contrary	   are	   declassified,	   perhaps	   the	   fairest	   conclusion	   over	   the	   origins	   of	  superpower	   involvement	   is	   offered	   by	   another	   administration	   insider.	   Nathaniel	  Davis,	  who	  resigned	  over	  the	  direction	  Kissinger	  was	  taking	  in	  Angola	  in	  September	  1975,	  stated	   in	  a	  1978	  Foreign	  Affairs	  article,	   ‘So	  the	  answer	  seems	  to	  be	  that	   the	  escalations	   mutually	   produced	   counter-­‐escalations…	   None	   of	   the	   major	   actors	  entered	  the	  drama	  of	  1975	  unencumbered	  by	  the	  baggage	  of	  the	  past.	  Nobody	  can	  make	  a	  very	  good	  claim	   to	  have	  been	  uninvolved	  until	  provoked.’404	  Furthermore,	  Kissinger	  was	  clearly	  aware	  of	  the	  mutual	  nature	  of	  the	  superpower	  escalation	  and	  the	  belated	  arrival	  of	  active	   fighting	   forces	   from	  Cuba	  and	  his	  belated	   justification	  for	  the	  failed	  American	  operations	  in	  Angola	  constituted	  a	  deliberate	  retelling	  of	  the	  facts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Similarly,	  the	  historical	  record	  does	  not	  support	  the	  Secretary’s	  explanation	  for	  the	  ultimate	  failure	  of	  IAFEATURE	  and	  American	  efforts	  to	  control	  events	  in	  Angola.	  To	   suggest	   that	   Congress	  withdrawing	   the	   necessary	   funding	   foiled	   an	   otherwise	  successful	  policy	  ignores	  the	  reality	  that	  the	  respective	  FNLA/FAZ	  and	  SADF-­‐UNITA	  drives	   for	   Luanda	   had	   been	  militarily	   defeated	   by	   the	   Cuban-­‐MPLA	   alliance	   even	  before	   the	   Tunney	   Amendment	   of	   December	   20th	   could	   have	   any	   effect	   on	   the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Angolan	  crisis.	  Furthermore,	  Kissinger’s	  interpretation	  conveniently	  forgets	   the	   repeated	   warnings	   he	   received	   from	   within	   his	   own	   ranks	   over	   the	  dangers	  of	  a	  covert	   foray	   into	  Angola,	  which	  would	  ultimately	  be	  unable	   to	  match	  the	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   commitment,	   and	   the	   pitfalls	   of	   a	   tactical	   alliance	  with	  Mobutu.	  Nathaniel	   Davis’	   adamant	   opposition	   has	   been	   considered	   and	   the	   Kinshasa	  embassy	  had	  also	  made	  its	  concerns	  over	  a	  covert	  operation	  that	  relied	  in	  large	  part	  on	  a	  cooperative	  Mobutu	  abundantly	  clear	  and	  as	  late	  as	  October	  1975	  was	  urging	  the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   to	   reconsider	   his	   approach.405	  When	   these	   very	   accurate	  predictions	   were	   ultimately	   borne	   out	   by	   events,	   Kissinger’s	   effort	   to	   shift	   the	  responsibility	   for	   failure	   to	   the	   Congressional	   withdrawal	   of	   funds	   appears	  particularly	   cynical.	   Time	   and	   again	   the	   Secretary	   had	   ignored	   the	  recommendations	   of	   his	   Africa	   Department	   and	   those	   with	   no	   doubt	   greater	  regional	  experience	  and	  expertise	  to	  force	  his	  own	  foreign	  policy	  vision.	  More	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  404	  Nathaniel	  Davis,	  ‘The	  Angola	  Decision	  of	  1975:	  A	  Personal	  Memoir’,	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (Fall	  1978)	  p.	  123	  405	  Walker,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Zaire	  Economic	  Situation/Angolan	  War’,	  10th	  September	  1975;	  ‘Mobutu’s	  Expectations’,	  12th	  September	  1975;	  ‘Policy	  Demarche	  to	  Mobutu’,	  13th	  September;	  ‘The	  US,	  Zaire	  and	  Angola’,	  11th	  October	  1975;	  all	  in	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	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this,	   however,	   it	   was	   the	   Secretary’s	   obstinate	   refusal	   to	   reassess	   the	   American	  relationship	  with	  Congo	   that	  ensured	   the	  United	  States	  would	  once	  more	   jump	   to	  Mobutu’s	  rescue	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  his	  defeat	  in	  Angola.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  Kissinger	  line	   distort	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   his	   Angola	   strategy,	   then,	   but	   it	   also	   had	   a	  profoundly	   negative	   impact	   on	   future	   policies	   towards	   the	   region	   and	   Congo	   in	  particular.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Before	   examining	   the	   exact	   nature	   of	   Washington’s	   developing	   relationship	  with	  Congo	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Angola,	  however,	  a	  brief	  résumé	  of	  America’s	  chief	  ally’s	   performance	   in	   this	   first	   regional	   test	   should	   be	   considered.	   Washington	  presumably	   hoped	   for	   a	   useful	   local	   proxy	   to	   supply	  more	   detailed	   and	   accurate	  intelligence	   on	   the	   developing	   situation	   on	   the	   ground,	   diplomatic	   support	   in	   the	  various	  regional	  forums	  and,	  when	  necessary,	  an	  effective	  and	  coordinated	  military	  role	  in	  the	  conflict	  itself.	  On	  all	  these	  counts	  Mobutu	  fell	  far	  short	  of	  playing	  a	  useful	  and	   productive	   role	   in	   American	   designs.	   John	   Stockwell’s	   account	   laments	   the	  CIA’s	   limited	   access	   to	   intelligence	   both	   on	   the	   exact	   nature	   of	   the	   Angolan	  independence	   movements	   and	   the	   actual	   unfolding	   situation	   on	   the	   ground	  throughout	   Angola.406	  Unfortunately,	   despite	   Mobutu’s	   longstanding	   relationship	  with	   Roberto	   and	   the	   FNLA,	  Washington’s	   Kinshasa	   contacts	  were	   of	   little	   use	   in	  alleviating	   this	   information	   deficit.	   Despite	   facilitating	   various	   meetings	   between	  Washington	   officials	   and	   Roberto,	   and	   later	   Savimbi,	   ultimately	   Mobutu	   only	  reinforced	   the	   inflated	   picture	   of	   the	  movements’	   relative	  military	   strength	   in	   all	  too	   transparent	  efforts	   to	  garner	  support	   from	  the	  United	  States.	  Beyond	   this,	   the	  record	  shows	  little	  useful	  intelligence	  passing	  from	  Kinshasa	  to	  Washington.	  Much	  rather,	  Mobutu	   remained	   consistent	   in	   stressing	   the	   general	   Soviet/Cuban	   threat	  behind	  any	  event	  in	  Angola	  rather	  than	  offering	  accurate	  details	  of	  the	  conflict,	  no	  doubt	  hoping	  to	  capitalise	  on	  Washington’s	  renewed	  interest	  in	  the	  area	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  broader	  Cold	  War	  struggle.407	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  With	   regards	   to	   Congo’s	   military	   capabilities,	   despite	   years	   of	   American	  assistance,	  the	  poor	  showing	  of	  the	  FAZ	  has	  been	  mentioned.408	  Even	  Mobutu’s	  elite	  commando	   units	   proved	   capable	   of	   little	  more	   than	   terrorising	   the	   population	   of	  northern	   Angola	   but	   crumpled	   as	   soon	   as	   they	   met	   any	   properly	   armed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  406	  Stockwell,	  In	  Search	  of	  Enemies	  pp.	  90-­‐127	  	  407	  Various	  meetings	  between	  Vance	  and	  Mobutu,	  July	  1975;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	  408	  Ambassador	  Walter	  L.	  Cutler,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Angola	  and	  Zairian	  Security’,	  19th	  June	  1976;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	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resistance. 409 	  The	   clearest	   example,	   however,	   that	   Kinshasa	   was	   very	   much	  pursuing	  its	  own	  agenda	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Congo’s	  role	  as	  a	  distributor	  for	  American	  military	   supplies	   to	   the	   Angolan	   independence	   movements.	   By	   late	   1975	   it	   was	  becoming	   increasingly	   evident	   that	   Mobutu	   was	   retaining	   arms	   for	   his	   own	  purposes	  rather	  than	  passing	  them	  to	  their	  intended	  target.	  Holden	  Roberto	  himself	  lamented	   this	   problem	   in	   a	   meeting	   with	   Deputy	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	  Mulcahy	   and	   an	   intelligence	   memorandum	   for	   Brent	   Scowcroft	   noted	   in	   January	  1976	   that,	   ‘Zaire	   is	   becoming	   a	   highly	   questionable	   conduit.’410	  As	   such,	   both	   in	  terms	  of	  offering	  useful	   intelligence	  and	  in	  the	  projection	  of	  direct	  military	  power,	  America’s	   Congolese	   ally	   proved	   a	   weak	   and	   unreliable	   reed	   and	   at	   times	   even	  hindered	  immediate	  American	  objectives.	  Indeed,	  this	  was	  a	  further	  illustration	  that	  Mobutu’s	  personal	  aims	  were	  by	  no	  means	  congruent	  with	  the	  American	  Cold	  War	  agenda.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	   the	   diplomatic	   stage,	   the	   picture	   is	   a	   little	   more	   blurred.	   As	   the	   effort	   to	  defeat	   the	   MPLA	   and	   its	   backers	   floundered	   militarily,	   by	   the	   end	   of	   1975	  Washington	   somewhat	   belatedly	   hoped	   to	   isolate	   the	   independence	   movement	  politically	   through	   its	   allies	   at	   the	   OAU	   with	   calls	   for	   a	   cessation	   of	   outside	  intervention.	  Thus	  Schaufele	  and	  Mulcahy’s	  diplomatic	  missions	  to	  Kinshasa	  sought	  to	   harness	   Mobutu	   into	   organising	   a	   coalition	   of	   ‘moderate’	   African	   states	   to	  forestall	  recognition	  of	  the	  MPLA	  government	  in	  Luanda.	  For	  a	  leader	  keen	  to	  stress	  his	   credentials	   as	   a	   pivotal	   African	   statesman	   such	   calls	   were	   no	   doubt	  enthusiastically	   received	   and	  Mobutu	   certainly	  made	   the	   right	   noises	   both	   at	   the	  OAU	   and	   the	   UN.	   Considerable	   chest	   beating	   from	   Kinshasa	   over	   the	   president’s	  skilful	  diplomacy	  in	  organising	  a	  loose	  coalition	  against	  the	  MPLA	  ahead	  of	  the	  OAU	  summit	   amounted	   to	   very	   little	   and	   Mobutu	   quietly	   dropped	   this	   initiative,	   no	  doubt	   wary	   of	   championing	   a	   futile	   cause.	   By	   late	   December	   Secretary	   Shaufele	  reported,	   ‘I	   am	   convinced	   that,	   while	   we	   can	   continue	   to	   count	   on	   Zaire	   in	   the	  military	   sphere,	   we	   cannot	   look	   to	   Mobutu	   to	   provide	   the	   major	   impetus	   for	  effectively	  organizing	  political	  and	  diplomatic	  efforts	  among	  friendly	  African	  states	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  409	  The	  British	  Embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  commented	  that	  even	  the	  much-­‐vaunted	  North	  Korean	  trained	  ‘Kamanyola	  Division’	  had	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  ‘an	  untrained	  rabble’.	  Ambassador	  R.J.	  Stratton,	  Kinshasa,	  ‘Zaire	  Annual	  Review	  for	  1975’,	  2nd	  January	  1975;	  FCO	  31/2014:	  Annual	  Review	  for	  Zaire	  for	  1975,	  Kew	  410	  Walker,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Mulcahy	  Meeting	  with	  Holden	  Roberto’,	  28th	  November	  1975;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL;	  NSC	  Staffer	  Clinton	  E.	  Granger,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  Brent	  Scowcroft:	  Overt	  Funding	  for	  Angola’,	  16th	  January	  1976;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  1,	  NSA,	  GFL	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prior	  to	  or	  during	  the	  OAU	  meetings.’411	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  failure	  of	  this	  initiative	  was	  due	  more	  to	   its	  belated	  nature	  no	  longer	  reflecting	  the	  political	  realities	   in	  Angola	  than	  any	  visible	  diplomatic	  shortcomings	  on	  Mobutu’s	  part.	  Moreover,	  despite	   the	  initiative’s	   failure,	   Kissinger	   certainly	   placed	   some	   value	   on	   a	   vociferous	   regional	  ally	   touting	   the	  Washington	   line	   and	   boosting	   American	   third	   world	   credentials,	  albeit	  in	  a	  flawed	  and	  limited	  way.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Ultimately,	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   failure	   of	   Kissinger’s	   Angola	   policies	   were	  manifold;	   not	   least	   the	   lack	   of	   appetite	   for	  military	   escalation	   from	   the	  American	  public,	  the	  increasingly	  active	  Cuban	  and	  Soviet	  role	  in	  the	  conflict	  and	  the	  relative	  superiority	   of	   the	   MPLA	   leadership	   to	   its	   competitors	   all	   contributed	   to	   this	  eventual	   outcome.	   The	   point	   is	   that	   these	   dangers	   were	   clearly	   apparent	   even	  before	   Washington	   escalated	   its	   stakes	   in	   Angola	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1975	   but	  Kissinger	  had	  hoped	  to	  offset	  these	  disadvantages	  by	  relying	  on	  his	  Congolese	  ally.	  Just	  as	  the	  Africa	  bureau	  in	  Washington	  and	  the	  embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  had	  warned,	  this	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  gross	  miscalculation	  and	  overestimation	  of	  Mobutu’s	  usefulness.	  Nor	  could	  Washington	  hope	  for	  much	  more	  from	  its	  bankrupt	  African	  protégé	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   Cuban-­‐Soviet	   assisted	   success	   of	   the	   MPLA	   cast	   independence	  movements	   throughout	   Africa	   in	   a	   new	   light	   as	   White	   House	   options	   paper	   on	  southern	   Africa	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   Angola	   noted,	   ‘The	   massive	   introduction	   of	  Soviet	   equipment	   and	  Cuban	   combat	   forces	   into	  Angola	   has	   altered	   the	   nature	   of	  the	   region’s	   struggles	   for	   national	   liberation.’ 412 	  Thus,	   Washington	   viewed	  subsequent	   developments	   in	   Zimbabwe	   (then	   Southern	   Rhodesia),	   Namibia	   and	  apartheid	   South	   Africa	   with	   considerable	   trepidation.	   That	   Mobutu	   would	   have	  little	  influence	  in	  these	  developments	  was	  clear	  from	  the	  outset,	  however.	  Teetering	  as	  it	  was	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  bankruptcy,	  Congo’s	  own	  domestic	  woes	  precluded	  it	  from	  playing	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  Washington	  sought	  to	  steer	  Zimbabwe	  towards	   a	   negotiated	   political	   settlement,	   Secretary	   Schaufele	   noted	   that	   Congo’s	  economic	  dependence	  on	  its	  neighbour	  was	  such	  that,	   ‘We	  can	  expect	  support	  but	  not	  much	   of	   a	   contribution	   from	  Mobutu.’413	  Similarly,	   Congo’s	   president’s	   all	   too	  cosy	   relationship	   with	   the	   apartheid	   South	   African	   government	   since	   the	   very	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  411	  Schaufele,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Angola:	  Meeting	  with	  Mobutu’,	  27th	  December	  1975;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	  412	  Springsteen,	  Memorandum	  for	  Scowcroft,	  11th	  March	  1976;	  Institutional	  Files-­‐	  NSSM	  241:	  United	  States	  Policy	  in	  Southern	  Africa,	  Box	  44,	  NSC,	  GFL	  413	  Katangan	  copper	  production	  was	  dependent	  on	  Zimbabwean	  coal	  and	  corn	  imports	  were	  increasingly	  supplementing	  the	  Congolese	  food	  supply.	  Schaufele,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Conversation	  with	  Mobutu’,	  13th	  July	  1976;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	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beginning	  of	  his	  rule	  had	  once	  more	  come	  under	  scrutiny	  with	  his	  forces	  fighting	  as	  de	   facto	   allies	   with	   the	   SADF	   in	   Angola.	   As	   a	   result,	   he	   lacked	   both	   interest	   and	  credibility	  on	  this	  issue.	  In	  other	  words,	  beyond	  its	  miserable	  showing	  as	  an	  ally	  in	  Angola,	   the	   United	   States	   could	   not	   hope	   for	   a	   much	   more	   from	   its	   Congo	  relationship	  looking	  forward	  to	  the	  challenges	  facing	  Washington	  in	  Africa	  either.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Actively	  involved	  in	  its	  creation	  and	  having	  propped	  up	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  for	  the	  past	   decade,	   then,	   drawing	  up	   a	   balance	   sheet	   in	  1976	  demonstrates	   that	   the	  United	   States	   had	   gained	   few	   tangible	   benefits	   from	   its	   considerable	   efforts	   in	  Congo.	  More	   importantly	  still,	  no	  change	  was	   in	  sight	   in	  this	  one-­‐way	  relationship	  as	   American	   officials	   noted	   that	  Mobutu’s	   Congo	   could	   not	   be	   expected	   to	   play	   a	  useful	  role	  in	  the	  African	  challenges	  facing	  Washington	  in	  Angola’s	  aftermath.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Congo’s	  domestic	  problems	  abounded	  and	  Mobutu’s	  leadership	  stood	  on	  increasingly	  tenuous	  ground.	  Just	  as	  the	  American	  embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  had	  warned	  the	   previous	   year,	   Mobutu	   had	   used	   the	   Angolan	   conflict	   as	   a	   distraction	   from	  Congo’s	   economic	   troubles	   and	   the	   result	  was	   a	   predictably	   deepening	   economic	  crisis	   matched	   by	   ever	   increasing	   disillusionment	   with	   the	   Kinshasa	   regime	  amongst	  the	  population	  at	  large.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Thus,	   the	   after	   tremors	   of	   the	   Kissinger-­‐Mobutu	   Angola	   adventure	   were	   now	  profoundly	  impacting	  the	  Congolese	  population	  and	  even	  appeared	  to	  threaten	  the	  Kinshasa	   regime.	  A	  detailed	   analytical	   paper	  on	  Congo	  passed	   to	  Brent	   Scowcroft	  that	  August	  warned,	  ‘Zaire’s	  political	  base	  has	  contracted	  to	  include	  at	  the	  core	  only	  military	  and	  civilian	  bureaucracies;	  the	  disaffection	  of	  parts	  of	  these	  bureaucracies	  and	   the	   urban	   and	   mining	   workers	   are	   serious	   threats.’414	  Falling	   copper	   prices	  coupled	  with	  Mobutu’s	  unpopular	  and	  expensive	  Angola	  foray	  meant	  that	  by	  1976	  the	  country’s	  mismanagement	  was	  having	  a	  severe	  impact	  on	  many	  sections	  of	  the	  population.	  Beyond	  the	  economic	  woes	  of	  food	  shortages,	  high	  prices	  and	  reduced	  purchasing	   power	   of	   salaries;	   the	   analytical	   paper	   noted	   that	   the	   rotten	  administration	   was	   increasingly	   unable	   to	   offer	   even	   basic	   services	   with	   the	  severely	   diminished	   ability	   of	   hospitals	   to	   care	   for	   the	   sick	   and	   ‘the	   reduction	   of	  public	  schools	  to	  “animation	  centres”	  for	  Mobutu.’415	  As	  such,	  while	  the	  largess	  and	  exorbitant	  lifestyles	  of	  the	  narrow	  elite	  was	  galling,	  the	  growing	  spread	  of	  diseases	  such	   as	   Kwashiorkor	   (an	   acute	   form	   of	   childhood	   protein	   deficiency	   and	  malnutrition)	   illustrated	   the	   lot	   of	   the	   frustrated	   masses.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  Mobutu’s	   ability	   to	   alleviate	   dissent	   through	   his	   long	   trusted	  means	   of	   patronage	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  414	  Arthur	  H.	  House,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  Brent	  Scowcroft:	  Analytical	  Paper	  on	  Zaire’,	  30th	  August	  1976;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐77,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	  415	  Ibid.	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was	  increasingly	  hamstrung	  and	  growing	  problems	  of	  poor	  morale	  and	  indiscipline	  could	   be	   noted	   in	   the	   military.	   Thus,	   despite	   Mobutu’s	   continued	   emphasis	   on	  external	  communist	  aggression,	  an	   interagency	   intelligence	  report	  concluded	  that,	  ‘Perhaps	   the	   strongest	   potential	   threat	   to	   Mobutu	   emanates	   from	   within	   Zaire	  rather	  than	  from	  across	  its	  borders.’416	  In	  sum	  then,	  by	  1976	  Washington	  was	  faced	  with	  a	  largely	  moribund	  ally	  in	  Congo	  that	  lacked	  both	  legitimacy	  at	  home	  and	  the	  ability	   to	  play	  a	  useful	   role	   in	   the	  region	  beyond	  meagre	  expressions	  of	   loyalty	   to	  the	  American	  line	  in	  the	  diplomatic	  sphere.	  In	  view	  of	  such	  limited	  prospects	  for	  a	  mutually	  beneficial	  partnership,	  the	  question	  remains	  how	  the	  Ford	  administration	  would	  respond	  to	  these	  circumstances?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  March	  1976,	  Mobutu	  buckled	  and	  finally	  agreed	  to	  a	  long	  overdue	  and	  much	  needed	   IMF	   reform	   package.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   this	   was	   touted	   by	   Kissinger	   in	  Washington	  as	  a	  clear	  signal	  of	  the	  leader’s	  desire	  to	  move	  his	  country	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   details	   of	   how	   Mobutu	   would	   abide	   by	   and	  implement	   unpalatable	   austerity	   measures	   (including	   a	   forty-­‐two	   per	   cent	  devaluation	  of	  the	  Zaire)	  and	  uphold	  Congo’s	  commitments	  remained	  to	  be	  seen.	  No	  doubt	   American	   policy	   and	   guidance	   were	   crucial	   to	   Mobutu’s	   calculations,	   as	  Charles	  W.	  Robinson	  (the	  Undersecretary	  of	  State	  for	  Economic	  Affairs)	  noted,	  	  ‘Economic	  distress-­‐-­‐	  stemming	  from	  a	  combination	  of	  depressed	  copper	  prices,	  inflated	   costs	   of	   imports,	   heavy	   foreign	   debts	   accumulated	   in	   a	   binge	   of	  spending,	   and	   nationalistic-­‐socialistic	   excesses—combines	  with	   political	   crisis	  to	  make	  Mobutu	  look	  to	  the	  industrial	  West	  for	  salvation…	  In	  this	  atmosphere,	  we	  have	  a	  better	  chance	  than	  we	  ever	  have	  had	  or	  may	  again	  have	  to	  move	  Zaire	  along	  the	  way	  toward	  fulfilling	  its	  great	  promise.’417	  	  To	  what	  extent	  Washington	  would	  in	  fact	  seize	  this	  moment	  soon	  became	  evident.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Once	  again	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  dominated	  policy	  and	  ensured	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  remain	  steadfast	   in	   its	  uncritical	  support	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  This	  line	  was	  underscored	  by	  string	  of	  diplomatic	  visits	  to	  Kinshasa	  as	  further	  economic	  and	  military	  aid	  packages	  were	  hammered	  out	  and	  Washington,	  under	  Kissinger’s	  direction,	   took	   the	   lead	   in	   organising	   the	   international	   community’s	   bailout	   of	  Congo’s	   debt	   crisis.	   Perhaps	   the	   clearest	   public	   indication	   that	   Mobutu’s	   Congo	  remained	   very	  much	  within	   the	   public	   fold	  was	   the	   string	   of	   diplomatic	  missions	  between	   Washington	   and	   Kinshasa.	   Thus	   both	   Mulcahy	   and	   Schaufele	   made	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  416	  Bush	  to	  Kissinger:	  Interagency	  Intelligence	  Memorandum:	  ‘The	  Military	  Threat	  to	  Zaire’,	  25th	  May	  1976;	  FRUS,	  1969-­‐1976,	  Volume	  E-­‐6	  417	  Robinson,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  Secretary:	  ‘Expanded	  US	  Assistance	  to	  Zaire’,	  6th	  March	  1976;	  FRUS,	  1969-­‐1976,	  Volume	  E-­‐6	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repeated	  visits	  to	  Mobutu	  between	  December	  1975	  and	  the	  summer	  of	  1976,	  as	  has	  been	   noted.	   Nor	   was	   the	   Pentagon	   to	   be	   out	   done	   by	   the	   State	   Department,	   as	  General	  Rockwell	  led	  another	  military	  mission	  to	  Kinshasa	  and	  Secretary	  of	  Defence	  Donald	  Rumsfeld	  also	  followed	  suit	  in	  June	  1976.	  Most	  notably,	  however,	  President	  Ford	   received	   Congo’s	   Foreign	   Minister	   Nguza	   Karl-­‐I-­‐Bond	   in	   Washington	   that	  February	  in	  a	  largely	  symbolic	  gesture	  of	  support	  while	  Secretary	  Kissinger	  offered	  Mobutu	   further	   assurances	   in	   a	   personal	   stopover	   in	   Kinshasa	   during	   his	   much-­‐vaunted	   Africa	   trip	   in	   April.	   More	   than	   empty	   gestures,	   this	   political	   activity	  translated	  into	  considerable	  assistance	  for	  Congo.	  Direct	  economic	  and	  military	  aid	  was	  significantly	   increased	  as	  the	  State	  Department	  proposed	  a	  184	  million	  dollar	  bilateral	   aid	   program	   for	   the	   two	   fiscal	   years	   1976-­‐77418	  and	   additional	   Security	  Supporting	  Assistance	  of	  44.5	  million	  dollars	  for	  1977	  was	  sought	  following	  General	  Rockwell’s	  report.419	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Concerned	  that	  this	  bilateral	  effort	  would	  prove	  insufficient,	  the	  United	  States	  also	   exerted	   considerable	   pressure	   on	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	   World	   Bank	   (IBRD)	   to	  reengage	   Congo.	   The	   result	  was	   150	  million	   dollar	   loan	   from	   the	   former	   and	   the	  reviving	  the	  international	  Consultative	  Group	  for	  (aid	  to)	  Zaire	  under	  the	  latter.420	  In	   addition	   to	   cajoling	   the	   major	   development	   organisations,	   Washington	   also	  pressured	   its	   European	   allies	   directly	   into	   further	   assistance	   and	   the	   coordinated	  management	   of	   Congo’s	   debt	   crisis. 421 	  In	   the	   first	   half	   of	   1976,	   the	   State	  Department’s	  Bureau	  of	   Intelligence	  and	  Research	  noted	  that	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime	  had	   failed	   to	  meet	  some	  150	  million	  dollars	   in	  debt	   repayment	  obligations.422	  The	  renegotiation	  of	   this	  debt	  on	  a	   short-­‐term	  basis	  was	  achieved	  at	   the	  Paris	  Club	   in	  June	   but,	   as	   Washington	   was	   painfully	   aware,	   debt	   service	   payments	   looked	   to	  remain	  at	   some	   thirty	  per	   cent	  of	   gross	  domestic	  product	   for	   the	  best	  part	  of	   the	  next	  decade.423	  For	  this	  very	  reason	  the	  American	  lead	  in	  this	  process	  was	  no	  doubt	  as	   important	   to	  Mobutu	   as	   it	  was	   to	   the	   smaller	  donor	   countries	   in	  Europe.	  Even	  with	   all	   of	   the	   above	  measures,	  whether	   such	   a	   cash-­‐strapped	   economy	   could	   be	  revived	  remained	  doubtful	  and	  depended	  very	  much	  upon	  stringent	  administrative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  418	  Ibid.	  	  419	  NSSM	  241:	  United	  States	  Policy	  in	  Selected	  Areas	  of	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa:	  Summary	  Overview,	  19th	  August	  1976;	  Institutional	  Files,	  NSSM	  241:	  United	  States	  Policy	  in	  Southern	  Africa,	  Box	  44,	  NSC,	  GFL	  420	  Robinson	  to	  Kissinger,	  ‘Expanded	  US	  Assistance	  to	  Zaire’,	  6th	  March	  1976;	  FRUS,	  1969-­‐1976,	  Volume	  E-­‐6	  421	  Turner,	  USMISSION	  OECD	  Paris	  to	  Robinson,	  ‘Meeting	  with	  Political	  Director	  Davignon	  of	  Belgian	  Foreign	  Ministry	  to	  Discuss	  Aid	  to	  Zaire’,	  12th	  March	  1976;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Europe	  and	  Canada,	  Box	  5,	  NSA,	  GFL	  422	  INR,	  ‘Zaire:	  A	  Poor	  Prognosis’,	  28th	  December	  1976;	  FRUS,	  Volume	  E-­‐6	  423	  Ibid.	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reforms	  and	  the	  resurrection	  of	  various	  moribund	  sectors,	  in	  particular	  agriculture	  and	  transport,	  to	  make	  the	  country	  less	  dependent	  on	  expensive	  food	  imports.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  From	   the	   very	   outset,	   however,	   this	   American	   orchestrated	   effort	  was	   riddled	  with	  problems.	  First	  of	  all,	  Mobutu	  was	  a	  notoriously	  unreliable	  and	  evasive	  partner	  for	   such	   development	   schemes.	   Successive	   administrations	   in	   Washington	   had	  noted	   his	   brash	   attitude	   towards	   economic	   matters,	   promising	   reforms	   while	  pursuing	  a	  much	  more	  self-­‐serving	  line.	  This	  round	  would	  prove	  no	  exception	  and	  the	  analytical	  paper	  cited	  earlier	  made	  precisely	  this	  point,	  	  ‘Mobutu	  is	  a	  man	  who	  dislikes	  economics,	  postpones	  economic	  decisions	  as	  long	  as	   he	   can,	   and	   resists	   adjusting	   to	   economic	   reality…	   Mobutu	   has	   become	  fabulously	  wealthy;	   estimates	   run	  over	  100	  million	  dollars	   in	  personal	  wealth	  with	  chateaus	  in	  Europe	  and	  most	  of	  the	  other	  trappings.	  Mobutu	  would	  have	  to	  do	   something	   extraordinary	   before	   the	   Zairian	   people	   would	   believe	   that	   the	  extravagance	   symbolized	   by	   his	   Marble	   Palace,	   helicopters,	   the	   expensive	  automobiles,	  and	  his	  well	  supported	  entourage…	  Mobutu	  has	  exasperated	  those	  who	   try	   to	   discuss	   economic	  management	   and	   reform;	   the	   results	   are	   usually	  use	  of	   the	  right	  words	  without	  action	   to	  back	   them	  up…	  A	  Spartan	  conversion	  would	   be	   popular,	   if	   difficult.	   Mobutu	   may	   well	   prefer	   to	   go	   the	   route	   on	  champagne.’424	  	  As	  a	   result,	   if	  Congo	  was	   to	  be	   steered	   into	  a	  more	   sustainable	  direction	   then	   the	  United	  States	  would	  have	  to	  take	  a	  decisive	  lead.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	   the	   diagnosis	   of	   the	   State	   Department,	   and	   Under	   Secretary	   Charles	  Robinson	   in	   particular,	   appeared	   accurate,	   the	   necessary	   impetus	   to	   ensure	   an	  about	  turn	  by	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  was	  decidedly	  absent.	  An	  early	  indication	  of	  this	  was	  the	  pressure	  exerted	  on	  the	  American	  Export	  Import	  Bank	  for	  continued	  credit	  to	   the	   Inga-­‐Shaba	   power	   line	   project.	   As	   has	   been	   noted	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	  inefficient	   prestige	   projects	   that	   diverted	   scarce	   capital	   from	   much	   needed	  development	   and	   infrastructure	   programs	   had	   plagued	   Mobutu’s	   economic	  management	   throughout	   the	  1970s.	  Rather	   than	  abandon	  such	  projects	   to	   failure,	  Washington	   preferred	   to	   help	   the	   leader	   stumble	   along	   in	   this	   venture	   in	   an	  apparent	   effort	   to	   cushion	   the	   inevitable	  blows	   to	  his	   credibility	   as	   the	  Bureau	  of	  Intelligence	  and	  Research	  pointed	  out,	   ‘Political	  considerations	  are	  also	  behind	  the	  government’s	   insistence	  on	  continuing	  the	  prestige	  projects,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  so	  far	  along	  that	  cancelling	  them	  would	  be	  viewed	  as	  and	  admission	  of	  the	  gravity	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  424	  Arthur	  H.	  House,	  Memorandum	  for	  Scowcroft:	  Analytical	  Paper	  on	  Zaire,	  30th	  August	  1976;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	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the	  economic	  situation.’425	  In	  other	  words,	  from	  the	  outset	  of	   its	  post-­‐Angola	  drive	  to	  strengthen	  Congo	  then,	  Washington	  was	  already	  signalling	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  compromise	  to	  accommodate	  Mobutu’s	  past	  excesses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   greatest	   obstacle	   to	   more	   decisive	   pressure	   for	   reform	   on	   Mobutu,	  however,	   was	   Kissinger’s	   continued	   personal	   dominance	   over	   US-­‐Congolese	  relations.	   Both	   to	   his	   own	   staff	   and	   in	   various	   meetings	   with	   the	   president,	   the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  aggressively	  pursued	  additional	  assistance	  to	  Congo.	  In	  this	  way,	  minutes	   of	   a	   cabinet	   meeting	   emphasised	   his	   personal	   stake	   in	   securing	   aid	   for	  Mobutu	  and	  his	  central	  role	  in	  forming	  a	  posse	  of	  helpers	  from	  Europe	  in	  a	  cabinet	  meeting	  that	  June,	  	  ‘But	   can	   I,	   by	   the	   time	   I	   get	   back,	   get	   a	   package	  of	  what	   is	   needed	   so	   that	  we	  know	   what	   we	   are	   doing…I	   don’t	   want	   to	   worry	   about	   whether	   it’s	  bureaucratically	   proper.	   Then	   you	   do	   it.	  When	   I	   was	   there	   I	   told	  Mobutu	   we	  would	  do	   this…	   I	   think	  we	   can	   get	  Belgian	   support.	   I	   think	  we	   can	   get	  British	  support.	   It	   takes	   somebody	   to	   take	   the	   initiative…	  But	   can	  we	  get	   a	  program?	  You’ll	  never	  get	  it	  by	  just	  calling	  a	  meeting	  of	  a	  group.	  Somebody	  has	  to	  push	  a	  program	  and	  ask	  them	  for	  specific	  contributions.’426	  	  The	   Secretary	  of	   State’s	   pulling	   the	   strings	  of	   the	  unfolding	  Congo	  policy	   entailed	  two	   important	   side	   effects.	   First	   of	   all,	   it	   ensured	   that	   a	   considerable	   emphasis	  would	  remain	  on	  Congo’s	  perceived	  security	  needs.	  More	  significant,	  however,	  was	  Kissinger’s	   lack	  of	  emphasis	  on	   the	  much-­‐needed	  political	  overhaul	  and	  reform	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  line	  with	  Kissinger’s	  fixation	  on	  security	  and	  in	  an	  about	  turn	  from	  its	  earlier	  mission,	   the	   second	   Military	   Technical	   Advisory	   Team	   (MTAT	   II)	   report	   under	  General	   Rockwell	   in	   June	   1976	   was	   now	   adamant	   over	   the	   urgent	   need	   for	   a	  massive	   increase	   in	   military	   assistance	   to	   Congo.	   To	   Rockwell	   events	   in	   Angola	  posed,	  ‘a	  well-­‐defined	  potential	  threat	  which	  will	  mature	  in	  one	  to	  three	  years…’	  for	  Congo	  as	  he	  felt	  that,	  ‘the	  Soviets	  have	  a	  grand	  design	  to	  control	  Southern	  Africa.’	  As	  a	   result,	  he	   stressed	   the	   strategic	   importance	  of	   fostering,	   ‘an	  economically	  viable	  Zaire	   possessing	   a	   credible	  military	   deterrent…’	   that	   could,	   ‘…	   assist	  markedly	   in	  countering	  Soviet	  efforts	  in	  that	  part	  of	  the	  world.’	  	  All	  this	  only	  served	  to	  highlight	  the	  dangers	  for	  Congo	  and	  American	  interests	  there	  as	  Rockwell	  deemed	  it,	  	  ‘entirely	   plausible…	   for	   the	   Soviets	   to	   use	   surrogates	   (Angolans	   and	   ex-­‐Katangese	  gendarmes)	  armed	  with	  sophisticated	  weapons	  already	  in	  Angola	  to	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insure	   the	  demise	  of	   the	  pro-­‐Western	   regime	   in	  Zaire,	   replacing	   it	  with	  a	  pro-­‐Soviet	  revolutionary	  movement.’427	  This	  was	  not	  only	  a	  complete	  shift	  from	  the	  earlier	  MTAT	  report	  that	  predated	  the	  Angolan	  defeat,	  recommending	  much	  more	  limited	  assistance,	  but	  it	  also	  flew	  in	  the	  face	   of	   the	   Interagency	   Report	   on	   Congo’s	   security	   that	   identified	   the	   primary	  threat	  to	  Mobutu	  as	  internal	  instability	  rather	  than	  any	  external	  peril	  (as	  has	  been	  noted	  earlier).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	   this	   demonstrates	   the	   siege	   mentality	   felt	   in	   certain	   quarters	   in	  Washington	   following	   Angola.	   It	   is	   certainly	   indicative	   of	  Washington’s	   failure	   to	  draw	  from	  the	  obvious	  lessons	  of	  this	  earlier	  defeat.	  The	  fact	  that	  Mobutu’s	  Congo	  had	  proved	  a	  paper	  tiger	  during	  this	  first	  regional	  test	  was	  at	  least	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  intransigence	   of	   his	   self-­‐serving	   regime	   that	   relied	   more	   on	   its	   armed	   forces,	  supported	   and	   equipped	   by	   the	   United	   States,	   than	   on	   effective	   governing.	   The	  result	  was	  a	  bankrupt	  and	  crippled	  country	  that	  was	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  ‘deterrent’	  envisioned	  by	  Rockwell.	  Rather	  than	  addressing	  these	  issues,	  however,	  the	  MTAT	  II	  report	  called	  for	  some	  465	  million	  dollars	  worth	  of	  military	  assistance	  over	  the	  next	  five	   years;	   almost	   quadrupling	   previous	   estimates.	   In	   other	   words,	   without	   the	  necessary	   reforms,	   such	   support	  would	   offer	   little	  more	   than	   temporary	   relief	   to	  the	   floundering	   and	   unpopular	   Mobutu	   government.	   Newly	   arrived	   ambassador	  Walter	   L.	   Cutler,	   a	   former	  member	   of	  Washington’s	   Congo	  Working	  Group,	   noted	  precisely	   this	   frustration	  with	   American	   policy	   from	   Kinshasa	   insiders,	   ‘We	   have	  received	  a	  trickle	  of	  critical	  comments	  (primarily	  from	  the	  intellectual	  community)	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  US	  support	  for	  Mobutu	  amounts	  to	  propping	  up	  a	  nearly	  defunct	  regime.’428	  As	  such,	  any	  effort	  that	  fell	  short	  of	  a	  stringent	  and	  binding	  commitment	  for	   reform	   in	  Kinshasa	  simply	  condemned	  Congo’s	  population	   to	   further	  hardship	  without	   offering	   the	   prospect	   of	   a	   stable	   and	   dependable	   ally	   to	   Washington.	  Unfortunately,	  under	  Secretary	  Kissinger’s	  lead	  such	  pressure	  for	  reform	  remained	  notably	  absent.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Linked	  to	  Kissinger’s	  refusal	  to	  draw	  critical	  conclusions	  from	  his	  failed	  Angola	  strategy	   was	   his	   blinkered	   fixation	   on	   Mobutu’s	   security	   needs	   over	   the	   much-­‐needed	  political	  and	  economic	  reform.	  Ahead	  of	  the	  Angola	  escalation	  the	  Secretary	  of	   State	   had	   resisted	   calls	   for	   conditional	   aid	   to	   Congo	   to	   be	   tied	   to	   IMF	   reforms.	  While	  Kissinger	  was	  now	  keen	  to	  stress	  Mobutu’s	  acceptance	  of	  the	  IMF	  reforms	  as	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an	   indication	   of	   the	   leader’s	   repentant	   attitude	   in	   Washington,	   he	   remained	  characteristically	   mute	   on	   this	   subject	   in	   his	   personal	   meetings	   with	   Congo’s	  president	  that	  April.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  in	  these	  meetings	  the	  Secretary	  seemed	  taken	  in	   with	   Mobutu’s	   security	   concerns,	   ‘Everywhere	   he	   looks	   he	   sees	   red	   or	   crazy	  regimes—Angola,	   Mozambique,	   Central	   African	   Republic,	   Congo/Brazzaville,	  Rwanda,	   Burundi,	   Tanzania,	   Sudan,	   Uganda,	   Libya.’	   More	   than	   this,	   however,	   in	  another	  breakfast	  meeting	   apparently	   favoured	  by	   the	  Kinshasa	  despot,	  Kissinger	  indulged	   Mobutu’s	   line	   that	   no	   doubt	   reflected	   his	   own	   version	   of	   the	   Angola	  debacle	   berating	   the	   ‘retired	   Protestant	   missionaries	   who	   constitute	   our	   Africa	  bureau’	   and	   who	   ‘don’t	   believe	   in	   military	   aid’.429	  Indeed,	   in	   the	   preceding	   talks	  aboard	  the	  presidential	  yacht	  Kissinger	  had	  confided	  to	  Mobutu,	  	  ‘I	  must	  manoeuvre	  to	  get	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  split	  Africa	  and	  I	  think	  I	  am	  making	  progress.	   That	   is	   my	   public	   position.	   But	   my	   private	   position	   is	   that	   without	  strength,	   there	   is	   no	   foreign	   policy.	   You	   know	   very	  well	   that	   if	  we	   had	   had	   a	  foreign	  policy,	  we	  would	  have	  won	  in	  Angola.	  If	  we	  had	  done	  more	  for	  Savimbi,	  there	   would	   have	   been	   a	   victory	   in	   Angola,	   but	   we	   must	   not	   permit	   this	   to	  happen	  again…	  We	  will	  strengthen	  Zaire,	  which	  is	  a	  friend	  of	  the	  US,	  just	  as	  we	  have	  made	  Egypt	  stronger.	  Two	  and	  one-­‐half	  years	  ago	  when	  I	  began	  my	  policy,	  Egypt	  was	  not	  receiving	  one	  cent	   from	  the	  US.	  Today,	   it	  receives	  one	  billion	   in	  direct	  aid	  and	  900	  million	  in	  indirect	  aid.’430	  	  This	  brazen	  rewriting	  of	  history	  and	  attributing	  the	  failure	  in	  Angola	  to	  insufficient	  aid	   was	   no	   doubt	   music	   to	   Mobutu’s	   ears.	   Kissinger	   went	   on	   to	   promise	   both	  increased	  direct	  economic	  and	  military	  assistance	  as	  well	  as	  assurances	  of	   raising	  support	  from	  other	  donor	  countries	  and	  multilateral	  aid	  organisations.	  At	  no	  point	  did	  he	  mention	  Mobutu’s	  past	  transgressions	  nor	  did	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  at	  any	  stage	   point	   to	   the	   need	   for	   administrative	   reform	   or	   economic	   restraint	   from	   his	  ally.	   In	   other	   words,	   Kissinger	   offered	   his	   old	   partner	   in	   Kinshasa	   a	   seemingly	  unqualified	  and	  unconditional	  offer	  of	  assistance.	  Coming	  as	   it	  did	  within	  a	  month	  of	  Mobutu’s	   reluctant	  acquiescence	   to	   the	   IMF	  reforms,	   this	  did	  not	  bode	  well	   for	  the	  effective	  implementation	  of	  such	  a	  program.	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  Whether	   viewed	   through	   a	   hardnosed	   realist	   lens	   or	   from	   a	   more	   liberal	  developmentalist	  perspective,	  the	  course	  taken	  by	  Kissinger	  in	  Kinshasa	  can	  only	  be	  described	  as	  extremely	  short	  sighted.	  That	  Congo	  was	  unable	  to	  function	  as	  a	  strong	  and	  stable	  counterpoint	  to	  regional	  instability	  or	  Soviet	  subversion	  had	  been	  amply	  demonstrated	  in	  Angola.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  decade	  of	  Mobutu’s	  rule	  of	  largess	  and	  corruption	   had	   ruined	   the	   economy	   of	   a	   potentially	   prosperous	   country	   and	  was	  now	  severely	  impacting	  the	  lives	  of	  ordinary	  Congolese.	  The	  IMF,	  World	  Bank	  and	  even	   Undersecretary	   Roberts	   had	   all	   pointed	   to	   the	   need	   for	   stringent	   austerity	  measures	  and	  economic	  reform	  if	  Mobutu	  was	  to	  reverse	  Congo’s	  fortunes	  and,	  by	  extension,	  play	  a	  useful	  role	  in	  future	  American	  designs.	  That	  Mobutu	  was	  unlikely	  to	  cooperate	  by	  his	  own	  volition	  and	  preferred	  to	  ‘go	  the	  route	  on	  champagne’	  had	  also	   been	   amply	   stressed.	   Nevertheless,	   in	   his	   private	   talks	   with	   the	   Congolese	  leader	  Kissinger	  appeared	  to	  be	  signalling	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  not	  permit	  its	  allies	  to	  fall	  with	  an	  unconditional	  promise	  of	  support.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  results	  were	  predictable.	  By	  August	   the	  previously	  cited	  analytical	  paper	  on	   Congo	   noted,	   ‘The	   IMF	   has	   extended	   credit	   on	   terms	   which	   Zaire	   evidently	  cannot	  meet	   and	  based	  on	   reforms	  not	  being	  made.’431	  By	   the	  end	  of	   the	  year	   the	  Bureau	  of	  Intelligence	  and	  research	  issued	  a	  gloomy	  warning,	  	  ‘The	   short-­‐term	   outlook	   for	   Zaire	   is	   for	   continued	   balance	   of	   payments	  problems,	   little	   if	   any	   economic	   growth,	   the	   need	   for	   austerity	  measures,	   and	  increased	   popular	   discontent.	   For	   the	   outlook	   to	   improve	   in	   the	   longer	   run,	  several	   fundamental	  problems	   that	  have	  plagued	   the	  economy	  will	   have	   to	  be	  resolved…	  If,	  however,	  the	  international	  financial	  community	  continues	  to	  make	  loans	  without	  strict	  conditions,	  or	  sufficient	  bilateral	  or	  international	  aid	  funds	  become	   available,	   Zaire	   will	   be	   able	   to	   muddle	   through	   the	   present	   financial	  crisis	   without	   changing,	   even	   so	   far	   as	   it	   can,	   the	   reasons	   for	   deficits	   in	   its	  balance	  of	  payments.’432	  	  In	  precisely	  this	  way,	  Henry	  Kissinger	  ignored	  the	  moment	  of	  opportunity	  identified	  by	  Undersecretary	  Roberts	  to	  revive	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   reasons	   for	   the	   Secretary’s	   refusal	   to	   heed	   the	  warnings	   even	   of	   his	   own	  economic	  advisers	  are	  a	  little	  baffling	  at	  first	  glance.	  To	  be	  sure,	  many	  other	  corners	  of	   the	   administration,	   not	   least	   the	   Kinshasa	   embassy	   under	   Cutler,	   called	   for	  increased	   economic	   and	   military	   assistance	   to	   maintain	   good	   relations	   with	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  431	  Arthur	  H.	  House,	  Memorandum	  for	  Brent	  Scowcroft:	  ‘Analytical	  Paper	  on	  Zaire’,	  30th	  August	  1976;	  Presidential	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	  432	  Bureau	  of	  Intelligence	  and	  Research,	  Department	  of	  State,	  ‘Zaire:	  A	  Poor	  Prognosis’,	  28th	  December	  1976;	  FRUS,	  Volume	  E-­‐6	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faltering	   ally.	   It	   was	   the	   cavalier	   no-­‐strings-­‐attached	   manner	   in	   which	   Kissinger	  offered	   US	   aid	   that	   is	   so	   surprising.	   Perhaps	   Kissinger	   simply	   did	   not	   see	   the	  relevance	   of	   a	   functioning	   economic	   system	   provided	   Congo’s	   leader	   had	   ample	  military	  muscle	  to	  back	  up	  his	  position	  both	  domestically	  and	  abroad.	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  was	  at	  pains	  to	  turn	  Washington’s	  long	  term	  friend	  into	  a	  showcase	  in	  Africa	  flies	  in	   the	   face	   of	   such	   an	   explanation,	   however.433	  Indeed,	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   entire	  strategy	   lay	   the	   perceived	   need	   to	   reinforce	   American	   credibility	   throughout	   the	  globe,	  and	  in	  the	  third	  world	  in	  particular,	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  benefits	  of	  close	  cooperation	   with	   America.	   In	   a	   National	   Security	   Council	   meeting	   Kissinger	  proclaimed,	  ‘Mr.	  President,	  in	  the	  Congo,	  Zaire,	  we	  won	  the	  war	  we	  lost	  in	  Angola.	  If	  Zaire	   goes,	   every	   African	   state	   will	   draw	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  (which	   they	   don’t	   like	   all	   that	   much)	   is	   the	   wave	   of	   the	   future.’434	  From	   this	  perspective,	   Mobutu’s	   success	   was	   intimately	   tied	   to	   American	   credibility	  throughout	   the	   region.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   a	   self-­‐conscious	   Kissinger,	  reassuring	   and	   apologetic	   over	   perceived	   past	   American	  weakness	   in	   the	   region,	  apparently	  felt	  unable	  to	  pressure	  his	  Congolese	  ally	  when	  it	  came	  to	  Mobutu’s	  own	  much	   needed	   domestic	   reforms.	   Ultimately	   then,	   despite	   the	   extremely	   limited	  rewards	  from	  its	  ten	  year	  support	  of	  Congo,	  a	  myopic	  refusal	  to	  grasp	  the	  lessons	  of	  the	  Angola	  debacle	  and	  a	  crisis	  of	  confidence	  over	  perceived	  American	  credibility	  in	  the	  area	  combined	   to	  ensure	   that	  no	  progress	  would	  be	  made	   in	   the	  Washington-­‐Kinshasa	  relationship.	  Congo’s	  kleptocratic	  regime	  could	  continue	  to	  muddle	  along	  on	   the	   edge	   of	   bankruptcy	   with	   an	   apparently	   unconditional	   guarantee	   from	   its	  American	  patron.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  1975,	  Mobutu	  had	  run	  his	  country	  into	  economic	  ruin	  and	  the	  prospects	  of	  his	  regime	  looked	  increasingly	  questionable.	  With	  a	  series	  of	  crass	  political	  ploys	  he	  manoeuvred	   his	   Congo	   back	   into	   the	   American	   fold	   and	   became	   the	   lynchpin	   of	  Washington’s	   Angola	   intervention	   under	   Secretary	   Kissinger’s	   direction,	   and	  despite	  the	  warnings	  of	  the	  State	  Department’s	  Africa	  Bureau	  and	  the	  its	  Kinshasa	  embassy.	   The	   conflict	   in	   Angola,	   in	   turn,	   clearly	   indicated	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   a	  strategy	   focused	   around	   Washington’s	   Congo	   ally	   and	   illustrated	   the	   limited	  rewards	  of	  its	  decade	  long	  support	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  Rather	  than	  reassessing	  past	   failings	   and	   looking	   to	   move	   this	   relationship	   in	   a	   more	   positive	   direction,	  however,	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   sought	   to	   avert	   responsibility	   for	   the	   humiliating	  defeat	   in	  Angola	  by	  pointing	   to	  an	   intransigent	  Congress	  withdrawing	  support	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  433	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation:	  President	  Ford,	  Secretary	  Kissinger,	  Brent	  Scowcroft;	  10th	  May	  1976;	  Memoranda	  of	  Conversations-­‐1973-­‐77,	  Box	  19,	  NSA,	  GFL	  434	  NSC	  Meeting,	  ‘Kissinger’s	  Africa	  Trip’,	  11th	  May	  1976;	  NSC	  Meetings	  File,	  Box	  2,	  NSA,	  GFL	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an	  otherwise	  effective	  strategy.	  Such	  a	  cynical	  distortion	  of	  the	  facts	  ensured	  that	  a	  much	  needed	  reassessment	  and	  overhaul	  of	  the	  Washington-­‐Kinshasa	  relationship	  was	   avoided.	   Despite	   the	   various	   multilateral	   agencies	   and	   Kissinger’s	   own	  economic	   advisers’	   insistence	   that	   Congo	   was	   in	   dire	   need	   for	   economic	   and	  administrative	  reform,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  ensured	  that	  Washington	  would	  once	  more	   offer	   unconditional	   support	   to	   Mobutu	   and	   travelled	   to	   Kinshasa	   to	   make	  personal	  assurances	   to	   this	  effect.	  The	  predictable	  result	  was	  continued	  economic	  malaise	  in	  Congo	  as	  its	  government	  remained	  evasive	  on	  the	  promised	  reforms.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Defeat	   in	   Angola	  was	   the	   culmination	   of	   a	   decade-­‐long	   reliance	   of	   successive	  Washington	  administrations	  on	  President	  Mobutu	  to	  uphold	  American	  interests	  in	  the	   region.	   The	   reluctant	   foreign	   policy	   of	   Lyndon	   Johnson	   resisted	   a	   more	  meaningful	  identification	  with	  Africa’s	  independence	  struggles	  in	  the	  mid	  1960s.	  In	  Congo	   this	   translated	   into	   a	   series	   of	   short-­‐term	  manipulations	   that	   fostered	   the	  emergence	   of	   Colonel	   Mobutu	   to	   the	   fore	   of	   Congolese	   politics	   and	   presented	   a	  seemingly	  workable	  solution	   to	   the	   turmoil	   that	  plagued	   the	  country	   following	   its	  independence.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  both	  elevated	  the	  United	  States	  to	  a	  position	  of	  dominant	  influence	  with	  the	  Kinshasa	  government	  while	  increasingly	  tying	  America	  to	  a	  regime	  with	  dubious	  credentials.	  For	  all	  his	  apparent	  foreign	  policy	  expertise,	  this	  emphasis	  on	  the	  American-­‐Mobutu	  alliance	   in	  place	  of	  any	  more	  fundamental	  African	  engagement	  was	  swallowed	  whole	  and	  pushed	  by	  Kissinger	  with	  his	  arrival	  in	  Washington	  during	  the	  Nixon	  years.	  As	  such,	  it	  was	  during	  the	  Nixon	  years	  that	  this	  reliance	  on	  Mobutu	  personally	  was	  formalised	  into	  a	  more	  coherent	  strategy.	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine,	  the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  foreign	  policy	  team	  looked	  to	  regional	  allies	  to	  carry	  the	  burden	  of	  American	  global	  Cold	  War	  designs.	  Mobutu,	  of	  course,	  readily	  pandered	  to	  the	  geostrategic	  preoccupations	  of	  his	  principal	  ally	  and	  in	  return	  received	  an	  unfettered	  presidential	  endorsement	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  1970s.	  Despite	  the	  increasingly	  obvious	  signs	  that	  the	  Kinshasa	  despot	  was	  creating	  an	   unsustainable	   personal	   fiefdom	   ruled	   through	   a	   mixture	   of	   repression	   and	  patronage,	  the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  willingness	  to	  rely	  narrowly	  on	  Mobutu	  personally	  as	  a	  loyal	  bulwark	  against	  communist	  subversion	  in	  the	  region	  considerably	  aided	  and	  abetted	  his	  mounting	  corrupt	  largess.	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  The	  complete	  undoing	  of	  this	  line,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  neglected	  Congolese	  masses	  but	  also	  for	  immediate	  American	  interests,	  finally	  came	  during	  the	  Ford	  years	  when	  the	   muscle	   flexed	   by	   the	   increasingly	   bankrupt	   Kinshasa	   ally	   in	   Angola	   had	  atrophied	   to	   the	   point	   of	   complete	   impotence.	   Mobutu’s	   quite	   transparent	  manipulations	   of	   his	   Washington	   ally	   were	   nonetheless	   shrewd	   reflections	   of	  Kissinger’s	  own	  desire	   for	  his	  regional	  partner	   to	  dominate	   the	  crisis	  unfolding	   in	  Angola.	  Going	  against	  the	  better	  judgment	  of	  his	  key	  Africa	  advisers,	  the	  Secretary	  of	   State	   thus	   responded	   to	   Mobutu’s	   prompting	   to	   conceive	   an	   ill-­‐fated	   CIA	  operation	  with	  Congo	  as	  the	  centrepiece	  of	  its	  support	  of	  the	  FNLA.	  As	  such,	  Mobutu	  had	  successfully	  directed	  his	  American	  partner	   into	  a	  growing	  commitment	   in	   the	  Angolan	  civil	  war	  while	  pursuing	  very	  much	  his	  own	  agenda.	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  was	  an	   increasingly	   unreliable	   conduit	   for	   American	   arms	   intended	   for	   the	   FNLA	  certainly	   suggests	   that	   his	   efforts	   in	   Angola	   were	   not	   entirely	   whole-­‐hearted.	  Unable	   to	   either	  match	   the	   corresponding	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   escalation	   or	   trump	   this	  with	  his	  presumed	  Congolese	  ace,	  Kissinger	  thus	  presided	  over	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  flawed	  strategy	  in	  Angola	  that	  led	  to	  the	  first	  resounding	  American	  setback	  in	  Africa	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Equally	  unwilling	  to	  contemplate	  the	  flaws	  of	  his	  own	  design,	  however,	  Kissinger	  remained	  defiant	  in	  defeat	  and	  continued	  to	  hold	  firm	  to	  the	  line	  of	  unconditional	  support	  for	  Mobutu’s	  defunct	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	   inertia	   to	   redirect	   a	   clearly	   moribund	   policy	   is	   extremely	   hard	   to	  understand	   and	   no	   doubt	   strengthens	   the	   scepticism	   of	   conspiracy	   theorists	   that	  would	  place	  American	  private	  business	  interests	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  American	  concerns	  in	   Congo.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   tangible	   gains	   were	   so	   limited	   relative	   to	   the	  considerable	   investments	   of	   successive	   Washington	   administrations	   into	   Congo	  lends	   itself	   to	   the	   line	   that	   the	   government	   machinery	   was	   acting	   on	   behalf	   of	  private	   corporations	   in	   search	   of	   opportunity	   and	   mining	   concessions.	   As	   in	  previous	   chapters,	   however,	   during	   this	   period	   it	   was	   the	   Washington	  administration	  that	  harnessed	  its	  business	  contacts	  to	  its	  own	  political	  ends	  rather	  than	   the	   other	   way	   round.	   In	   this	   way	   Kissinger	   himself	   met	   with	   Maurice	  Templesman	   and	   former	   CIA	   Chief	   of	   Mission	   Devlin	   (by	   now	   a	   Templesman	  employee),	  and	  called	  Standard	  Oil’s	  chairman	  Swearingen,	  to	  ask	  them	  to	  postpone	  any	   decisions	   to	   mothball	   the	   exploitation	   of	   the	   Tenke	   Fugurumne	   concession,	  awarded	  to	  the	  Societe	  Miniere	  de	  Tenke	  Fungurume	  (SMTF)	  consortium	  in	  1970,	  until	   after	   the	   pending	   OAU	   summit	   on	   Angola.	   Similarly,	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	  applied	  pressure	  on	  World	  Bank	  President	  Robert	  McNamara	  to	  offer	  financing	  for	  the	  SMTF	  project.	  While	  such	  close	  cooperation	  between	  private	  business	  interests,	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the	   World	   Bank	   and	   the	   grand	   strategists	   of	   government	   policy	   in	   Washington	  undoubtedly	   has	   an	   unsavoury	   tone	   to	   it,	   these	   exchanges	   led	   to	   little	  more	   than	  SMTF	   postponing	   the	   announcement	   of	   its	   decision	   to	   withdraw	   until	   1976	   at	  Kissinger’s	  beckoning.435	  Evidence	  of	  business	   influence	  on	  government	  policy,	   on	  the	  other	  hand,	  remains	  scarce.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	  a	  more	  reasonable	  but	  equally	  intangible	  explanation	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  psychological	  need	  of	  successive	  Washington	  administrations	  to	  portray	  Congo	  as	  a	  success	  story	  and	  the	  fear	  that	  a	  collapse	  of	  its	  long-­‐standing	  ally	  would	  deal	  a	  blow	   to	   American	   credibility	   in	   Africa	   and	   the	   Third	  World	   at	   large.	   As	   has	   been	  seen,	   in	   a	   post-­‐mortem	   of	   IAFEATURE,	   Kissinger	   proclaimed	   to	   the	   NSC,	   ‘Mr	  President,	  in	  the	  Congo,	  Zaire,	  we	  won	  the	  war	  we	  lost	  in	  Angola.’436	  Time	  and	  again,	  the	  loyal	  ally	  Mobutu	  was	  vaunted	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  successful	  covert	  operation	  in	  the	  Third	  World.	  With	  the	  failures	  in	  Vietnam	  and	  Angola	  etched	  into	  the	  minds	  of	  policy	  makers,	  clinging	  to	  such	  supposed	  triumphs	  appeared	  all	  the	  more	  vital.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  potential	  collapse	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  might	  demonstrate	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  a	  close	  collaboration	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  was	  accordingly	  viewed	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  American	  credibility	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  such,	  the	  psychological	  need	  to	  cling	   to	  a	   success	   story	   in	  Washington	  and	   the	  desire	   to	  promote	  American	  Third	  World	   credentials	   were	   inextricably	   linked	   in	   the	   mind-­‐set	   of	   the	   Kissinger-­‐dominated	   administration	   that	   ensured	   further	   support	   with	   only	   the	   loosest	  conditions	   for	   the	   defunct	   Kinshasa	   despot.	   Unfortunately,	   the	   price	   of	   this	   was	  continued	   stagnation	   and	   economic	   hardship	   for	   the	   people	   of	   Congo,	   a	   further	  blow	  to	  America’s	  standing	  in	  Africa	  and	  a	  serious	  setback	  for	  American	  Cold	  War	  aims.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Both	   with	   its	   encouragement	   of	   Mobutu’s	   costly	   and	   diversionary	   Angola	  adventure	  and	  with	  Kissinger’s	  willingness	  to	  give	  further	  unconditional	  assurances	  for	   further	   aid;	   the	   United	   States	   played	   its	   role	   in	   Mobutu’s	   continued	  intransigence	   over	   reform,	   Congo’s	   mounting	   debt	   and	   corresponding	   financial	  ruin,	  and	  the	  by	  now	  abject	  poverty	  of	  much	  of	  the	  population.	  Mobutu,	  of	  course,	  at	  least	  in	  part	  engineered	  his	  foray	  into	  Angola	  in	  response	  to	  his	  domestic	  woes.	  As	  such,	   the	   doomed	   Washington-­‐Kinshasa	   alliance	   in	   Angola	   and	   the	   devastating	  impact	  on	  American	  regional	  standing	  of	  their	  resounding	  defeat	  were	  inextricably	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  435	  Schaufele	  to	  Embassy,	  Kinshasa,	  ‘Secretary’s	  Meeting	  with	  SMTF	  Reps,	  Call	  to	  MacNamara’,	  25th	  December	  1975;	  Mobutu	  was	  also	  not	  averse	  to	  using	  Maurice	  Templesman	  and	  Devlin	  as	  intermediaries	  to	  pass	  on	  his	  concerns	  over	  Angola	  to	  American	  officials.	  Hinton	  reported	  such	  a	  meeting	  on	  7th	  June	  1975;	  both	  in	  Country	  Files	  for	  Africa,	  1974-­‐1977,	  Box	  7,	  NSA,	  GFL	  Also,	  Gibbs,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Third	  World	  Intervention	  pp.	  183-­‐85	  436	  NSC	  Meeting,	  ‘Kissinger’s	  Africa	  Trip’,	  11th	  May	  1976;	  NSC	  Meetings	  File,	  Box	  2,	  NSA,	  GFL	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linked	  to	  Congo’s	  domestic	  troubles.	  With	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  MPLA	  by	  the	  OAU,	  the	   communist	   bloc	   had	   successfully	   backed	   a	   legitimate	   and	   acceptable	  independence	  movement	  with	  equipment	   from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	   largely	  black	  soldiers	  from	  Cuba.	  Washington	  and	  its	  Congolese	  ally,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  not	  only	  found	  themselves	  on	  the	  losing	  side	  but	  had	  also	  formed	  a	  de	  facto	  alliance	  with	  the	  reviled	  SADF	  and	  its	  apartheid	  government.	  Once	  more	  the	  United	  States	  was	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  reactionary	  forces	  in	  a	  continent	  desperate	  to	  rid	  itself	  of	  white	  minority	  rule	  in	  a	  quest	  for	  true	  independence	  and	  the	  outrage	  was	  palpable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Most	   significant,	   at	   least	   from	   an	   American	   perspective	   however,	   were	   the	  consequences	  for	  the	  global	  Cold	  War.	  Westad	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  from	  the	  Soviet	  vantage	  Angola	  had	  been	  somewhat	  of	  a	  chance	  success.437	  It	  was	  this	  victory	  that	  caused	  the	  communist	  superpower	  to	  take	  note	  and	  consider	  Africa	  as	  an	  arena	  in	  which	  real	  tangible	  gains	  could	  be	  achieved	  at	  limited	  cost.	  As	  a	  result,	  just	  as	  the	  US	  policy	   paper	   on	   Southern	  Africa	   (NSSM	  241)	   noted,	   Angola	   opened	   the	   door	   to	   a	  renewed	  and	  more	  confident	  Soviet	  adventurism	   in	  Africa.	   Indeed,	   the	  emergence	  of	   Africa	   as	   a	   more	   active	   battlefield	   for	   Cold	  War	   competition	   was	   perhaps	   the	  most	   devastating	   consequence	   of	   Kissinger’s	   reliance	   on	  Mobutu’s	   Congo	   and	   his	  corresponding	   failure	   to	  develop	  and	  adequate	   response	   to	  Africa’s	   independence	  movements,	   and	   the	   spreading	   turmoil	   in	   Angola	   in	   particular,	   in	   eight	   years	   in	  office.	  How	  the	  avowed	   idealism	  of	   Jimmy	  Carter	  would	  deal	  with	   this	   legacy	   that	  saw	  both	  a	  more	  concerted	  resistance	  and	  even	  open	  revolt	  against	  Mobutu’s	  rule	  in	  Congo	  and	  an	   increasingly	   active	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	  engagement	   in	  Africa	   forms	   the	  subject	  of	  the	  final	  chapter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  437	  Westad,	  Global	  Cold	  War	  pp.	  242-­‐243	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Ambivalence	  and	  Continuity:	  	  
Jimmy	  Carter	  and	  Mobutu’s	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  With	   the	   arrival	   of	   President	   Carter	   to	   the	  White	  House	   in	   January	   1977,	   the	  Washington	   maverick	   professed	   a	   fresh	   approach	   to	   diplomacy	   ‘based	   on	  fundamental	  values…	  and	   the	  use	  of	  power	  and	   influence	   for	  human	  purposes’.438	  Rejecting	  the	  hard-­‐nosed	  realism	  of	  the	  Kissinger	  years,	  the	  president	  announced	  a	  vision	   that	  would	   further	  American	   interests	  by	  once	  more	  making	   it	   a	  beacon	  of	  idealism	   throughout	   the	  world.	  Carter	  himself	   summarised	   these	   intentions	   in	  his	  memoirs	  as	  follows,	  	  ‘I	   was	   determined	   to	   combine	   support	   for	   our	   more	   authoritarian	   allies	   and	  friends	   with	   effective	   promotion	   of	   human	   rights	   within	   their	   countries.	   By	  inducing	   them	   to	   change	   their	   repressive	   policies,	   we	   would	   be	   enhancing	  freedom	  and	  democracy,	  and	  helping	  to	  remove	  the	  reasons	  for	  revolutions	  that	  often	  erupt	  among	  those	  who	  suffer	  from	  persecution.’439	  	  It	   was	   clear	   from	   the	   outset	   that	   such	   high-­‐minded	   goals	   presented	   a	   dilemma	  between	   protecting	   immediate	   American	   interests	   around	   the	   world	   while	  remaining	   true	   to	   this	   principled	   stand.	   Indeed,	   the	   traditional	   view	   of	   Carter’s	  foreign	   policy	   sees	   the	   tension	   between	   projecting	   an	   assertive	   foreign	   policy	  agenda	  while	   professing	   a	  more	  moralistic	   approach	   to	   diplomacy	   personified	   in	  the	  conflicting	  stances	  of	  his	  two	  key	  advisers,	  the	  lawyerly	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Cyrus	  Vance	  and	  the	  hawkish	  National	  Security	  Adviser	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  part	  due	  to	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  rough	  and	  tumble	  of	  international	  politics	  and	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  successful	  manoeuvrings	  of	  Brzezinski	  and	  Vance’s	  resignation	  in	  April	   1980,	   according	   to	   this	   line	   lofty	   ambitions	   to	   reshape	   international	  politics	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	   fundamental	  values	  were	   thus	  gradually	   replaced	  by	  a	  more	  traditionally	   realist	   and	   muscular	   foreign	   policy	   by	   the	   second	   half	   of	   Carter’s	  term.440	  The	   result	  was	   the	  perception	  of	   an	   incoherent	   approach	   to	   international	  affairs	  remembered	  more	  for	  its	  contradictions,	  shortcomings	  in	  its	  diplomacy	  with	  the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   weakness	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   rival	   superpower	   than	   its	   apparent	  successes.	   As	   such,	   the	   White	   House’s	   inability	   to	   counter	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	  adventurism	  in	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  secure	  the	  release	  of	  American	  hostages	  in	  Iran	  or	  compel	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  withdraw	  from	  Afghanistan	  receive	  greater	  emphasis	  and	  are	  more	  readily	  remembered	  than	  apparent	  successes	  such	  as	  the	  negotiation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  438	  Quote	  from	  a	  key	  foreign	  policy	  address	  given	  by	  President	  Carter	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame,	  22nd	  May	  1977;	  cited	  in	  William	  Stueck,	  ‘Placing	  Jimmy	  Carter’s	  Foreign	  Policy’	  	  in	  Gary	  M.	  Fink	  &	  Hugh	  Davis	  Graham	  (eds.),	  The	  Carter	  Presidency:	  Policy	  Choices	  in	  the	  Post	  New	  Deal	  Era	  (Uni	  Kansas	  Press,	  1998)	  p.	  247	  439	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  Keeping	  the	  Faith:	  Memoirs	  of	  a	  President	  (Uni.	  Of	  Arkansas	  Press,	  1995)	  p.	  142	  440	  Gaddis	  Smith,	  Morality,	  Reason	  and	  Power:	  American	  Diplomacy	  in	  the	  Carter	  Years	  (New	  York;	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1986)	  p.	  9	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of	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaty,	   the	   conclusion	   of	   a	   second	   strategic	   arms	   limitation	  agreement	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (SALT	  II)	  and	  the	  effective	  brokering	  of	  the	  Camp	  David	  Accords.441	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Arguably,	   Carter’s	   approach	   to	   Africa	   gives	   the	   clearest	   illustration	   of	   this	  foreign	   policy	   ambivalence.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   continuing	   Kissinger’s	   belated	  diplomatic	  initiatives,	  Carter	  won	  considerable	  acclaim	  amongst	  Africa’s	  statesmen	  for	   his	   support	   of	   British	   efforts	   for	   a	   peaceful	   transition	   to	   majority	   rule	   in	  Zimbabwe,	  his	  encouragement	  of	  a	  United	  Nations	  resolution	  over	  Namibia	  and	  his	  pressure	   on	   South	   Africa	   to	   reform	   its	   apartheid	   system.	   As	   such,	   Tanzanian	  President	  Julius	  Nyerere	  heralded	  Carter’s	  electoral	  victory	  with	  hopeful	  optimism,	  	  ‘Today’s	  elections	  bear	  even	  greater	  significance,	  to	  Tanzania	  and	  Africa,	  as	  far	  as	  concerns	   the	   liberation	  struggle	   in	  Southern	  Africa,	  because	  of	   the	  declared	  policies	  of	   the	   two	  candidates…	  America’s	  belated	   interest	   in	  a	   solution	   to	   the	  racial	  and	  colonial	  problems	  in	  southern	  Africa	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  Kissinger’s	  shuttles	  of	  April	   through	  September	  1976	  was	  basically	   to	  police,	   contain	   and	  finally	   counteract	   the	   “Soviet	   Threat”.	   James	   Earl	   Carter,	   the	   Democrat	  presidential	  candidate,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  …	  makes	  pronouncements	  about	  the	  liberation	  struggle	  in	  southern	  Africa,	  which	  indicate	  that	  he	  does	  not	  regard	  the	  struggle	  as	  one	  whose	  objective	  is	  to	  hand	  over	  Africa	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  just	  because	  Africa	  is	  a	  recipient	  of	  Soviet	  aid.’442	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Despite	  this	  optimistic	  tenor,	  the	  spectre	  of	  communist	  subversion	  continued	  to	  loom	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  Washington	  policy	  makers	  as	  these	  turbulent	  issues	  appeared	  to	   offer	   plenty	   of	   opportunity	   for	   further	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   meddling.	   Indeed,	   these	  fears	   were	   not	   entirely	   unfounded	   as	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   did	   in	   fact	   continue	   to	  expand	  its	  presence	  in	  Africa,	  most	  notably	  coming	  to	  the	  rescue	  of	  Mengistu	  Haile	  Mariam’s	  and	  the	  Ethiopian	  revolution	  following	  Somalia’s	  invasion	  of	  the	  Ogaden.	  From	  September	  1977	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  provided	  over	  a	  billion	  dollars	  of	  military	  equipment	  during	  the	  following	  eighteen	  months	  and	  close	  to	  one	  thousand	  Soviet	  military	   personnel	   assisted	   on	   the	   ground	   in	   the	   organisation	   of	   the	   Ethiopian	  counteroffensive,	  once	  more	  aided	  by	  the	  active	  role	  of	  some	  11,600	  Cuban	  troops	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  441	  For	  a	  more	  complete	  overview	  of	  this	  debate	  see	  Robert	  A.	  Strong,	  Working	  in	  the	  World:	  Jimmy	  Carter	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Louisiana	  State	  Uni	  Press,	  Baton	  Rouge,	  2000);	  Fink	  &	  Graham,	  The	  Carter	  Presidency:	  Policy	  Choices	  in	  the	  Post	  New	  Deal	  Era;	  Smith,	  Morality,	  Reason	  and	  Power;	  Richard	  C.	  Thornton,	  The	  Carter	  Years:	  Towards	  a	  New	  Global	  Order	  (Paragon	  House,	  Minnesota,	  2007)	  442	  Julius	  Nyerere,	  Crusade	  for	  Liberation	  (Oxford	  Uni.	  Press,	  1978)	  p.	  2	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and	  6,000	  Cuban	  military	  advisors.443	  Westad	  points	  to	  the	  success	  of	  this	  particular	  intervention,	   better	   planned	   and	   organised	   than	   its	  more	   haphazard	   response	   to	  Angola,	  as	  signalling	  a	  growing	  self-­‐belief	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  its	  emergence	  as	   a	   global	   superpower	   and	   ability	   to	   decisively	   impact	   regional	   events.444	  This	  increased	   Soviet	   role	   in	   Africa	   filled	   Washington	   with	   trepidation	   and	   sparked	  considerable	   debate	   amongst	   Carter’s	   top	   foreign	   policy	   aids	   over	   how	   far	   these	  developments	   should	   be	   linked	   to	   on-­‐going	   SALT	   negotiations	   and	   the	   broader	  superpower	  relationship.445	  Carter’s	  resulting	  shrill	  denouncement	  of	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  aggression	  in	  Africa	  only	  highlighted	  Washington’s	  impotence	  to	  actually	  influence	  events	   on	   the	   Horn	   and	   put	   considerable	   strain	   on	   the	   superpower	   relations.	  Indeed,	  Brzezinski	  himself	  wrote	  in	  his	  memoirs,	  ‘Détente	  lies	  buried	  in	  the	  sands	  of	  the	  Ogaden.’446	  As	  such,	  the	  seemingly	  hopeful	  beginnings	  of	  Carter’s	  Africa	  agenda	  were	  soon	  displaced	  by	  a	  much	  more	  traditional	  Cold	  War	  line.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	   was	   in	   its	   relationship	  with	   its	   old	   ally	   in	   Congo,	   however,	   that	   the	   Carter	  administration’s	  Cold	  War	  conservatism	  was	  most	  apparent.	  Having	  played	  such	  an	  integral	  part	  in	  the	  failed	  Kissinger	  Angola	  strategy	  towards	  Africa,	  Mobutu’s	  Congo	  provides	   an	   excellent	   case	   study	   for	   the	   Carter	   dilemma	   of	   balancing	   a	   Cold	  War	  agenda	  with	   its	   espoused	  human	   rights	  priorities.	   Indeed,	   there	   is	   a	   certain	   irony	  that	  at	  the	  very	  time	  that	  President	  Carter	  publicly	  rejected,	  ‘…	  that	  inordinate	  fear	  of	   communism	  which	   once	   led	   us	   to	   embrace	   any	   dictator	  who	   joined	   us	   in	   that	  fear…	  (and	  to	   fight)	   fire	  with	   fire,	  never	  thinking	  that	   fire	   is	  better	  quenched	  with	  water’447,	  American	  planes	  were	  once	  more	  delivering	  much	  needed	  military	  aid	  to	  ensure	   the	  survival	  of	   its	   long-­‐term	  ally	  and	   the	  continuation	  of	  Mobutu’s	  corrupt	  twelve	   year	   regime.	   While	   keen	   to	   follow	   a	   European	   lead,	   the	   United	   States	  remained	   integral	   to	   backstopping	   Congo’s	   leader	   when	   he	   was	   faced	   with	  spreading	  unrest	  and	  two	  separate	  cross-­‐border	  attacks	   from	  the	  exiled	  Katangan	  force	  (now	  under	  the	  name	  of	  the	  National	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Congo-­‐	  FNLC)	  in	  Angola	  in	  the	  first	  two	  years	  of	  Carter’s	  presidency.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  443	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War	  pp.	  276-­‐277;	  See	  also	  Louise	  Woodroofe,	  Buried	  in	  the	  Sands	  of	  the	  Ogaden:	  The	  United	  States,	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  and	  the	  Demise	  of	  Détente	  (LSE	  Thesis	  Collection;	  2007)	  444	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War	  p.	  279	  445	  A	  much	  cited	  Special	  Coordination	  Committee	  (SCC)	  meeting	  reveals	  precisely	  this	  debate	  over	  ‘Linkage’	  between	  events	  on	  the	  Horn	  and	  the	  broad	  US-­‐Soviet	  relations	  between	  Brzezinski	  and	  Vance.	  White	  House	  Situation	  Room,	  SCC	  Meeting	  on	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa’,	  2nd	  March	  1978;	  Vertical	  Files,	  Box	  115,	  Jimmy	  Carter	  Library	  (JCL)	  446	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	  The	  Power	  and	  the	  Principle:	  Memories	  of	  a	  National	  Security	  Adviser	  (New	  York;	  Fonar,	  Strauss,	  Giroux,	  1983)	  p.	  189	  447	  Quote	  from	  a	  key	  foreign	  policy	  address	  given	  by	  President	  Carter	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame,	  22nd	  May	  1977;	  cited	  in	  William	  Stueck,	  ‘Placing	  Jimmy	  Carter’s	  Foreign	  Policy’	  in	  Gary	  M.	  Fink	  &	  Hugh	  Davis	  Graham,	  The	  Carter	  Presidency:	  Policy	  Choices	  in	  the	  Post	  New	  Deal	  Era	  (Uni	  Kansas	  Press,	  1998)	  p.	  247	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Congo	  at	  least,	   it	  would	  appear	  that	  from	  its	  very	  outset	  the	  Carter	  administration	  chose	  to	  ‘fight	  fire	  with	  fire’,	  albeit	  partnered	  with	  European	  hard	  power	  projection.	  The	   ‘water’	  of	  reforming	  Mobutu’s	  corrupt	  and	  brutal	  regime	  always	  came	  second	  to	   the	   perceived	   security	   needs	   of	   the	   incumbent	   dictator.	   This	   chapter	  will	   thus	  examine	   the	   US	   approach	   to	   Congo	   during	   the	   Carter	   years,	   with	   particular	  attention	  to	  both	  its	  emphasis	  on	  human	  rights	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  and	  its	  support	  for	  the	  two	  Franco-­‐Belgian	  military	  interventions	  to	  quell	  unrest	  in	  Congo’s	  economic	  heartland	  of	  Shaba	  province	  (former	  Katanga)	  in	  the	  aptly	  named	  Shaba	  I	  and	  Shaba	  II	  operations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   picture	   that	   ultimately	   emerges	   is	   one	   of	   ambivalence	   and	   surprising	  continuity.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   throughout	   his	   term	   the	   Carter	   White	   House	   did	  consistently	  pressure	  Mobutu	  towards	  economic,	  political	  and	  humanitarian	  reform	  with	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  conditionality	  on	  American	  aid	   than	  had	  previously	  been	  seen	   in	  Washington	  or	  was	  demanded	   from	   its	  European	  allies.	  At	   the	  same	   time,	  however,	   US	   assistance	   to	   Mobutu	   continued	   throughout	   this	   period	   and,	   when	  push	  came	  to	  shove,	  the	  Cold	  War	  paradigm	  remained	  firmly	  in	  place.	  Following	  the	  example	  of	  its	  predecessors,	  the	  Carter	  administration	  once	  more	  preferred	  support	  for	   the	   status	   quo	   in	   Kinshasa	   in	   the	   name	   of	   stability	   to	   following	   its	   reformist	  tendencies	  to	  their	  logical	  conclusion	  and	  dropping	  its	  alliance	  with	  the	  intransigent	  Kinshasa	  despot.	  Furthermore,	  while	  there	  was	  a	  growing	  emphasis	  on	  the	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  involvement	  by	  the	  time	  of	  Shaba	  II,	  this	  triumph	  of	   ‘stability’	  over	   ‘reform’	  was	  consistently	  upheld	  from	  the	  very	  outset	  of	  the	  Carter	  years,	  perhaps	  revealing	  a	   more	   conventional	   Cold	   War	   stance	   from	   its	   inception	   than	   the	   president’s	  rhetoric	  would	  immediately	  suggest.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  by	  contrast	  to	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  Horn,	  on	  the	  evidence	  available	  this	  reasoning	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   have	   been	   a	   major	   point	   of	   contention	   within	   the	  administration	   as	   Brzezinski,	   Vance	   and	   the	   various	   branches	   of	   the	   National	  Security	  apparatus	  seemingly	  concurred	  with	  this	  support	  for	  Mobutu	  already	  from	  Carter’s	  first	  months	  in	  office.	  448	  Moreover,	  wary	  of	  an	  active	  involvement	  in	  Africa	  or	   a	   reversion	   to	   covert	   operations,	   under	   Carter	   the	   United	   States	   once	   more	  looked	   to	   Europe	   to	   shoulder	   Congo’s	   security	   burdens,	   much	   as	   Johnson	   had	  sought	   to	   do	   over	   a	   decade	   earlier.	   Unable	   to	   transcend	   traditional	   Cold	   War	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  448	  The	  research	  on	  the	  American	  archives	  comes	  with	  the	  caveat	  that	  the	  State	  Department	  documents	  for	  this	  period	  unfortunately	  remain	  in	  the	  ‘declassification’	  process	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing.	  What	  follows	  is	  based	  largely	  on	  the	  reports	  and	  summaries	  that	  filtered	  through	  to	  Brzezinski	  and	  the	  White	  House	  (found	  in	  the	  Carter	  Library),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  CIA	  material	  made	  available	  on	  the	  CREST	  database	  at	  the	  National	  Archives	  II,	  MD.	  It	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  revise	  some	  of	  the	  conclusions	  made	  here	  when	  the	  more	  in	  depth	  analytical	  reports	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  are	  made	  available.	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paradigms	  and	  married	  once	  more	  to	  the	  old	  European	  order	  of	  the	  former	  colonial	  powers;	   the	  results	  were	  disastrous	   for	  Congo	   itself,	   for	  American	  standing	   in	   the	  region	  and,	  ultimately,	  even	  for	  its	  relations	  with	  its	  Soviet	  rival.	  Divided	  into	  three	  parts,	   the	   following	  pages	  will	   thus	  analyse	  each	  of	   the	  Shaban	  crises	  respectively	  before	  considering	  the	  broader	  implications	  of	  the	  Carter	  policies	  that	  developed	  in	  response	  in	  a	  final	  section.	  	  	  
Crisis	  and	  Continuity:	  Carter	  Surveys	  Shaba	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   two	   chapters,	   with	   the	   economic	   downturn	   of	  1974	   and	   following	   the	   unpopular	   Angola	   debacle,	   the	   by	   now	   bankrupt	  Mobutu	  regime	  was	  beset	  by	  perpetual	   crises	   that	   increasingly	  undermined	   its	   legitimacy.	  449	  It	  did	  not	  take	  long	  for	  the	  new	  administration	  in	  Washington	  to	  be	  alerted	  to	  the	  plight	   of	   its	   troubled	   ally.	   In	   April	   1977	   Brzezinski	   received	   a	   summary	   of	  Ambassador	   Cutler’s	   report	   describing,	   ‘the	   spreading	   odour	   of	   political	   decay	   in	  Kinshasa.’450	  In	  a	  telegram	  the	  previous	  month	  the	  Kinshasa	  embassy	  surmised	  the	  festering	  situation	  in	  Congo	  as	  follows,	  	  ‘As	  reflected	  in	  our	  reporting	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  unhappiness	  with	  Mobutu’s	  regime	  has	   gradually	   deepened	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   variety	   of	   grievances:	   prolonged	   and	  worsening	  economic	  conditions	  occasioned	  in	  part	  by	  depressed	  copper	  prices	  but	  also	  in	  large	  measure	  by	  gross	  mismanagement	  of	  the	  economy;	  widespread	  and	  often	  blatant	   corruption,	   starting	  at	   the	   top	  of	   the	   regime	  and	  seeping	   far	  down;	   conspicuous	   consumption	   by	   the	   regime’s	   elite	   while	   it	   appeals	   for	  national	   austerity;	  misplaced	   priorities	   in	   allocating	   developmental	   resources,	  resulting	   in	   massive	   deterioration	   of	   the	   agricultural	   sector;	   ill-­‐conceived	  policies	  with	   respect	   to	   education,	   the	   church	   and	   other	   national	   institutions;	  progressive	  political	  isolation	  of	  the	  leader	  from	  his	  followers.’451	  	  Cutler	  might	   have	   added	   to	   the	   above	   that	   the	   poor	   showing	   of	   the	   FAZ	   (Armed	  Forces	   of	   Zaire)	   in	   Mobutu’s	   unpopular	   Angola	   foray	   seriously	   undermined	   the	  mainstay	   of	   his	   grip	   on	   the	   country.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Carter	   team	   inherited	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  449	  Congo’s	  economic	  woes	  continued	  to	  abound	  with	  the	  CIA	  noting	  ever	  increasing	  foreign	  debt	  climbing	  to	  1.7	  billion	  dollars,	  inflation	  surpassing	  eighty	  per	  cent	  once	  more	  and	  political	  vendettas	  targeting	  the	  few	  competent	  officials	  associated	  with	  economic	  stability,	  such	  as	  the	  dismissal	  of	  Central	  Bank	  Governor	  Sambwa,	  further	  shaking	  creditor	  confidence.	  National	  Intelligence	  Daily	  Cable,	  Zaire:	  More	  Debt	  Relief,	  13th	  August	  1977;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  450	  Memorandum	  for	  Brzezinski,	  Situation	  Room:	  Evening	  Notes,	  5th	  April	  1977;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  1,	  NSA,	  Jimmy	  Carter	  Library,	  Atlanta,	  Georgia	  (hereafter	  JCL)	  451	  Cutler,	  Kinshasa	  telegram	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Subject:	  ‘Shaba	  Invasion;	  Declining	  Prospects	  for	  Mobutu’s	  Political	  Survival;	  Recommended	  US	  Action’,	  26th	  March	  1977;	  NLC	  16,	  Cables	  Files,	  Carter	  Library	  Research	  Tool	  (digital	  copies	  available	  in	  Carter	  Library	  Reading	  Room,	  hereafter	  CREST,	  JCL)	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impending	  crisis	  predicted	  at	   the	  outset	  of	  Mobutu’s	  Angola	  adventure	  by	  Lannon	  Walker,	   the	   Deputy	   Chief	   of	   the	   Kinshasa	   Embassy	   who	   became	   the	   State	  Department’s	   Director	   for	   Central	   Africa	   under	   Carter,	   almost	   immediately	   upon	  assuming	  office.	  It	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  military	  incursion	  by	  the	  former	  Katangan	  gendarmes	   exiled	   in	   Angola	   who	   had	   fought	   alongside	   the	   MPLA	   to	   repulse	   the	  FNLA/FAZ	   incursion.	  Well	   aware	  of	   the	   shortcomings	  of	   its	   long-­‐term	  ally,	  within	  only	   a	   few	   weeks	   of	   assuming	   office	   the	   Carter	   White	   House	   was	   immediately	  presented	   with	   a	   stark	   test	   for	   its	   much-­‐vaunted	   principled	   stand	   in	   the	  international	  arena.	  Ultimately,	  despite	  a	  seemingly	  accurate	  and	  sober	  assessment	  of	  the	  events	  on	  the	  ground,	  familiar	  arguments	  for	  the	  need	  of	  stability	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  chaos	  remained	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Carter’s	  approach	  to	  Congo	  illustrating	  the	  degree	  of	  Cold	  War	  conservatism	  that	  shaped	  its	  policies	  from	  the	  beginning.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	  the	  9th	  March,	  news	  reached	  the	  White	  House	  that	  an	  undetermined	  number	  of	   former	   Katangan	   gendarmes	   had	   attacked	   several	   towns	   in	   southern	   Congo	   in	  the	  area	  of	  Kisenge.452	  That	  the	  simmering	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  finally	  boiled	  over	  into	  open	  confrontation	  in	  the	  Shaba	  region	  in	  early	  1977	  could	  not	  have	  come	  as	  a	  huge	  surprise	  to	  either	  Kinshasa	  or	  Washington	  observers.	  The	  mounting	   unpopularity	   of	   Congo’s	   government	   was	   particularly	   acute	   in	   this	  neglected	   province	   with	   its	   secessionist	   tendencies	   since	   the	   country’s	  independence.	   Coupled	   with	   a	   relatively	   well-­‐trained	   fighting	   force	   of	   former	  Katangan	  gendarmes	   in	  exile	   across	   the	  Angolan	  border,	  no	  doubt	   encouraged	  by	  the	   FAZ’s	   recent	   poor	   showing	   there,	   the	   situation	   was	   rife	   for	   further	   armed	  resistance	  into	  Congo.	  Moreover,	  the	  border	  was	  by	  no	  means	  secure	  following	  the	  official	  cessation	  of	  violence	  with	  the	  FNLA	  continuing	  its	  raids	  into	  Angola	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  retaliatory	  action	  into	  Congo	  the	  price	  of	  Mobutu’s	  continued	  support	  for	  the	  defeated	   Angolan	   movement.	   Finally,	   with	   the	   traditional	   power	   seat	   of	   the	  persecuted	   Lundas	   transcending	   the	   Shaba	   borders	   into	   northern	   Angola	   and	  Zambia,	  ethnic	  tensions	  exacerbated	  the	   isolation	  of	   the	  region	  from	  the	  country’s	  capital	   and	   assured	   widespread	   local	   support	   for	   any	   uprising	   or	   invading	   force	  along	  such	  lines.453	  As	  the	  first	  towns	  fell	  to	  some	  two	  thousand	  invading	  Katangan	  fighters	   (of	   an	   estimated	   total	   force	   of	   four	   thousand)	  with	   the	   typically	   sluggish	  FAZ	  putting	  up	  little	  to	  no	  resistance,	  the	  mining	  centre	  and	  economic	  heartland	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  452	  Memorandum	  for	  Brzezinski,	  The	  Situation	  Room:	  Noon	  Notes,	  9th	  March	  1977;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  1,	  NSA,	  JCL	  453	  Alan	  Donald,	  British	  Embassy	  Kinshasa	  to	  FCO	  London,	  ‘Last	  Chance	  for	  Mobutu’,	  9th	  June	  1978;	  FCO	  99/162-­‐	  Cuba/Zaire	  Shaba	  Invasion,	  Kew	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Congo	   was	   precariously	   threatened. 454 	  The	   details	   of	   the	   spreading	   invasion	  remained	  murky,	   however,	   and	   it	   is	  worth	   considering	  how	  Washington	  assessed	  the	  Katangan	  incursion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Initially,	   the	   CIA	   offered	   a	   slightly	   alarmist	   appraisal	   of	   the	   invading	   force	  pointing	  to	  its	  ties	  to	  the	  MPLA,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  level	  of	  equipment	  and	  organisational	  prowess	  to	  suggest	  a	  more	  sinister	  superpower	  involvement,	  	  ‘The	   invasion	   of	   Shaba	   Province	   has	   the	   appearance	   of	   a	   well-­‐planned,	  professionally	   executed	   operation…	   These	   gendarmes	   have	   been	   trained	   over	  the	   years	   by	   Belgian,	   Portuguese,	   and	   now	   Cuban	   advisers…(The	   gendarmes)	  appear	   to	   be	   well	   equipped,	   and	   may	   be	   operating	   with	   Soviet-­‐supplied	  armoured	   cars	   and	  multiple-­‐tube	   rocket	   launchers.	  White	   advisory	   personnel	  reportedly	  have	  been	  seen	  with	  the	  Katangan	  troops	  in	  Shaba	  province.’455	  	  The	   above	   intelligence	   report	   did	   not	   point	   this	   out	   but	   the	   implication	   of	   the	  Katangans	  willingness	  to	  switch	  allegiance	  from	  former	  colonial	  masters	  to	  Cuban	  revolutionaries	  clearly	  indicated	  a	  degree	  of	  pragmatism	  and	  a	  readiness	  to	  accept	  aid	   from	   any	  willing	   quarter	   rather	   than	   a	   deeper	   ideological	   commitment	   to	   the	  communist	   powers.	   Mobutu	   himself	   was,	   of	   course,	   eager	   to	   counter	   the	   poor	  performance	  of	  the	  FAZ	  in	  Shaba	  by	  once	  more	  relying	  on	  his	  superpower	  ally	  at	  a	  time	   of	   crisis	   and	   stressed	   the	   Soviet/Cuban	   support	   for	   the	   Katangan	   incursion	  with	  a	  virulent	  press	  campaign	  against	  this	  supposed	  communist	  aggression.456	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Despite	   the	   initial	  CIA	  warnings,	  however,	  both	   the	  Kinshasa	  embassy	  and	  DC	  officials	   remained	   largely	   unimpressed	   by	   Mobutu’s	   efforts.	   Indeed,	   Cutler	   was	  quick	   to	  point	  out	   the	  opportunistic	  nature	  of	  his	   allegations,	   ‘Mobutu’s	   efforts	   to	  internationalise	  the	  Shaba	  problem	  appear	  designed	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  US	  and	  its	  allies	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  the	  perceived	  Soviet	  threat	  in	  Africa.’457	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  intelligence	  community	  in	  Washington	  conceded	  the	  lack	  of	  accurate	  intelligence	  to	  confirm	  any	  foreign	  meddling	  in	  the	  crisis,	  ‘We	  really	  don’t	  know	  very	  much	  in	  any	  detail.	   There	   is	   no	   confirmation	   of	   Cubans	   (although	   there	   are	   some	  white	   faces	  around)	   nor	   is	   there	   any	   confirmation	   that	   Luanda	   is	   controlling	   the	   operation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  454	  Memorandum	  for	  Thomas	  Thorne,	  INR	  from	  NIO/AF,	  ‘Assessment	  of	  Developments	  in	  Zaire’	  17th	  March	  1977;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  455	  Ibid.	  456	  Cutler,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Shaba	  Attack:	  Mobutu	  lashes	  out	  at	  Soviets	  and	  Cubans’,	  23rd	  March	  1977;	  General	  Odom	  File,	  Box	  61,	  NSA,	  JCL;	  Mobutu	  interview	  with	  Newsweek’s	  Arnaud	  de	  Borchgrave	  asking	  whether	  it	  was	  US	  intention	  to	  simply	  abandon	  African	  moderates	  to	  Soviet	  expansionism	  and	  if	  they	  would	  be	  better	  served	  making	  their	  own	  arrangements,	  Memorandum	  for	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	  Situation	  Room:	  Noon	  Notes,	  8th	  April	  1977;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  NSA,	  Box	  1	  457	  Cutler,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Shaba	  Invasion:	  Consultations	  with	  Mobutu’,	  23rd	  March	  1977;	  General	  Odom	  File,	  Box	  61,	  NSA,	  JCL	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(although	   they	   are	   obviously	   involved).’ 458 	  As	   such,	   the	   report	   that	   reached	  Brzezinski’s	   desk	   at	   the	   White	   House	   stressed	   the	   local	   context	   of	   disturbances	  fuelled	  largely	  by	  grievances	  with	  the	  Mobutu	  regime,	  	  ‘More	  than	  any	  other	  area	  of	  Zaire	  it	  has	  felt	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  economic	  slump.	  The	  general	  populace	  has	   felt	   for	  some	  time	  now	  that	   the	  government	  has	  not	  responded	  to	  its	  needs	  and	  secessionist	  feelings	  still	  run	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  general	  population	  of	  the	  area…	  There	  is	  a	  danger	  that	  military	  operations	  in	  the	  area	  will	  spark	  widespread	  popular	  unrest	  against	  the	  Mobutu	  government.’459	  	  At	  this	  early	  stage	  in	  its	  dealings	  with	  the	  wily	  Kinshasa	  despot	  then,	  the	  fledgling	  Carter	  administration	  seemed	  to	  respond	  with	  a	  healthy	  degree	  of	  scepticism	  to	  his	  manoeuvres	  to	  turn	  the	  spreading	  unrest	  into	  another	  Cold	  War	  intrigue	  in	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	   appreciative	   of	   its	   specifically	   local	   dimensions,	   the	   upheaval	   in	   Shaba	  nevertheless	   presented	   Washington	   with	   a	   serious	   policy	   dilemma	   as	   Carter’s	  avowed	  effort	  for	  a	  more	  principled	  foreign	  policy	  approach	  ran	  into	  its	  first	  major	  Congolese	  test.	  The	  administration	  was	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  controversy	  entailed	  in	  any	  seeming	  endorsement	  of	  the	  unpopular	  Congolese	  dictator.	  Nor	  was	  a	  move	   towards	  a	  more	  direct	  American	   involvement	   in	   a	   further	  African	   conflict	  politically	   viable.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   considerable	   nervousness	   over	   the	   potential	  collapse	   of	   an	   ally	   seen	   firmly	   in	   the	  Western	   camp	   remained,	   with	   all	   that	   this	  might	   entail	   for	   Carter’s	   standing	   in	   Africa	   and	   the	   world	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   recent	   Soviet	  gains	   in	   this	   arena.	   The	   problem	   was	   succinctly	   summarised	   in	   an	  interdepartmental	  discussion	  on	  Zaire	  policy	  as	  follows,	  	  ‘The	  dilemma	   is	   a	   simple	   and	   traditional	   one.	  How	   far	  do	  we	  go	   to	   support	   a	  regime	   that	   is	   very	   imperfect	   but	   is	   friendly	   to	   us,	   with	  which	  we	   have	   been	  deeply	   involved,	   and	   which	   is	   seen	   to	   be	   our	   ally?	   To	   what	   extent	   is	   our	  credibility	  at	  stake?	  Will	  our	  help	  have	  any	  real	  chance	  of	  success	  in	  making	  the	  FAZ	   a	   capable	   instrument?	  Will	   our	   involvement	   tend	   to	   increase	   the	   already	  more	  than	  latent	  polarization	  along	  US-­‐Soviet/Cuban	  lines?’460	  	  Indeed,	   top-­‐level	   policy	   advisers,	   from	  NSC	   staffers,	   the	   State	  Department	   and	   its	  Kinshasa	  embassy,	  the	  CIA	  and	  even	  the	  Policy	  Planning	  Staff	  under	  Anthony	  Lake,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  458	  Thomas	  P.	  Thornton,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  Files,	  Subject:	  ‘Zaire	  Situation’	  (Discussion	  between	  Thomas	  P.	  Thornton	  (NSC),	  Bill	  Odom,	  Anne	  Holloway	  (AF),	  Tom	  Buchanan	  (AF),	  Gerry	  Helman	  (IO)	  from	  State	  and	  Bill	  Parmenter	  (NIO)	  and	  –classified-­‐	  (CIA)),	  16th	  March	  1977;	  CREST,	  NLC	  24,	  North	  South,	  JCL	  459	  Memorandum	  for	  Brzezinski,	  The	  Situation	  Room:	  Noon	  Notes,	  9th	  March	  1977;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  1,	  NSA,	  JCL	  	  460	  Thornton,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  Files,	  Subject:	  Zaire	  Situation	  (Discussion	  between	  Thomas	  P.	  Thornton	  (NSC),	  Bill	  Odom,	  Anne	  Holloway	  (AF),	  Tom	  Buchanan	  (AF),	  Gerry	  Helman	  (IO)	  from	  State	  and	  Bill	  Parmenter	  (NIO)	  and	  –classified-­‐	  (CIA)),	  16th	  March	  1977;	  CREST,	  NLC	  24,	  JCL	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agonised	   over	   its	   response	   to	   the	   Shaba	   crisis	   and,	   despite	   this	   interagency	  approach,	  a	  remarkable	  consensus	  emerged.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	  was	  largely	  accepted	  that	  American	  inaction	  would	  likely	  lead	  to	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  government.	  Indeed,	  in	  a	  clear	  effort	  to	  transcend	  the	  traditional	  Cold	  War	   paradigm,	   Lake	   suggested	   that	   America’s	   chief	   interest	   in	   Congo	   was	   ‘the	  maintenance	   of	   sound	   economic	   relationship’	   which	   could	   be	   accomplished	   with	  ‘almost	   any	   Zairian	   government’.461	  	   The	   CIA	   too	   considered	   that	   the	   continued	  access	  to	  Congolese	  strategic	  minerals	  (notably	  cobalt	  from	  Shaba	  making	  up	  some	  seventy-­‐five	  per	  cent	  of	  American	  demand)	  could	  be	  maintained	  regardless	  of	   the	  regime	   that	   occupied	   the	   seat	   of	   power	   in	   Kinshasa.462	  Despite	   this	   seemingly	  progressive	   approach,	   however,	   no	   one	  was	  willing	   to	   go	   quite	   so	   far	   as	   to	   drop	  Mobutu	   completely.	   Indeed,	   the	   thought	   of	   a	   complete	   collapse	   of	   the	   Kinshasa	  regime	  still	  filled	  many	  corners	  of	  the	  administration	  with	  considerable	  trepidation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  starkest	  warning	  over	  the	  consequences	  of	  such	  a	  development	  came	  in	  the	  form	   of	   a	   lengthy	  memorandum	   from	   Admiral	   Stansfield	   Turner.	   The	   Director	   of	  Central	   Intelligence	  pointed	  to	  the	   likely	  regional	   implications	   for	  southern	  Africa,	  the	   potential	   for	   escalating	   East-­‐West	   involvement	   and	   the	   threat	   to	   American	  credibility	  if	  this	  African	  ‘domino’	  did	  indeed	  fall.	  As	  such,	  Turner	  wrote,	  	  ‘Mobutu’s	  overthrow	  would	  be	  followed	  by	  turmoil	   in	  Zaire	  itself,	  with	  various	  factions	  and	  provincial	  regimes	  scrambling	  for	  pieces	  of	  the	  pie	  and	  beseeching	  support	  from	  the	  US,	  the	  Soviets	  and	  the	  Chinese…	  Radical	  groups	  would	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  Shaba	  (the	  old	  Katanga)	  as	  a	  domestic	  support	  base	  and	  both	  nearby	  Angola	   and	   the	  Congo	   as	   actively	  helpful	   neighbours.	  We	   could	   expect	  Cubans	  to	  be	  invited	  to	  assist	  in	  stabilizing	  the	  situation…	  After	  the	  initial	  phase	  of	   disorder,	   and	   assuming	   a	   radical	   regime	   came	   to	   power,	   a	   regional	  realignment	   of	   forces	   would	   emerge,	   with	   Angola	   as	   the	   principle	   immediate	  regional	  beneficiary.	  Angola’s	  other	  problems	  would	  be	  solved,	  although	  UNITA	  would	   not	   be	   immediately	   effected	   in	   the	   South;	   the	   Benguela	   Railway	  ultimately	  could	  be	  reopened;	  and	  a	  more	  secure	  base	  formed	  for	  the	  training	  of	  guerrilla	  forces	  for	  Namibia	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  for	  Rhodesia.’	  	  Moreover,	  American	  prestige	  would	  be	  dealt	  a	  marked	  blow	  as,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  461	  From	  Anthony	  Lake	  (Director	  of	  Policy	  Planning)	  and	  Leslie	  Gelb	  (Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Political	  and	  Military	  Affairs)	  to	  Secretary	  Vance,	  ‘Zaire	  Policy’,	  5th	  April	  1977;	  RG59,	  P9,	  Records	  of	  Anthony	  Lake,	  Box	  17,	  NARAII	  462	  Memorandum	  from	  DCI	  Admiral	  Stansfield	  Turner	  to	  Brzezinski,	  Vance,	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Harold	  Brown,	  JCS,	  ‘Implications	  of	  the	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Zaire’,	  17th	  March	  1977;	  NLC	  2,	  Dailey	  CIA	  Briefs	  CREST,	  JCL	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‘Mobutu	  has	  long	  been	  identified	  throughout	  Africa	  and	  the	  Third	  World	  as	  a	  US	  client,	  presiding	  over	  a	  piece	  of	  highly	  strategic	  geography;	  his	  downfall	   could	  not	  fail	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  major	  “loss”	  for	  the	  US	  in	  Africa	  and	  especially	  if	  he	  had	   a	   radical	   successor,	   a	   potential	   if	   not	   actual	   “gain”	   for	   the	   USSR,	   and	   the	  radical	  socialist	  club	  in	  Africa.’463	  	  In	   other	   words,	   despite	   the	   debacle	   of	   its	   failed	   Congo	   alliance	   in	   its	   Angola	  adventure,	   the	  new	  CIA	  chief	  held	   firm	  to	   the	  view	  that	  Mobutu	  at	   least	  served	   to	  protect	  a	  modicum	  of	  regional	  stability	  and	  his	  demise	  would	  only	  exacerbate	   the	  dangers	   of	   further	   foreign	   meddling	   and	   perceived	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   adventurism	   in	  Africa	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  American	  interests.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Other	  quarters	  within	   the	   administration	  did	  not	   substantially	   contradict	   this	  view	  of	  Mobutu	  as	  a	  bastion	  for	  stability,	  continuity	  and	  American	  credibility.	  Even	  ambassador	  Cutler	   tempered	  his	  damning	  assessment	  of	  Mobutu’s	  regime	  cited	  at	  the	  beginning	  by	  pointing	  to	  Mobutu’s	  apparently	  significant	  pluses,	  ‘not	  the	  least	  of	  these	   is	   important	   fact	   of	   life	   that	   Mobutu,	   in	   contrast	   to	   any	   other	   leader	   since	  independence,	  has	  achieved	  the	  seemingly	  impossible	  by	  creating	  political	  stability	  nationwide	   and	   maintaining	   it	   for	   almost	   a	   dozen	   years.’464	  NSC	   staffer	   Thomas	  Thornton	  too	  was	  quick	  to	  acknowledge	  Washington’s	  perception	  that	  there	  was	  no	  alternative	   to	   the	  Mobutu	  regime	  to	  secure	  American	   interests,	   ‘At	   the	  same	  time,	  we	  may	  well	  be	  selling	  Mobutu	  short,	  and	  a	  visible	  withdrawal	  of	  US	  support	  would	  spell	   the	  end	   for	  him.	  There	   is	  no	  desirable	  successor	  government	  standing	   in	   the	  wings.’465	  Even	  Anthony	  Lake	  and	  Les	  Gelb’s	  carefully	  considered	  review	  of	  Congo	  policy	   for	   the	   State	  Department,	  with	   its	   emphasis	   on	  American	   economic	   stakes,	  acknowledged	  the	  apparent	  threat	  to	  regional	  stability	  and	  American	  credibility	  in	  the	  Shaba	  situation,	  concluding,	   ‘…	  We	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  charge	  that	  we	  “walked	  away”.’466	  As	  such,	  the	  shared	  opinion	  from	  the	  various	  corners	  of	  the	  Carter	  administration	  saw	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  as	  an	  undesirable	  partner	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  viewing	  his	  demise	  as	  fraught	  with	  dangers	  for	  American	  interests	  and	  opportunities	  for	  Soviet	  advances.	  The	  question	  remained,	  however,	  over	  how	  this	  ambiguity	  could	  be	  translated	  into	  a	  meaningful	  policy	  response?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  463	  DCI	  Turner	  to	  Brzezinski,	  Vance,	  Brown,	  JCS,	  ‘Implications	  of	  the	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Zaire’,	  17th	  March	  1977;	  NLC	  2,	  CREST,	  JCL	  464	  Cutler,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Subject:’	  Shaba	  Invasion;	  Declining	  Prospects	  for	  Mobutu’s	  Political	  Survival;	  Recommended	  US	  Action’26th	  March	  1977;	  NLC	  16,	  CREST,	  JCL	  465	  Thomas	  P.	  Thornton,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  Files,	  Subject:	  ‘Zaire	  Situation’	  (Discussion	  between	  Thomas	  P.	  Thornton	  (NSC),	  Bill	  Odom,	  Anne	  Holloway	  (AF),	  Tom	  Buchanan	  (AF),	  Gerry	  Helman	  (IO)	  from	  State	  and	  Bill	  Parmenter	  (NIO)	  and	  –classified-­‐	  (CIA)),	  16th	  March	  1977;	  NLC	  24,	  CREST,	  JCL	  466	  Lake	  and	  Gelb	  (Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Political	  and	  Military	  Affairs)	  to	  Vance,	  Zaire	  Policy,’	  5th	  April	  1977;	  RG59,	  P9,	  Records	  of	  Anthony	  Lake,	  Box	  17,	  NARAII	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  In	  grappling	  with	  its	  options	  that	  ranged	  from	  the	  unfettered	  endorsement	  and	  reliance	  on	  Mobutu	  akin	  to	  that	  seen	  during	  the	  Kissinger	  years	  to	  abandoning	   its	  ally	  of	  old	   completely,	   the	  various	  departments	  desperately	   sought	  a	   compromise	  solution.	  It	  was	  the	  Kinshasa	  embassy	  that	  recommended	  a	  seemingly	  workable,	  if	  superficial,	  middle	   path	   between	  offering	   some	   assistance	   to	   Congo	  while	   staying	  aloof	  from	  the	  unpalatable	  regime.	  As	  such,	  Ambassador	  Cutler	  recommended	  that	  further	   support	   would	   be	   publically	   justified	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   principled	   stand	   to	  preserve	  Congo’s	  territorial	   integrity,	  a	  concept	  inline	  with	  the	  OAU	  charter,	  while	  avoiding	  a	  close	  identification	  with	  Mobutu	  personally.	  Thus	  Cutler	  wrote,	  	  	  ‘The	   problem	  which	  Mobutu’s	   unpopularity	   poses	   for	   US	   diplomacy	   at	   a	   time	  when	   the	   territorial	   integrity	   of	   Zaire	   is	   threatened	   is	   a	   delicate	   one.	   In	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  clear	  indication	  that	  the	  US	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between	  support	  of	  principles	   and	   support	   for	   Mobutu,	   the	   perception	   here,	   and	   we	   presume	  abroad	  as	  well,	  risks	  being	  one	  of	  the	  US	  govt	  propping	  up	  a	  regime	  unwanted	  and	   unsupported	   by	   the	   populace.	  We	  believe	   it	   is	   in	   our	   own	   self-­‐interest	   to	  begin	  to	  draw	  the	  distinction	  clearly	  and	  I	  belief	  the	  place	  to	  start	  is	  in	  the	  field	  of	  public	  diplomacy.’467	  	  To	   be	   clear,	   this	   suggested	   break	   did	   not	   envision	   withdrawing	   support	   for	   the	  Kinshasa	  regime.	  Much	  rather,	  any	  such	  support	  should	  be	  justified	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  defence	  of	  Congo’s	  sovereignty,	  rather	  than	  assisting	  Mobutu	  personally,	  to	  present	  it	  in	  a	  more	  palatable	  light.	  This	  is	  important	  as	  it	  indicates	  a	  schism	  between	  public	  rhetoric	   and	   actual	   policy	   that	   would	   become	   key	   to	   Washington’s	   approach	   to	  Congo.	  Not	  nearly	  as	  free	  from	  old	  Cold	  War	  conservatism	  as	  Lake’s	  analysis	  would	  suggest	   at	   first	   glance,	   the	   administration	   sought	   to	   distance	   itself	   from	   the	  Congolese	  dictator	  personally	   and	  avoid	  a	  deepening	   involvement	   in	   the	   crisis	  on	  the	   one	   hand,	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   searching	   for	   a	  way	   to	   counter	   threatening	  instability	  in	  Congo	  much	  as	  its	  predecessors	  had	  done.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Reverting	  to	  the	  familiar	  line	  that	  Africa	  remained	  the	  primary	  responsibility	  of	  the	   former	   colonial	   powers	   with	   the	   greatest	   stakes	   in	   the	   continent,	   the	   Carter	  administration	  cast	  a	  hopeful	  eye	  to	  Europe	  to	  meet	  Congo’s	  most	  urgent	  security	  needs.	   Indeed,	   between	   Belgian’s	   long-­‐standing	   interests	   in	   Congo	   and	   a	   willing	  French	   activism	   in	   the	   region	   combined	   with	   its	   growing	   involvement	   in	   Congo	  itself,	   a	   ready-­‐made	   European	   solution	   to	   the	   American	   dilemma	   was	   emerging.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  Secretary	  Vance	  flew	  to	  Paris	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  April	  to	  consult	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  467	  Cutler,	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  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Shaba	  Invasion;	  Declining	  Prospects	  for	  Mobutu’s	  Political	  Survival;	  Recommended	  US	  Action’,	  26th	  March	  1977;	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  16,	  CREST,	  JCL	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with	   his	   Belgian	   and	   French	   counterparts.	   Indeed,	   before	   delving	   deeper	   into	   the	  unfolding	   American	   strategy,	   it	   is	   worth	   briefly	   reviewing	   the	   respective	  approaches	   of	   these	   two	   old	   Africa	   hands	   that	   would	   form	   the	   cornerstone	   of	  Carter’s	  policies	  towards	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Brussels	  officials	  sought	  to	  emphasise	  the	  apparent	  Cold	  War	  dimensions	  of	  the	  unfolding	   turmoil	   in	   Shaba,	   perhaps	   reflecting	   their	   narrow	   focus	   on	   immediate	  economic	   interests	   and	   a	   corresponding	   desire	   to	   secure	   the	   backing	   of	   its	  superpower	   ally.	   In	   Vance’s	   meeting	   with	   Foreign	  Minister	   Van	   Elslande	   and	   his	  aide	  on	   the	  2nd	  April,	   the	  Belgians	   stressed	   ‘the	   extensive	   ideological	   and	  military	  preparation	   that	   had	   gone	   into	   the	   Katangan	   gendarmes’	   invasion	   of	   Shaba	  province…’	   explaining	   to	   Vance	   that	   the	   Katangans	   were	   ‘…	   now	   interested	   in	  overthrowing	  Mobutu	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  “Congo”	  which	  would	  be	  aligned	  with	  the	  Soviets	  and	  radical	  African	  states.’	  Vance	  chimed	  in	  to	  confirm	  the	  US	  view	  of	   this	   gloomy	  picture	   citing	   the	   threat	   to	  Zairian	   territorial	   integrity	   running	   the	  risk	  of	   ‘destabilization	  throughout	  this	  region	  of	  Africa’.468	  Both	  sides	  conveniently	  omitted	   the	   former	   alliance	   between	   the	   Belgians	   and	   the	  Katangans	   of	   the	   early	  1960s	   from	   the	   discussion	   over	   the	   former	   secessionists’	   presumed	   ideological	  reorientation	   and	   appeared	   united	   in	   their	   desire	   for	   swift	   action	   to	   resolve	   the	  unrest	  in	  Shaba.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  According	   to	  Belgian	  estimates,	  with	  more	  adequate	   leadership	   the	  FAZ	  could	  be	  turned	  into	  a	  capable	  fighting	  force	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  Katangan	  incursion.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Belgian	  policy	  recommendations	  sought	  to	  accommodate	  both	  American	  domestic	   constraints,	   repeatedly	   stressed	   by	   Vance,	   and	   their	   own	   reluctance	   to	  become	  too	  intimately	  involved	  with	  Mobutu	  personally	  in	  view	  of	  past	  turbulences	  in	   Kinshasa-­‐Brussels	   relations.	   As	   such,	   the	   Belgians	   once	   again	   saw	   a	   possible	  solution	   in	   the	   tried	   and	   tested	   tactic	   of	   introducing	   mercenaries	   to	   stiffen	   the	  resolve	   of	   Congo’s	   armed	   forces.	  His	   allies	   could	   confine	   themselves	   to	   supplying	  debt	   relief	   and	   equipment	   to	   free	   up	   funds	   for	   Mobutu	   to	   make	   his	   own	  arrangements	   in	   hiring	   additional	   manpower.	   Indeed,	   the	   record	   of	   a	   meeting	  between	  Thornton	  and	  Belgian	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  Mission	  Alfred	  Cahen	  in	  Washington	  on	   the	   5th	   of	   April	   suggests	   certain	   currents	   within	   the	   Belgian	   camp	   were	  deliberating	  over	  more	  drastic	  measures,	  even	  considering	  alternatives	  to	  Mobutu	  at	  Congo’s	  helm.	  The	  following	  passage	  summarising	  this	  meeting	  was	  highlighted	  with	  the	  comment	  ‘good’,	  presumably	  by	  Brzezinski-­‐	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  summary,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  468	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  Meeting	  with	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  NLC	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‘His	  (Cahen)	  policy	  proposal	  is	  that	  the	  Belgians	  and	  French	  supply	  mercenaries	  and	   military	   equipment	   while	   the	   United	   States	   sends	   food	   and	   medical	  supplies.	   The	   object	   would	   be	   to	   stabilize	   the	   situation	   so	   that	  Mobutu	   could	  gracefully	  withdraw	  and	  some	  more	  acceptable	   figure,	  such	  s	  Foreign	  Minister	  Nguza	  could	  put	  the	  pieces	  together.’469	  	  The	   available	   record	   goes	   no	   further	   on	   this	   so	   whether	   Cahen’s	   statement	   was	  simply	  the	  speculative	  whim	  of	  a	  lone	  individual,	  or	  whether	  the	  matter	  was	  quietly	  dropped	   by	   a	   Belgian	   parliament	   unwilling	   to	   pursue	   such	   a	   course	   only	   weeks	  before	  a	  general	  election,	  remains	  unclear.	  Whatever	  the	  case,	   this	  discussion	  was	  quickly	   overtaken	   by	   events	   as	   the	   French	   offered	   a	   more	   enticing	   and	   perhaps	  realistic	  alternative	  still.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Following	   the	   independence	   of	   its	   colonies	   in	   Africa,	   France	   had	   expended	  considerable	  effort	   towards	  preserving	   its	   influence	  and	  protecting	   its	   interests	   in	  the	   former	   dependencies	   through	   a	   series	   of	   bilateral	   economic,	   cultural	   and	  defence	  agreements	  and	  even	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  single	  currency	  area	  pegged	  to	  the	  Franc	  (Communautés	  Financière	  Africaine).	  This	  approach	  reflected	  as	  much	  a	  desire	   to	  maintain	  preferential	   economic	   ties	   and	  access	   to	  markets	   and	   strategic	  raw	  materials	  (notably	  uranium),	  as	  it	  looked	  to	  seize	  a	  Third	  World	  opportunity	  to	  project	  French	  prestige	  and	  support	  claims	  to	  continued	  global	  influence	  and	  major	  power	  status.	  By	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  the	  presidency	  of	  Valery	  Giscard	  d’Estaing,	  this	  classical	   neo-­‐colonial	   approach	  was	  matched	   by	   a	   resurgent	   French	  militarism	   in	  Africa	   with	   interventions	   underway	   in	   Chad,	   Mauritania	   and	   Djibouti	   in	   what	  became	  known	  as	  French	  ‘Gendarmeism’	  on	  the	  continent.470	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  extend	  its	  influence	  in	  francophone	  Africa	  beyond	  its	  immediate	  colonial	  roots,	  France	  thus	  built	   up	   both	   economic	   and	   military	   assistance	   ties	   with	   the	   Mobutu	   regime	  throughout	   the	   1970s.471	  As	   such,	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	   Shaba	   crisis,	   France	   had	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  in	  Review	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  Base	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  Martin	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Africa:	  The	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  French	  Connection’	  Annals	  of	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Political	  and	  Social	  Science	  Vol.	  489	  (Jan.	  1987);	  471	  On	  the	  economic	  front,	  alongside	  installing	  a	  Creusot-­‐Loire	  dairy	  factory	  at	  Nsele	  and	  the	  SOTEXKI	  textile	  factory	  in	  Kisangani,	  France	  also	  indulged	  Mobutu’s	  penchant	  for	  prestige	  projects	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Trade	  Centre	  of	  Zaire,	  a	  thirteen	  station	  satellite	  communications	  network	  and	  the	  broadcasting	  facilities	  of	  the	  Voice	  of	  Zaire	  in	  Kinshasa;	  all	  financed	  with	  loans	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  French	  government.	  In	  the	  military	  sphere,	  following	  an	  initially	  secret	  technical	  assistance	  agreement	  in	  1974	  and	  the	  sale	  of	  Mirage	  fighter	  jets	  and	  Alouette	  and	  Puma	  helicopters;	  French	  military	  sales	  to	  Congo	  actually	  surpassed	  those	  of	  the	  United	  States	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade	  according	  to	  data	  prepared	  by	  the	  Stockholm	  International	  Peace	  Research	  Institute.	  Ibid.	  p.	  71;	  B.	  Verhaegan,	  ‘Les	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  au	  Zaire,	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  in	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  71-­‐87	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established	  a	  considerable	  stake	  in	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  and	  clearly	  viewed	  Congo	  as	  within	  its	  sphere	  of	  influence	  in	  francophone	  Africa.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   the	  meeting	   with	   his	   Belgian	   counterparts,	   Vance	   told	   Van	   Elslande	   that	  Giscard	   had	   informed	   him	   that	  morning	   of	   having,	   ‘just	   received	   a	   call	   from	  King	  Hassan,	   who	   had	   expressed	   a	   willingness	   to	   have	   an	   unspecified	   number	   of	  Moroccan	   “volunteers”	   to	   go	   to	   Zaire.’472	  As	   the	   various	   observers	   in	  Washington	  and	  Europe	  ostensibly	  favoured	  an	  ‘African’	  solution	  to	  Congo’s	  security	  issues,	  the	  French/Moroccan	  offer	  seemed	  to	  offer	  a	  convenient	  regional	  option	  to	  strengthen	  Mobutu’s	   wavering	   regime.	   As	   a	   result,	   from	   the	   vantage	   of	   the	   Carter	  administration,	   Vance’s	   Paris	   trip	   yielded	   a	   seemingly	   workable	   if	   superficial	  solution	  to	  its	  Congo	  dilemma.	  After	  various	  rumours	  and	  denials	  from	  Rabat	  in	  the	  first	   week	   of	   April,	   the	   French	   embassy	   eventually	   confirmed	   that	   France	   would	  airlift	   approximately	   1,500	  Moroccan	   troops	   to	   Shaba	  province.	  At	   the	   same	   time	  the	   FAZ	   would	   be	   assisted	   by	   some	   fifty	   Belgian	   and	   sixty-­‐five	   French	   military	  advisers.	   Mobutu	   was	   even	   able	   to	   enlist	   the	   support	   of	   Arab	   allies	   with	   Saudi	  Arabia,	  Kuwait,	  Qatar	  and	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  providing	  some	  financial	  aid	  to	  pay	   for	   the	   Moroccan	   troops	   in	   what	   the	   Situation	   Room	   described	   as	   a	   ‘timely	  boost’	   to	   ‘Kinshasa’s	   near	   empty	   coffers’.473 	  As	   such,	   Mobutu’s	   most	   pressing	  security	   concerns	   were	   addressed	   and	   the	   United	   States	   could	   confine	   itself	   to	  supplying	   largely	   non-­‐lethal	   assistance	   in	   this	   field;	   as	   it	   airlifted	   parachutes,	  clothing,	   radios,	   batteries	   and	   spare	   parts	   to	   assist	   the	   FAZ-­‐Moroccan	   effort	   and	  contributed	  some	  thirty	  million	  dollars	  in	  Foreign	  Military	  Sales	  credits.474	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	  be	   sure,	   even	   the	   administration	   avowed	   contention	   that	   it	  was	   supplying	  ‘non-­‐lethal’	   aid	  was	  not	   strictly	   speaking	   true	   in	   the	   final	   analysis.	  When	   the	   FAZ	  was	   running	   low	   on	   M-­‐16	   ammunition,	   the	   White	   House	   was	   quick	   to	   approve	  Vance’s	  recommendation	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  two	  million	  rounds	  in	  accordance	  with	  ambassador	  Cutler’s	  suggestion.475	  Faced	  with	  serious	  resistance	  and	  an	  organised	  military	  force	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  Katangans	  withdrew	  across	  the	  border	  within	  a	  month	  and	  the	  immediate	  military	  threat	  to	  Shaba	  and	  the	  country	  at	  large	  quickly	  evaporated.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Stockholm	  International	  Peace	  Research	  Institute,	  www.sipri.org;	  The	  Institute	  itself	  cautions	  that	  its	  sources	  cannot	  always	  be	  100%	  accurate	  and	  should	  be	  used	  to	  indicate	  trends.	  	  472	  Telegram	  from	  Secretary	  Vance,	  Paris	  to	  Brzezinski,	  DC,	  Secretary’s	  Meeting	  with	  Foreign	  Minister	  Van	  Elslande,	  3rd	  April	  1977;	  NLC	  16,	  CREST,	  JCL	  473	  Memorandum	  for	  Brzezinski,	  Situation	  Room:	  Evening	  Notes,	  27th	  April	  1977;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  2,	  NSA,	  JCL	  474	  Vance	  to	  American	  Embassy	  Brussels,	  ‘Border	  Attack	  on	  Zaire’,	  14th	  March	  1977;	  General	  Odom	  File,	  Box	  61,	  NSA,	  JCL	  475	  Vance	  to	  the	  president,	  ‘Military	  Aid	  to	  Zaire’;	  NLC	  2,	  CREST,	  JCL	  
	   183	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	   such,	   in	   the	   immediate	   term	   the	   Carter	   White	   House	   could	   perhaps	   be	  satisfied	   with	   its	   first	   encounter	   with	   the	   Mobutu	   state.	   The	   threat	   of	   Congo’s	  disintegration,	   and	   all	   that	   this	  might	   entail	   for	   the	  wider	   region	   in	   the	  minds	   of	  Washington	   policy	   makers,	   had	   been	   averted.	   Moreover,	   France-­‐	   and	   to	   a	   lesser	  extent	  Belgium-­‐	  had	  shouldered	  the	  bulk	  of	  Congo’s	  security	  burden	  permitting	  the	  United	  States	  to	  put	  some	  welcome	  distance	  between	  itself	  and	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  That	  this	  could	  only	  be	  the	  first	  step	  towards	  a	  broader	  rescue	  of	  Congo	  was	  clear,	  however.	   Most	   notably,	   there	   remained	   the	   spectre	   of	   Congo’s	   imminent	   fiscal	  collapse	   into	  bankruptcy.	  As	  such,	  despite	  Mobutu’s	   failure	   to	  comply	   to	   the	  1976	  IMF	  stabilisation	  plan,	   the	  United	  States	  was	  again	   integral	   in	  mustering	   renewed	  commitments	  from	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  various	  corporate	  bank	  donors	  to	   prolong	   Congo’s	   public	   and	   private	   debt	   by	   another	   year,	   thus	   temporarily	  forestalling	  the	  country’s	  financial	  collapse.476	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  playing	  only	  a	  secondary	   role	   in	   the	   security	   field,	   the	   United	   States	   remained	   integral	   to	   the	  continued	  propping	  up	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  throughout	  this	  period.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  That	   the	   Carter	   administration’s	   response	   to	   the	   first	   Shaba	   crisis	   was	   not	  without	  domestic	  critics	  soon	  became	  clear.	  A	  Washington	  Post	  editorial	  at	  the	  time	  of	   the	   first	  US	  airlift	  of	  equipment	   to	  Zaire	   illustrates	   this	   scepticism	  over	   the	  US-­‐Congo	   alliance	   as	   it	   pointed	   to	   Mobutu’s	   poor	   human	   rights	   record,	   the	   opaque	  nature	  of	  the	  Shaba	  disturbances	  and	  post-­‐Vietnam	  anxiety	  over	  being	  drawn	  into	  another	   third	   world	   conflict.	   Perhaps	   more	   importantly	   still,	   the	   editorial	   saw	  Carter	  as	  falling	  far	  short	  of	  his	  initial	  promise	  and	  setting	  dangerous	  precedents	  in	  his	  first	  confrontation	  with	  Congo	  and	  the	  third	  world,	  ‘It	  is	  odd	  to	  see	  him	  reacting	  to	  his	   first	   challenge	   in	   the	  pattern	  of	   the	  previous	   administration:	   hustling	  more	  security	  assistance	  to	  a	  long-­‐time	  client	  state	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  under	  Cuban	  guns.’ 477 	  Indeed,	   the	   administration	   itself	   was	   acutely	   aware	   of	   this	   popular	  rejection	  of	  Mobutu	  in	  America	  and	  a	  State	  Department	  background	  briefing	  ahead	  of	  Vice	  President	  Walter	  Mondale’s	  meeting	  with	  Congo’s	   Foreign	  Minister	  Nguza	  Karl-­‐I-­‐Bond	  in	  Washington	  in	  July	  1977	  summarised	  this	  sentiment	  as	  follows,	  ‘This	  “measured”	   US	   response	   (to	   Shaba	   I)	   was	   not	   supported	   by	   some	   members	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  476	  ‘Cost	  of	  Zairian	  Stabilization	  &	  Recovery’	  (Fragment:	  no	  date	  or	  author	  given-­‐	  presumably	  late	  1978);	  General	  Odom	  File,	  Box	  61,	  NSA,	  JCL	  	  477	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  ‘Why	  Zaire?’	  March	  16,	  1977;	  Editorial;	  p.	  A20	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Congress	  and	   the	  public	  who	  view	  Mobutu’s	   regime	  as	  corrupt	  and	  having	  a	  poor	  record	  on	  human	  rights.’478	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   administration	   was	   thus	   at	   least	   in	   part	   responding	   to	   a	   popular	   and	  Congressional	   mood	   against	   the	   support	   of	   obviously	   corrupt	   and	   unpalatable	  dictators	   when	   it	   began	   to	   champion	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   Kinshasa	   government.	  Framing	   its	  military	  and	   fiscal	  bailout	   in	   terms	  of	  a	  necessary	   first	  step	  towards	  a	  more	   comprehensive	   rehabilitation	   of	   the	  Mobutu	   regime	   proved	   a	   useful	   tool	   in	  selling	   American	   policy	   to	   Congress	   and	   the	   public	   at	   large	   at	   this	   stage.	   The	  reformist	  concerns	  of	  the	  Carter	  administration	  were	  added	  after	  the	  fact	  and	  only	  once	  Mobutu’s	  pressing	  security	  concerns	  had	  been	  met,	  of	  course.	  This	  should	  not	  detract	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   for	   the	   first	   time	   a	   consistent	   call	   for	   an	   economic	   and	  political	  overhaul	  coloured	  Washington’s	  dealings	  with	   its	  Kinshasa	  ally,	  however.	  These	  pressures	  stood	   in	  stark	  contrast	   to	  Kissinger’s	   response	   to	  similar	  cries	   to	  modernise	   the	   state	   of	   Congo.	   It	   is	   worth	   recalling	   that	   even	   after	   the	   Angola	  debacle	   the	   then	   Secretary	   of	   State	   ignored	   the	   better	   judgment	   of	   his	   Africa	  specialists	   and	   completely	   avoided	   the	   issue	   of	   reform	   in	   his	   personal	   meetings	  with	  Mobutu.	  Throughout	  the	  Carter	  years,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  issue	  of	  economic	  reform	  along	   the	   lines	  of	   the	  various	   IMF	  stabilization	  plans,	   the	  need	   for	  greater	  political	   decentralization	   and	   plurality	   and	   pressure	   for	   improvement	   in	   Congo’s	  human	   rights	   record	   remained	   constant	   (if	   secondary)	   themes	   both	   in	   the	  administration’s	   dealings	   with	   Congo	   and	   its	   European	   allies.	   While	   no	   more	  effective	   in	  the	   long	  run,	  this	  translated	  into	  a	  visible	  cooling	  of	  relations	  between	  Washington	  and	  Kinshasa.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Already	  during	  the	  first	  Shaba	  crisis	  Mobutu	  was	  visibly	  disgruntled	  in	  what	  he	  saw	   as	   a	   lack	   of	   support	   from	   his	   trusted	   US	   ally	   and	   sought	   to	   retaliate	   with	   a	  familiar	   trick.479	  Reverting	   to	   a	   diplomatic	   stunt	   that	   had	   made	   Kissinger’s	   pulse	  race	  only	  two	  years	  earlier,	  he	  once	  more	  fired	  accusations	  at	  American	  diplomats	  in	   Congo	   asserting	   that	   American	   Consul	   Borg	   in	   Lubumbashi	   was	   conspiring	  against	   the	   central	   government	   with	   local	   Lunda	   leaders.	   Again,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  know	  what	   the	   exact	  motivations	   behind	   this	  were	   but	   it	   is	   likely	   that,	   just	   as	   in	  1975,	   Mobutu	   sought	   to	   reinvigorate	   the	   relationship	   and	   provoke	   a	   positive	  reaffirmation	  of	  fidelity	  from	  his	  Washington	  ally.	  This	  time,	  however,	  he	  was	  to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  478	  Christine	  Dodson	  to	  Denis	  Clift,	  Vice	  President	  Mondale’s	  Meeting	  with	  Zairian	  Commissioner	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  International	  Cooperation	  Nguza	  Karl-­‐I.Bond,	  26th	  July,	  1977;	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  CO	  67,	  WHCF,	  JCL	  479	  Memorandum	  for	  Brzezinski,	  Situation	  Room:	  Evening	  Notes	  1st	  April	  1977;	  President’s	  Dailey	  Report	  File,	  Box	  1,	  NSA,	  JCL	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disappointed	  by	  the	  more	  measured	  reaction	  from	  Washington.	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Warren	  Christopher	  simply	  advised	  the	  president	  to	  ignore	  a	  likely	  retaliation	  ‘for	  what	  he	   sees	  as	  our	   lack	  of	   support	  during	   the	  Shaba	   invasion’480	  in	   the	  hope	  that	  it	  would	  blow	  over.	  Indeed,	  unable	  to	  push	  this	  matter	  without	  risking	  a	  further	  deterioration	  of	   relations,	  within	  only	  a	   few	  weeks	  Mobutu	   informed	  ambassador	  Cutler	   that	   the	   issue	   had	   been	   dropped	   and	   Borg	   was	   not	   required	   to	   leave	   the	  country.481	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Alongside	  this	  rather	  aggressive	  sulking,	  Mobutu	  also	  looked	  to	  woo	  the	  Carter	  White	   House	   by	   sending	   a	   number	   of	   emissaries	   to	   Washington	   in	   an	   apparent	  effort	  to	  bridge	  the	  gulf	  with	  his	  long-­‐term	  ally,	  both	  as	  expressions	  of	  gratitude	  for	  continued	   support	   and	   to	   discuss	   Mobutu’s	   own	   much-­‐vaunted	   reform	   plans.	  Despite	   repeated	   requests	   from	   the	   Congolese	   president,	   however,	   both	   Foreign	  Minister	  Nguza	   in	   July	  1977	   and	  his	   replacement	  Umba	  di	   Lutete	   and	  Minister	   of	  Plan	   Mulamba	   in	   March	   1978	   were	   denied	   access	   to	   the	   president	   and	   had	   to	  content	   themselves	   with	   brief	   encounters	   with	   Vice	   President	   Mondale	   and	   the	  Assistant	  National	  Security	  Adviser	  David	  Aaron.	  This	  was	  a	  conscious	  decision	  by	  the	   Carter	   administration	   and	   again	   was	   a	   visible	   shift	   from	   the	   very	   public	  endorsements	   Mobutu	   had	   received	   from	   Nixon	   and	   Kissinger.	   Furthermore,	   in	  each	   of	   the	   above	   meetings	   reform	   was	   the	   central	   theme	   demonstrating	   the	  importance	   US	   officials	   ascribed	   to	   goading	   the	   Kinshasa	   regime	   down	   this	   path.	  Time	  and	  again,	  both	  the	  embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  and	  Washington	  officials	  stressed	  the	  need	   for	   tangible	   progress	   on	   economic	   and	   political	   reform	   for	   American	   aid	   to	  continue.	  Mobutu	  himself	  certainly	  responded	  with	  the	  appropriate	  public	  gestures,	  a	  much-­‐publicised	  speech	  on	  25th	  November	  1977	  thus	  committing	  his	  regime	  to	  a	  renewed	  modernisation	  effort.	  Under	  Belgian	  tutelage,	  the	  ‘Mobutu	  Plan’	  proposed	  a	   typically	   ‘ill	   defined	   conceptual	   approach	   to	   economic	   recovery	   and	   reform’,	  including	  a	  call	  for	  foreign	  specialists	  to	  man	  key	  government	  agencies	  and	  reduce	  economic	  mismanagement.482	  	  With	   both	   the	   Carter	   administration	   and	   its	   Congo	  ally	   apparently	   committed	   to	   this	   reformist	   drive,	   the	   question	   remains	  why	   this	  shifting	  emphasis	  and	  modernising	  approach	  during	  the	  Carter	  years	  failed	  to	  have	  more	  of	  an	  impact?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  480	  Warren	  Christopher,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  President	  1st	  June	  1977;	  Plains	  File,	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  37,	  JCL	  481	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  White	  House:	  ‘Mobutu	  Drops	  Request	  for	  Withdrawal	  of	  Borg’,	  22nd	  June	  1977;	  President’s	  Dailey	  Report	  File,	  Box	  2,	  NSA,	  JCL	  482	  Briefing	  Memorandum	  for	  David	  Aaron	  for	  Meeting	  with	  Zairian	  Emissaries	  Umba	  &	  Mulamba,	  3rd	  March	  1978;	  Country	  File,	  Zaire,	  Box	  87,	  NSA,	  JCL	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  From	  the	  outset	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  Mobutu	  presented	  a	  difficult	  proposition	  when	  it	  came	  to	  influencing	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  and	  future	  direction	  of	  Congo.	  The	  past	  twelve	  years	  had	  seen	  a	  gulf	  between	  government	  rhetoric	  and	  actual	  policy,	  as	  the	  wily	   dictator	   established	   his	   hold	   on	   the	   country	   through	   a	   system	   of	   fear,	  corruption	  and	  patronage	  as	  has	  been	  noted.	  Reform	  would	  thus	  threaten	  the	  very	  essence	   of	   ‘Mobutism’	   and	   the	   foundations	   of	   his	   power	   and	   his	   bold	  announcements	   were	   treated	   with	   a	   healthy	   scepticism	   in	   Washington.	   On	   the	  economic	   front,	   despite	   previous	   declarations	   of	   this	   nature	   Congo	   had	   failed	   to	  adhere	   to	   both	   IMF	   stabilization	   plans	   of	   1976	   and	   1977,	   as	   the	   CIA	   intelligence	  briefs	   were	   quick	   to	   point	   out.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Mobutu	   government	   remained	  ineligible	   for	   further	   drawdowns	   of	   IMF	   aid	   by	   1978	   and	   previously	   negotiated	  private	  bank	  loans	  of	  some	  250	  million	  dollars	  were	  withheld	  for	  similar	  reasons.483	  In	   the	   realm	   of	   political	   reform	   the	   picture	  was	   even	   bleaker.	   Calls	   for	   a	   greater	  devolution	   of	   power	   and	   inclusive	   politics	   would	   be	   disappointed	   by	   Mobutu	  reverting	   to	   the	  purging	   of	   his	   top	  political	   and	  military	   ranks	   in	   response	   to	   the	  festering	   Shaba	   unrest.	   	   In	   August	   1977	   the	   CIA	   reported,	   ‘Mobutu’s	   purge	   of	  civilian	  officials	   appears	  aimed	  at	   creating	   scapegoats,	   eliminating	  potential	   rivals	  and	   their	   supporters,	   and	   warning	   critics	   of	   his	   one-­‐man	   rule.’484	  This	   political	  purge	   was	   followed	   by	   an	   alleged	   coup-­‐plot,	   trials	   and	   executions	   the	   following	  February	  and	  a	   further	   large-­‐scale	  purge	  of	   the	  military.	  Again,	   the	   targets	  of	   this	  campaign	   were	   largely	   from	   Congo’s	   more	   restless	   regions.	   Thus	   the	   CIA	   noted,	  ‘Some	   700	   men-­‐	   12	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   officer	   corps-­‐	   are	   being	   dismissed	   because	  Mobutu	   has	   doubts	   about	   the	   loyalty	   of	   personnel	   from	   Zaire’s	   eastern	   and	  southern	  provinces…	  Mobutu	  periodically	  purges	  the	  military,	  but	  this	  purge	  is	  the	  largest	  in	  the	  memory	  of	  Embassy	  officers.’485	  This	  rather	  familiar	  modus	  operandi	  must	  have	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  sincerity	  of	  Mobutu’s	  proclaimed	  reform	  program	  from	  its	  very	  outset.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	   the	   strongest	   indication,	   however,	   that	   Mobutu	   would	   do	   everything	  within	   his	   power	   to	   protect	   his	   personal	   hold	   on	   Congo	   could	   be	   found	   in	   the	  personal	  vendetta	  he	  pursued	  against	  his	  own	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Nguza	  Karl-­‐I-­‐Bond.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  483	  Cost	  of	  Zairian	  Recovery	  (Undated/Unsigned	  Memorandum-­‐	  from	  early	  1978,	  presumably	  from	  State	  to	  Brzezinski);	  General	  Odom	  File,	  Box	  61,	  NSA,	  JCL;	  CIA,	  National	  Intelligence	  Dailey	  Cable:	  ‘Zaire	  Economic	  Recovery	  Scheme’,	  27th	  February	  1978;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  484	  That	   this	   crackdown	   would	   target	   even	   the	   few	   qualified	   technicians	   at	   Congo’s	   disposal	   was	  demonstrated	   by	   the	   removal	   of	   the	   apparently	   able	   governor	   of	   the	   Central	   Bank	   Jules-­‐Fontaine	  Sambwa.	  	  CIA,	  National	  Intelligence	  Dailey	  Cable:	  ‘Zaire:	  Ouster	  of	  Foreign	  Minister’,	  13th	  August	  1977;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  485	  CIA,	  National	  Intelligence	  Dailey	  Cable:	  ‘Zaire:	  Political	  Dismissals’,	  18th	  April	  1978;	  CREST,	  NARAII	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From	   sending	   Nguza	   as	   his	   personal	   envoy	   to	  Washington	   in	   July	   1977,	   Mobutu	  turned	  on	  his	  Foreign	  Minister	   the	  very	  next	  month,	  accusing	  him	  of	  high	   treason	  for	   withholding	   information	   on	   the	   impending	   Katangan	   incursion	   into	   Shaba	  earlier	   that	   year.	   Following	   his	   arrest	   that	   August,	   along	   with	   Daniel	   Muteb	  Tshombe	   in	   Shaba	   (also	   known	   as	   Mbumba	  Muteba	   II,	   the	   Lunda	  Mwant	   Yav	   or	  leader),	  Nguza	  was	  duly	  sentenced	  to	  death	  the	  following	  month.	  Whether	  Mobutu	  was	  genuinely	  suspicious	  of	  Nguza,	  himself	  a	  Lunda	  related	  to	  Moise	  Tshombe,	  or	  simply	  reacting	  to	  his	  Foreign	  Minister’s	  growing	  stature	  and	  acclaim	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  is	  difficult	  to	  assess.	  That	  the	  Belgians	  viewed	  him	  as	  a	  viable	  successor	  to	   Mobutu	   was	   noted	   earlier	   and,	   perhaps	   more	   critically,	   the	   CIA	   reported	   that	  many	   influential	   Congolese	   were	   discussing	   Mobutu’s	   vulnerability	   and	   Nguza’s	  prospects	   so	   openly	   that	   the	   latter	   issued	   a	   public	   declaration	   of	   support	   for	   his	  president	  to	  ward	  off	  further	  speculation.486	  His	  sudden	  fall	  from	  favour	  and	  the	  fact	  that	   Mobutu	   subsequently	   commuted	   his	   death	   sentence	   smacks	   of	   a	   degree	   of	  cynicism	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   veracity	   of	   the	   charges	   brought	   against	   the	   rising	  Congolese	  politician.	  Indeed,	  Nguza’s	  story	  in	  Congolese	  politics	  is	  an	  intriguing	  one	  in	   itself.	   Following	   cruel	   torture	   while	   imprisoned	   that	   reportedly	   left	   him	  impotent,	  Nguza	  would	  be	  pardoned	  and	  rehabilitated	  to	  the	  regime	  the	  following	  year	  before	  defecting	  abroad	  and	  both	  testifying	  to	  Congress	  and	  publishing	  a	  book	  of	   indictments	   against	   Mobutu	   in	   1982. 487 	  In	   an	   illustration	   of	   Mobutu’s	  manipulative	  powers	  and	  the	  reach	  of	  his	  patronage,	  by	  1985	  Nguza	  returned	  to	  the	  fold	  of	  his	  erstwhile	  president	  to	  serve	  once	  more	  as	  Congo’s	  foreign	  minister	  and	  then	   prime	   minister-­‐	   reportedly	   against	   receipt	   of	   ten	   million	   dollars	   for	   his	  rediscovered	  loyalty.488	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   above	   serves	   to	   indicate	   not	   only	   Mobutu’s	   resilience	   to	   economic	   and	  political	  reform,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  continued	  human	  rights	  transgressions,	  but	  also	  that	  this	  was	  once	  more	  clearly	  apparent	  to	  contemporary	  observers	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	   Carter	   presidency.	   Moreover,	   while	   Mobutu’s	   hold	   on	   the	   country	   may	   have	  been	   tenuous,	   it	   illustrates	   the	   extreme	   difficulties	   of	   any	   alternative	   political	  leadership	   emerging	   in	   Congo	   and	   the	   skill	   with	   which	   the	   entrenched	   dictator	  manipulated	   the	   levers	   of	   power	   to	   assure	   his	   continued	   survival.	   Nevertheless,	  while	   effectively	   blocking	   the	   emergence	  of	   an	   alternative	  political	   force,	   the	   first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  486	  CIA,	  National	  Intelligence	  Dailey	  Cable;	  ‘Zaire:	  Ouster	  of	  Foreign	  Minister’,	  13th	  August	  1977;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  487	  Nguza	  Karl	  I	  Bond,	  Mobutu:	  Ou	  L’incarnation	  du	  Mal	  Zairois	  (London,	  Rex	  Collings;	  1982)	  488	  According	  to	  Radio	  Trottoir	  as	  cited	  in	  Michaela	  Wrong,	  In	  the	  Footsteps	  of	  Mr.	  Kurtz	  (Fourth	  Estate;	  London,	  2000)	  pp.	  101-­‐102	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Shaba	   uprising	   had	   clearly	   shown	   that	   Mobutu	   was	   dependent	   on	   outside	  intervention	   to	   pacify	   dissident	   provinces	   and	   ultimately	   retain	   control	   of	   the	  country.489	  As	  such,	  the	  greatest	  obstacle	  to	  the	  reform	  of	  Congo,	  to	  which	  both	  the	  Carter	   administration	   and	   Mobutu	   himself	   had	   now	   publically	   committed	  themselves,	   was	   the	   renewed	   outbreak	   of	   violence	   in	   Shaba	   province	   that	  constitutes	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Carter	   certainly	   made	   the	   right	   noises	   to	   suggest	   a	   complete	   break	   with	  Kissinger’s	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  and	  involvement	  with	  Congo’s	  tyrant	  as	  a	  lynchpin	  of	  US	   Africa	   policy,	   as	   Washington	   increasingly	   looked	   to	   his	   European	   allies	   to	  shoulder	   the	   burden	   of	   Congolese	   security	   with	   a	   Moroccan	   veil.	   This	   is	   a	   little	  misleading,	   however.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   Moroccan	   fig	   leaf	   designed	   to	   provide	   an	  African	  cover	  for	  the	  American-­‐European	  sponsored	  operations	  in	  Congo	  was	  both	  transparent	  and	  cynical.	  While	  King	  Hassan	  had	  voiced	  his	  concern	  over	  apparent	  Soviet	   gains	   in	   Africa	   and	   the	   encirclement	   of	   Europe	   in	   a	   meeting	   with	   Under	  Secretary	   of	   State	   Habib	   that	   April,	   according	   to	   Moroccan	   comments	   to	  Washington	   officials	   they	   acquiesced	   to	   the	   Shaba	   plan	   only	   after	   considerable	  French	  pressure.490	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Carter	  administration	  may	  have	  been	  keen	  to	  stress	   the	   renewed	   distance	   between	   Washington	   and	   its	   Kinshasa	   ally	   but,	  according	  to	  Mobutu	  himself,	  it	  remained	  the	  single	  largest	  donor	  during	  the	  Shaba	  crisis.491	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  rescheduling	  of	  Congo’s	  debt	  was	  scarcely	  imaginable	  without	   the	  agreement	  and	  active	  cajoling	  of	  other	  creditors	  by	   the	  United	  States.	  Even	   the	   claim	   of	   only	   supplying	   non-­‐lethal	   aid	   proved	   false	   upon	   closer	  examination.	  All	  this	  reflects	  the	  administration’s	  intent	  not	  to	  abandon	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  this	  allows	  for	  some	  more	  general	  and	  less	  sanguine	  conclusions.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  Carter	  administration	  did	  recognise	  the	  local	  discontent	  and	  very	  regional	  dimension	  of	  the	  Katangan	  incursion	  and	  various	  commentators	  pointed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  US	  economic	  interests	  and	  access	  to	  raw	  materials	  could	  most	  likely	  be	  upheld	   even	   if	   the	   Mobutu	   regime	   fell,	   regardless	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   successor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  489	  This	  view	  of	  Mobutu’s	  survival	  as	  contingent	  upon	  outside	  support	  was	  clearly	  shared	  by	  the	  CIA	  intelligence	  assessment	  in	  early	  1978-­‐	  ‘Unless	  he	  obtain	  substantial	  foreign	  military	  and	  economic	  assistance,	  Mobutu	  may	  not	  survive.’	  CIA,	  Intelligence	  Daily,	  ‘Zaire:	  Background	  to	  the	  Struggle’;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  490	  American	  Ambassador	  Anderson,	  Rabat	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Under	  Secretary	  Habib’s	  April	  15th	  Meeting	  with	  King	  Hassan	  Part	  II-­‐	  Africa’,	  17th	  April	  1977;	  NLC	  16,	  CREST	  JCL	  ;	  Memorandum	  for	  Brzezinski,	  Situation	  Room:	  Evening	  Notes:	  ‘French	  Assistance	  to	  Zaire’,	  15th	  April	  1977;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  1,	  NSA,	  JCL	  491	  Summary	  of	  meeting	  between	  Ambassador	  Cutler	  and	  Mobutu	  on	  post-­‐Shaba	  developments,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  White	  House:	  ‘Meeting	  with	  Mobutu’,	  27th	  June,	  1977;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  2,	  NSA,	  JCL	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regime.	   Despite	   considerable	   deliberation	   over	   the	   potential	   consequences	   and	  pitfalls	  of	  abandoning	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  informing	  Washington’s	  decision	  makers,	  however,	  none	  of	   these	  analyses	  were	  ultimately	  able	   to	   transcend	   the	   traditional	  Cold	   War	   paradigm	   of	   its	   predecessors.	   In	   other	   words,	   just	   as	   consecutive	  administrations	   from	   Johnson	   to	   Ford	   had	   argued,	   the	   view	   of	   Mobutu	   as	   a	  guarantor	   of	   stability	   and	   the	   fear	   that	   the	   fall	   of	   his	   regime	   would	   lead	   to	  communist	  gains,	  not	  only	  in	  Congo	  but	  with	  dangerous	  implications	  for	  the	  wider	  region,	   remained	   the	   single	  most	   important	   consideration	   behind	   Carter’s	   Congo	  policy	  even	  at	  this	  early	  stage.	  Carter	  had	  signalled	  the	  ushering	  in	  of	  new	  foreign	  policy	   era	   that	   would	   no	   longer	   be	   held	   hostage	   by	   an	   ‘inordinate	   fear	   of	  communism’.	   In	   Congo,	   however,	   the	   administration	   was	   far	   from	   free	   of	   such	  burdens.	   Ultimately,	   Washington	   wanted	   to	   publically	   distance	   itself	   from	   an	  unpalatable	   regime	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   ensuring	   it	   received	   the	   support	  necessary	  for	  its	  survival.	  France	  and	  Belgium	  supplied	  readymade	  answers	  to	  this	  dilemma.	   	   This	   was	   not	   a	   radical	   shift	   in	   approach	   but	   simply	   a	   transfer	   of	  responsibility	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	   stability	   and	   order	   to	   America’s	   European	  partners.	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	   that	   this	   is	  not	   terribly	  different	   to	   the	  policies	  of	   the	  Johnson	  years	  looking	  to	  Europe	  as	  the	  principle	  influence	  in	  its	  traditional	  sphere.	  As	  such,	   from	  the	  very	  outset	  of	   its	   term,	  a	  very	   traditional	  Cold	  War	  approach	  to	  Congo	  prevailed	  in	  the	  Carter	  administration	  with	  considerable	  uniformity.	  A	  more	  immediate	   implication	   of	   this	   renewed	   reliance	   on	   Europe	   was	   that,	   rather	   than	  ushering	  in	  a	  fresh	  and	  reinvigorated	  approach	  to	  dealing	  with	  the	  uncertainties	  of	  Africa’s	   independence	   struggle,	   this	   first	   encounter	   with	   the	   continent	   saw	  Washington	  once	  more	  aligned	  with	  the	  ancien	  régime	  of	  the	  former	  Franco-­‐Belgian	  colonial	  order.	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Shaba	  II,	  Renewed	  Cold	  War	  Diatribes	  and	  Reform	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  his	  memoirs,	  Brzezinski	  quotes	  his	  diary	  to	  explain	  the	  American	  support	  for	  another	  French	  airdrop	  in	  1978	  as	  an	  important	  display	  of	  American	  determination,	  not	  least	  to	  the	  Chinese	  ahead	  of	  his	  upcoming	  trip	  to	  China.	  He	  went	  on,	  ‘We	  in	  fact	  took	   action	   in	   response	   to	  major	  unrest	   in	  Zaire,	   apparently	   fomented	  with	   some	  Angolan	   and	   probably	   Cuban	   assistance.’492	  The	   reality	   of	   the	   situation	   in	   Congo	  was,	   of	   course,	   much	   more	   complicated,	   but	   Brzezinksi’s	   passing	   treatment	  illustrates	  an	  increasing	  readiness	  to	  couch	  events	  in	  Congo	  in	  the	  most	  basic	  Cold	  War	  terms	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  second	  Shaba	  crisis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  initial	   justification	  for	  rushing	  to	  the	  rescue	  of	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime	  in	  the	  spring	   of	   1977	   was	   to	   buy	   time	   for	   its	   leader	   to	   enact	   a	   much	   needed	   reform	  agenda.	   By	   May	   of	   the	   following	   year,	   however,	   Congo’s	   president	   hat	   fallen	  woefully	   short	  of	  his	  public	  pledges.	  Rather	   than	   the	  decline	   in	  American	  support	  that	   might	   have	   been	   expected,	   however,	   with	   the	   outbreak	   of	   fresh	   violence	  following	  a	  second	  Katangan	  incursion	  the	  Franco-­‐Belgian-­‐American	  coalition	  once	  more	   jumped	  to	   the	  rescue	  of	   its	   failing	  ally.	  Most	   immediately,	   this	   loose	  alliance	  responded	  with	   the	   direct	   intervention	   of	   Belgian	   and	   French	   troops	   assisted	   by	  American	   equipment	   and	  airlift	   capabilities,	   in	   an	  ostensibly	  humanitarian	   rescue	  operation	  of	  Western	  expatriates	  in	  Shaba.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  organisation	  of	  an	  ‘International	  African	  Force’	  (IAF)	  to	  shoulder	  Congo’s	  security	  burden	  in	  Shaba,	  the	   launching	   of	   a	   further	   retraining	   effort	   of	   the	   FAZ	   and	   a	   renewed	   financial	  bailout.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	   calls	   for	   reform	   and	   the	   conditionality	   of	   this	   aid	   continued,	   a	   further	  development	  in	  the	  Carter	  line	  made	  cooperation	  from	  Mobutu	  even	  less	  likely.	  For	  the	   first	   time	   since	   Kissinger’s	   Angola	   debacle,	   events	   in	   Congo	   were	   once	  more	  publically	   framed	   in	   stark	   East-­‐West	   terms	   and	   the	   need	   for	   the	  United	   States	   to	  stand	   tall	   and	   face	   down	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   adventurism	   in	   Africa.	   As	   such,	   the	   public	  denouncements	  of	  an	  apparent	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  role	  in	  the	  second	  Katangan	  incursion,	  led	   by	   President	   Carter	   himself,	   marked	   a	   significant	   shift	   at	   least	   in	   the	  administration’s	  rhetorical	  approach	  to	  Congo	  and	  further	  dented	  any	  hope	  for	  an	  effective	   remodelling	   of	   the	   reluctant	   Kinshasa	   regime.	   The	   details	   of	   the	   second	  Shaba	   crisis	   in	  May	   1978,	   the	   American	   response	   and	   its	   impact	   on	   the	   on-­‐going	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  492	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	  Power	  and	  Principle;	  Memoirs	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Advisor,	  1977-­‐81	  (Weidenfeld	  &	  Nicolson;	  London,	  1983)	  pp.	  208-­‐9	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effort	   to	   goad	   Congo’s	   recalcitrant	   despot	   towards	   political	   and	   economic	   reform	  merit	  further	  consideration	  as	  Carter	  espoused	  an	  increasingly	  conservative	  line.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	  the	  15h	  May	  1978,	  Kinshasa	  informed	  Washington	  that	  it	  would	  once	  again	  seek	   help	   in	   the	   face	   of	   another	   Katangan	   raid	   into	   Shaba	   province.	   Reportedly,	  some	  eight	   to	   twelve	  hundred	  Katangans	  had	  crossed	   the	  border	   from	  Caianda	   in	  Angola	  with	  a	   further	  estimated	   four	   thousand	  uncommitted	   troops	  remaining	  on	  the	   Angolan	   territory.493	  The	   following	   day	   the	   CIA	   reported	   that	   the	   returning	  Katangan	   insurgents	   had	   taken	   control	   of	   most	   of	   the	   mining	   town	   of	   Kolwezi,	  reportedly	   capturing	   the	   foreign	   residential	   sectors	   and	   the	   airfield	   along	   with	  several	   Italian-­‐made	   fighter	   aircraft,	   two	   helicopters,	   one	   transport	   and	   several	  utility	  aircraft.	  This	  intelligence	  report	  noted	  that	  the	  invading	  force	  had	  refined	  its	  tactics	   from	   a	   year	   earlier	   in	  what	   appeared	   to	   be	   ‘a	  well-­‐conceived,	   coordinated	  attack	  on	  pre-­‐selected	  objectives.’	  As	  such,	  the	  Katangans	  initial	  strike	  was	  aimed	  at	  the	  mining	  town	  of	  Kolwezi	  directly-­‐	  ‘a	  target	  of	  strategic	  and	  symbolic	  importance’,	  according	   to	   the	   CIA.494	  Washington	   observers	   were	   once	   more	   flustered	   by	   the	  speed	  of	  events	  in	  Shaba.	  Moreover,	  on	  this	  occasion	  the	  attack	  not	  only	  threatened	  Congo’s	  economic	  heartland	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  itself,	  but	  it	  also	  endangered	  Western	  direct	  material	  interests	  and	  even	  risked	  the	  lives	  of	  American	  and	  European	  expatriates	  in	  the	  area.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   CIA	   reported	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	   Shaba	   I,	   the	   fall	   of	   major	   towns	   in	   the	  copper	  belt	  during	  the	  second	  incursion	  was	  now	  severely	  harming	  Congo’s	  mining	  operations;	  accounting	  for	  seventy	  to	  eighty	  per	  cent	  of	  its	  gross	  domestic	  product,	  seventy-­‐five	   per	   cent	   of	   Zaire’s	   copper	   production,	   ninety	   per	   cent	   of	   cobalt	  production,	   and	   all	   its	   zinc	   production.	   Perhaps	   even	   more	   concerning	   than	   the	  inherent	  threat	  this	  entailed	  for	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  was	  the	  immediate	  effect	  of	  the	  violence	   on	   Western	   access	   to	   these	   strategic	   minerals	   and	   the	   corresponding	  economic	  consequences.	  While	  noting	  that	  world	  copper	  consumers	  had	  sufficient	  stockpiles	  to	  resist	  even	  a	  total	  suspension	  of	  Congolese	  output	  without	  significant	  hardship,	   the	   loss	   of	   its	   cobalt	   supply	   would	   prove	   more	   serious.	   The	   CIA	  commented	  with	   some	   concern,	   ‘Short-­‐term	   reductions	   in	   cobalt	   output	   by	   Zaire,	  however,	   could	   be	   serious	   because	   Zaire	   is	   the	   free	   world’s	   leading	   supplier.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  493	  Memorandum	  (no	  author	  given),	  Status	  of	  American	  Citizens	  in	  Kolwezi/Zairian	  Army	  Operations	  16th	  May	  1978;	  Country	  File,	  Zaire,	  Box	  87,	  NSA,	  JCL;	  NB,	  According	  to	  Odom,	  while	  their	  exact	  number	  is	  uncertain,	  at	  least	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  Katangans	  entered	  Congo	  from	  Zambia	  on	  this	  occasion	  (Odom,	  p.	  12).	  see	  Lt.	  Colonel	  Thomas	  P.	  Odom,	  Shaba	  II:	  The	  French	  and	  Belgian	  Intervention	  in	  Zaire	  in	  1978	  (US	  Army	  Combined	  Arms	  Center,	  Command	  and	  General	  Staff	  College;	  Fort	  Leavenworth	  Papers,	  1993)	  available	  at	  www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csl/odom2/odom2.asap	  494	  CIA,	  National	  Intelligence	  Daily	  Cable:	  Zaire	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Consumers	   are	   already	   experiencing	   scarcities	   and	   skyrocketing	   prices.’ 495	  Moreover,	  with	  over	  two	  thousand	  European	  and	  seventy-­‐five	  American	  expatriates	  (largely	  Morrison-­‐Knudsen	  employees	  and	  their	  entourage)	  manning	  the	  mines	  and	  infrastructure	   projects	   of	   Kolwezi,	   concerns	   over	   reprisals	   against	   the	   white	  community	   mounted	   alongside	   these	   considerations.	   With	   the	   FAZ	   once	   more	  proving	  incapable	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  Katangan	  dangers	  alone;	  the	  threat	  to	  its	  long-­‐term	  ally	  in	  Kinshasa,	  the	  economic	  implications	  of	  the	  fall	  of	  this	  mining	  town	  and	  the	  dangers	   to	   the	   foreign	  population	  provided	  both	   an	   immediate	   interest	   and	   a	  justification	  to	  once	  more	  galvanise	  the	  West	  into	  action.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Before	   considering	   the	   policies	   that	   unfolded,	   however,	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   a	  response	   that	   was	   almost	   entirely	   neglected	   by	   both	   the	   United	   States	   and	   its	  European	   allies.	   At	   no	   point	   was	   any	   effort	   to	   establish	   links	   with	   the	   Katangan	  leadership	   or	   a	   politically	   negotiated	   inclusive	   settlement	   between	   Kinshasa	   and	  the	  disgruntled	  periphery	  attempted	  or	  even	   seriously	   considered	   in	  Washington.	  This	  is	  remarkable	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First	  of	  all,	  despite	  the	  immediate	  threat	  of	  a	  disruption	  to	  mineral	  supplies	  due	  to	  the	  spreading	  violence,	  various	  analysts	  had	  pointed	   out	   that	   overall	   US	   aims	   could	   be	   achieved	   with	   almost	   any	   Congo	  government	   as	   was	   noted	   earlier.	   Secondly,	   describing	   the	   insurgents	   simply	   as	  ‘Katangans’	   was	   not	   entirely	   accurate	   as	   the	   growing	   unrest	   in	   Shaba	   was	  representative	  of	  a	  much	  wider	  popular	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  regime.	  As	  such,	  the	  CIA	  noted,	  	  ‘The	  Zairian	  Government	  has	  said	   the	   invaders	  are	  Katangan	  rebels,	  but	   it	  has	  applied	   the	   term	   “Katangan”	   to	   anti-­‐Mobutu	   elements	   in	   general.	   The	   rebels’	  basic	   force	   probably	   consists	   of	   tribal	   relatives	   recruited	   by	   the	   original	  Katangan	   exiles,	   other	   political	   dissidents	   from	   Zaire,	   and	   some	   vagrant	  Angolans.	  The	  rebel	  leadership	  itself	  describes	  its	  movement	  as	  a	  popular	  anti-­‐Mobutu	  uprising	  consisting	  of	  Zairians	  from	  all	  regions.’496	  	  Finally	  and	  most	  significantly,	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  French	  partners	  were	  approached	   on	   at	   least	   three	   documented	   occasions	   by	   the	   Katangans	   seeking	  assistance	  with	   regards	   to	  events	   in	  Congo	  but	   failed	   to	  pursue	   these	  openings	   to	  establish	   links	   with	   the	   opposition	   movements	   in	   Congo	   or	   reach	   an	   inclusive	  negotiated	  settlement.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  first	  Shaba	  crisis,	  members	  of	  the	  FNLC	  sought	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  American	  president	  directly	  hoping	  for	  support	  in	  pressuring	  Mobutu	  into	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  495	  CIA,	  National	  Intelligence	  Daily	  Cable:	  Zaire	  Situation	  Report,	  17th	  May	  1978;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  496	  CIA,	  National	  Intelligence	  Daily	  Cable:	  Zaire	  Situation	  Report,	  17th	  May	  1978;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  
	   193	  
more	   inclusive	   style	   of	   government.	   As	   such,	   two	   opposition	   leaders,	  Mbwa	  Mika	  and	  Mutsha	  Mokoa,	   formulated	   a	   letter	   to	   President	   Carter	   on	   July	   3rd	   1977	   that	  voiced	  profound	  scepticism	  over	  Mobutu’s	  promised	  reforms	  and	  made	  a	  desperate	  appeal	   for	   Kinshasa’s	   American	   backers	   to	   effect	   a	   more	   pluralistic	   politics	   in	  Congo,	   ‘We	  expect	  much	  of	  you,	  Mr.	  President.	  We	  know	  that	  you	  will	  use	  all	  your	  influence	  to	  obtain	  for	  us	  that	  second	  party,	  without	  which	  the	  announced	  reforms	  would	   only	   bring	   a	   few	  months	   of	   distraction	   before	   a	   return	   to	   the	   old.’497	  In	   a	  similar	  vein,	  in	  January	  1978	  the	  brother	  of	  the	  Lunda	  Mwant	  Yav	  in	  Shaba	  made	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  French	  Consul	  in	  Lubumbashi	  for	  France	  to	  pressure	  Mobutu	  to	  offer	  an	   amnesty	   to	   the	   Katangans	   and	   seek	   rapprochement	   with	   the	   rebellious	  elements.498	  Finally,	  even	  in	  the	  aftermath	  to	  the	  second	  Shaba	  war,	  members	  of	  the	  Katangan	  ‘National	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Congo’	  (FNLC)	   ‘accosted’	  officials	  in	  the	  American	  embassy	  in	  Brussels	  to	  convey	  the	  inclusive	  nature	  of	  their	  genuinely	  anti-­‐Mobutu	  movement,	   free	  of	  Communist	   influence,	   appealing	   for	   a	   cessation	  of	  all	   foreign	   meddling	   and	   pressure	   on	   Mobutu	   to	   step	   aside	   ‘to	   let	   peace	   and	  progress	  return	  to	  the	  potentially	  rich	  nation’.499	  While	  the	  Belgian	  record	  remained	  inaccessible	   at	   the	   time	   of	   writing,	   the	   French	   embassy	   in	   Kinshasa	   nevertheless	  pointed	   to	   Belgian	   contacts	   with	   the	   FNLC	   and	   their	   desire	   for	   a	   negotiated	  settlement	  over	  the	  renewed	  violence.500	  	  The	  State	  Department	  response	  to	  these	  overtures	  remained	  typical	  throughout,	  however.	  A	  reply	  to	  the	  letter	  addressed	  to	  President	   Carter	   was	   rejected	   with	   the	   familiar	   reference	   to	   Congo’s	   sovereignty	  stating	   that	   ‘President	   Mobutu	   would	   be	   almost	   certain	   to	   construe	   this	   as	  unwarranted	   interference	   in	   Zairian	   domestic	   politics,’	   and	   the	   latest	   FNLC	  overtures	   were	   simply	   dismissed	   as	   Katangan	   propaganda.	   501 	  	   With	   both	  Washington	  and	  Paris	  ignoring	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  negotiated	  diplomatic	  solution	  to	  the	   festering	   Shaba	   problem,	   events	   on	   the	   ground	   in	  Kolwezi	   itself	   ensured	   that	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their	   policy	   options	   became	   more	   limited	   still	   as	   the	   expatriate	   population	   was	  targeted	  for	  the	  first	  time	  with	  38	  Europeans	  reportedly	  killed	  on	  the	  17th	  May.502	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   his	   autopsy	   of	   the	   second	   Shaba	   intervention,	   the	   French	   Ambassador	   to	  Congo,	   André	   Ross,	   clearly	   saw	   the	   humanitarian	   justification	   as	   integral	   to	   the	  renewed	  Western	  intervention	  in	  Shaba	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  The	  view	  that	   Katangan	   brutality	   roused	   the	   West	   to	   act	   once	   more	   is	   a	   little	   simplistic,	  however,	  and	  closer	  examination	  reveals	  traces	  of	  Mobutu’s	  manipulations.	  First	  of	  all,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   Katangan	   forces	   had	   been	   relatively	   civil	   to	   the	  nervous	   expatriate	   population	   during	   the	   ‘War	   of	   Eighty	   Days’	   in	   1977,	   even	   on	  occasion	   permitting	   American	   missionaries	   to	   use	   their	   radios	   to	   update	   the	  American	   consulate	   on	   their	   welfare. 503 	  During	   the	   second	   crisis,	   the	   French	  embassy	   reported	   orders	   found	   on	   captured	   Katangans	   expressly	   forbidding	   any	  reprisals	   against	   the	   foreign	  workers	  of	  Kolwezi,	   no	  doubt	  keenly	   aware	   that	   this	  could	   be	   used	   as	   a	   pretext	   for	  Western	   interference.504	  The	  Katangans	   apparently	  having	  maintained	   order	   in	   Kolwezi	   for	   several	   days,	   the	   French	   analysis	   simply	  attributed	   the	   subsequent	   descent	   into	   looting	   and	   violence	   to	   the	   exhausted	  invaders	  turning	  to	  hemp	  and	  drink,	  as	  well	  as	   joining	  forces	  with	   less	  disciplined	  local	   youths.505	  While	   the	   exact	   picture	   of	   events	   on	   the	   ground	   remains	   murky,	  even	   the	   French	   autopsy	   of	   events	   allows	   for	   a	   further	   dimension	   to	   this	   loss	   of	  discipline.	   As	   the	   CIA	   had	   noted,	   with	   the	   fall	   of	   Kolwezi	   the	   foreign	   population	  found	   itself	   in	   a	   de	   facto	   hostage	   situation,	  with	   the	   Katangans	   hoping	   that	   large	  numbers	  of	  foreign	  civilians	  in	  Kolwezi	  would	  prevent	  the	  FAZ	  from	  ‘launching	  air	  raids	   or	   a	   major	   ground	   assault	   against	   the	   town.’506	  Seemingly	   unaware	   of	   this	  threat,	   or	   perhaps	   precisely	   to	   provoke	   a	   response	   from	   his	   Western	   backers,	  Mobutu	  was	  the	  first	  to	  react	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  Kolwezi,	  however.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  an	  apparent	  display	  of	  his	  regime’s	  virility	  and	  the	  FAZ’s	  newfound	  resolve,	  Congo’s	   president	   ordered	   a	   counteroffensive	   to	   retake	   Kolwezi.	   The	   rather	  foolhardy	  airdrop	  of	  a	  single	  FAZ	  Para-­‐troop	  company	  on	  the	  16th	  May,	  with	  further	  battalions	   on	   route	   on	   the	   ground	   from	  Kamina	   and	  Mutshatsha,	  was	  predictably	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disastrous	  as	  the	  Katangan	  force	  simply	  picked	  off	  their	  outnumbered	  assailants.507	  The	   ground	   offensive	   faired	   somewhat	   better	   as	   General	   Mahele	   recaptured	   the	  Kolwezi	   airport	   on	   the	   17th	   May.508	  Unfortunately,	   this	   rather	   limited	   success	   did	  nothing	  to	  secure	  the	  civilian	  population	  in	  Kolwezi	   itself.	  As	  Mobutu	  himself	   flew	  to	   the	   retaken	   airfield	   accompanied	   by	   reporters	   with	   a	   Mirage	   fighter	  demonstratively	  staging	  airstrikes	  in	  the	  background,	  the	  Katangans	  and	  their	  local	  recruits	  turned	  on	  black	  and	  white	  civilians	  suspected	  of	  loyalty	  to	  the	  regime.	  This	  begs	  the	  speculative	  question	  to	  what	  extent	  Mobutu	  factored	  the	  likely	  inadequacy	  of	  this	  offensive	  and	  the	  humanitarian	  implications	  for	  civilians	  in	  Kolwezi	  into	  his	  calculations	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  provoking	  a	  swifter	  and	  more	  substantial	  response	  from	  his	  Western	  allies?509	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Whatever	  Mobutu’s	   intentions	  with	   his	   own	  military	   foray,	   he	  was	   no	   doubt	  pleased	   by	   the	   Western	   reaction	   this	   actually	   precipitated.	   With	   the	   American	  Morrison-­‐Knudsen	   employees	   safely	   evacuated	   on	   the	   17th,	   the	   82nd	   Airborne	  Division	  could	  stand	  down	  from	  its	  alerted	  status	  and	  Carter	  once	  more	  looked	  to	  a	  European	   lead	   on	   Congo’s	   security.	   Eager	   for	   the	   Europeans	   to	   act,	   Carter	  responded	  to	  French	  and	  Belgian	  requests	  and	  approved	  eight	  C-­‐141	  planes	  to	  haul	  ammunition	   from	  Brussels	   to	  Kamina	   and	   ten	  C-­‐141	   transport	  plane	   to	   assist	   the	  French	   airlift	   to	   Congo;	   logistical	   support	   worth	   some	   thirteen	  million	   dollars.510	  The	   French	   ‘2ieme	   Régiment	   Étranger	   de	   Parachutiste’	   (2nd	   REP-­‐	   an	   airborne	  regiment	   in	   the	  French	  Foreign	  Legion)	   launched	   its	  Operation	  Leopard	   to	   retake	  Kolwezi	  on	  the	  19th	  May	  and	  on	  the	  20th	  May	  the	  Belgian	  Para-­‐Commando	  Regiment	  began	   its	   rescue	   operation	   of	   the	   European	   population	   from	   Kamina	   airport	   in	  Congo	   under	   the	   code	   name	   ‘Red	   Bean’.	  511	  The	   results	   and	   implications	   of	   this	  extremely	   loose	  and	  disjointed	  Franco-­‐Belgian	   coalition	  were	   threefold.	  Militarily,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  507	  Memorandum	  (no	  author	  given),	  ‘Status	  of	  American	  Citizens	  in	  Kolwezi/Zairian	  Army	  Operations’,	  16th	  May	  1978;	  Country	  File,	  Zaire,	  Box	  87,	  NSA,	  JCL	  508	  Ross,	  ‘Chronologie	  a	  détaillé	  de	  l’affaire	  de	  Kolwezi	  du	  13	  au	  31	  Mai	  1978’,	  26	  June	  1978;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Étrangères,	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Carton	  45,	  CADN;	  	  Much	  of	  the	  details	  of	  the	  ensuing	  military	  operations	  cannot	  be	  found	  in	  the	  official	  record	  available	  thus	   far	   in	   the	   American	   archives.	   Based	   on	   various	   first	   hand	   accounts	   and	   the	   French	   military	  archives	  respectively,	  see	  Lt.	  Colonel	  Thomas	  P.	  Odom,	  Shaba	  II:	  The	  French	  and	  Belgian	  Intervention	  in	  Zaire	  in	  1978;	  Nathaniel	  Kinsey	  Powell,	  The	  “Cuba	  of	  the	  West”:	  France	  and	  Mobutu’s	  Zaire,	  1977-­‐79	  (Unpublished	  paper	  given	  at	  LSE	  IDEAS	  Africa	  Department);	  Corroborated	  by	  contemporary	  news	  reports.	  Washington	   Post	   1977-­‐79;	   Newsweek	   1977-­‐79;	   Time	  Magazine	   1977-­‐79;	   New	   York	   Times	  (1977-­‐79)	  509	  Thomas	  P.	  Odom	  implies	  this	  in	  his	  study	  of	  the	  military	  intervention.	  Ibid.	  510	  Memorandum	  from	  Deputy	  Assistant	  for	  National	  Security	  Affairs	  David	  Aaron	  to	  General	  William	  E.	  Odom,	  SCC	  Working	  Group	  Meeting	  on	  Zaire,	  19th	  May	  1978;	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  28,	  NSA,	  JCL	  511	  According	  to	  Odom	  the	  final	  name	  given	  to	  the	  operation	  was	  Operation	  Bonité.	  Lt.	  Colonel	  Thomas	  P.	  Odom,	  Shaba	  II:	  The	  French	  and	  Belgian	  Intervention	  in	  Zaire	  in	  1978	  p.	  33;	  	  See	  also	  Pierre	  Sergent,	  La	  Légion	  Saute	  sur	  Kolwezi;	  Opération	  Léopard:	  Le	  2e	  R.E.P.	  au	  Zaïre,	  Mai-­‐Juin	  1978	  (Paris;	  Press	  de	  la	  Cite,	  1978)	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despite	   their	   lack	   of	   coordination	   and	   slightly	   divergent	   aims,	   the	   operation	  effectively	  evacuated	  the	  majority	  of	   the	  white	  civilian	  population	  by	  the	  21st	  May	  and	   the	   Katangans	   withdrew	   back	   across	   the	   Angolan	   border	   and	   the	   operation	  drew	   to	   what	   was	   deemed	   a	   successful	   conclusion	   by	   the	   26th	   May.	   At	   the	   same	  time,	  the	  humanitarian	  cost	  of	  the	  entire	  operation	  painted	  a	  bleaker	  picture.	  Some	  150	  white	  civilians	  perished	  and,	  while	  not	  featured	  as	  prominently	  on	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  Washington	  Post,	  a	  staggering	  estimated	  five	  hundred	  black	  civilians	  lost	  their	  lives	   in	   the	   ensuing	   reprisals.	  With	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   Belgian	   and	   French	  missions	  apparently	  divided	  between	  simply	  rescuing	  white	  expatriates	  and	  clearing	  Kolwezi	  from	   the	   Katangan	   forces	   respectively,	   the	   fate	   of	   the	   indigenous	   population	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  sadly	  neglected	  in	  the	  mandate	  of	  both.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  Carter	  administration,	  its	  immediate	  response	  to	  the	  Shaba	   crisis	   could	  be	  viewed	  with	   some	   satisfaction,	  however.	  American	   lives	  had	   been	   spared	   in	   the	   turmoil	   of	   Shaba	   II	   without	   having	   to	   deploy	   American	  troops.	  Indeed,	  while	  playing	  an	  important	  secondary	  role	  with	  its	  logistical	  (and	  by	  extension	  moral)	  support	  of	  the	  operations,	  once	  again	  Washington	  had	  secured	  a	  European	  lead	  in	  putting	  down	  spreading	  unrest	  in	  Congo’s	  economic	  heartland.512	  Overall,	   the	   Western	   media	   also	   viewed	   the	   intervention	   as	   a	   necessary	   and	  effective	  intervention	  responding	  to	  a	  humanitarian	  crisis.	  The	  Belgian	  government	  was	   criticised	   for	   its	   initially	   slow	   response	  but	   the	   French	   in	   particular	   received	  widespread	   public	   endorsement	   in	   the	   European	   and	   American	   press.513	  Indeed,	  this	  limited	  support	  for	  a	  largely	  European	  venture	  combined	  with	  its	  humanitarian	  justification	  appears	  to	  have	  resonated	  with	  the	  previously	  critical	  American	  media.	  A	  Washington	  Post	  editorial	  under	  the	  title	  ‘The	  Right	  Policy	  on	  Zaire’,	  for	  example,	  praised	  the	  American	  reaction	  of	  supplying	  eighteen	  transport	  planes	  to	  the	  Franco-­‐Belgian	   intervention	   and	   offering	   twenty	  million	   dollars	   in	   ‘non-­‐lethal’	   aid	   to	   the	  Mobutu	  regime	  as	  ‘on	  the	  money’,	  as	  two	  thousand	  European	  lives	  were	  apparently	  threatened	  in	  Shaba.514	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   while	   the	   Katangans	  were	   ejected	   from	   Kolwezi	   easily	   enough	   and	   a	  semblance	   of	   order	   restored	   in	   May,	   as	   this	   editorial	   suggested	   the	   situation	   in	  Congo	   remained	   tenuous	   and	   the	   CIA	   warned	   that	   the	   departure	   of	   European	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  512	  That	  the	  United	  States	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  second	  Shaba	  intervention	  was	  noted	  by	  the	  French	  embassy.	  Ambassadeur	  Ross	  a	  Direction	  des	  Affaires	  Africaines	  et	  Malgaches,	  Paris,	  ‘Dépêche	  d’Actualité’,	  2nd	  June	  1978;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Étrangères,	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Carton	  45,	  CADN	  513	  Memorandum	  for	  Aaron,	  Situation	  Room,	  Evening	  Notes:	   ‘Media	  Reaction	  to	   the	  Shaba	  Situation’,	  22nd	  May	  1978;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  5,	  NSA,	  JCL;	  Pierre	  Lellouche	  and	  Dominique	  Moisi,	  ‘French	   Policy	   in	   Africa:	   A	   Lonely	   Battle	   against	   Destabilisation’	   in	   International	   Security	   (Spring	  1979)	  pp.	  124-­‐5	  514	  Editorial,	  ‘The	  Right	  Policy	  on	  Zaire’,	  Washington	  Post	  21st	  May	  1978,	  p.	  B6	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troops	  would	  most	   likely	   see	   Shaba	   slip	   once	  more	   into	   violence.515	  Despite	   their	  initial	   reticence	   and	   limited	   rescue	  mandate,	   it	  was	   the	   Belgian	   para-­‐commandos	  who	   remained	   in	   Congo	   on	   an	   interim	   basis	   until	   July	   while	   a	   more	   permanent	  solution	   to	   Congo’s	   security	   crisis	   was	   sought.	  516	  As	   a	   result,	   policymakers	   in	  Washington,	   Paris	   and	   Brussels	   were	   frantically	   considering	   a	   more	   sustainable	  strategy	  for	  Congo.	  The	  more	  medium	  term	  response	  to	  the	  renewed	  crisis	  was	  to	  address	  both	  Congo’s	  military	  and	  economic	  deficits	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  calling	  once	  more	  for	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  reform	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Already	  during	  the	  closing	  stages	  of	  the	  intervention	  Belgium	  and	  France	  began	  to	  petition	  for	  an	  international	  African	  peacekeeping	  force	  combined	  with	  economic	  assistance	   package	   to	   revive	   their	   ailing	   ally. 517 	  On	   the	   26th	   May	   Brzezinski	  convened	   the	   SCC	   (Special	   Coordination	   Committee)	   to	   discuss	   the	   ‘overall	  approach	  to	  the	  Zairian	  problem’	  and	  the	  role	  the	  United	  States	  might	  play	  in	  such	  a	  venture	   ahead	   of	   a	   private	   meeting	   between	   President	   Carter	   and	   the	   French	  President	   Giscard	   d’Estaing,	   visiting	   the	   US	   to	   attend	   a	   special	   UN	   session	   on	  disarmament.	  Brzezinski’s	  summary	  of	  the	  SCC	  deliberations	  conveys	  considerable	  angst	  over	  any	  deepening	  American	  commitments	   in	  Congo.	  Nevertheless,	  despite	  his	  scepticism	  the	  National	  Security	  Adviser	  went	  on	   to	  describe	   the	  SCC’s	  shared	  view	   that	   the	  United	  States	   could	   simply	  not	   afford	   to	   ignore	  Congo’s	   threatening	  demise,	  	  ‘Despite	   the	   poor	   prospects	   for	   significant	   reform,	   there	   was	   a	   general	   SCC	  consensus	  led	  by	  State	  that	  Zaire	  is	  too	  important	  and	  the	  global	  stakes	  too	  high	  for	   the	   United	   States	   to	   continue	   its	   past	   posture	   of	   marginal	   support…	   The	  alternative	   of	   not	   participating	   in	   this	   effort	   would	   probably	   lead	   to	   rapid	  economic	  collapse	  and	  political	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  country.’518	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   SCC	   recommended	   that	   the	   president	   signal	   a	  willingness	   for	   the	  United	  States	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  multinational	  development	  program,	  under	   the	  auspices	   of	   the	   ‘Mobutu	   Plan’	   for	   reform,	   and	   to	   share	   part	   of	   the	   burden	   of	   an	  international	   force	   for	   Congo	   by	   once	  more	   providing	   airlift	   capabilities.	   Again,	   a	  strong	  desire	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  play	  a	  subordinate	  role	  to	  its	  European	  allies	  in	   this	   effort	   was	   reiterated.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   US	   role	   in	   these	   efforts	   remained	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  515	  Odom	  to	  Aaron,	  ‘SCC	  Working	  Group	  Meeting	  on	  Zaire’,	  22nd	  May	  1978;	  NLC	  2,	  CREST,	  JCL	  516	  Once	  again	  the	  United	  States	  played	  an	  important	  behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	  contribution	  as	  further	  C-­‐141	  airlifts	  delivered	  additional	  spare	  parts,	  fuel	  handling	  gear	  and	  the	  loan	  of	  a	  communications	  truck	  to	  Kamina	  airport	  in	  support	  of	  the	  continuing	  Belgian	  operation.	  Aaron,	  Memorandum	  for	  Secretaries	  of	  State,	  Defense	  and	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence:	  ‘Belgian	  Request	  for	  Additional	  Support	  in	  Zaire’,	  24th	  May	  1978;	  NLC	  2,	  CREST,	  JCL	  517	  Brzezinski	  to	  Carter,	  23rd	  May	  1978;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  5,	  NSA,	  JCL	  518	  Brzezinski	  to	  Carter,	  ‘Next	  Steps	  in	  Zaire’,	  26th	  May	  1978;	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  28,	  NSA,	  JCL	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critical	   and	   in	   May	   1978	   the	   Carter	   administration	   was	   once	   more	   rallying	   to	  Mobutu’s	   side	   as	   the	   United	   States	   not	   only	   contributed	   to	   a	   rapid	   military	  intervention	   in	   Shaba	  but	   also	   committed	   to	   a	   broader	   security	   and	  development	  plan	  for	  Congo	  under	  European	  auspices.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   the	   realm	   of	   security,	   the	   French	   were	   again	   the	   key	   to	   enlisting	   support	  from	  its	  francophone	  African	  allies	  to	  this	  effect.	  As	  a	  result,	  David	  Newsom,	  now	  as	  Undersecretary	  of	  State	  for	  Political	  Affairs,	  travelled	  to	  Paris	  to	  discuss	  the	  details	  of	   these	   operations	   on	   the	   first	  weekend	   of	   June.	   In	   his	   briefing	   to	   the	   president,	  Brzezinski	  outlined	  his	  limited	  mandate	  as	  follows,	  ‘Newsom	  is	  going	  with	  guidance	  reflecting	  your	  desire	  to	  keep	  the	  Europeans	  in	  the	  lead,	  rely	  on	  African	  troops,	  and	  keep	  us	  in	  a	  backstopping	  role	  not	  including	  troops.’519	  Details	  gradually	  emerged	  of	  a	  renewed	  Moroccan	  commitment	  of	  1,500	  troops	  and	  contributions	  from	  Senegal,	  Togo,	  Gabon	  and	  the	  Ivory	  Coast	  bringing	  the	  force	  up	  to	  some	  2,500	  and	  giving	  the	  venture	  a	  more	   ‘pan-­‐African’	  appearance.520	  By	   June	  9th,	  Brzezinski	  exclaimed	  that	  he	  had	  finally	  received	  a	  full	  exposition	  of	  French	  requirements	  for	  the	  airlift	  of	  the	  Inter	   African	   Force	   (IAF)	   and	   was	   able	   to	   communicate	   to	   the	   French	   Foreign	  Minister,	   Jean	   François-­‐Poncet,	   that	   twenty-­‐five	   C-­‐141	   and	   C-­‐5	   transport	   plane	  sorties	  in	  support	  of	  this	  effort	  had	  been	  approved.	  With	  a	  mandate	  to	  remain	  for	  a	  year	  initially,	  while	  French	  and	  Belgian	  military	  advisers	  set	  about	  another	  training	  program	  to	  improve	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  FAZ,	  it	  appeared	  that	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  IAF	  that	   July	   had	   resolved	   Mobutu’s	   most	   immediate	   security	   fears,	   at	   least	   on	   his	  Shaban	   flank.	  521	  The	  willingness	   of	   the	   Carter	   administration	   to	   simply	   follow	   an	  opaque	  French	  lead	  illustrates	  Washington’s	  emphasis	  on	  Congolese	  stability.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	   security	   effort	   alone,	   however,	   could	   not	   ensure	   Mobutu’s	   survival	   as	  Congo’s	  dire	  economic	  straits	  had	  been	  further	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  damage	  inflicted	  upon	  Kolwezi’s	  mining	  operations	  during	  the	  recent	  upheavals.	  Even	  if	  his	  creditors	  ignored	   Congo’s	   non-­‐compliance	   with	   the	   past	   two	   IMF	   stabilization	   plans	   and	  continued	   financing	   as	   previously	   agreed,	   according	   to	   US	   officials	   the	   combined	  cost	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  earnings	  from	  Kolwezi’s	  mines	  and	  their	  reconstruction	  over	  the	  following	  two	  to	  three	  months	  was	  estimated	  at	  some	  one	  hundred	  and	  fifty	  million	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  519	  Brzezinski	  to	  Carter,	  ‘Mini-­‐SCC	  Meeting	  on	  Zaire’,	  2nd	  June	  1978;	  NLC	  2,	  CREST,	  JCL	  520	  Thornton	  to	  Aaron,	  ‘O’Neil	  Briefing’,	  5th	  June	  1978;	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  CO67,	  WHCF,	  JCL;	  Milton	  R.	  Benjamin,	  ‘Morocco	  will	  send	  Troops	  to	  help	  Zaire’	  Washington	  Post;	  3rd	  June	  1978,	  p.	  A1	  521	  UPI	  reported	  that	  France	  and	  Belgium	  would	  train	  a	  15,000-­‐man	  elite	  strike	  force	  for	  the	  FAZ	  on	  12th	  June	  1978.	  Two	  ‘North-­‐South:	  Evening	  Reports’	  from	  Thornton	  to	  Brzezinski,	  12th	  June	  and	  21st	  June	  1978;	  NLC	  24,	  CREST,	  JCL	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dollars.	  522	  Under	  French	  and	  Belgian	  auspices,	  the	  international	  donor	  community	  of	   the	   IMF,	  Paris	  Club	  and	  various	   commercial	  banks	  were	   cajoled	   into	   continued	  support	  at	  multilateral	  donor	  meetings	  in	  Paris	  on	  5th	  June	  and	  Brussels	  on	  the	  13th-­‐14th	  June	  and	  again	  on	  9th-­‐10th	  November.	  Again	  following	  the	  lead	  of	  its	  European	  partner,	   the	   United	   States	   remained	   instrumental	   in	   ensuring	   Congo’s	   continued	  financial	   viability.	  As	   such,	   despite	   tight	   budget	   constraints	   imposed	  by	  Congress,	  the	   Washington	   agreed	   to	   a	   further	   thirty-­‐six	   million	   dollar	   food,	   security	   and	  development	   assistance	   for	   1979	   and	   1980-­‐	   an	   important	   gesture	   to	   shore	   up	  donor	  confidence	  by	  signalling	  continued	  American	  support.523	  Thus,	  on	  November	  17th	  Brzezinski	  cabled	  the	  Paris	  embassy	  with	  some	  satisfaction	  noting,	   ‘While	  not	  making	   any	   specific	   commitments	   for	   new	   aid,	   the	   IMF	   appears	   to	   have	   been	  satisfied	   that	   it	   had	   generated	   enough	   information	   on	   assistance	   flows	   to	   allow	  resumption	  of	  planning	  for	  the	  standby	  agreement	  loan.’524	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  These	  economic	  and	  security	  arrangements	  were	  not,	  however,	  to	  be	  entirely	  without	  conditions	  and	  the	  final	  aspect	  of	  the	  Western	  rescue	  package	  in	  1978	  was	  a	  renewed	  call	  for	  reform	  of	  the	  bedraggled	  Mobutu	  regime.	  Here	  the	  United	  States	  took	   the	   lead	   in	   cajoling	   the	   Five	   Power	   (United	   States,	   France,	   Belgian,	  Western	  Germany	  and	  Britain)	  meeting	  in	  Paris	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  concerted	  demarche	  that	  June	  by	  their	  respective	  ambassadors	  in	  Kinshasa	  to	  press	  Mobutu	  on	  his	  economic	  and	  political	  reform	  program	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  IMF	  stabilization	  measures	  and	  the	  Mobutu	  Plan	  that	  envisioned	  placing	  foreign	  experts	  in	  key	  positions	  at	  the	  Central	  Bank,	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  Customs,	  as	  well	  as	  pledging	  a	  greater	  devolution	  of	  political	  power.525	  Of	   course,	  with	   its	  policies	  during	   the	   second	  Shaba	   crisis	   once	  more	  under	  scrutiny,	  the	  domestic	  political	  case	  for	  reform	  of	  its	  Congolese	  ally	  was	  compelling	  from	  the	  Washington	  administration’s	  point	  of	  view.	  The	  initial	  airlift	  in	  support	   of	   the	   French	   and	   Belgian	   operations,	   while	   couched	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  humanitarian	  rescue	  mission,	  had	  already	  sparked	  some	  congressional	  debate	  over	  the	   applicability	   of	   the	  War	   Powers	   Act	   and	   representatives	   of	   the	   Congressional	  Black	   Caucus	  wrote	   a	   letter	   to	   President	   Carter	  warning	   against	   a	   resumption	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  522	  ‘Cost	  of	  Zairian	  Stabilization	  and	  Recovery’	  (no	  author/date	  given);	  General	  Odom	  File,	  Box	  61,	  NSA,	  JCL	  523	  The	  British	  delegation	  at	  the	  Brussels	  Conference	  on	  Zaire	  noted	  the	  dual	  purpose	  of	  their	  American	  counterparts	  in	  both	  touting	  reform	  while	  eager	  to	  ensure	  continued	  credit	  for	  Congo.	  Maurice	  to	  Winpenny,	  ‘Some	  Economic	  Aspects	  on	  the	  Brussels	  Conference	  on	  Zaire’,	  17th	  November	  1978	  and	  ‘Opening	  Statements	  of	  the	  Unite	  States,	  9th	  November,	  1978;	  both	  in	  FCO	  31/2305,	  IMF/IBRD	  in	  Zaire	  524	  Brzezinski	  to	  American	  Embassy,	  Paris,	  ‘Briefing	  Material	  for	  Senator	  Percy’,	  17th	  November	  1978;	  NLC	  2,	  CREST,	  JCL	  525	  Letter	  from	  Carter	  to	  Mobutu,	  11th	  June	  1978	  (to	  be	  transmitted	  via	  Kinshasa	  Embassy	  after	  5	  Power	  Ambassador	  Demarche);	  NLC	  16,	  CREST,	  JCL	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clandestine	  activity	  in	  Angola	  and	  restating	  their	  support	  of	  the	  Clark	  Amendment	  prohibiting	  this.526	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Carter	  White	  House	  was	  under	  constant	  pressure	  to	   justify	   any	   further	   involvement	   in	   Congolese	   affairs	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   the	  country’s	   much	   needed	   rehabilitation.	   The	   talking	   points	   prepared	   by	   Lannon	  Walker	   for	   Brzezinski’s	   conversation	   with	   the	   French	   Foreign	   Minister	   stressed	  exactly	   this	   conditionality	   of	   further	  US	   support,	   ‘There	   is	   no	  way	  we	   can	   sustain	  our	  commitment	  to	  Zaire,	  or	  our	  support	  for	  European	  efforts,	  if	  we	  are	  not	  able	  to	  persuade	  Congress	  that	  fundamental	  reforms	  have	  been	  undertaken	  by	  Mobutu.’527	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	   dismiss	   the	   American	   rallying	   cry	   for	   reform	   of	   its	   ally	   of	   old	   simply	   as	  cynical	   domestic	   politicking	   is	   perhaps	   overstating	   the	   case,	   however.	   Again,	   the	  issue	  of	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  very	  much	  formed	  an	  integral	  part	   of	   the	   Carter	   administration’s	   deliberations.	   As	   such	   the	   SCC	  meeting	   on	   the	  26th	   May	   1978	   discussed	   earlier	   already	   reflected	   a	   consensus,	   ‘that	   any	   US	  contribution	   to	   such	   a	   program	   (economic	   assistance,	   debt	   rescheduling	   and	  assistance	   to	   the	   IAF)	   would	   depend	   on	   significant	   reforms	   –	   many	   of	   which	  Mobutu	   has	   already	   pledged	   to	   undertake.’ 528 	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   Five	   Power	  Demarche,	  the	  United	  States	  also	  launched	  a	  diplomatic	  drive	  of	  its	  own	  to	  maintain	  pressure	   on	   the	   Congolese	   president.	   As	   such,	   ambassador	   Cutler	   continued	   to	  press	   for	   reform	   in	  Kinshasa	   and	   this	   constituted	   the	   central	   subject	   of	   Secretary	  Vance’s	   consultations	  with	   Congo’s	   Foreign	  Minister	   Umba	   in	  Washington	   on	   4th	  October	  as	  well	  as	  during	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dick	  Moose	  and	  ambassador	  Don	  McHenry’s	  mission	   to	   Congo	   that	   November.529	  	  Most	   notable,	   however,	   was	  the	  tenor	  taken	  by	  President	  Carter	  personally.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Breaking	   with	   the	   aloofness	   from	   Congo’s	   internal	   problems	   of	   his	  predecessors,	   Carter	   responded	   to	   Mobutu’s	   message	   of	   thanks	   for	   continued	  American	  assistance	  with	  a	  long	  letter	  that	  both	  reiterated	  Mobutu’s	  public	  pledges	  and	  stressed	  in	  some	  detail	  the	  need	  for	  economic	  and	  political	  reform.	  Carter	  went	  on	   to	   ‘speak	   frankly…	   between	   friends...’	   by	   addressing	   the	   poor	   human	   rights	  record	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  directly,	  writing,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  526	  Herbert	  J.	  Hansell	  (State	  Department	  Legal	  Adviser),	  June	  16th	  1978	  explained	  why	  War	  Powers	  Act	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  a	  US	  ‘transport	  operation…more	  than	  100	  miles	  from	  the	  combat	  zone’;	  	  	  Letter	  from	  Charles	  C.	  Diggs	  and	  Darren	  J.	  Mitchell	  (Chairman	  of	  Congressional	  Black	  Caucus),	  27th	  May	  1978;	  both	  in	  Country	  File,	  Zaire,	  Box	  87,	  NSA,	  JCL	  527	  Walker,	  Talking	  Points	  for	  Use	  with	  Francois-­‐Poncet,	  1st	  June	  1978;	  Vertical	  Files,	  Box	  115,	  JCL	  	  528	  Brzezinski	  to	  Carter,	  Memorandum:	  ‘Next	  Steps	  in	  Zaire’,	  26th	  May	  1978;	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  28,	  NSA,	  JCL	  529	  US	  Delegation	  in	  NY	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Secretary’s	  Bilateral	  with	  Foreign	  Minister	  Umba,	  October	  5th,	  6th	  October	  1978;	  NLC	  16,	  CREST,	  JCL;	  Vance	  to	  Carter,	  27th	  November	  1978;	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  39,	  Plains	  File,	  JCL	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‘I	   realize	   full	  well	   the	   enormous	   challenge	   that	  bringing	  unity	   to	   the	  nation	  of	  Zaire	  presents	  and	  I	  know	  that	  American	  norms	  cannot	  be	  transplanted.	  At	  the	  same	   time,	   you	   must	   know	   that	   I	   cannot	   continue	   significant	   assistance	   if	  corrupt	   elements	   continue	   to	   be	   associated	   in	   the	   public	   mind	   with	   your	  government.	   Our	   ambassador	   will	   be	   prepared	   to	   discuss	   specific	   allegations	  with	   you	   if	   you	   desire.	   Also,	   support	   will	   be	   most	   difficult	   if	   the	   pattern	   of	  arrests	  and	  executions	  we	  have	  witnessed	  continues.’530	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  issue	  of	  maintaining	  Congressional	  support	  played	  a	  part	  in	  Carter’s	  demarche	  but	   it	   is	  nonetheless	  noteworthy	   that	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	  US-­‐Congolese	  relations	   an	   American	   president	   directly	   confronted	   Mobutu	   personally	   on	   his	  domestic	  record.	  With	  such	  high-­‐level	  engagement,	   the	  question	  remains	  why	  this	  reformist	  drive	  failed	  to	  have	  greater	  impact	  on	  the	  direction	  taken	  in	  Kinshasa?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  two	  Shaba	  interventions	  and	  the	  renewed	  economic	  bailout	  demonstrated	  the	   dependence	   of	   the	   Mobutu	   regime	   on	   his	   foreign	   backers	   for	   its	   continued	  survival,	   as	   the	   French	   embassy	   noted.531	  There	   are	   three	   principal	   reasons	   why	  this	   considerable	   leverage	   did	   not	   translate	   into	   an	   effective	   reform	   of	   its	  beneficiary,	   however.	   First	   of	   all,	   Mobutu’s	   intransigence	   on	   his	   domestic	   front	  would	   again	   prove	   a	  major	   stumbling	   block	   as	   the	  wily	   Congolese	   leader	   did	   his	  utmost	   to	   ward	   off	   unwanted	   ‘meddling’	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1978.	   He	   publicly	  rejected	   any	   conditionality	   of	   the	   aid	   received	   as	   infringements	   of	   Congo’s	  sovereignty	   and	   even	   temporarily	   fended	   off	   the	   Paris	   Five	   ambassadors	   by	  retreating	   to	   the	   north	   of	   the	   country	   and	   not	   receiving	   visitors.532	  To	   move	   the	  Kinshasa	   regime	   would	   therefore	   require	   a	   united	   front	   and	   Brzezinski	   himself	  concluded	  his	  suggested	  talking	  points	  for	  the	  president’s	  meeting	  with	  his	  French	  counterpart	   in	   May	   1978	   with	   the	   sage	   warning,	   ‘The	   key	   to	   success	   of	   any	  endeavour	   is	   going	   to	   be	   close	   cooperation	   among	   us.	   Mobutu	   will	   exploit	   any	  differences	   in	   our	   positions.’533	  The	   second	   notable	   failure	   of	   this	   reformist	   drive	  therefore,	  despite	   their	  efforts	   for	  a	   joint	  demarche,	  was	  the	  disunity	  amongst	   the	  Paris	  Five	  in	  how	  to	  induce	  compliance	  from	  Congo’s	  intractable	  dictator.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   uncoordinated	   and	   divergent	   approaches	   of	   Brussels	   and	   Paris	   were	  already	   apparent	   during	   the	   Kolwezi	   intervention,	   perhaps	   reflecting	   their	  respective	   levels	  of	   support	   for	  Mobutu	  personally.	   Indeed,	   a	  hint	  of	   exasperation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  530	  Letter	  from	  Carter	  to	  Mobutu,	  11th	  June	  1978;	  NLC	  16,	  CREST,	  JCL	  531	  Ross	  à	  Direction	  des	  Affaires	  Africaines	  et	  Malgaches,	  Paris,	  ‘Dépêche	  d’Actualité’,	  2nd	  June	  1978;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Étrangères,	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Carton	  45,	  CADN	  532	  Vance	  to	  Carter,	  June	  12th	  1978;	  NLC	  2,	  CREST,	  JCL	  533	  Brzezinski	  to	  Carter,	  26th	  May	  1978;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  17,	  NSA,	  JCL	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can	  be	  noted	  in	  French	  Ambassador	  Ross’s	  account	  of	  the	  Belgian	  reluctance	  to	  side	  with	   Mobutu	   personally	   in	   the	   Kolwezi	   operations	   and	   unwillingness	   to	   involve	  itself	   in	   Congo’s	   domestic	   affairs	   as	   he	   wrote	   from	   Kinshasa,	   ‘Cette	   attitude	  procédait	   des	   réticences	   a	   s’engager	   aux	   cotes	   du	  Général	  Mobutu.’534	  Conversely,	  while	   well	   aware	   of	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   Kinshasa	   regime,	   the	   French	   were	  reluctant	   to	  pin	  this	  on	  Mobutu	  personally	  and	  Ross	  wrote,	   ‘Mais,	  quelles	  qu’aient	  été	  les	  fautes	  d’un	  homme,	  on	  ne	  peut	  le	  charger	  de	  tous	  les	  péchés	  du	  Zaïre:	  de	  ce	  pays	   sous-­‐développé,	   au	   seuil	   du	   quart-­‐monde,	   trop	   vaste,	   sans	   véritables	  structures…’535	  As	  such,	  perhaps	  reflecting	  French	  desires	   to	  guard	  their	  close	  ties	  with	  the	  incumbent	  Kinshasa	  despot,	  Washington	  was	  frustrated	  by	  their	  reluctant	  ally	   to	   actually	   confront	   President	   Mobutu.	   NSC	   Staffer	   Thornton	   commented	   to	  Brzezinski	  that	  June,	  ‘The	  French	  are	  pretty	  clearly	  putting	  a	  monkey	  wrench	  in	  our	  plans	  for	  strong	  pressure	  on	  Mobutu.’536	  Indeed,	  Thornton	  even	  speculated	  that	  the	  French	   might	   leak	   a	   copy	   of	   Carter’s	   letter	   to	   Mobutu	   before	   it	   had	   reached	   its	  intended	  target	  and	  derailing	  the	  entire	  process,	  such	  was	  American	  confidence	  in	  their	   French	   allies.	   Nor	   were	   the	   French	   the	   only	   obstacle	   to	   a	   united	   drive	   for	  reform	   in	  Congo	  and,	   following	   the	  Paris	  Five	  Demarche	   to	  Mobutu	   in	   June	  1978,	  the	  US	  embassy	  in	  Kinshasa	  reported	  its	  distinct	  impression	  that	  their	  counterparts,	  ‘have	  been	  relatively	  gentle	  with	  Mobutu	  and	  have	  let	  us	  carry	  the	  main	  burden	  of	  delivering	  the	  hard	  line’.537	  The	  Kinshasa	  despot	  was	  thus	  left	  to	  exploit	  the	  chinks	  in	  the	  Western	  position	  just	  as	  Brzezinski	  had	  warned.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Less	   obvious,	   however,	   is	   why	   the	   United	   States	   did	   not	   convert	   its	   leverage	  both	   on	   the	  Mobutu	   regime	   and	   its	   European	   partners	   to	   bring	   their	   joint	   Congo	  endeavours	  in	  line	  with	  its	  stated	  modernising	  intentions?	  In	  fact,	  even	  as	  Mobutu’s	  resistance	   and	   European	   vacillations	   were	   becoming	   increasingly	   apparent,	  Washington	   offered	   logistical	   support	   to	   the	   IAF	   force,	   agreed	   to	   a	   renewed	  financial	   bailout	   and	   continued	   to	   offer	   as	   much	   aid	   to	   the	   Kinshasa	   regime	   as	  Congress	  would	   tolerate.	   At	   least	   part	   of	   the	   explanation	   for	   the	  weakness	   of	   the	  American	  position	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Washington’s	  shifting	  rhetorical	  approach	  to	  its	  Congo	   dilemma.	   Indeed,	   despite	   its	   apparent	   commitment	   to	   pressuring	  Mobutu,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  534	  Ross	  and	  Chouvet	  to	  de	  Guiringaud,	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Étrangères,	  ‘Etude	  Sur	  les	  Événements	  de	  
Kolwezi’	  9th	  August	  1978;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Étrangères,	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Carton	  45,	  CADN;	  For	  an	  elaboration	  on	  the	  Belgian	  motivations	  and	  reluctance	  to	  support	  Mobutu	  personally	  see	  Gauthier	  de	  Villers,	  De	  Mobutu	  à	  Mobutu:	  Trente	  Ans	  de	  Relations	  Belgique-­‐Zaire	  (Brussels;	  De	  Boeck	  University,	  1995)	  535	  Ross	  to	  Direction	  des	  Affaires	  Africaines	  et	  Malgaches,	  Paris,	  ‘Dépêche	  d’Actualité’,	  2nd	  June	  1978;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Étrangères,	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Carton	  45,	  CADN	  536	  Thornton	  to	  Brzezinski,	  North-­‐South:	  Evening	  Reports,	  13th	  June	  1978;	  NLC	  10,	  CREST,	  JCL	  537	  Henry	  Richardson	  (NSC)	  to	  Brzezinski,	  International	  Organizations:	  Evening	  Report,	  21st	  June	  1978;	  NLC	  10,	  CREST,	  JCL	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Carter	  was	  never	  able	  to	  free	  himself	  from	  the	  more	  traditional	  Cold	  War	  complex	  of	  his	  predecessors	  and	   it	  was	   this	  paradox	  that	  ultimately	  doomed	  this	  reformist	  drive	  to	  failure.	  This	  transformation	  of	  the	  official	  public	  American	  position	  marked	  the	  final	  aspect	  of	  the	  failure	  to	  reform	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime	  as	  it	  clearly	  played	  into	  Mobutu’s	   hands	   who	   had	   long	   lambasted	   a	   supposed	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   grand	   design	  behind	  the	  unrest	  he	  faced	  in	  Shaba.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	   the	   justification	   for	   continued	   assistance	   of	   Congo’s	   leader	   in	   times	   of	  crisis	  remained	  constant,	  as	  has	  been	  seen,	  US	  officials	  notably	  resisted	  any	  public	  endorsement	   of	  Mobutu’s	   claims	  of	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	  meddling	  during	   the	   first	   Shaba	  crisis	   and	   shied	   away	   from	  any	  potential	   escalation	   of	   this	   local	   crisis	   along	   such	  lines.	   The	   resurgence	   of	   violence	   in	   Shaba	   the	   following	   year	   saw	   this	   cautious	  approach	   cast	   into	   the	   wind	   as	   the	   State	   Department	   almost	   immediately	  denounced	   the	   supposed	   Cuban	   role	   in	   training	   and	   equipping	   the	   invading	  Katangan	   force.	   Furthermore,	   President	   Carter	   himself	   took	   the	   lead	   in	   publicly	  lambasting	   the	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   militarism	   in	   Africa.	   During	   a	   Chicago	   press	  conference	   the	   following	   week	   on	   the	   25th	   May,	   just	   as	   the	   US-­‐French-­‐Belgian	  operations	   in	   Shaba	   were	   coming	   to	   a	   close,	   the	   president	   criticised	   Angola	   and	  Cuba	  for	  their	  apparent	  roles	  in	  the	  Katangan	  invasion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Describing	  the	  Cubans	  as	  Soviet	  proxies,	  he	  went	  on	  to	  dismiss	  any	  deliberate	  policy	   of	   ‘Linkage’	   while	   betraying	   considerable	   ambivalence	   in	   response	   to	   a	  question	   on	   the	   subject	   as	   he	   denounced	   the	   Soviet	   human	   rights	   record	   and	  concluded,	  ‘…	  and	  unless	  they	  show	  some	  constraints	  on	  their	  own	  involvement	  in	  Africa	   and	   on	   their	   sending	   Cuban	   troops	   to	   be	   involved	   in	  Africa,	   it	  will	  make	   it	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  conclude	  a	  SALT	  agreement	  and	  to	  have	  it	  ratified	  once	  it	  is	  written.’	   The	   warning	   entailed	   the	   above	   statement	   was	   clear	   and	   constituted	   a	  much	  more	  confrontational	  line	  over	  Africa	  from	  the	  White	  House.	  Indeed,	  this	  shift	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  its	  audience	  as	  Walt	  Rogers	  of	  the	  Associated	  Press	  commented,	  ‘It	  was	  just	  about	  a	  year	  ago	  at	  Notre	  Dame	  University	  you	  told	  Americans	  it	  was	  time	  to	   end	   their	   inordinate	   concern	   and	   alarm	   with	   communism.	   You	   seem	   to	   have	  fallen	  into	  that	  same	  preoccupation	  in	  Africa.’538	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  second	  Shaba	  crisis	  Carter	  had	  seemingly	   reverted	   to	   the	  all	   too	   familiar	   line	   that	  communist	   aggression	   lurked	   behind	   Congo’s	   domestic	   troubles.	   By	   extension,	  casting	   any	   setbacks	   for	  Mobutu’s	   regime	   as	   a	   gain	   for	  America’s	   Cold	  War	   rivals	  made	  it	  that	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  curb	  his	  domestic	  transgressions	  effectively.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  538	  The	  President’s	  News	  Conference,	  Chicago	  Illinois,	  25th	  May	  1978,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project	  (www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=30852);	  See	  also	  John	  M.	  Goshko,	  ‘Carter	  Accuses	  Cuba	  
on	  Zaire	  Raid’,	  Washington	  Post	  26th	  May	  1978,	  A1	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  The	   basis	   for	   this	   about	   turn	   Carter’s	   finger	   pointing	   over	   the	   alleged	   Cuban	  role	   in	   Congo’s	   Shaba	   troubles	   is	   puzzling	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons.	   American	  statements	   were	   careful	   not	   to	   accuse	   Cuba	   of	   an	   actual	   combat	   role	   in	   the	  occupation	   of	   Kolwezi,	   as	   there	   was	   no	   evidence	   to	   support	   such	   claims.539	  The	  wider	   assertion	   that	   Cuba	   had	   facilitated	   the	   invasion	   by	   training	   and	   equipping	  FNLC	   recruits	   in	   the	   past	   would	   be	   harder	   to	   counter	   due	   to	   their	   cooperation	  during	  the	  Angolan	  crisis.	  Of	  course,	  both	  Carter	  and	  his	  team	  failed	  to	  mention	  the	  inherent	  reciprocity	  of	  these	  alleged	  actions,	  if	  confirmed,	  with	  Mobutu’s	  continued	  assistance	   to	   FNLA	   and	   UNITA	   in	   their	   on	   going	   campaign	   against	   Angola.	  Furthermore,	  if	  past	  involvement	  with	  the	  Katangans	  could	  serve	  as	  an	  indictment,	  Washington	  might	  as	  well	  consider	  their	  early	  partnership	  with	  Belgium	  during	  the	  secessionist	  years	  of	  the	  early	  1960s,	  as	  Castro	  himself	  was	  quick	  to	  point	  out.540	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  More	   remarkable	   still	   was	   the	   administrations	   conduct	   towards	   Cuba	   during	  the	   Shaba	   turmoil.	   Following	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   US	   Interest	   Section	   in	   Havana	  (USINT)	   the	   previous	   year,	   Castro	   now	   used	   this	   as	   a	   sounding	   board	   during	   the	  Shaba	  crisis.	  Already	  on	  the	  17th	  May,	  Castro	  called	  the	  American	  Chief	  of	  Mission,	  Lyle	  Lane,	  to	  his	  office	  to	  categorically	  deny	  any	  direct	  or	  indirect	  Cuban,	  Angolan	  or	  Soviet	   involvement	   in	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence.	   In	  stressing	  that	  Cuba	  was	  neither	  supplying	   weapons,	   training	   the	   FNLC	   nor	   in	   fact	   had	   any	   contact	   with	   the	  Katangans;	  Castro	  explained	   that,	   ‘Cuba	  has	  adopted	   this	  position	  because	   it	  does	  not	   consider	   Katangan	   incursions	   into	   Zaire	   desirable	   from	   any	   standpoint	   and	  specifically	  not	  conducive	  to	  good	  relations	  among	  the	  nations	  of	  black	  Africa	  or	  to	  the	   peaceful	   development	   of	   Angola,’	   and	   that	   Cuba	   was	   reluctant	   to	   give	   either	  Congo	  or	  its	  allies	  any	  excuse	  for	  renewed	  violence	  with	  its	  southern	  neighbour.541	  This	   was	   very	   close	   to	   the	   arguments	   used	   by	   the	   CIA	   in	   rejecting	   Mobutu’s	  allegations	  of	  Cuban	  involvement	  in	  the	  1977	  Katangan	  incursion.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  response	  from	  Washington	  on	  this	  occasion	  was	  much	  more	  confrontational.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Not	  only	  did	  Carter	  publicly	  reject	  Castro’s	  assertions	  as	  has	  been	  noted,	  but	  the	  State	   Department	   also	   leaked	   the	   Cuban	   leader’s	   confidential	   consultations	   with	  USINT	  in	  Havana.	  Castro	  and	  Lane	  appeared	  equally	  disgruntled	  over	  Washington’s	  abuse	   of	   their	   very	   first	   substantive	   talks.	   The	   American	   Chief	   of	   Mission	  reprimanded	  the	  State	  Department	  a	  follows,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  539	  Letter	  from	  Frank	  Moose,	  Assistant	  to	  the	  President	  for	  Congressional	  Liaison	  to	  the	  Honorable	  Millicent	  Fenwick,	  14th	  August	  1978;	  Country	  File,	  Zaire,	  Box	  87,	  NSA,	  JCL	  	  540	  Lane,	  Havana	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Fidel	  Castro	  Denies	  Cuban	  Involvement	  in	  Shaba’,	  18th	  May	  1978;	  Powell	  Press,	  Box	  55,	  Staff	  Offices,	  JCL	  541	  Ibid.	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‘I	   am	   of	   course	   deeply	   distressed	   by	   indications	   that	   my	   conversation	   with	  Castro	   has	   been	   leaked	   to	   the	   press.	   At	   the	   outset	   of	   the	   conversation,	   Castro	  said	   that	   he	   had	   chosen	   to	   see	  me	   very	   quietly	   since	   he	   did	   not	  want	   to	   read	  about	  it	  in	  the	  newspapers.	  I	  did	  not	  think	  it	  necessary	  to	  include	  that	  comment	  in	  my	  reporting	  cable.	  Assuming	  the	  leak	  did	  not	  originate	  from	  the	  Cubans,	  this	  development	   could	   have	   obviously	   adverse	   effects	   on	   my	   relations	   with	   the	  GOC,	   and	   it	   measurably	   reduces	   the	   likelihood	   that	   I	   might	   have	   any	   further	  contact	  on	  substantive	  matters	  with	  Castro.’542	  	  The	  fact	  that	  Washington	  utterly	  failed	  to	  engage	  Castro’s	  opening	  on	  the	  Katangan	  issue	  and	  so	  readily	  risked	  any	   improvement	   in	   its	  relations	  with	  Cuba	  suggests	  a	  mass	  of	  evidence	  implicating	  Cuban	  aggression	  on	  Congo’s	  borders.	  Indeed,	  by	  mid-­‐June	   1978,	   in	   response	   to	   Congressional	   probing	   the	   CIA	   had	   produced	   a	   dossier	  citing	   over	   thirty-­‐five	   sources	   confirming	   the	   Cuban	   links	   with	   the	   Katangans,	  according	  to	  a	  Newsweek	  article.	  This	  evidence,	  included	  radio	  intercepts,	  accounts	  of	  training	  basis	   in	  Angola	  and	  photos	  of	  Cuban	  weapons	  found	  amongst	  captured	  Katangas,	   apparently	   convinced	  much	   of	   Congress	   including	   the	   Senator	   Howard	  Baker,	   the	   Republican	   leader,	   and	   House	   Speaker	   Thomas	   (‘Tip’)	   O’Neill.	   One	  administration	   insider	  who	  had	  access	   to	   the	   full	   record	  was	  quoted	  as	   saying,	   ‘If	  you	  took	  it	  to	  a	  jury,	  you'd	  get	  a	  12	  to	  0	  vote.’543	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   actual	   French	   and	   American	   records	   available	   tell	   a	   very	   different	   story,	  however.	  Throughout	  both	  Shaba	  crises,	   the	  French	  embassy	  and	  military	  mission	  in	   Congo	  most	   consistently	   blamed	   Angolan	   and	   Cuban	   (and,	  more	   speculatively,	  East	   German)	   influences	   directing	   the	   Katangan	   forces.544	  Indeed,	   Ambassador	  Ross’s	   autopsy	   of	   events	   saw	   Cuban	   transgressions	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   galvanising	  renewed	  Western	  involvement	  and	  the	  American	  media	  picked	  up	  on	  these	  French	  claims.545	  The	   foundations	   of	   these	   assertions	   were	   decidedly	   shaky,	   however,	   as	  they	  pointed	  to	  little	  more	  than	  a	  second-­‐hand	  account	  of	  two	  Katangan	  prisoners	  and	   some	   supposed	   radio	   intercepts. 546 	  Actual	   evidence	   of	   Cubans	   in	   Shaba	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  542	  Lane,	  Havana	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  19th	  May	  1978;	  Powell	  Press,	  Box	  55,	  Staff	  Offices,	  JCL	  543	  Raymond	  Carroll,	  ‘What	  Did	  Cuba	  Do?’	  Newsweek	  12th	  June	  1978,	  p.	  32	  544	  For	  Example,	  Colonel	  Bommier	  (French	  Attaché	  des	  Forces	  Armées	  in	  Kinshasa)	  without	  citing	  actual	  evidence	  placed	  the	  Cubans	  firmly	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  first	  Katangan	  invasion	  of	  Shaba	  already	  in	  April	  1977	  in	  his	  report	  to	  the	  French	  Chief	  of	  Staff,	  ‘Rapport	  de	  Renseignement	  Bimestriel,	  Avril-­‐	  Mai	  1977’;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Étrangères,	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Carton	  45,	  CADN	  545	  Ross	  to	  Direction	  des	  Affaires	  Africaines	  et	  Malgaches,	  Paris,	  ‘Dépêche	  d’Actualité’,	  2nd	  June	  1978;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Étrangères,	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Carton	  45,	  CADN;	  	  For	  Example:	  David	  B.	  Ottaway,	  ‘French,	  Belgians	  Get	  All	  Whites	  out	  of	  Zaire	  City’	  Washington	  Post	  22nd	  May	  1978,	  A1;	  Raymond	  Carroll,	  ‘What	  Did	  Cuba	  Do?’	  Newsweek	  12th	  June	  1978,	  p.	  32	  546	  It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  the	  radio	  intercepts	  were	  made	  by	  the	  French	  themselves	  or	  passed	  on	  by	  the	  FAZ;	  Ambassador	  Ross,	  ‘Présentation	  a	  la	  Presse	  de	  deux	  Prisonniers	  Katangais’	  22nd	  April;	  CADN-­‐	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Étrangères-­‐Kinshasa-­‐Ambassade-­‐	  Carton	  45	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remained	  illusive.	  Similarly,	  in	  a	  memorandum	  evaluating	  Castro’s	  denials,	  the	  CIA	  in	   turn	   also	   cited	   a	   conversation	   between	   Newsweek	   journalist	   Arnaud	   de	  Borchgrave	   and	   two	   wounded	   Katangans	   reporting	   the	   presence	   of	   two	   ranking	  Cuban	   advisors	   at	   a	   training	   base	   in	  Angola	   on	   the	   2nd	  May	   ahead	   of	   the	  Kolwezi	  operation.547	  This	  unverifiable	  third-­‐hand	  information	  was	  apparently	  backed	  up	  by	  South	  African	  Foreign	  Minister	  Botha’s	  claim	  of	  a	  ‘very	  reliable	  source’	  informing	  of	  some	   two	   thousand	   Katangans	   being	   trained	   by	   Cubans	   in	   north-­‐eastern	   Angola.	  Like	   Mobutu,	   however,	   the	   South	   African	   and	   French	   governments	   clearly	   had	  strong	  ulterior	  motives	  for	  couching	  the	  turmoil	  in	  Shaba	  in	  Cold	  War	  terms	  in	  the	  hope	   of	   securing	   further	   US	   involvement	   in	   Congo	   and	   Angola.	   Perhaps	   the	  strongest	  evidence,	  then,	  came	  from	  an	  apparent	  statement	  from	  an	  FNLC	  leader	  by	  the	  name	  of	  Nathaniel	  Mbumba.	  In	  a	  document	  that	  unfortunately	  remains	  heavily	  sanitised,	   the	  CIA	   reported	  Mbumba’s	  allegations	   that	   ‘Angola	  and	  Cuba	  had	  been	  helping	  the	  insurgents,	  particularly	  with	  Arms	  and	  training.’	  This	  report	  went	  on	  to	  state	  that	   two	  Cuban	  and	  six	  Angolan	  advisors	  accompanied	  the	  rebels	  when	  they	  started	   towards	   Kolwezi	   in	   early	   May	   and	   that	   ‘Cuban	   military	   advisers	   had…	  coordinated	   closely	   in	   the	   planning	   of	   the	   invasion.’548	  Soviet	   and	   East	   German	  personnel	   were	   also	   engaged	   in	   FNLC	   training	   in	   Angola,	   it	   continued.	   As	   such,	  Mbumba’s	  claims	  gave	  a	  degree	  of	  credence	  to	  an	  otherwise	  circumstantial	  case	  and	  it	  was	  precisely	  this	  last	  source,	  Secretary	  Vance	  cited	  in	  his	  conversation	  with	  his	  Soviet	   counterpart,	   Foreign	  Minister	   Gromyko,	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	  crisis	  to	  support	  Carter’s	  public	  condemnation.549	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Gromyko	   for	   his	   part	   simply	   dismissed	   this	   as	   a	   campaign	   of	   disinformation.	  Indeed,	   considerable	   gaps	   remained	   in	   the	   case	   for	   the	  Cuban	   involvement	   in	   the	  Shaba	   crisis.	   From	   the	  now	  accessible	  East	  German	  government	   records,	   it	   seems	  clear	   that	   it	   played	  no	   active	   role	   in	   supporting	   the	   FNLC	  during	   the	   Shaba	   crisis	  and	  it	  remained	  nonplussed	  over	  claims	  to	  the	  contrary.550	  Gleijeses’	  analysis	  of	  the	  Cuban	   archives	   draws	   a	   similar	   conclusion. 551 	  Even	   the	   contemporary	   record	  available	   in	  Washington	   in	  May	  1978,	   however,	   undermined	   the	   reasoning	   of	   the	  Carter	  administration.	  That	  both	  French	  and	  Mobutu’s	  assertions	  of	  a	  direct	  Soviet-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  547	  CIA	  Memorandum,	  ‘Shaba,	  Castro	  and	  the	  Evidence’,	  6th	  June	  1978;	  NLC	  24,	  CREST,	  JCL	  548	  all	  taken	  from	  Ibid.	  549	  Record	  of	  the	  main	  Content	  of	  the	  Conversation	  between	  Soviet	  Foreign	  Minister	  A.	  A.	  Gromyko	  and	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Vance,	  31st	  May	  1978	  in	  New	  York	  (Excerpts	  regarding	  Africa);	  Vertical	  Files,	  Box	  115,	  JCL	  550	  Aktenvermerk,	  Gespräch	  Stellvertreters	  des	  Ministers	  für	  Auswärtige	  Angelegenheiten	  der	  DDR,	  Dr.	  Klaus	  Willerding,	  mit	  Botschafter	  Bolelala	  Wa	  Boende,	  3.	  Mai	  1977;	  Mikrofiche	  C6256,	  MfAA,	  DDR	  551	  Piero	  Gleijeses,	  ‘Truth	  or	  Credibility:	  Castro,	  Carter,	  and	  the	  Invasion	  of	  Shaba’	  in	  International	  History	  Review	  18	  (February	  1996);	  pp.	  70-­‐103	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Cuban	  role	  in	  the	  attack	  on	  Kolwezi	  lacked	  hard	  evidence	  was	  quickly	  conceded	  by	  the	   administration	   following	   further	   questions	   from	   individual	   Congressmen.552	  Moreover,	   the	   accusation	   made	   by	   Carter	   that	   the	   Cubans	   must	   have	   known	   of	  Katangan	  plans	   and	   failed	   to	   give	  due	  warning,	   signalling	   a	  degree	  of	   collusion	  at	  least,	  cannot	  be	  taken	  at	  face	  value.	  In	  fact,	  quite	  the	  opposite	  was	  true.	  Cuba	  did	  in	  fact	  issue	  a	  startlingly	  early	  warning	  over	  Katangan	  activity	  when	  Havana’s	  officials	  approached	   Belgian	   diplomats	   in	   Brussels	   already	   in	   February,	   cautioning	   over	  troop	   movements	   across	   the	   Zambian	   border	   signalling	   an	   impending	   attack	   on	  Shaba.	   Anne	   Cox	   Chambers,	   the	   American	   ambassador	   to	   Brussels,	   reported	   her	  conviction	   that	   the	  Cubans	  wanted	   this	   intelligence	   to	  be	  passed	  on	   to	   the	  United	  States.	  Of	  course,	  this	  may	  have	  been	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  ruse	  to	  cover	  the	  tracks	  of	   Cuban	   involvement	   in	   the	   actual	   operations	   that	   broke	   out	   several	   months	  later.553 	  Perhaps	   Castro	   was	   simply	   covering	   his	   tracks	   but	   the	   fact	   remains,	  however,	  that	  this	  intriguing	  piece	  of	  the	  puzzle	  was	  entirely	  omitted	  from	  the	  very	  public	   allegations	   over	   Cuban	   collusion	   in	   Katanga	   the	   following	   May.	   In	   other	  words,	   not	   only	   did	   the	   Carter	   administration	   lack	   hard	   evidence	   over	   Cuban	  involvement	   in	   Congo	   but	   it	   also	   ignored	   an	   apparent	   effort	   by	   the	   Cubans	   to	  engage	  the	  West	  on	  security	  issues	  on	  the	  Angolan-­‐Congolese	  border.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Whether	   this	   indicates	   a	   wilfully	   duplicitous	   use	   of	   evidence	   to	   challenge	  Cuban	   gains	   in	   Africa,	   or	   simply	   reflects	   a	   sincere	   inability	   to	   imagine	   that	   Cuba	  might	   not	   be	   pulling	   the	   strings	   in	   a	   venture	   originating	   in	   Angola	   is	   difficult	   to	  assess.	  The	  above-­‐cited	  CIA	  report	  indicated	  the	  latter	  as	  it	  concluded,	  	  ‘It	  is	  impossible	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  Cubans	  had	  no	  part	  in	  the	  plans	  or	  training	  or	  foreknowledge	   of	   the	   attack	   in	   a	   country	   in	  which:	   A)	   there	   are	   5,000	   Cuban	  civilian	   advisers	   filling	   top	   managerial	   and	   technical	   positions;	   B)	   They	   are	  developing	  a	  national	  education	  system,	  running	  public	  health	  service,	  assisting	  in	  the	  coffee	  and	  sugar	  harvest	  and	  reconstructing	  roads	  and	  bridges	  destroyed	  during	  the	  civil	  war.’554	  	  The	  French	  line	  followed	  a	  similar	  trail	  of	  thought	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Shaban	  troubles	   in	   1977	   and	   even	   the	   sceptical	   British	   embassy	   ascribed	   some	   Cuban	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  552	  Letter	  from	  Frank	  Moose,	  Assistant	  to	  the	  President	  for	  Congressional	  Liaison	  to	  the	  Honorable	  Millicent	  Fenwick,	  14th	  August	  1978;	  JCL-­‐	  Brzezinski	  Material-­‐	  Country	  File-­‐	  Box	  87	  553	  Memorandum	  for	  Brzezinksi,	  Situation	  Room:	  Evening	  Notes;	  ‘Reports	  of	  Impending	  Activity	  in	  Zaire’,	  9th	  February,	  1978;	  President’s	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  8,	  NSA,	  JCL	  554	  CIA	  Memorandum,	  ‘Evidence	  of	  Cuban	  Involvement	  in	  Training	  FNLC	  Forces’	  (Undated);	  CREST,	  NARAII	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collusion	  in	  the	  planning	  of	  the	  incursion.555	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Castro’s	  reasoning	  for	  avoiding	  any	  role	  in	  Shaba	  closely	  correlated	  to	  that	  of	  the	  CIA	  during	  the	  1977	  crisis	  and	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  what	  had	  changed	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Congo	  and	  Angola	  to	   now	   prompt	   renewed	   Cuban	   meddling.	   Indeed,	   perhaps	   the	   biggest	   variable	  between	  the	  two	  crises	  was	  simply	  the	  resurgent	  activities	  of	  communist	  powers	  in	  the	  Horn	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  Africa	  contributing	  to	  an	  increased	  overall	  nervousness	  in	  Washington	  over	  perceived	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  gains	  on	  the	  continent.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   catastrophe	   of	   Kissinger’s	   Angola	   fiasco	   had	   only	   heightened	   American	  concerns	   over	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   intentions	   in	   Africa,	   as	   the	   previous	   chapter	   has	  discussed.	  Despite	  Carter’s	  avowed	  intent	  to	  transcend	  these	  Cold	  War	  confines	  in	  his	  dealings	  with	  the	  Third	  World,	  his	  administration	  no	  doubt	  shared	  these	  fears	  as	  the	   outbreak	   of	   violence	   in	   the	   Horn	   saw	   further	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   gains	   on	   the	  continent.	   In	   part,	   these	   anxieties	   perhaps	   reflected	   domestic	   political	  considerations,	  and	  Newsweek	  quoted	  an	  administration	   insider	  saying,	   ‘Since	  the	  Carter	  Administration	  came	  to	  power,	  the	  number	  of	  red	  blotches	  all	  over	  the	  map	  of	   Africa	   has	   increased	   dramatically…	   That	   gives	   the	   Republicans	   enormous	  political	   advantages	   for	   1978	   and	   1980.’	   These	   fears	   were	   not	   entirely	   without	  foundation,	  however,	  and	  the	  article	  went	  on,	  	  ‘The	  "red	  blotches"	  were	  spreading	  steadily.	  From	  Ethiopia,	  there	  were	  reports	  last	  week	  of	  a	  large,	  new	  offensive	  by	  the	  Marxist	  government	  against	  rebels	  in	  the	  province	  of	  Eritrea.	  U.S.	  officials	  said	  that	  Cuban	  troops	  were	  present	  in	  the	  area,	  although	   they	  were	  not	  yet	   involved	   in	   the	   fighting.	   In	  Rhodesia,	   fighting	  continued	   between	   the	   new,	  multiracial	   government	   and	   guerrillas	   supported	  by	  Russia	  and	  Cuba.’556	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	   such,	   a	   Policy	   Review	   Memorandum	   (PRM	   36)	   prepared	   by	   the	   NSC	   in	  response	   to	   Vance’s	   request	   that	   April	   highlighted	   the	   sincerity	   of	   these	   growing	  concerns	  over	  the	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  presence	  in	  Africa.	  This	  document	  pointed	  to	  some	  60,000	   civilian	   and	   military	   personnel	   between	   the	   two	   communist	   countries	  scattered	  across	  Africa,	  with	  the	  Soviets	  represented	  in	  thirty-­‐five	  countries	  and	  the	  Cubans	   in	   thirteen,	   and	   went	   to	   explore	   their	   differing	   ‘harmonious	   but	   not	  synonymous’	  objectives.	  As	  such,	  it	  contrasted	  Cuban	  policy,	  born	  out	  of	  ‘its	  activist,	  revolutionary	   and	   almost	   messianic	   zeal	   to	   diminish	   US	   and	   other	   Western	  influence	  in	  the	  Third	  World,’	  to	  the	  Soviet	  agenda	  in	  Southern	  Africa	  as	  essentially	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  555	  Ross,	  ‘Le	  Zaïre,	  Le	  Bloc	  Soviétique	  et	  les	  Évènements	  du	  Shaba’	  8th	  April	  1977;	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Étrangères,	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Carton	  45,	  CADN;	  Ambassador	  Donald,	  Kinshasa	  to	  David	  Owen,	  FCO,	  London,	  ‘Last	  Chance	  for	  Mobutu’,	  9th	  June	  1978;	  FCO	  99/162,	  Cuba/Zaire	  Shaba	  Relations,	  Kew	  556	  Susan	  Fraker,	  ‘Toughening	  in	  Africa’	  in	  Newsweek	  29th	  May	  1978,	  p.	  20	  
	   209	  
‘a	  case	  by	  case	  exploitation	  of	  targets	  of	  opportunity	  arising	  from	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Portuguese	   empire	   an	   the	   racial	   and	   colonial	   tensions	   in	   southern	   Africa.’	   This	  opportunistic	   characterisation	   led	   the	   report	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  could	   be	   expected	   to	   focus	   its	   efforts	   on	   Angola,	   Ethiopia	   and	   the	   Rhodesian	  nationalists	  while	  responding	  to	  unpredictable	  events	  such	  as	  a	  change	  of	  regime	  in	  a	   given	   country	   as	   they	   arose.	   As	   such,	   Congo	   continued	   to	   present	   an	   inviting	  target	  for	  Soviet	  subversion,	  at	  least	  through	  the	  Washington	  prism,	  and	  the	  report	  concluded,	  ‘Over	  the	  long	  term,	  they	  probably	  consider	  Zaire	  and	  Southern	  Africa	  as	  having	  the	  greatest	  potential	   for	  successful	  Soviet	   intervention.’557	  In	  other	  words,	  the	   Carter	   administration	   not	   only	   remained	   transfixed	   by	   traditional	   Cold	   War	  paradigms	   in	   its	   approach	   to	   Congo,	   but	   its	   shifting	   rhetorical	   approach	   also	  ultimately	  recast	  a	  relatively	  parochial	  crisis	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  broad	  East-­‐West	  rivalry.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	   is	  worth	   noting	   that,	   following	   considerable	   conformity	   over	   the	   American	  Congo	   line	   during	   Shaba	   I,	   by	   1978	   some	   dissident	   voices	   within	   the	   Carter	  administration	  were	   finally	   emerging.	   Ambassador	   to	   the	  United	  Nations	  Andrew	  Young,	  oft	  cited	  as	  the	  champion	  of	  a	  more	  regionalist	  approach	  to	  Africa,	  spoke	  out	  over	   the	   dangers	   of	   the	   American	   reliance	   on	   a	   European	   lead	   in	   dealing	   with	  Congo.	  Unfortunately,	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  cable	  voicing	  these	  concerns	  in	  early	  June	  1978	  remains	   unavailable	   as	   the	   State	   Department	   material	   for	   this	   period	   awaits	  declassification.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   views	   entailed	   therein	   were	   summarised	   in	   a	  report	  for	  Brzezinski	  by	  Thomas	  Thornton	  as	  follows,	  	  ‘A	   cable	   from	   Andy	   Young	   sets	   forth	   his	   belief	   that	   the	   further	   we	   go	   in	   the	  French-­‐Belgian	  effort	  to	  meet	  critical	  problems	  in	  Shaba/Zaire,	  the	  more	  we	  risk	  polarization	  that	  will	  hurt	  us	   in	  Africa.	  An	  international	   force	  for	  Shaba	  risks	  a	  deep	   split	   in	   the	   OAU.	  Western	   backing	   for	   both	   the	   force	   and	   the	   economic	  salvage	  job	  risks	  confrontation	  with	  most	  of	  those	  who	  oppose	  Mobutu	  in	  Africa,	  and	   with	   their	   bloc	   supporters-­‐	   giving	   an	   East-­‐West	   cast	   to	   the	   reaction.	  Because	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   no	   alternative	   to	   swift	   action,	   the	   African	   force	  contemplated	   by	   the	   French	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   best	   we	   can	   hope	   for	   at	   the	  moment.	   However,	   we	   must	   distance	   ourselves	   from	   French	   leadership	   in	  Africa.	   Young	   urges	   consideration	   of	   a	   dramatic	   US	   statement	   that	   calls	   for	   a	  truly	  international	  responsibility	  for	  the	  problems	  of	  central	  Africa.’558	  	  Of	   course,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   know	   from	   this	   to	   what	   extent	   Thornton	   coloured	  Young’s	   representation	   with	   his	   own	   views	   but,	   while	   accurately	   gauging	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  557	  NSC	  Policy	  Review	  Memorandum	  36:	  ‘Soviet	  Cuban	  Presence	  in	  Africa,	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  RG	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  of	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  17,	  NARAII	  558	  Thornton	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  Report,	  6th	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  10,	  CREST,	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dangers	   for	  the	  American	   image	   in	  Africa,	   this	  did	  not	  go	  very	  far	   in	  proposing	  an	  alternative	   strategy	   for	   dealing	   with	   Congo	   and	   the	   need	   for	   joining	   the	   Franco-­‐Belgian	  security	  plans	  appear	  to	  have	  remained	  unchallenged.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	  more	  controversial	  attack	  on	  the	  American	  role	  in	  Congo	  came	  from	  a	  former	  political	   counsellor	   of	   the	   US	   embassy	   in	   Kinshasa,	   Robert	   Remole,	   and	   remains	  entirely	  absent	  from	  the	  declassified	  official	  record.	  According	  to	  a	  Washington	  Post	  report,	  this	  whistle-­‐blower	  claimed	  that	  ambassador	  Cutler	  deliberately	  suppressed	  his	  reports	  on	  Mobutu’s	  human	  rights	  abuses	  over	  a	  period	  of	  two	  years	  and	  that,	  following	  his	  urging	  for	  Washington	  to	  cease	  its	  assistance	  to	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime	  and	  permit	   it	   to	   ‘fall	   of	   its	  own	  corruption	  and	   inefficiency’559,	   he	  was	   forced	   into	  early	   retirement.	   Again,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   await	   the	   full	   release	   of	   the	   State	  Department	  records	  to	  gauge	  the	  veracity	  of	  his	  claims	  and	  how	  far	  Remole	  went	  in	  actually	   proposing	   an	   alternative	   American	   policy	   towards	   Congo.	   It	   is	   worth	  noting,	  however,	  that	  Cutler	  himself	  urged	  a	  distancing	  from	  Mobutu	  personally	  and	  Mobutu’s	  transgressions	  were	  well	  known	  in	  Washington	  even	  if	  Remole’s	  reports	  were	  suppressed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	   most	   surprising	   was	   the	   scepticism	   voiced	   by	   Brzezinski’s	   own	  military	   advisor,	   Lt.	   General	   William	   E.	   Odom,	   over	   the	   efficacy	   of	   continuing	  support	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  just	  as	  the	  Franco-­‐Belgian	  intervention	  in	  Shaba	  was	  coming	   to	   a	   close.	   Rather	   than	   concern	   over	  Mobutu’s	   domestic	   record,	   however,	  this	   criticism	   was	   based	   on	   the	   limited	   chance	   of	   success	   of	   such	   a	   course,	  comparing	   assistance	   plans	   to	   Congo	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   Shaba	   II	   with	   the	   CORDS	  program	  during	   the	  Vietnam	  War.	   As	   such	   he	  warned	   against	   the	   introduction	   of	  foreign	   technicians	   in	   the	  Congo	   government	   as	   a	   form	  of	   colonialism	   that	  would	  lead	  to	  ‘de	  facto	  if	  not	  de	  jure	  corruption’	  of	  American	  and	  European	  officials,	  as	  had	  been	   the	   case	   in	   Vietnam.	   He	   was	   equally	   scathing	   over	   the	   announced	  decentralisation	   of	   the	   government	   in	   a	   country	   where	   the	   elite	   in	   the	   capital	  struggled	  to	  enforce	  its	  will	  in	  the	  provinces.	  Just	  as	  dubious	  were	  the	  prospects	  of	  success	   of	   the	   planned	   military	   reforms	   and	   the	   retraining	   of	   ‘backward	  populations	  in	  military	  organisations.’	  While	  perhaps	  coloured	  by	  a	  degree	  of	  racial	  prejudice,	  Odom	  did	  seem	  to	  correctly	  identify	  the	  difficulty	  of	  successfully	  affecting	  a	  change	  in	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  His	  prescription,	  however,	  was	  far	  from	  flawless.	  In	  the	   short	   term,	   he	   agreed	   to	   the	   need	   for	   the	   Franco-­‐Belgian	   and	   IAF	   security	  operations	  in	  Congo.	  Beyond	  this,	  Odom	  surmised,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  559	  Dusko	  Doder,	  ‘People	  of	  Zaire	  Direct	  Suppressed	  Anger	  at	  Mobutu;	  US	  Diplomat	  Charges	  Cables	  were	  
Ignored’	  Washington	  Post	  30th	  December	  1979,	  A1	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‘For	  the	  long	  run,	  we	  should	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  we	  will	  not	  underwrite	  anybody’s	  internal	   security	   problems.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   we	   should	   focus	   less	   on	   Zaire,	  Shaba,	   Katangans	   and	   Angola	   and	   rather	   put	   our	   efforts	   on	   the	   Cubans	   and	  Soviets.	  We	  have	  to	  make	  it	  costly	  for	  them,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  way	  we	  can	  make	  it	  costly	  for	  them	  by	  committing	  resources	  in	  Zaire	  or	  Angola.’	  	  This	  logic	  is	  a	  little	  baffling	  as	  the	  more	  events	  in	  Congo	  were	  couched	  in	  terms	  of	  an	   East-­‐West	   confrontation,	   the	   less	   free	   Washington	   would	   be	   to	   drop	   the	  intransigent	  Mobutu	  and	  risk	  the	  collapse	  of	  a	  regime	  that	  would	  be	  interpreted	  as	  another	   Cold	  War	   loss	   in	   Africa.	   As	   such,	  while	  warning	   over	   potential	   pitfalls	   of	  specific	  aspects	  of	   the	  emerging	  American	  response	   to	   the	  Congo	  turmoil,	  none	  of	  the	  above	  critiques	  went	  very	  far	  in	  suggesting	  a	  coherent	  alternative	  to	  the	  policies	  pursued.560	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	   conclude	   this	   section,	  while	   the	   desire	   to	   discredit	   Castro’s	   Africa	   policies	  was	   understandable,	   there	  was	   something	   illogical	   about	   this	   resurgence	   in	   Cold	  War	  rhetoric	  in	  Washington’s	  approach	  to	  Congo.	  Just	  as	  in	  1977,	  the	  Carter	  White	  House	   responded	   to	   spreading	   violence	   in	   Shaba	   by	   offering	   material	   military	  assistance	   to	   a	   European	   lead	   in	   repulsing	   the	   Katangan	   attack	   on	   Kolwezi.	  Furthermore,	  with	  Western	  economic	  interests	  more	  directly	  threatened	  and	  white	  lives	  at	  risk	  that	  May,	  the	  United	  States	   increased	  the	  stakes	  of	   its	   involvement	  by	  supplying	  direct	   airlift	   capabilities	   to	   the	  French	  and	  Belgian	   forces.	  The	   fact	   that	  this	  could	  be	  couched	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  necessary	  humanitarian	  rescue	  no	  doubt	  made	  for	   a	   less	   agonising	   decision	   and	   strengthened	   American	   resolve.	   Neither	  Washington	  officials	  nor	   the	  press	  commented	  on	   the	   fact	   that	  no	  effort	  was	  ever	  made	   to	   contact	   or	   negotiate	  with	   the	   Katangan	   force.	   That	   the	   ensuing	   violence	  against	  civilians	  in	  Kolwezi	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  a	  botched	  FAZ	   operation	   and	   frustration	   at	   a	   renewed	   Western	   rescue	   of	   the	   entrenched	  Kinshasa	   despot	  was	   also	   omitted	   from	  public	   debate.	   By	   now	   it	  was	   abundantly	  clear	  that	  Mobutu	  had	  failed	  to	  make	  significant	  progress	  towards	  reform	  between	  the	  two	  Shaban	  crises.	   In	  fact,	  as	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  paper	  illustrated,	  Mobutu	  had	  responded	  to	  the	  earlier	  unrest	  with	  further	  purges	  of	  government	  officials	  and	  the	  army	  officer	  corps.	  Rather	  than	  reassessing	  its	  relationship	  with	  its	  intransigent	  ally,	  however,	  the	  Carter	  administration	  once	  more	  threw	  its	  weight	  behind	  Franco-­‐Belgian	  security	  and	  economic	  revival	  plans	  to	  keep	  the	  Congolese	  president	  on	  his	  feet;	   facilitating	  both	   the	  airlift	  of	   the	   IAF	  and	  cajoling	   the	  donor	  community	   for	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  560	  Odom	  to	  Brzezinski	  and	  Aaron,	  State	  Department	  Paper:	  ‘Zaire:	  Options	  after	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  II’,	  25th	  May	  1978;	  Subject	  File,	  Box	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  NSA,	  JCL	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further	  extension	  of	  credit.	  This	  was,	  of	  course,	  one	  more	  matched	  by	  increasingly	  stringent	   calls	   for	   reform	   and	   even	   a	   direct	   demarche	   from	   President	   Carter	   to	  pressure	  his	  Congolese	  counterpart.	  Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   telling	   that	   these	  efforts	   to	  mend	  the	  ways	  of	  its	  erring	  ally	  always	  seemed	  to	  appear	  after	  his	  most	  immediate	  security	  concerns	  had	  been	  met.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  All	   this	   reveals	   that	   traditional	  Cold	  War	   concerns	   remained	   the	   constant	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  American	  dealings	  with	  Congo	   from	   the	  outset	  of	  Carter’s	  presidency	  and	   during	   both	   Shaba	   crises.	   Mobutu	   remained	   the	   only	   force	   trusted	   with	  upholding	  stability	   in	  Congo,	  albeit	  with	  a	   little	  help	  from	  his	   friends,	  and	  keeping	  communist	   subversion	   at	   bay.	   While	   this	   line	   may	   have	   been	   consistent,	   the	  administration’s	  rhetorical	  approach	  to	  events	  in	  Shaba	  saw	  a	  startling	  about	  turn	  between	   1977	   and	   1978.	   Despite	   its	   resistance	   to	   Mobutu’s	   efforts	   to	   cast	   his	  troubles	   in	   terms	   of	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   meddling	   during	   the	   first	   crisis,	   by	   1978	   the	  White	  House	  took	  the	  lead	  in	  denouncing	  the	  apparent	  Cuban	  aggression	  in	  support	  of	   the	  second	  Katangan	   incursion.	  No	  doubt	  actual	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  activism	   in	  other	  areas	   of	   Africa,	   and	   the	   Horn	   in	   particular,	   contributed	   to	   this	   resurgent	   public	  posturing	   against	   the	   perceived	   gains	   of	   its	   superpower	   rival.	   This	   is	   peculiar	  nevertheless,	  as	  it	  not	  only	  risked	  escalating	  a	  local	  conflict	  into	  a	  further	  Cold	  War	  confrontation	   as	   analysts	   in	   1977	   had	   already	   stressed,	   but	   it	   also	   narrowed	  Washington’s	  options	  in	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  crisis.	  From	  Washington’s	  vantage,	  if	  the	  darker	  forces	  of	  communist	  subversion	  were	  at	  work	  in	  Shaba,	  it	  would	  be	  that	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  remain	  aloof	  from	  Congo’s	  troubles	  or	  indeed	  bring	  pressure	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  Mobutu	  regime	  without	  risking	  a	  further	  defeat	  in	  the	  broader	  Cold	  War	  arena.	  This	  was	  no	  doubt	  not	  lost	  on	  Congo’s	  recalcitrant	  leader	  and	  could	  not	  fail	   to	   have	   a	   detrimental	   impact	   on	   the	   American	   reformist	   drive	   in	   Congo,	   its	  relations	   with	   the	   wider	   region,	   as	   well	   as	   have	   broader	   implications	   for	   its	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  broader	  Cold	  War.	  This	  forms	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  final	  section.	  	  
The	  Impact	  of	  Ambivalence:	  ‘Incoherence	  and	  Decay’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	   early	   as	   June	   1978,	   the	  British	  Ambassador	   in	  Kinshasa,	   Alan	  Donald,	   had	  dismissed	  the	  Mobutu	  Plan	  as,	  ‘little	  more	  than	  an	  inflated	  package	  of	  pious	  hopes.’	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  he	  warned	   that	   failing	   to	   curb	  Mobutu’s	  domestic	  excesses	  was	  fraught	  with	   dangers	   for	   the	  Western	   position,	   as	   it	   would	   alienate	   ‘some	   of	   our	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more	  worthwhile	  African	  friends’	  and	  ‘play	  into	  Soviet	  hands.561	  Initially	  optimistic	  noises	   over	  Mobutu’s	   reform	   program	   soon	   gave	   way	   to	   grunts	   of	   consternation	  from	  various	  corners	  of	  the	  administration.562	  Nevertheless,	  despite	  these	  warning	  signals,	   Washington	   did	   not	   respond	   with	   the	   threatened	   distancing	   from	   the	  Kinshasa	  regime.	  An	  initial	  reticence	  over	  further	  assistance	  to	  the	  IAF	  at	  the	  Paris	  and	  Brussels	  summits	  reflected	  renewed	  legislative	  constraints	  more	  than	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  executive’s	  position,	  as	  Congress	   imposed	  a	  further	  FMS	  credit	  reduction	  from	  10.5	   to	   8.5	   million	   dollars.	   In	   fact,	   Mobutu	   no	   doubt	   noted	   with	   approval	   that	  continued	   financial	   commitments	   flowed	   from	  other	  American	  quarters	   and	  were	  matched	   by	   a	   softening	   in	  Washington’s	   diplomatic	   associations.563	  In	   May	   1979,	  Brzezinski	   met	   with	   the	   reinstated	   Minister	   for	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   Nguza,	   and	   the	  following	   September	   Mobutu	   was	   finally	   awarded	   his	   long	   yearned	   for	   meeting	  with	  President	  Carter.564	  This	  brief	  encounter	  was	  dominated	  by	  the	  issue	  of	  reform	  and	  did	  not	  compare	  to	  the	  fanfare	  Mobutu	  had	  enjoyed	  in	  Washington	  during	  the	  Nixon	   years,	   but	   it	   nevertheless	   proved	   a	   useful	   reassurance	   for	   the	   Congolese	  leader.	   Indeed,	   Ambassador	   Cutler	   noted	   that	   Mobutu’s	   consternation	   over	  Washington’s	   insistence	   on	   reform	   throughout	   1978	  was	   gradually	   replaced	   by	   a	  ‘more	  relaxed	  and	  secure’	  mood	  over	  ‘US	  intentions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Zaire’	  in	  1979.565	  As	  a	  result,	   even	   as	   the	   effort	   to	   reform	   Congo	   floundered,	   Carter	   softened	   its	   stance	  towards	  Kinshasa’s	  intractable	  despot.	  This	  final	  section	  thus	  considers	  the	  impact	  of	   the	   Carter	   position	   for	   Congo	   itself,	   for	  American	   standing	   in	   the	  wider	   region	  and,	  ultimately,	  for	  its	  broader	  Cold	  War	  effort.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  most	  coherent	  case	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  all	  facets	  of	  Congo’s	  reform	  could	   be	   found	   in	   a	   CIA	   Intelligence	  Assessment	   completed	   in	  March	  1979	  under	  the	  title,	   ‘Zaire:	   Incoherence	  and	  Decay	   in	  an	  Autocracy.’	  This	  report	  detailed	  how	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime	  had	  fallen	  far	  short	  of	  its	  pledges	  to	  reform	  its	  corrupt	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  561	  Donald,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Owen,	  London,	  ‘Last	  Chance	  for	  Mobutu’,	  9th	  June	  1978;	  FCO,	  99/162,	  Cuba/Zaire	  Shaba	  Relations,	  Kew	  562	  Both	  from	  within	  its	  own	  ranks	  and	  from	  its	  Belgian	  allies-­‐	  Gerald	  Funk	  (NSC)	  to	  Brzezinski	  reporting	  on	  meeting	  between	  Newsom	  and	  Cahen	  in	  Washington,	  North-­‐South:	  Evening	  Report,	  15th	  January	  1979;	  NLC	  10,	  CREST,	  JCL	  563	  This	  included	  some	  36	  million	  dollars	  a	  year	  in	  food,	  security	  and	  development	  assistance	  in	  1979	  and	  1980,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  apparent	  67	  million	  dollars	  in	  subsidised	  rice	  sales	  between	  1976	  and	  early	  1980.	  Vance	  to	  Carter,	  27th	  February	  1979;	  NLC2,	  CREST,	  JCL;	  	  Dusko	  Doder,	  ‘Zaire	  Allegedly	  Diverted	  Food	  Aid	  from	  US	  Program’,	  Washington	  Post	  29th	  February	  1980,	  A20	  564	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation:	  ‘Summary	  of	  Meeting	  between	  Dr.	  Brzezinski	  and	  Commissioner	  Nguza’,	  10th	  May	  1979;	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  33,	  NSA,	  JCL;	  Vance	  to	  Carter,	  11th	  February	  1979;	  NLC2,	  CREST,	  JCL	  565	  Cutler,	  Kinshasa	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Moose	  Meeting	  with	  Mobutu	  in	  Kisangani’,	  25th	  November	  1978;	  NLC	  16,	  CREST,	  JCL	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practices	  and	  to	  rein	  in	  the	  scourge	  of	  its	  abusive	  security	  services.	  As	  such,	  the	  CIA	  reported,	  ‘Basically,	   “Mobutuism”	   is	   a	   classic	   example	   of	   political,	   social,	   and	   economic	  exploitation.	   The	   President’s	   authoritarian	   philosophy	   of	   l’état	   c’est	   moi	   has	  resulted	  in	  his	  ruling	  the	  country	  though	  a	  pervasive	  system	  of	  patronage,	  graft	  and	  corruption,	  and	  rewards	  and	  punishments.’	  	  While	  he	  might	  pay	  lip	  service	  to	  reform	  and	  on	  occasion	  publically	  purged	  corrupt	  individuals,	  ultimately	  the	  chief	  obstacle	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  CIA	  in	  1979	  remained	  the	  president’s	  awareness,	   ‘that	   limiting	   the	  opportunities	   for	   corruption	  by	   relatives,	  cronies,	   and	   other	   influential	   military	   and	   civilian	   supporters,	   will	   lessen	   their	  loyalty	   to	   him.’566	  Nor	   was	   any	   shift	   in	   its	   stance	   on	   the	   horizon.	   The	   role	   of	  government	  troops	  in	  the	  disappearance	  of	  UN	  trucks	  to	  be	  used	  for	  refugee	  relief	  in	   Shaba	  mentioned	   in	   the	   above	   1979	   report,	   the	   revelations	   of	   a	   Congressional	  investigation	  over	  some	  1.3	  million	  dollar	  proceeds	  of	  the	  American	  food	  for	  peace	  program	   being	   illegitimately	   paid	   to	   five	   close	   associates	   of	  Mobutu	   and	   the	   five	  million	   dollar	   deficit	   of	   American	   subsidised	   rice	   sales	   to	   counter	   chronic	  malnutrition	   in	  Congo	   in	   February	  1980,	   alongside	   the	  World	  Bank	   crying	   foul	   at	  the	   government’s	   illegal	   misappropriation	   of	   some	   nine	   million	   dollars	   of	  GECAMINES	   receipts	   in	   March	   1980,	   were	   all	   simply	   further	   examples	   of	   the	  inherent	   corruption	   of	   the	   Mobutuist	   state,	   always	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   ordinary	  Congolese.567	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   long-­‐promised	   overhaul	   of	   Congo’s	  military	   and	   security	   services	   looked	  just	  as	  bleak	  and	  Congressman	  Solarz	  commented	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1979,	  ‘Trying	  to	  reform	  the	  Zairian	  army	  is	  like	  trying	  to	  sell	  chastity	  belts	  to	  a	  whorehouse.’568	  Inept	  at	   protecting	   the	   country’s	   territorial	   integrity	   and	  maintaining	   internal	   security,	  the	   CIA	   commented,	   ‘The	   Zairian	   Army	   (FAZ)	   is	  more	   a	  menace	   to	   the	   country’s	  civilian	  population	  than	  a	  threat	  to	  outside	  force.’	   It	  went	  on	  to	  describe	  Mobutu’s	  apparently	   quite	   deliberate	   use	   of	   the	   entrenched	   ‘tribalism’	   within	   the	   armed	  forces	   to	   ensure	   loyalty	   and	  prevent	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   single	   alternative	   power	  block	  to	  his	  rule.	  The	  tension	  between	  General	  Babia,	  head	  of	  the	  FAZ,	  and	  officers	  from	  Mobutu’s	  home	  province	  of	  Equateur	  was	  only	  the	  most	  prominent	  example	  of	  this.	  No	  doubt	  maintaining	  a	  fractious	  security	  service	  that	  ultimately	  lived	  off	  local	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  566	  CIA,	  Foreign	  Assessment	  Center,	  ‘Zaire:	  Incoherence	  and	  Decay	  in	  an	  Autocracy’,	  9th	  March	  1979;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  567	  Dusko	  Doder,	  ‘Zaire	  Allegedly	  Diverted	  Food	  Aid	  and	  US	  Program’	  Washington	  Post	  29th	  February	  1980,	  A2;	  Funk	  to	  Brzezinski,	  North-­‐South:	  Evening	  Reports,	  31st	  March	  1980;	  NLC	  10,	  CREST,	  JCL	  568	  Keith	  Richburg,	  ‘Military	  Aid	  Reduction	  Seen	  as	  a	  Move	  to	  Divorce	  US	  from	  Zaire	  Regime’,	  Washington	  Post,	  14th	  August	  1979,	  A14	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populations	   continued	   to	   be	   the	   surest	   way	   of	   subjugating	   distant	   provinces	   to	  Kinshasa’s	  rule,	  as	  the	  report	  concluded.	  So	  effective	  was	  Mobutu’s	  stick-­‐and-­‐carrot	  rule	  still	   in	  1979	   that,	  while	  noting	   the	  dilapidated	  state	  of	  all	   facets	  of	  Congolese	  society	   and	   the	   evermore-­‐tenuous	   grip	   of	   Mobutu’s	   regime,	   the	   report	   conceded	  that	  Congo’s	  president	  had	  successfully	  prevented	  any	  alternative	  leadership	  from	  forming	  out	   of	   the	  widespread	   apathy	   to	   his	   rule.569	  As	   a	   result,	   not	   only	  was	   the	  attempted	  rejuvenation	  of	  Congo’s	  corrupt	  government	  stillborn	  but	  the	  prospects	  for	   a	   workable	   political	   transition	   towards	   a	   more	   moderate	   and	   inclusive	  government	  were	  also	  dismal.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  biggest	  loser	  in	  this	  failed	  reform	  was,	  of	  course,	  the	  population	  at	  large	  in	  Congo	  whose	  lot	  continued	  to	  fester.	  As	  such,	  the	  above	  quoted	  CIA	  report	  noted	  the	  rampant	   inflation	   caused	   by	   fuel	   and	   food	   shortages,	   the	   corresponding	   hunger,	  malnutrition	  and	  disease	  (exacerbated	  by	  drought	   in	  Bas-­‐Zaire	   in	  1979)	  alongside	  the	  harassments	  of	  the	  security	  services	  that	  continued	  to	  haunt	  the	  downtrodden	  citizens	   of	   America’s	   long	   term	   ally.	   Indicative	   of	   the	   underdevelopment	   of	   the	  whole,	   Kivu	   was	   cited	   as	   the	   hardest	   hit	   regional	   example	   and	   the	   CIA	   analysis	  summarised	  the	  situation	  as	  follows,	  ‘Several	   of	   the	   Zaire’s	   regions	   are	   so	   physically	   and	   psychologically	   separated	  from	   Kinshasa	   that	   they	   are	   part	   of	   the	   country	   in	   name	   only.	   Deteriorating	  roads,	  shortages	  of	   fuel,	  and	  limited	  contacts	  with	  the	  capital	  contribute	  to	  the	  general	  isolation	  and	  social	  malaise.	  Kivu	  has	  been	  particularly	  hard	  hit.	  Roads	  between	  eastern	  and	  western	  Kivu	  have	  been	  impassable	  for	  years.	  In	  addition,	  all	   available	   food	   is	   flown	   to	   the	   capital	   from	  Kivu	  and	  other	  outlying	   regions.	  Instead	  of	  looking	  to	  Kinshasa	  and	  the	  central	  government	  for	  relief,	  the	  capital	  is	   regarded	   as	   an	   exploiter,	   and	   inhabitants	   of	   Kivu	   and	   other	   rural	   areas	   see	  Kinshasa	   as	   largely	   responsible	   for	   their	   problems.	   The	   US	   consul	   in	   Kivu	  reports	   that	   in	   some	   rural	   areas	   the	   money	   economy	   has	   completely	  disappeared	  and	  the	  population	  has	  reverted	  to	  a	  pre-­‐colonial	  lifestyle.’570	  	  The	  devastating	  effect	  of	  the	  continued	  propping	  up	  of	  the	  corrupt	  Kinshasa	  regime	  on	   Congolese	   society	   at	   large	   was	   thus	   abundantly	   clear.	   Perhaps	   more	   relevant	  from	   Washington’s	   vantage,	   however,	   was	   the	   impact	   these	   policies	   had	   on	   the	  standing	  of	  the	  United	  States	  throughout	  the	  region.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  569	  CIA,	  Foreign	  Assessment	  Center,	  ‘Zaire:	  Incoherence	  and	  Decay	  in	  an	  Autocracy’,	  9th	  March	  1979;	  CREST,	  NARAII	  570	  Ibid.	  	  All	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  were	  effected	  by	  this	  neglect	  of	  the	  most	  basic	  human	  rights,	  of	  course,	  and	  an	  Amnesty	  International	  report	  in	  May	  1980	  publicized	  the	  abuses	  around	  Kinshasa	  prisons	  and	  detention	  centres	  ranging	  torture,	  rape,	  murder	  and	  starvation;	  FCO	  106/194-­‐	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Zaire	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  Secretary	   of	   State	   Kissinger	   had	   already	   set	   the	   agenda	   for	   a	   reinvigorated	  engagement	  of	   the	  more	  divisive	  southern	  African	   issues	  at	   the	  end	  of	  his	   term	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  reviving	  the	  tarnished	  American	  image	  and	  warding	  off	  further	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  gains	  on	  the	  continent.	  Alongside	  his	  overt	  emphasis	  on	  human	  rights,	  Carter	  followed	  suit	   continuing	  diplomatic	   initiatives	   to	   facilitate	  a	   transition	   to	  majority	  rule	  in	  Zimbabwe	  and	  pushing	  for	  a	  South	  African	  withdrawal	  from	  Namibia.	  While	  quite	  prepared	  to	  follow	  the	  British	  lead	  in	  the	  negotiations	  that	  ensued,	  this	  was	  a	  clear	   effort	   to	   be	   identified	   with	   the	   progressive	   forces	   of	   history	   in	   Africa	   by	  championing	  a	  peaceful	  transition	  to	  independence.	  Its	  alliance	  with	  the	  reactionary	  former	   colonial	  masters	   and	  a	   corrupt	   and	  oppressive	   regime	   in	  Congo,	   however,	  stood	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  these	  efforts.	  American	  planes	  once	  more	  bringing	  Belgian	  and	   French	   troops	   to	   Congo	   in	   May	   1978	   no	   doubt	   was	   a	   difficult	   image	   for	   a	  continent	  in	  which	  the	  struggle	  for	  independence	  from	  the	  yolk	  of	  colonial	  mastery	  and	   white	   minority	   rule	   remained	   far	   from	   complete.	   Indeed,	   in	   this	   broader	  African	  context	  the	  American	  Congo	  policies	  appeared	  all	  the	  more	  questionable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s	  Mobutu	  lacked	  any	  credibility	  as	  a	  serious	  force	  in	  the	  African	   international	   arena.	   A	   unilaterally	   launched	   mediation	   effort	   on	   the	   on	  going	  Zimbabwean	  negotiations	   left	  his	  contemporaries	  at	   the	  OAU	  cold.	  Even	  the	  British,	   while	   sceptically	   appreciative,	   saw	   this	   for	   what	   it	   was;	   an	   empty	   public	  relations	  gesture	  for	  Washington	  and	  London’s	  benefit.571	  Vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  West,	  he	  did	  receive	   some	  mileage	   out	   of	   his	  willingness	   to	   reach	   rapprochement	  with	  Angola	  and	  his	  acceptance,	  however	  fruitless,	  of	  Nigerian	  negotiation	  efforts	  over	  Shaba	  as	  this	  appeared	  to	  cat	  him	  in	  a	  more	  moderate	  conciliatory	  light.	  Just	  as	  during	  earlier	  crises,	  Mobutu	  was	  quite	  willing	  to	  make	  grand	  diplomatic	  gestures,	  at	  little	  actual	  cost	   to	   his	   personal	   position,	   to	   avoid	   addressing	   the	  more	   substantive	   domestic	  issues.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  reports	  of	  the	  Paris	  and	  Brussels	  summits	  suggest	  that	  his	  Western	  benefactors	  were	  all	   too	  eager	   to	   take	   this	  as	  prima	   facie	  evidence	  of	  his	  willingness	  to	  cooperate	  justifying	  continued	  assistance.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  the	  Western	  response	   to	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   second	   Shaba	   crisis	   that	   caused	   the	   most	  consternation	   throughout	   African	   political	   circles.	   Alongside	   the	   Franco-­‐Belgian	  military	  operations,	  the	  fact	  that	  Western	  powers	  were	  again	  meeting	  in	  Paris	  and	  Brussels	  to	  determine	  Congo’s	  security	  and	  financial	  arrangements	  was	  particularly	  irksome	   as	   it	   once	   more	   bypassed	   and	   emasculated	   regional	   organisations	   and	  mediation	  efforts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  571	  Donald,	  Kinshasa	  to	  FCO,	  London,	  ‘Intervention	  by	  President	  Mobutu	  with	  leaders	  of	  Front	  Line	  States’,	  5th	  June	  1979;	  FCO	  36/2534-­‐	  Zaire’s	  Involvement	  in	  the	  Rhodesian	  Problem,	  Kew	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  It	   is	   hard	   to	   gauge	   the	   reactions	   around	  Africa	   accurately	   but	   an	   exchange	   of	  letters	   between	  President	   Carter	   and	   the	   heads	   of	   state	   of	   two	   relatively	   friendly	  African	  governments,	  Nigerian	  Lt.	  General	  Olusegon	  Obasanjo	  and	  Tanzanian	  Julius	  Nyerere,	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1978	   reveals	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   outrage	   felt.	   Obasanjo	  criticised	  not	  only	  the	   failure	  to	  negotiate	  with	   local	   forces	  and	  the	  corresponding	  casualties	   in	   the	   immediate	  Shaban	   context,	   but	   also	   the	  Paris	   talks	   and	   resultant	  IAF	   security	   solution	   as	   further	   foreign	   intrusions	   that	   prevented	   an	   African	  resolution	   to	   a	   local	   conflict	   as	   he	  wrote,	   ‘…Western	   powers	   rushed	   to	   intervene	  militarily	   and	   to	   underscore	   Africa’s	   helplessness,	   in	   a	   situation	   that	   called	   for	  utmost	  caution	  and	  restraint.’572	  Himself	  the	  successor	  of	  a	  military	  coup,	  Obasanjo	  showed	  restraint	  in	  criticising	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Mobutist	  state	  and	  was	  careful	  to	  condemn	  all	  foreign	  meddling	  in	  Africa	  equally.	  Nyerere,	  by	  contrast,	  was	  more	   tolerant	   of	   Cuban	   involvement	   in	   Angola	   and	   Ethiopia	   as	   a	   necessary	  counterbalance	   to	   South	   African	   and	   Somali	   aggression	   respectively.	   Despite	   the	  warming	  of	  mutual	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States	  signified	  by	  Nyerere’s	  state	  visit	  in	  August	  1977,	  following	  the	  Western	  reaction	  to	  Shaba	  II	  the	  Tanzanian	  President	  could	   contain	   himself	   no	   longer.	   His	   public	   demarche	   to	   both	  Western	   diplomats	  and	   journalists	   on	   June	   8th	   over	   the	   Paris	   meetings	   preceded	   two	   letters	   to	  President	  Carter	  that	  month.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   exchange	   that	   followed	   between	   the	   two	   heads	   of	   state	   reveals	   Carter’s	  fundamental	   failure	   to	   appreciate	   these	   sensitivities	   over	   continued	   Western	  interference	   in	  Africa.	  Carter	   thus	   framed	  his	   response	   to	  Nyerere	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  immediate	   humanitarian	   crisis	   (ignoring	   Obasanjo’s	   charge	   over	   the	   Western	  failure	   to	   seek	   negotiations)	   and	   continued	   with	   the	   tired	   but	   all	   too	   familiar	  argument	   that	   the	   incumbent	   regime	   in	   Congo	   had	   to	   be	   protected	   to	   avoid	   the	  chaos	   that	   would	   otherwise	   ensue.	   Bearing	   in	  mind	   that	   this	   reasoning	   had	   now	  been	   employed	   for	   nigh	   on	   thirteen	   years,	   Carter’s	   repost	   was	   not	   entirely	  convincing	  when	  he	  wrote,	  	  ‘Whatever	  one	  may	  think	  about	  some	  of	   the	  practices	  and	  policies	  of	   the	  Zaire	  government,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  imagine	  any	  benefit	  that	  might	  follow	  to	  Zaire	  or	  to	  Africa	   from	  a	   repetition	  of	   the	   internal	   chaos	   that	  plagued	  Zaire	  during	   the	  mid	   and	   late	   1960s	   and	   brought	   such	   suffering	   and	   deprivation	   to	   the	  population.’573	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  572	  Telegram	  from	  Warren	  Christopher	  to	  American	  Embassy	  Lagos,	  Nigeria,	  ‘Obasanjo	  Letter	  to	  President	  Carter’	  (dated	  1st	  June,	  delivered	  12th	  June	  by	  Nigerian	  embassy),	  13th	  June	  1978;	  NLC	  16,	  CREST,	  JCL	  573	  Letter	  from	  Carter	  to	  Nyerere,	  10th	  June	  1978;	  NLC	  16,	  CREST,	  JCL	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That	   Nyerere	   was	   unimpressed	   by	   this,	   and	   Carter’s	   continued	   professions	   of	  Congo’s	  reform	  program,	  is	  evidenced	  by	  his	  second	  letter	  critiquing	  the	  American	  role	   in	   propping	   up	   the	  Mobutu	   regime	   in	   considerable	   detail.	   Indeed,	   Brzezinski	  passed	  a	  copy	  of	  this	  letter,	  complete	  with	  annotations	  by	  the	  American	  President,	  to	  Vance	  on	  the	  22nd	   June	  and	  both	   its	  content	  and	  Carter’s	  commentary	  make	  for	  fascinating	  reading.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘These	  “rescue	  operations”	  are	  by	  their	  nature	  the	  privilege	  and	  prerogative	  of	  the	   rich	   and	  powerful	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  weak,’	  Nyerere	  began.	  As	   it	  was	  Western	  support	  that	  enabled	  the	  continuing	  abuses	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime,	  he	  continued,	  	  ‘I	  hold	  no	  brief	  for	  the	  Shaban	  rebels;	  indeed	  I	  have	  some	  suspicion	  about	  their	  purposes.	  But	  I	  am	  very	  aware	  of	  Africa’s	  need	  for	  change	  in	  Zaire	  so	  that	  it	  can	  become	   a	   decent	   place	   for	   its	   people	   to	   live	   in	   and	   less	   of	   a	   worry	   for	   its	  neighbours.	  I	  do	  not	  see	  how	  this	  is	  going	  to	  happen	  until	  political	  changes	  have	  been	  forced	  upon	  the	  country	  by	  the	  peoples	  themselves.	  But	  the	  day	  that	  kind	  of	   thing	   is	   going	   to	   become	   possible	   is	   further	   postponed	   when	   the	   present	  structure	   is	   maintained	   by	   bloody	   intervention	   which	   not	   only	   upholds	   the	  Mobutu	  regime	  but	  also	  gives	  note	  that	  the	  regime	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  defended	  by	   Europe.	   Under	   those	   circumstances	   there	   is	   no	   pressure	   upon	   President	  Mobutu	  to	  seek	  a	  political	  settlement	  with	  his	  opponents.’	  	  This	   passage	   was	   underlined,	   presumably	   by	   Carter,	   with	   the	   comment,	   ‘strange	  logic.’	   Unfortunately,	   events	   in	   Congo	   would	   prove	   this	   strange	   logic	   to	   be	  devastatingly	  accurate	  as	  has	  been	  seen.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nyerere	   went	   on	   to	   criticise	   the	   Western	   dominance	   over	   Congo	   and	   its	  economic	   grip	   on	   the	   continent	   as	   a	   whole.	   Carter’s	   somewhat	   weak	   annotation	  retorted	  that	  the	  attacks	  were	  out	  of	  Angola	  and	  Zambia,	  not	  Congo	  itself,	  and	  that	  the	   West	   didn’t	   have	   forty	   to	   fifty	   thousand	   troops	   in	   Africa.	   That	   this	   failed	   to	  appreciate	   African	   concerns	   over	   neo-­‐colonial	   meddling	   was	   clear	   as	   Nyerere	  continued,	  	  ‘I	   am	   therefore	   very	   worried	   when	   I	   see	   ex-­‐colonial	   powers	   extending	   their	  control	   over	   African	   governments,	   as	   is	   the	   case	   of	   Zaire	   where	   they	   are	  deliberately	   propping	   up	   an	   unstable	   government	   which	   is	   indebted	   to	   them	  because	  it	  is	  the	  most	  pliable	  government	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  get	  into	  that	  country.	  This	  is	  of	  us	  much	  concern	  to	  me	  as	  similar	  action	  by	  the	  USSR	  would	  be…	  You	  say	   to	   me,	   “the	   activities	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   Cuba,	   while	   they	   may	  sometimes	   coincide	   with	   the	   legitimate	   aspirations	   of	   Africans,	   are	   directed	  primarily	   towards	   enhancement	   of	   their	   own	   special	   interests.”	   I	   do	   not	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disagree	  at	  all;	  you	  are	  right.	  But	  can	  you	  disagree	  when	  I	  say,	  “the	  activities	  of	  the	  West	  European	  countries	  and	  the	  USA,	  while	  they	  may	  sometimes	  coincide	  with	   the	   legitimate	   aspirations	   of	   Africans,	   are	   directed	   primarily	   towards	  enhancement	  of	  their	  own	  special	  interests.’	  	  The	   Tanzanian	   leader	   flatly	   rejected	   his	   American	   counterparts	   repost	   that	   the	  United	  States,	   at	   least,	  was	  not	  pursuing	   its	  aims	   through	  by	  pointing	   to	   the	  CIA’s	  support	  of	   the	  FNLA	  during	  the	  Angolan	  civil	  war	   in	  response	  to	  Havana’s	  alleged	  support	  of	  the	  Katangans.	  A	  strange	  case	  of	  denial	  prompted	  Carter	  to	  highlight	  this	  passage	   with	   the	   expletive	   acronym	   ‘B.S.’.	   Finally,	   in	   lamenting	   the	   failure	   of	   the	  Western	   deliberations	   over	   Congo	   to	   make	   use	   of	   available	   African	   diplomatic	  channels,	  and	  the	  OAU	  in	  particular,	  for	  the	  resolution	  of	  a	  regional	  crisis,	  Nyerere	  once	  more	  illustrated	  his	  dismay	  over	  perceived	  Western	  arrogance	  and	  continued	  neo-­‐colonial	  subjugation	  of	  parts	  of	  the	  continent.574	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Ultimately,	  all	   this	  demonstrates	   that	   the	  U.S.	  collaboration	  with	  Mobutu	  and	  his	   European	   allies,	   while	   steeped	   in	   the	   language	   of	   reform,	   was	   fraught	   with	  problems	  for	  the	  American	  standing	  in	  the	  wider	  region.	  That	  Mobutu’s	  days	  were	  numbered	  without	  further	  Western	  assistance	  seemed	  clear	  to	  outside	  observers	  in	  Washington,	   Europe	   and	   Africa	   alike;	   making	   Nyerere’s	   call	   to	   allow	   the	   ailing	  regime	   to	   fall	   of	   its	   own	  weight	   all	   the	  more	  poignant	   as	   it	   suggested	  a	  degree	  of	  culpability	   for	   those	   governments	   that	   continued	   their	   blinkered	   support.	   The	  letters	  of	   the	  Nigerian	  and	  Tanzanian	  Presidents	   in	   response	   to	   the	  Second	  Shaba	  crisis	  illustrate	  that	  the	  view	  from	  at	  least	  two	  prominent	  African	  leaders	  once	  more	  placed	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  camp	  of	  a	  corrupt	  regime	  seen	  as	  the	  proxy	  of	  the	  old	  colonial	   order.	   That	   this	   was	   in	   no	   small	   part	   due	   to	   Washington’s	   failure	   to	  transcend	  the	  Cold	  War	  paradigm	  it	  had	  sought	  to	  eclipse	  was	  amply	  illustrated	  by	  Carter’s	   own	   commentary	   of	   Nyerere’s	   in	   depth	   analysis	   and	   the	   continued	  emphasis	  on	  security	  entailed	  therein.	  Thus,	  by	  its	  own	  choosing,	  the	  United	  States	  had	   once	   more	   actively	   brought	   the	   Cold	   War	   to	   the	   turmoil	   in	   Congo	   with	  disastrous	  consequences	  for	  the	  population	  of	  the	  latter	  and	  unpleasant	  side	  effects	  for	  its	  own	  status	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Beyond	   these	   local	   and	   regional	   implications,	   the	   broader	   consequences	   of	  Carter’s	  Congo	  policies	  appear	  to	  have	  had	  a	  profound,	  if	  not	  immediately	  obvious,	  effect	  on	  American	  geo-­‐strategic	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  That	  Washington	  was	  prepared	  to	  risk	  its	  recent	  softening	  of	  relations	  with	  Cuba	  and	  even	  cynically	  misuse	   the	   newly	   established	   USINT	   office	   in	   Havana	   has	   been	   discussed	   earlier.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  574	  Brzezinski	  to	  Vance,	  ‘President’s	  Reaction	  to	  Nyerere’s	  Letter’,	  22nd	  June	  1978;	  NLC	  2,	  CREST,	  JCL	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Indeed,	   Lyle	   Lane	   summarised	   Castro’s	   own	   exasperation	   in	   a	   meeting	   with	  Congressmen	  Beilenson	   and	   Solarz	   on	   the	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   second	   Shaba	   crisis	  with	  the	  following	  report,	  ‘On	  the	  Shaba	  incident,	  Castro	  expressed	  rage	  (in	  front	  of	  journalists)	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  personal	  hurt	  that	  his	  efforts	  to	  remain	  uninvolved	  and	  even	   head	   off	   the	   attack	   had	   been	   received	   so	   poorly	   in	   the	  US.’575	  Nor	   could	   the	  Soviet	  Union’s	   very	  public	  blasting	  of	  American	   ‘neo-­‐colonialism’	   in	   its	  own	  press	  have	   come	   as	   a	   huge	   surprise.576	  More	   significant,	   however,	   is	   the	   impact	   this	  appears	  to	  have	  had	  on	  direct	  American-­‐Soviet	  relations.	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  events	  in	  the	   Horn,	   Westad	   makes	   the	   point	   that	   Moscow	   was	   ‘unaware	   of	   the	   profound	  effects	   their	   Third	   World	   policies	   were	   having	   on	   American	   perceptions	   of	   the	  future	  détente	  process.’577	  Perhaps	  at	   least	  part	  of	   the	  answer	   lies	   in	   the	  disparity	  between	   Carter’s	   denunciations	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   in	   this	   sphere	   and	   his	   own	  policies	   in	   support	   of	   the	  Mobutu	   regime.	  With	   an	   eye	   to	   what	   it	   perceived	   as	   a	  long-­‐term	  aggressive	  American	  strategy	   in	  Congo,	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  possibly	  could	  not	   imagine	  that	  American	  outrage	  over	   its	   involvement	   in	  the	  Horn	  was	  genuine.	  When	  Carter	  raised	  the	  subject	  of	  Africa	  in	  a	  meeting	  with	  Foreign	  Minister	  Andrei	  Gromyko	   and	   Ambassador	   Anatoly	   Dobrynin,	   to	   discuss	   strategic	   arms	   limitation	  and	  comprehensive	  test	  ban	  treaty	   in	  Washington	  during	  the	  closing	  stages	  of	   the	  second	  Shaba	  intervention,	  he	  was	  met	  with	  disgruntled	  exacerbation	  as	  Gromyko	  flatly	   denied	   any	   Soviet	   involvement	   and	   simply	   hinted	   at	   American	   past	  transgressions.	   In	   a	   veiled	   reference	   to	   American	   meddling	   in	   Congo	   during	   the	  early	   1960s	   Gromyko	   commented,	   ‘The	   Soviet	   Union	   knew	   absolutely	   nothing	  about	  the	  recent	  actions	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  gendarmes	  of	  Katanga.	  The	  word	  brought	  back	  memories	  of	  the	  period	  when	  Tshombe	  was	  in	  charge.’578	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Even	  more	   telling,	   however,	   is	   an	  exchange	  between	  Secretary	  Vance	  and	   the	  Soviet	  Foreign	  Minister	  two	  days	  later.	  In	  his	  concluding	  remarks,	  Vance	  once	  more	  broached	   the	   impact	   of	   antagonistic	   African	   policies	   on	   détente	   more	   broadly.	  Gromyko’s	  irritated	  response	  again	  focused	  on	  Congo	  as	  he	  fired	  back,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  575	  Lane,	  USINT	  Havana	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Solarz	  Meets	  with	  Fidel	  Castro’,	  13th	  June	  1978;	  Press	  Powell,	  Box	  55,	  Staff	  Offices,	  JCL	  576	  Aaron	  to	  Carter,	  Information	  Items:	  ‘Soviet	  Press	  Blasts	  US	  Africa	  Policy’,	  24th	  May	  1978;	  Daily	  Report	  File,	  Box	  5,	  NSA,	  JCL	  577	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War	  p.	  283	  578	  Cabinet	  Room,	  The	  White	  House,	  Subjects:	  SALT,	  CTB,	  Africa,	  Human	  Rights,	  (US	  participants-­‐	  President	  Carter,	  Secretary	  Vance,	  Secretary	  Brown,	  Dr.	  Brzezinski,	  Ambassador	  Paul	  C.	  Wanke,	  Ambassador	  Malcolm	  Toon,	  David	  Aaron,	  Reginald	  Bartholomew,	  Hamilton	  Jordan,	  Jody	  Powell;	  USSR	  Participants-­‐	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Andrei	  Gromyko,	  Ambassador	  Dobrynin,	  Deputy	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Korniyenko,	  Ambassador	  Makarov,	  Minister	  Counselor	  Bessmertnykh,	  V.G.	  Komplektov,	  V.	  N.	  Detinov),	  27th	  May	  1978	  8am-­‐12:20pm;	  Vertical	  Files	  Box	  115,	  JCL	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‘I	  must	  say	  that	   in	  this	  case	  a	   total	  and	  crude	  distortion	  of	   the	  real	  situation	   is	  taking	  place….	  Why	   is	   this	  done?	  Being	  realists,	  we	  started	  to	   look	   for	  reasons	  for	   such	   absurd	   assertions.	  We	   came	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  search	  for	  those	  reasons	  in	  the	  attempts	  of	  some	  definite	  forces,	  particularly	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  to	  create	  a	  screen	  through	  which	  it	  would	  be	  more	  difficult	  for	  people	   to	   understand	   the	   true	   situation,	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   its	   own	   actions	   in	  Africa,	  which	  appear	  as	   interference	   in	   the	  domestic	  affairs	  of	   the	  countries	   in	  the	  continent…	  An	  illustration	  of	  this	  statement	  is	  the	  slaughter	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Zaire	  not	  long	  ago.	  In	  fact,	  neither	  the	  USSR	  nor	  Cuba	  had	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  it.	   Pass	  my	  words	   on	   to	   the	   President.	   Tell	   him	   that	   the	   assertions,	  which	  we	  confront	   in	   connection	  with	   events	   in	   Africa,	   in	   particular	   Zaire,	  we	   can	   treat	  only	   as	   pure	   and	   deliberate	   fiction.	   As	   it	   happened,	   some	   individuals	   and	  governments	  themselves	  threw	  an	  explosive	  ball	  of	  lightning	  into	  the	  arena	  and	  are	   now	   saying:	   look,	   how	   terrible	   that	   looks.	   We	   are	   not	   responsible	   for	  someone	  else’s	  sins.	  Those	  who	  sin	  are	  responsible.’579	  	  In	  other	  words,	   the	  Soviet	  reaction	  to	  American	  criticism	  of	   its	  Africa	  policies	  was	  one	  of	  outrage	  over	  its	  apparent	  misrepresentation	  in	  the	  Shaba	  affair	  and	  a	  degree	  of	  cynicism	  of	  what	  it	  perceived	  as	  Washington’s	  hypocrisy	  in	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	   be	   sure,	   it	   would	   be	   an	   overstatement	   to	   argue	   that	   American	   actions	  during	  the	  two	  Shaba	  crises	  directly	  encouraged	  the	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  intervention	  on	  the	  Horn.	  If	  nothing	  else,	  the	  conventional	  war	  between	  Ethiopia	  and	  Somalia	  was	  already	  coming	  to	  a	  close	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  second	  US-­‐Franco-­‐Belgian	  intervention	  in	  Shaba	  in	  May	  1978.580	  The	  Soviet	  motivations	  here	  fall	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study	  but	  it	  seems	  reasonably	  clear	  that	  America’s	  rival	  was	  very	  much	  pursuing	  its	  own	  agenda	   following	   the	  successes	  of	  Angola.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  above	  exchanges	  do	   suggest	   that	   Moscow’s	   failure	   to	   appreciate	   quite	   how	   seriously	   its	   actions	  would	   be	   viewed	   in	  Washington	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   a	   certain	   degree	   to	   its	   very	  different	   interpretation	   of	   American	   meddling	   in	   Congo.	   After	   all,	   from	   this	  perspective,	   could	   Soviet	   support	   of	   the	   Mengistu	   regime	   be	   seen	   as	   so	   very	  different	   to	   the	   on	   going	   American	   role	   in	   propping	   up	   Mobutu	   since	   the	   very	  beginning	  of	  his	  rule?	  As	  mentioned	   in	  the	   introduction	  of	   this	  paper,	  Brzezinski’s	  own	   memoirs	   reflected	   that,	   ‘détente	   lies	   buried	   in	   the	   sands	   of	   the	   Ogaden.’581	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  579	  Record	  of	  the	  Main	  Content	  of	  the	  Conversation	  between	  Minister	  Andrei	  Gromyko	  and	  Secretary	  Vance,	  31st	  May	  1978,	  New	  York;	  Vertical	  Files,	  Box	  115,	  JCL	  580	  Westad	  dates	  the	  end	  of	  conventional	  war	  between	  these	  two	  powers	  with	  the	  recapture	  of	  Jijiga	  on	  5th	  March	  1978	  by	  Cuban	  and	  Ethiopian	  soldiers	  led	  by	  Soviet	  and	  Cuban	  officers.	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War	  p.	  278	  581	  Brzezinski,	  The	  Power	  and	  the	  Principle	  p.189	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When	   this	   statement	   is	   considered,	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   Carter	   administration	   to	  reformulate	  the	  American	  approach	  to	  Congo,	  and	  all	  that	  this	  entailed	  in	  how	  the	  two	   superpowers	   viewed	   their	   respective	   forays	   in	   Africa,	   takes	   on	   an	   even	  weightier	  significance.	  Ultimately	  then,	  the	  Carter	  administration	  had	  professed	  the	  reform	  of	   it	   long-­‐term	  ally	   in	  Kinshasa,	  had	  sought	   to	  play	  a	  more	  positive	  role	   to	  boost	   American	   standing	   in	   the	   region	   and	  was	   pursuing	   a	   softening	   of	   relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  strategic	  arms	  limitations.	  On	  all	  three	  counts	  it	  fell	  short	  and	  it	  was	  the	  conservatism	  of	  Carter’s	  Congo	  strategy	  that	  had	  proved	  a	  considerable	  obstacle	  to	  these	  aims.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Jimmy	  Carter’s	  declared	  intent	  was	  to	  reject	  the	  blinkered	  Cold	  War	  paradigm	  that	  simply	  embraced	  any	  dictator	  that	  flaunted	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  line	  and	  to	  hold	  firm	  in	  the	  reform	  of	  America’s	  less	  palatable	  allies.	  It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  a	  more	  suited	  project	  for	  this	  revision	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  than	  Washington’s	  alliance	   with	  Mobutu.	   	   From	   the	   very	   outset,	   however,	   as	   soon	   as	   the	   Congolese	  despot	   was	   threatened	   by	   the	   Katangan	   uprising	   in	   the	   first	   months	   of	   Carter’s	  presidency,	  Washington	   sprang	   to	   the	   rescue	   of	   its	   ally	   of	   old	   in	   familiar	   fashion.	  While	  the	  deliberations	  of	  the	  various	  corners	  of	  the	  administration	  in	  Washington	  betrayed	   considerable	   angst	   over	   its	   support	   of	   the	   Kinshasa	   regime	   and	   a	   keen	  desire	  to	  play	  a	  secondary	  role	  behind	  its	  European	  allies	  in	  any	  overt	  identification	  with	  his	   survival	   in	   the	  name	  of	   stability	   and	  American	   credibility.	  By	   the	   time	  of	  the	   second	  Shaba	   crisis,	   the	   rhetoric	  of	   the	   administration	  had	   caught	  up	  with	   its	  policies	   and	   was	   now	   publically	   berating	   the	   perceived	   Cold	   War	   dimension	   to	  Mobutu’s	   troubles,	   even	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   concrete	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   such	  claims.	  The	  professed	  reform	  of	  Congo’s	  parasitic	  elite,	  however,	  remained	  a	  much	  vaunted	  but	  secondary	  concern	  to	  Washington	  throughout	  this	  period.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	   the	   trickiest	  piece	  of	   the	  Carter	  puzzle,	   then,	   is	   the	  question	  over	   the	  sincerity	  of	  his	  human	  rights	  and	  reform	  agenda.	  Did	  the	  public	  pressure	  on	  Mobutu	  constitute	   a	   genuine	   effort	   to	   reform	   his	   corrupt	   regime,	   or	   was	   this	   simply	   lip	  service	   to	   mollify	   an	   increasingly	   critical	   Congress	   and	   a	   disenchanted	   domestic	  audience?	  To	  be	  sure,	  in	  contrast	  to	  its	  predecessors	  and	  the	  lackadaisical	  attitude	  of	   Kissinger	   in	   particular,	   there	   was	   a	   more	   constant	   high-­‐level	   commitment	   to	  goading	  the	  Kinshasa	  regime	  towards	  reform	  than	  had	  previously	  been	  seen	  in	  the	  past	   twelve	  years	  of	   the	  Washington-­‐Kinshasa	  relationship.	  As	  a	  result,	   to	  dismiss	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this	  as	  mere	  rhetorical	  politicking	  is	  perhaps	  too	  harsher	  criticism.	  Why,	  however,	  did	  security	  concerns	  consistently	  trump	  this	  reformist	  drive	  in	  defining	  the	  Carter	  approach	  to	  Congo?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Part	  of	  the	  answer	  no	  doubt	   lies	   in	  the	  broader	  motivations	  behind	  the	  Congo	  policies	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  Carter	  administration.	  As	  has	  been	  noted	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  much	  has	   been	  made	  of	   the	  American	   economic	   stakes	   in	   the	   resource-­‐rich	   Congo	   defining	   its	   policies	   towards	   its	   African	   ally.	   This	   chapter	   has	   shown,	  however,	   that	   the	   prevalent	   view	   in	   Washington	   considered	   that	   these	   interests	  could	  be	  preserved	  regardless	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  regime	  or,	   indeed,	  who	  headed	  the	   Kinshasa	   government.	   While	   some	   advisors	   did	   stress	   American	   economic	  stakes,	  at	  no	  point	  in	  the	  record	  over	  policy	  deliberations	  did	  this	  lead	  to	  a	  softening	  of	   the	   stance	   on	   Mobutu	   and	   there	   was	   certainly	   no	   underhand	   pull	   of	   the	  government	  placating	  private	  businesses.	  Nor	  was	  the	  issue	  of	  race	  as	  prevalent	  or	  apparent	   in	   the	   documentary	   record	   of	   the	   Carter	   years	   as	   in	   previous	   chapters.	  Perhaps	   this	   reflects	   a	   growing	   awareness	   over	   such	   cultural	   prejudices	  with	   the	  changing	   times	  or	  perhaps	   it	   is	  simply	  owed	  to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  entire	  record	  has	  not	  as	  yet	  been	  declassified.	  Nevertheless,	  while	  a	  continuing	  willingness	  to	  dismiss	  complex	  local	  issues	  blandly	  as	  ‘tribal’	  prevailed	  in	  certain	  reports	  and	  Carter’s	  own	  reflection	   in	   his	   letter	   to	   Mobutu	   that	   he	   did	   not	   wish	   to	   transpose	   ‘American	  norms’	  on	  Congo	  perhaps	  betrayed	  a	  certain	  cultural	  bias	  ,	  the	  issue	  of	  race	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  significantly	  impacted	  America’s	  Congo	  agenda	  at	  this	  time,	  at	  least	  overtly	  in	  the	  record	  available.	  Ultimately,	  as	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  two	  Shaban	  crises	  has	  shown,	  from	  its	  very	  outset	  the	  Carter	  administration	  was	  unable	  to	  transcend	  the	  Cold	  War	  fears	  and	  constraints	  that	  had	  plagued	  the	  United	  States’	  approach	  to	  Congo	  since	  the	  1960s.	  This	   lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Washington’s	   failure	  to	  exert	  more	  consistent	   pressure	   on	   the	   intractable	  Mobutu	   or	   align	   its	   European	   allies	   into	   a	  more	  concerted	  front	  for	  the	  reform	  of	  Congo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  a	   review	  of	   the	  Carter	  years	  betrays	  a	   remarkable	  continuity	  with	  his	  predecessors	  in	  a	  long	  established	  line	  of	  reasoning	  that	  in	  Congo	  the	  alternative	  to	  Mobutu	  was	  a	  descent	  once	  more	  into	  chaos	  opening	  the	  door	  to	  further	  communist	  subversion	   in	   the	   region.	   This	   central	   tenet	   of	   the	   Carter	   approach	   to	   Congo	  resulted	  in	  a	  policy	  that	  not	  only	  saw	  the	  United	  States	  play	  an	  instrumental	  role	  in	  the	  on-­‐going	  financial	  bailout	  of	  Congo	  but	  also	  offer	  important	  logistical	  assistance	  to	   two	   European-­‐organised	   African	   ‘peace-­‐keeping’	   forces	   and	   a	   direct	   Franco-­‐Belgian	   military	   intervention	   in	   response	   to	   the	   Katangan	   incursions	   into	   Shaba	  province	  in	  1977	  and	  1978.	  While	  its	  initial	  assessment	  of	  the	  Katangan	  movement	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suggested	   a	   relatively	   accurate	   reading	   in	   Washington	   of	   the	   local	   discontent	  behind	   the	   uprising	   and	   a	   rejection	   of	  Mobutu’s	   own	   efforts	   to	   portray	   his	  more	  parochial	   troubles	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   broader	   Cold	   War	   struggle,	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	  second	  crisis	  Carter	  himself	  was	  once	  more	  leading	  a	  public	  attack	  against	  alleged	  Cuban	   involvement	   based	   on	   scanty	   evidence	   that	   again	   cast	   Congo’s	   troubles	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  superpower	  rivalry	  in	  Africa.	  Combined	  with	  Washington’s	  willingness	  to	  follow	  a	  European	  lead	  in	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  Congo’s	  perceived	  security	  needs,	  as	  well	   as	  Mobutu’s	   own	   intransigence,	   this	   ensured	   that	   Congo’s	   reform	   agenda	  would	   ultimately	   come	   to	   nothing.	   Furthermore,	   despite	   the	   proclaimed	  conditionality	  of	  American	  aid,	  Washington	  never	  followed	  these	  threats	  through	  to	  their	  logical	  conclusion	  to	  withdraw	  its	  backing	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.	  The	  outcome	  was	  a	  strangely	  ambivalent	  policy	  that	  at	  once	  sought	  to	  distance	  America	  from	  its	  Congolese	   ally,	   and	   especially	   the	   by	   now	   controversial	   figure	   of	  Mobutu	  himself,	  while	   continuing	   to	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	  Mobutu’s	   survival.	   As	  Nyerere	  pointed	   out,	  this	   strengthened	   Congo’s	   corrupt	   despot	   in	   his	   resistance	   to	   reform	   and	  accommodation	  with	  the	  country’s	  dissident	  voices.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   devastating	   consequences	   for	   ordinary	   Congolese	   sinking	   deeper	   into	  poverty	   under	   the	   combination	   of	   the	   country’s	   economic	   stagnation,	   the	  exploitation	  of	  a	  corrupt	  system	  of	  governance	  and	  the	  abuses	  of	  the	  ill-­‐disciplined	  security	   services	  were	   tragically	   familiar	  by	  now.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  Washington’s	  cooperation	  with	  France	  and	  Belgium	  in	  Congo	  once	  more	  placed	  it	  in	  the	  camp	  of	  the	  former	  colonial	  powers	  further	  tarnishing	  the	  American	  image	  in	  the	  region,	  as	  the	   Nigerian	   and	   Tanzanian	   reactions	   clearly	   indicated.	   From	   their	   perspective,	  despite	   some	   positive	   moves	   with	   regards	   to	   Zimbabwe	   and	   Rhodesia,	   America	  thus	   remained	   aligned	   with	   those	   powers	   looking	   to	   extend	   their	   exploitative	  privileges	   from	   the	   colonial	   days	   and	   with	   an	   oppressive	   minority	   government	  initially	   imposed	   from	   outside	   in	   Congo	   in	   the	  minds	   of	   Africa’s	   political	   leaders.	  Beyond	   this	   immediate	   regional	   impact	   and	   perhaps	   a	   little	   more	   speculatively,	  these	   policies	   appeared	   to	   also	   have	   a	   profound	   effect	   on	   Soviet-­‐US	   relations.	  Washington’s	   outrage	   over	  what	   it	   saw	   as	   violations	   of	   détente	   in	  Africa	  was	   not	  fully	   appreciated	   in	   Moscow,	   not	   least	   due	   to	   the	   perceived	   hypocrisy	   over	   the	  American	  stance	  and	  its	  continuing	  forays	   in	  Congo.	   In	  other	  words,	  Washington’s	  own	   ambivalence	   over	   Congo	   contributed	   at	   least	   in	   part	   to	   a	   fundamental	   and	  mutual	  misreading	  of	  the	  two	  rivals’	  respective	  Africa	  policies,	  which	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  a	   marked	   souring	   of	   relations	   and	   ultimately	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   breakdown	   of	  détente.	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  More	   generally,	   the	   above	   analysis	   reveals	   a	   startling	   similarity	   between	   the	  American	   approach	   to	   Congo	   during	   the	   Johnson	   and	   Carter	   years.	   Neither	  administration	   was	   able	   to	   transcend	   its	   immediate	   Cold	   War	   concerns	   despite	  accurate	   intelligence	  over	   the	  very	   limited	  nature	  of	  any	  actual	  communist	  role	   in	  Congo	  during	   these	   respective	  periods.	  Both	   failed	   to	   appreciate	  on-­‐going	  African	  diplomatic	  efforts	  to	  resolve	  local	  conflicts	  and	  ended	  up	  actively	  involved	  in	  direct	  European	   military	   interventions	   in	   support	   of	   Mobutu,	   in	   Kisangani	   (formerly	  Stanleyville)	   and	   Shaba	   respectively,	   with	   all	   that	   this	   entailed	   for	   the	   American	  image	  on	  the	  continent.	  Following	  the	  formula	  that	  turmoil	  in	  Congo	  might	  lead	  to	  communist	  gains	  in	  the	  future	  and	  thus	  required	  preventive	  American	  action	  was	  as	  accepted	   under	   Carter	   as	   it	   was	   over	   a	   decade	   earlier	   by	   the	   Johnson	  administration.	  Of	  course,	  Carter	  was	  contending	  with	  a	  much	  more	  active	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	   presence	   throughout	   Africa,	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   Angola	   and	   the	   conflict	   on	   the	  Horn,	   making	   its	   trepidation	   over	   further	   communist	   gains	   a	   little	   more	  understandable.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   impotence	   of	   the	   American	   reliance	   on	  Mobutu	   and	   the	   failure	  of	  Congo	   to	  play	   any	  useful	   role	   in	   staving	  off	   communist	  gains	  in	  the	  region	  had	  been	  clearly	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  its	  joint	  Angola	  venture.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Following	  the	  resounding	  defeat	  in	  Angola,	  American	  foreign	  policy	  makers	  had	  understood	   that	   it	   was	   in	   their	   interest	   to	   redress	   Washington’s	   stance	   towards	  Africa	  and	  proactively	  engage	  the	  continent’s	  more	  contentious	  problems,	  and	  the	  issues	  of	  white	  minority	  rule	  in	  Zimbabwe	  and	  South	  Africa	  in	  particular.	  This	  about	  turn	  was	  amply	  illustrated	  by	  Kissinger’s	  whirlwind	  tour	  of	  Africa	  in	  his	  final	  year	  in	   office.	   Carter	   looked	   to	   go	   even	   further,	   not	   only	   supporting	   the	   British	  diplomatic	   initiatives	   over	   Zimbabwe	   but	   also	   boldly	   proclaiming	   an	   idealistic	  foreign	  policy	  to	  reinvigorate	  the	  American	  image	  around	  the	  globe.	  When	  it	  came	  to	   Congo,	   however,	   the	   Carter	   administration	   revealed	   a	   deep-­‐seated	   Cold	   War	  conservatism	   from	   the	   outset	   and	   an	   inability	   to	   fulfil	   its	   avowed	   intention	   to	  transcend	  ‘…	  that	  inordinate	  fear	  of	  communism	  which	  once	  led	  us	  to	  embrace	  any	  dictator	  who	  joined	  us	  in	  that	  fear.’582	  The	  result	  was	  the	  continued	  support	  of	  the	  corrupt	  Mobutu	  regime	  and	  an	  alignment	  with	  the	  old	  European	  order;	  with	  all	  that	  this	  entailed	  for	  Congo,	  America’s	  regional	  standing	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  more	  broadly.	  In	  other	  words,	  despite	  the	  bitter	  experience	  of	  a	  costly	  and	   impotent	   fifteen-­‐year	  alliance	  with	  the	  Mobutu	  regime,	  Congo	  continued	  to	  define	  the	  American	  approach	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  582	  Quote	  from	  a	  key	  foreign	  policy	  address	  given	  by	  President	  Carter	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame,	  22nd	  May	  1977;	  cited	  in	  William	  Stueck,	  ‘Placing	  Jimmy	  Carter’s	  Foreign	  Policy’	  in	  Gary	  M.	  Fink	  &	  Hugh	  Davis	  Graham,	  The	  Carter	  Presidency	  p.247	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towards	   Africa	   and	   remained	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	   United	   States	   playing	   a	   more	  constructive	  role	  on	  the	  continent.	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  If	   today’s	   Congo	   remains	   Africa’s	   ‘heart	   of	   darkness’,	   it	   is	   largely	   due	   to	   the	  legacy	   of	   the	   Mobutu	   regime,	   a	   regime	   that	   was	   fostered	   and	   sustained	   by	   the	  United	   States.	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   historical	   and	   geographical	   burdens	   of	   arbitrary	  borders,	   backward	   administrative	   capabilities	   and	   violent	   extractive	   policies	  bequeathed	   by	   the	   Belgian	   colonial	   legacy,	   combined	  with	   the	  mixed	   blessings	   of	  Congo’s	   vast	   natural	   resources	   in	   a	   largely	   landlocked	   country,	   predated	   the	  Mobutu	   era.583	  Added	   to	   this	  mix	   in	   today’s	   crisis	   are	   Congo’s	   African	   neighbours	  casting	  eager	  glances	  towards	  the	  country’s	  riches,	  the	  cross-­‐border	  ethnic	  tensions	  that	   continue	   in	   its	  more	   disparate	   regions	   (and	   the	   Kivus	   in	   particular)	   and	   the	  more	   modern	   phenomena	   of	   ‘War	   Lordism’	   that	   plagues	   Africa’s	   failed	   states.584	  There	  is	  nothing	  teleological,	  however,	  in	  pointing	  to	  the	  total	  decay	  within	  Congo’s	  borders,	   vividly	   embodied	   by	   the	   final	   retreat	   of	   Mobutu’s	   cancer	   ridden	   self	   in	  1997,	   that	  permitted	   these	   forces	   to	  descend	  on	  Congo	  and	   turn	   it	   into	   the	  battle	  ground	  of	  Africa’s	  world	  war.585	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	   is	   no	   coincidence	   that	   even	   today	   the	   regions	   that	   remain	   plagued	   by	  intractable	   violence	   are	   the	   provinces	   that	   suffered	   from	   the	   most	   neglect	   in	  Mobutu’s	   Congo.	   The	   CIA	   assessments	   of	   the	   Kivus	   throughout	   the	   1970s	   read	  much	  like	  contemporary	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  reports;	  each	  detailing	  the	  on-­‐going	  abuses	   suffered	   by	   civilians	   caught	   between	   government	   forces	   and	   local	   militia	  factions,	   the	  dilapidated	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  impossible	  depredation	  of	  much	  of	  the	   population	   living	   outside	   the	   moneyed	   economy.586	  Similarly,	   alongside	   its	  repressive	   capabilities,	   the	   systemic	   and	   pervasive	   corruption	   that	   continues	   to	  haunt	  today’s	  Congo	  was	  the	  central	  hallmark	  of	  the	  Mobutu	  regime.587	  As	  such,	  the	  continued	  suffering	  of	  millions	  of	  ordinary	  Congolese	  even	  today	  adds	  pertinence	  to	  the	   conclusions	   drawn	   from	   this	   study	   of	   the	  American	   role	   in	   the	   establishment	  and	  sustenance	  of	  the	  Mobutist	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  During	  the	   Johnson	  years,	  with	   its	  support	  of	   the	  1965	  coup,	  Washington	  was	  drawn	  into	  a	  peculiar	  form	  of	  state	  building	  in	  Congo.	  Rather	  than	  engaging	  the	  very	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  583	  Crawford	  Young,	  The	  African	  Colonial	  State	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (Yale	  University	  Press,	  1994)	  584	  For	  a	  survey	  of	  these	  complex	  forces	  see	  the	  collection	  of	  essays	  in	  John	  F.	  Clark,	  The	  African	  Stakes	  of	  the	  Congo	  War	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan;	  New	  York,	  2004)	  and	  a	  volume	  titled	  ‘State	  Failure	  in	  the	  Congo’	  in	  Review	  of	  African	  Political	  Economy	  Vol.	  29	  No.	  93/94,	  (September	  2002)	  585	  Thomas	  E.	  Turner,	  The	  Congo	  Wars;	  Conflict,	  Myth	  and	  Reality	  (Zed	  Books,	  London	  &	  New	  York,	  2007)	  586	  Compare,	  for	  example,	  the	  CIA’s	  report	  ‘Zaire:	  Incoherence	  and	  Decay	  in	  an	  Autocracy’	  9th	  March	  1979;	  CREST,	  NARAII;	  to	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  You	  Will	  Be	  Punished	  (December	  2009)	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Soldiers	  Who	  Rape,	  Commanders	  Who	  Condone;	  Sexual	  Violence	  and	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (July	  2009)	  587	  Mark	  John	  and	  Thomas	  Hubert,	  ‘Minerals,	  Graft	  and	  Miles	  of	  Red	  Tape’	  	  New	  York	  Times,	  20-­‐21st	  February	  2010,	  p.9	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real	  and	  accurately	  reported	  problems	  facing	  the	  fledgling	  nation,	  a	  series	  of	  crass	  manipulations	  saw	  the	  United	  States	  emerge	  as	  Mobutu’s	  main	  benefactor	  and	  ally.	  Upheld	  as	  a	  success	  by	  the	  intelligence	  community	  as	  continued	  American	  support	  and	  a	  fortuitous	  rise	  in	  the	  world	  copper	  price	  saw	  a	  semblance	  of	  stability	  return	  to	   Congo,	   it	   was	   under	   the	   Nixon-­‐Kissinger	   White	   House	   that	   the	   opportunistic	  meddling	   of	   the	   mid-­‐1960s	   was	   formalised	   as	   a	   strategy.	   Mobutu	   perfectly	   and	  willingly	   fitted	   the	   ‘Nixon	  Doctrine’	   and	   appeared	   to	   offer	   a	  workable	   low-­‐cost,	   if	  superficial,	   modus	   operandi	   for	   dealing	   with	   the	   region.	   Nixon’s	   very	   public	  endorsement	  of	  Mobutu	  and	  open	  encouragement	  of	  private	  businesses	  to	  invest	  in	  Congo,	   just	  as	  the	  profligate	  dictator	   increasingly	  asserted	  his	  own	  agenda,	  played	  an	  integral	  part	   in	  the	  country’s	  descent	  towards	   ‘kleptocracy’.	  Kissinger’s	  hapless	  Angola	  adventure	  soon	  exposed	  the	  short	  sighted	  and	  shallow	  nature	  of	  America’s	  Mobutu	   partnership,	   however.	   Congo	   was	   neither	   the	   regional	   force	   the	   United	  States	   had	   hoped	   for	   nor	   was	   the	   Kinshasa	   regime’s	   agenda	   anything	  more	   than	  superficially	   aligned	   with	  Washington’s	   Cold	  War	   aims.	   Even	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   this	  ignoble	  defeat,	  however,	  a	  decade	  of	  support	  was	  not	  easily	  abandoned	  despite	  the	  arrival	  of	  Jimmy	  Carter	  and	  his	  avowedly	  moral	  revision	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  In	   the	   eyes	   of	   Washington,	   Mobutu	   remained	   the	   key	   to	   stability	   in	   a	   troubled	  country	   and	  his	   survival	   intimately	   tied	   to	  American	   credibility.	  When	  his	   regime	  seemed	  threatened,	  from	  the	  outset	  the	  Carter	  administration	  sprang	  to	  his	  rescue	  much	   like	   his	   predecessors	   and	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   recalcitrant	   despot	   remained	   a	  secondary	  and	  unfulfilled	  vision.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  longevity	  of	  the	  American	  support	  for	  Mobutu,	  with	  few	  tangible	  gains	  for	  the	  United	  States,	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  understand.	  It	  no	  doubt	  lends	  credence	  to	  commentators	   placing	   economic	   considerations	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   America’s	   Congo	  policies.	   A	   central	   finding	   of	   the	   research	   conducted	   here,	   however,	   is	   that	   at	   no	  point	   does	   the	   documentary	   record	   support	   the	   claims	   of	   David	   Gibbs’	   ‘Business	  Conflict	  Model’	   that	  sees	  private	  businesses	  directing	  government	  policies.	   In	   fact,	  even	  by	   the	   end	  of	   the	  1970s	   the	  White	  House	  was	   all	   too	   aware	   that	  US	  private	  foreign	   investments	   into	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   over	   the	   entire	   period	   under	  consideration	  never	  grew	  beyond	  the	  meagre	  three	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  global	  total	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  (with	  an	  estimated	  two	  hundred	  million	  dollars	  of	  direct	  investment	  in	  Congo	  making	  up	  the	  smallest	  fraction	  of	  this).588	  The	  broader	  assertion	  that	  the	  United	   States	   was	   simply	   looking	   to	   secure	   strategically	   vital	   raw	  materials	   also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  588	  Memorandum	  for	  Brzezinski,	  ‘US	  Economic	  Interests	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa’,	  29th	  March	  1977;	  Geographic	  File,	  Box	  14,	  NSA,	  JCL	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needs	   questioning.	   In	   line	   with	   Forbes	   Pachter’s	   thesis,	   even	   the	   contemporary	  intelligence	  record	  reasoned	  that	  any	  regime	  in	  Kinshasa	  would	  be	  so	  dependent	  on	  foreign	  earnings	  that	  continued	  access	  to	  its	  minerals	  was	  assured.589	  That	  Congo’s	  geographic	  vastness,	  its	  centrality	  in	  Africa	  and	  its	  rich	  mineral	  endowment	  made	  it	  a	  prized	  ‘domino’	  in	  Africa	  is	  clear.	  It	  was	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  Soviets	  gaining	  a	  strategic	  foothold	  (and	  the	  concomitant	  blow	  to	  American	  credibility),	  rather	  than	  the	  loss	  of	  access	   to	   resources,	   that	   consistently	   haunted	  Washington’s	   Congo	   deliberations,	  however.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  more	  subtle	  reading	  of	  the	  economic	  factors	  entailed	  in	  American	  government	   policy	   towards	   Congo	   emerges.	   Benoit	   Verhaegan	   offers	   a	   detailed	  analysis	   of	   the	   devastating	   impact	   of	   foreign	   private	   business	   ventures,	   and	  Western	   government	   financing	   for	  Mobutu’s	   penchant	   for	  military	   hardware	   and	  industrial	  prestige	  projects,	  on	  Congo’s	  underdevelopment	  in	  the	  1970s.	  Combining	  Verhaegan’s	   thesis	   with	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   third	   chapter	   detailing	   the	   Nixon	  administration’s	   active	   encouragement	   of	   private	   businesses	   to	   deal	   directly	  with	  the	  Kinshasa	   regime	   and	   invest	   in	   Congo	  has	   a	   number	   of	   profound	   implications.	  First	   of	   all,	   and	   contrary	   to	   Gibbs,	   it	   was	   actually	   the	   American	   government	   that	  sought	   to	   harness	   the	   corporate	   world	   in	   pursuit	   of	   its	   own	   more	   narrow	   geo-­‐strategic	   aims	   rather	   than	   the	   other	   way	   round.	   Secondly	   and	   a	   little	   more	  speculatively,	  the	  American	  seal	  of	  approval	  entailed	  in	  Nixon’s	  emphatic	  embrace	  of	  his	  Congolese	  counterpart	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  seemed	  to	  lend	  an	  air	  of	  legitimacy	   to	   the	   forces	   that	   looked	   to	   continue	   the	   exploitation	   of	   Congo’s	  resources.	   Any	   thought	   for	   the	   plight	   of	   ordinary	   Congolese,	   even	   in	   the	   limited	  form	  of	  the	  humanitarian	  pretensions	  of	  the	  former	  colonisers,	  was	  notably	  absent	  from	  American	   strategic	   considerations.	   Simply	   relying	   on	   the	   dealings	   of	   private	  companies	  with	  a	  corrupt	  Congolese	  elite	  was	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  a	  sustainable	  vision	  for	  the	   country’s	   development,	   however,	   and	   Nixon’s	   flawed	   policies	   directly	  contributed	   to	   Congo’s	   financial	   collapse	   and	   the	   further	   impoverishment	   of	   its	  citizens.	   Indeed,	   even	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   its	   fiscal	   ruin,	   successive	   Washington	  administrations	   continued	   to	   successfully	   cajole	   the	   IMF	   and	   international	   donor	  community	  to	  bail	  out	  the	  intractable	  dictator.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Throughout,	   geostrategic	   considerations	   and	   a	   deep-­‐seated	   containment	  impulse	   remained	   the	   central	   tenet	   of	   the	   American	   approach	   to	   Congo	   from	  Johnson	   to	   Carter.	   More	   hardened	   Cold	   War	   warriors	   thus	   offset	   the	   plight	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  589	  DCI	  Turner,	  ‘Implications	  of	  the	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Zaire’,	  17th	  March	  1977;	  NLC	  2,	  CREST,	  JCL	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ordinary	  Congolese	  during	   the	  Mobutu	   era	   against	   an	   apparent	  Cold	  War	   victory.	  Lawrence	   Devlin’s	   self-­‐congratulatory	   memoirs,	   for	   example,	   willingly	   cite	   his	  efforts	  as	  the	  CIA’s	  Station	  Chief	  in	  Kinshasa	  as	  instrumental	  in	  keeping	  the	  Soviets	  out	   of	   central	   Africa	   and	   by	   extension	   contributing	   to	   the	   eventual	   defeat	   of	   the	  superpower	   rival.	   This	   research	   has	   shown,	   however,	   that	   for	  most	   of	   the	   period	  under	  review	  Washington’s	  close	  associations	  with	  Mobutu	  were	  detrimental	  even	  to	  immediate	  American	  aims.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  First	   of	   all,	   its	   identification	   with	   the	   Kinshasa	   despot	   had	   profound	  consequences	   for	   the	   American	   relationship	   with	   the	   wider	   region.	   On	   the	   one	  hand,	   throughout	   the	   period	   under	   review	   Washington	   entirely	   failed	   to	   engage	  regional	   actors	   and	   organisations	   in	   resolving	   the	   pressing	   issues	   facing	   Congo,	  much	   to	   the	   consternation	   of	   Africa’s	   nascent	   leadership.	   The	   failure	   to	   take	  seriously	  the	  OAU’s	  efforts	  during	  the	  Kisangani	  crisis	   in	  1964	  were	  bemoaned	  by	  Nkrumah	   just	   as	   Nyerere	   decried	   Carter’s	   willingness	   to	   circumvent	   African	  mediation	  efforts	  during	  the	  Shaba	  crisis	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  later.	  Both	  publically	  denounced	   America’s	   continued	   propping	   up	   of	   the	   Mobutu	   regime	   and	  unwillingness	   to	   trust	   in	   African	   regional	   forums.	   More	   important	   still,	   however,	  was	  the	  deeply	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  American	  image	  throughout	  the	  region	  of	  its	  close	   ties	   with	   a	   leader	   who	   was	   not	   only	   linked	   with	   the	   murder	   of	   Patrice	  Lumumba	  but	  whose	  continued	  associations	  with	  both	  apartheid	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	   former	   colonial	   powers	   of	   France	   and	   Belgium	   ensured	   that	   he	   never	   quite	  ventured	  out	  of	  the	  neo-­‐colonial	  camp	  in	  the	  public	  arena.	  Time	  and	  again,	  from	  the	  Kisangani	   airlift	   in	   1964,	   the	   Angolan	   civil	   war,	   and	   again	   during	   the	   two	   Shaba	  interventions	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1970s,	   the	   United	   States	   remained	   tied	   to	   the	  reactionary	   forces	   of	   white	   minority	   rule	   and	   former	   colonial	   masters	   in	   its	  continued	  meddling	  in	  Congo	  and	  support	  of	  Mobutu’s	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Even	  in	  terms	  of	  Washington’s	  more	  immediate	  Cold	  War	  strategies,	  however,	  its	  Mobutu	  partnership	  was	  deeply	  flawed.	  The	  1965	  coup	  was	  deemed	  a	  successful	  restoration	   of	   a	   semblance	   of	   stability	   to	   turbulent	   Congo	   and	   a	   self-­‐satisfied	  gloating	  permeated	  the	  later	  analyses	  of	  the	  Johnson	  administration.	  Beyond	  these	  initially	   optimistic	   resonances,	   Mobutu	   actually	   had	   little	   of	   value	   to	   offer	   to	   the	  American	   designs	   for	   fostering	   a	   Kinshasa	   regime	   that	   could	   preserve	   regional	  stability,	  counteract	  communist	  advances	  and	  provide	  a	   loyal	  voice	   in	  African	  and	  Third	  World	  forums.	  True,	  Mobutu	  relatively	  consistently	  touted	  the	  American	  line	  both	  at	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  OAU	  and	  the	  various	  Non-­‐Aligned	  conferences,	  much	  to	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   his	   Washington	   benefactors.	   The	   mercenary	   nature	   of	   this	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bought	  voice	  was	  all	  too	  transparent	  and	  Mobutu	  never	  managed	  to	  actually	  fill	  the	  shoes	  of	  the	  grand	  African	  statesman	  he	  sought	  to	  be.	  The	  rejection	  of	  his	  mediation	  efforts	  during	  the	  Zimbabwean	  negotiations	  demonstrated	  Congo’s	  president’s	  lack	  of	  credibility	  all	  too	  clearly	  once	  more	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s.	  That	  the	  paper	  tiger	  Congolese	   army,	   despite	   continuous	   funding	   and	   training	   efforts	   from	   the	   United	  States	  and	  Europe,	  could	  offer	  little	  resistance	  even	  to	  the	  most	  ramshackle	  forces	  was	  amply	  demonstrated	  by	  both	  the	  Angolan	  civil	  war	  and	  the	  two	  Shaba	  crises.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Beyond	  these	  diplomatic	  and	  military	  shortcomings,	  however,	  American	  Congo	  policies	  seemed	  to	  have	  an	  altogether	  more	  profound	  impact	  upon	  the	  broader	  Cold	  War.	  First	  of	  all,	   the	  fourth	  chapter	  demonstrated	  that	  Mobutu’s	  manoeuvring	  and	  Kissinger’s	   reliance	   on	   his	   Kinshasa	   ally	   contributed	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   to	   the	  formulation	   of	   a	   faulty	   Angola	   strategy.	   This	   defeat	   not	   only	   tarnished	   American	  prestige	   and	   credibility	   but	   also	   contributed	   to	   a	   growing	   Eastern	   Bloc	   self-­‐confidence	   and	   further	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   interventions	   in	  Africa.	   Secondly	   and	   a	   little	  more	   speculatively,	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   final	   chapter	   suggest	   that	   Moscow’s	  interpretation	   of	   America’s	   continued	   involvement	   in	   Congo	   contributed	   to	   a	  fundamental	   an	  mutual	  misreading	   of	   its	   rival’s	   position	   in	   Africa	   by	   each	   of	   the	  superpowers.	   Brzezinski	   himself	   attributed	   the	   breakdown	   of	   détente	   to	   the	  perceived	  rise	  of	  Soviet	  bellicosity	  on	  the	  Horn.	  As	  the	  exchange	  between	  Vance	  and	  Gromyko	   cited	   in	   the	   final	   chapter	   illustrates,	   however,	   from	   the	   Soviet	   vantage	  their	  actions	  were	  no	  more	   intrusive	   than	   the	  American	   role	   in	  Congo	  of	   the	  past	  two	  decades.	  How	  far	  this	  diplomatic	  breakdown	  in	  communication	  contributed	  to	  unnecessarily	  prolonging	  the	  Cold	  War	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	   this	  study,	  but	   it	  seems	  clear	  that	  this	  was	  not	  in	  the	  line	  with	  American	  diplomatic	  aims	  pursued	  at	  the	  time.	  As	  such,	  whether	  viewed	  from	  a	  narrow	  Congolese	  perspective,	  from	  the	  vantage	  of	   the	  American	  standing	   in	  Africa	  more	  broadly	  or	  even	   from	  the	  United	  States’	   immediate	   Cold	   War	   aims,	   Washington’s	   Mobutu	   relationship	   was	   an	  imperfect	  marriage	  with	   few	  benefits	   for	  anyone	  beyond	   the	  ambrosial	  Congolese	  tyrant	  and	  his	  immediate	  circle.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   its	   considerations	   of	   American	   foreign	   policy	   and	   the	   broader	   Cold	  War,	  recent	  scholarship	  has	   taken	  a	  step	   forward	   in	   its	   focus	  on	  the	  Third	  World	  or,	  as	  Westad	   puts	   it,	   ‘shifted	   south’. 590 	  As	   such,	   the	   literature	   detailing	   how	   the	  superpower	   interventions	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	   era	   shaped	   the	   issues	   that	   continue	   to	  haunt	   today’s	   Third	   World	   is	   growing.	   This	   framework	   certainly	   holds	   true	   for	  Congo.	  Refining	  this	  interpretation	  further	  is	  the	  revelation	  that	  forces	  from	  within	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  590	  Westad,	  Global	  Cold	  War	  p.	  1	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the	  Third	  World	  at	   times	  proved	   instrumental	   in	   shaping	   the	   superpower	  agenda	  or,	   as	   McCormick	   notes,	   ‘the	   tail	   wagging	   the	   dog.’ 591 	  Gleijeses’s	   ‘Conflicting	  Missions’	  is	  a	  vivid	  example	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  relatively	  minor	  power	  on	  the	  global	  arena.	   This	   study	   of	   American-­‐Congolese	   relations,	   however,	   offers	   a	   peculiar	  version	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  from	  an	  American	  perspective.	  Here	  a	  seemingly	  weak	  and	   dependent	   ally	   (rather	   than	   an	   ominous	   nationalist	   movement),	   to	   a	   large	  extent	   called	   into	   being	   by	   the	   United	   States,	   managed	   to	   secure	   continued	  American	   support	   over	   decades	   while	   utterly	   derailing	   American	   interests.	   In	  Angola,	   Kissinger	   sought	   to	   control	   events	   on	   the	   ground	   through	   a	   covert	  operation	  and	   the	  use	  of	  a	  proxy	  ally.	  Mobutu,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   looked	   to	  draw	  renewed	  support	   from	  his	   inattentive	  superpower	  benefactor	  and	  bolster	  his	  own	  narrow	   regime	   at	   home.	   Despite	   the	   defeat	   of	   his	   FAZ	   in	   an	   unpopular	  war,	   it	   is	  clear	  which	  of	  the	  strategists	  was	  more	  successful	  in	  asserting	  his	  interests.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  above	   interpretations	  also	  have	   important	  ramifications	   for	   the	  Africanist	  perspective	  on	  Congo.	  The	  American	  intervention	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  one-­‐sided	  story	  of	   economic	   and	   political	   exploitation.	   As	   such,	   this	   study	   is	   a	   step	   towards	  bettering	   our	   understanding	   of	   how	   the	   Mobutu	   relationship	   in	   turn	   shaped	  American	   policy	   and	   the	   broader	   Cold	   War,	   lending	   further	   weight	   to	   the	  scholarship	  on	  the	  internal	  machinations	  of	  the	  Mobutist	  state.	  Indeed,	  the	  research	  conducted	   here	   is	   perhaps	   open	   to	   the	   charge	   of	   being	   too	   Mobutu-­‐centric.	   The	  peculiar	  path	  taken	  by	  his	  regime	  was	  not	  imposed	  from	  outside	  and	  throughout	  his	  rule	  he	  was	  always	  able	  to	  find	  willing	  collaborators	  from	  within	  Congo.	  That	  said,	  it	  was	   his	   foreign	   benefactors,	   and	   the	  United	   States	   in	   particular,	   that	   permitted	   a	  narrow	   Congolese	   elite	   to	   function	   and	   realise	   its	   own	   exploitation	   of	   Congo.	   If	  anything,	   this	   calls	   for	   the	  need	   for	   further	   study	   in	   linking	   the	   internal	   events	   in	  Congo	  in	  shaping	  Mobutu’s	  strategy	  to	  influence	  his	  superpower	  patron.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  More	   broadly,	   to	   commentators	   and	   policy-­‐makers	   facing	   today’s	   crisis	   in	  central	  Africa,	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  relying	  on	  a	  questionable	  central	  authority	  in	  the	  name	  of	   stability	   have	   been	   underlined	   by	   this	   thesis.	   A	   return	   to	   the	   turbulent	   1960s	  could	   not	   be	   in	   the	   interest	   even	   of	   Congo’s	   downtrodden	   population,	   so	   the	  argument	   went.	   This	   willingness	   to	   hide	   behind	   a	   quest	   for	   ‘stability’	   is	   not	  dissimilar	   to	   today’s	   international	   and	   donor	   community’s	   tolerance	   of	   the	  inadequacies	  of	  the	  incumbent	  Kinshasa	  government-­‐	  most	  recently	  demonstrated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  591	  Thomas	  J.	  McCormick,	  America’s	  Half-­‐Century:	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  After,	  2d	  ed.	  (Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  Press,	  1995);	  Also,	  Tony	  Smith,	  ‘New	  Bottles	  for	  New	  Wine:	  A	  Pericentric	  Framework	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Cold	  War’,	  Diplomatic	  History	  24,	  no.	  4	  (Fall	  2000);	  Westad	  himself,	  of	  course,	  also	  elaborates	  this	  very	  issue.	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in	   the	   fraudulent	   elections	   of	   November	   2011-­‐	   in	   the	   name	   of	   preserving	   order,	  even	   as	   a	   largely	   ineffectual	   MONUSCO	   peace-­‐keeping	   operation	   permits	   the	  continued	  plunder	  and	  exploitation	  of	  much	  of	   the	  civilian	  population	  beyond	   the	  main	  towns	   in	   the	  Kivus.592	  It	   is	  unlikely	   that	  Congo	  will	  ever	  advance	  beyond	  the	  failed	  and	  fractured	  nature	  of	  its	  current	  state	  if	  the	  international	  community	  does	  not	  demand	  greater	  accountability	   from	  the	  Congolese	  government.	  The	  Cold	  War	  example	  of	  turning	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  the	  on	  going	  transgressions	  of	  the	  political	  elite	  in	  Kinshasa	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  perceived	  stability	  illustrates	  the	  extreme	  danger	  of	  such	  a	  short-­‐sighted	  approach.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Ultimately,	  this	  study	  has	  sought	  to	  place	  the	  American	  role	  in	  Mobutu’s	  Congo	  in	   its	   own	   specific	   context.	   Only	   by	   considering	   the	   very	   details	   driving	  Washington’s	  approach	   towards	   the	  country	   for	   the	  best	  part	  of	   two	  decades	   is	   it	  possible	  to	  discern	  the	  nuances	  that	  led	  to	  a	  catastrophic	  and	  lasting	  intervention	  in	  Congo.	   Time	   and	   again	   simply	   superimposing	   a	   broader	   Cold	   War	   vision	   on	   its	  interpretations	   of	   events	   in	   the	   central	   African	   region,	   even	   when	   very	   accurate	  intelligence	   was	   available,	   ensured	   a	   remarkable	   uniformity	   in	   the	   analyses	   of	  successive	   administrations	   and	  prevented	   a	  more	   nuanced	  policy	   from	   emerging;	  alternative	   voices	   in	   Congo	   were	   never	   heard,	   negotiations	   with	   rebel	   factions	  never	   attempted	   and	   regional	   forums	   remained	   impotent	   chalices	   as	   the	   United	  States	   continued	   arming	   and	   financing	   a	   corrupt	   dictator	   who	   ruled	   through	  largess,	   repression	   and	   neglect.	   Unfortunately,	   while	  Washington’s	   foreign	   policy	  mission	  could	  grind	  on	  without	   connecting	   the	  dots	  of	   its	   failings	   in	  Congo	   for	   its	  broader	  goals	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  it	  was	  the	  voiceless	  Congolese	  population,	  disenfranchised	  by	  the	  Mobutu	  coup,	   that	  was	   left	   to	  carry	  the	  burden	  of	  material	  suffering	  for	  these	  shortcomings.	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  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  Carter	  Centre’s	  report	  on	  the	  elections	  and	  the	  muted	  response	  of	  much	  of	  the	  international	  community	  on	  its	  findings.	  www.cartercenter.org/news/publications/election_reports.html#drc	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  du	  25/11/1965)	  File	  18802/205	  Congo	  1965	  (Coup	  d’état)	  File	  18882	  IV	  Aide	  aux	  Rebelles	  File	  P2.720.2725	  1965	  2ieme	  Semestre	  	  	  
iii.	  British	  National	  Archives,	  Kew,	  Surrey	  (Kew)	  
	  Records	  Created	  or	  Inherited	  by	  the	  Foreign	  Office:	  FO	  1100/9,	  Mercenaries	  Operating	  in	  the	  Congo,	  January-­‐December	  1964	  FO	  1100/10,	  Mercenaries	  Operating	  in	  the	  Congo,	  January-­‐December	  1964	  FO	  1100/11,	  Mercenaries	  Operating	  in	  the	  Congo,	  January-­‐December	  1964	  FO	  1100/12,	  Mercenaries	  Operating	  in	  the	  Congo,	  January-­‐December	  1964	  FO	  371/176742,	  Question	  of	  UK	  Continuing	  to	  Act	  for	  South	  African	  Interests	  in	  Congo,	  1964	  FO	  371/176647,	  Exchange	  of	  Information	  on	  Congo,	  1964	  FO	  371/181809,	  Congo	  1965	  FO	  371/181810,	  Congo	  1965	  FO	  1104/1,	  Foreign	  Office,	  Embassy	  DRC,	  Registered	  Files	  FO	  1104/2,	  Foreign	  Office,	  Embassy	  DRC,	  Registered	  Files	  FO	  1104/3,	  Foreign	  Office,	  Embassy	  DRC,	  Registered	  Files	  FO	  953/2207,	  Visit	  to	  the	  UK	  of	  General	  Mobutu	  Commander	  in	  Chief	  of	  ANC,	  1964	  FO	  1100/15,	  Congo-­‐	  Internal	  Political	  Situation,	  1965	  FO	  1100	  /26,	  Congo-­‐	  Internal	  Political	  Situation,	  1966	  	  Records	  of	  the	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office:	  FCO	  38/126,	  Internal	  Political	  Situation	  during	  Mobutu’s	  Regime	  &	  especially	  use	  of	  Mercenaries,	  1967	  FCO	  38/127,	  Internal	  Political	  Situation	  during	  Mobutu’s	  Regime	  &	  especially	  use	  of	  Mercenaries,	  1967	  FCO	  38/128,	  Internal	  Political	  Situation	  during	  Mobutu’s	  Regime	  &	  especially	  use	  of	  Mercenaries,	  1967	  FCO	  25/55,	  Annual	  Reports	  1966,	  1967,	  1968	  FCO	  31/2303,	  IMF/IBRD	  in	  Zaire:	  Mobutu	  Plan	  and	  Brussels	  Conference	  on	  Economic	  Problems	  of	  Zaire,	  1978	  FCO	  31/2304,	  IMF/IBRD	  in	  Zaire:	  Mobutu	  Plan	  and	  Brussels	  Conference	  on	  Economic	  Problems	  of	  Zaire,	  1978	  FCO	  31/2305,	  IMF/IBRD	  in	  Zaire:	  Mobutu	  Plan	  and	  Brussels	  Conference	  on	  Economic	  Problems	  of	  Zaire,	  1978	  FCO	  31/2110,	  Second	  Five	  Power	  Conference,	  Paris	  June	  1978	  FCO	  31/2111,	  Second	  Five	  Power	  Conference,	  Paris	  June	  1978	  FCO	  31/2112,	  Second	  Five	  Power	  Conference,	  Paris	  June	  1978	  FCO	  31/2113,	  Second	  Five	  Power	  Conference,	  Paris	  June	  1978	  FCO	  36/2534,	  Involvement	  of	  Zaire	  in	  the	  Rhodesian	  Problem	  FCO	  36/2231,	  Involvement	  of	  Zaire	  in	  the	  Rhodesian	  Problem	  FCO	  99/162,	  Cuba/Zaire	  Shaba	  Invasion	  FCO	  106/194,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Zaire	  	  Records	  Created	  or	  Inherited	  by	  HM	  Treasury:	  T354/312,	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  Transactions	  with	  the	  Republic	  of	  Zaire,	  January	  1972-­‐December	  1975	  T383/52,	  Financial	  Aid	  to	  Zaire	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T383/57,	  Zaire:	  Debts;	  Arrangements	  for	  Rescheduling	  T383/58,	  Zaire:	  Debts;	  Arrangements	  for	  Rescheduling	  	  	  
iv.	  France	  
Centres	  des	  Archives	  Diplomatique	  de	  Nantes	  (CADN)	  Ministre	  des	  Affaires	  Etrangères:	  -­‐	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Cartons	  1,	  22,	  45,	  49,	  50	  &	  51	  -­‐	  Kinshasa,	  Ambassade,	  Carton	  14	  (Rapport	  de	  Fin	  de	  Mission	  de	  l’Ambassadeurs)	  	  	  
v.	  German	  National	  Archives,	  Auswärtiges	  Amt,	  Berlin	  
	  
Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  (BRD)	  Bestand	  B34:	  Band	  496,	  Kongo	  Leopoldville,	  Innenpolitik,	  Parteien,	  Rebellen,	  1964	  Band	  497,	  Kongo	  Leopoldville,	  Innenpolitik,	  Parteien,	  Rebellen,	  1964	  Band	  498,	  Krisenstab,	  Presse,	  Beziehungen	  der	  BRD	  zum	  Kongo,	  1964	  Band	  500,	  Kongo	  Leopoldville,	  1964	  Band	  501,	  Kongo	  Leopoldville,	  1964	  Band	  587,	  Kongo	  Leopoldville,	  1965	  Band	  628,	  Afrika	  Allgemein,	  1965	  Band	  650,	  Kongo,	  Leopoldville,	  Parteien,	  Rebellen,	  1966	  Band	  652,	  Kongo,	  Kinshasa,	  1966	  Band	  692,	  Afrika	  Allgemein,	  1966	  Band	  703,	  Kongo	  Krise,	  Söldner,	  1967	  Band	  737,	  Kongo,	  Kinshasa,	  1966	  Band	  815,	  Innenpolitische	  Berichte	  von	  Kongo	  Kinshasa;	  Allg.	  Beziehungen	  zur	  Dem.	  Republik;	  Reisen	  des	  Leiters	  der	  Botschaft;	  1969-­‐1971	  Band	  816,	  Staatsbesuche	  von	  Mobutu;	  Rechtswesen,	  Pol	  Beziehungen	  u.	  Staatsreisen	  in	  Dritte	  Länder;	  Kongo-­‐	  Kinshasa,	  1969-­‐1971	  	  
German	  Democratic	  Republic	  (DDR)	  Ministerium	  für	  Auswertige	  Angelegenheiten	  (MfAA);	  Abteilung	  für	  Ost	  und	  Zentralafrika,	  Sektor	  Zentralafrika	  (Mikrofiches):	  A14593,	  DDR	  Unterstützung	  der	  bewaffneten	  Freiheitskämpfern	  im	  Kongo,	  1964-­‐1965	  C785/74,	  Haltung	  der	  DDR,	  USSR,	  China	  zum	  Kongo,	  August	  1964-­‐	  Januar	  1965	  C787/74,	  Einschätzungen	  der	  Beziehungen	  der	  Sowjet	  Union,	  Jugoslawien,	  CSSR	  zum	  Kongo,	  Juni	  1963,	  August	  1965,	  Mai	  1968’	  	  C790,	  Gespräche	  des	  Generalkonsulats	  und	  Beauftragte	  der	  Regierung	  der	  DDR	  in	  Kairo	  mit	  Vertretern	  der	  Freiheitsbewegung	  Kongos;	  1963-­‐67	  C791/74,	  Gespräche	  mit	  der	  Kongolesischen	  Freiheitsbewegung	  in	  Bankoko,	  Conakry,	  Dares	  Salaam,	  Havanna,	  Moskau,	  Prag,	  1966-­‐68	  C792/74,	  Gespräche	  mit	  akkreditierten	  Diplomaten	  in	  Berlin,	  Kairo,	  Belgrad	  zu	  Außenpolitischen	  Fragen,	  1966-­‐68	  C793/74	  C793/74,	  Gespräche	  mit	  Spezialisten	  und	  akreditierten	  Diplomaten	  im	  Kongo,	  1960-­‐62,	  1964-­‐66,	  1969	  C795/74,	  Beziehungen	  Kongo	  und	  Afrikanisch	  sozialistischen	  Ländern;	  1965,	  1966,	  1967	  C796/74,	  Aufenthalt	  Kongolesischer	  Befreiungsbewegung	  in	  Berlin,	  März	  1965-­‐Juni	  1967	  C948/78,	  Beziehungen	  Zaire	  zu	  Afrikanischen	  Staaten,	  1965	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C784/74,	  Arbeits-­‐	  und	  Maßnahme	  -­‐Pläne	  und	  Konzeptionen	  der	  Abteilung	  Afrika	  zur	  Entwicklung	  Beziehungen	  der	  DDR	  zu	  Zaire;	  Juli1960-­‐April196;	  ,Okt.1970_Dez1971	  C946/78_AufzeinchungGespräche	  zwischen	  DDR	  Diplomaten	  in	  Kairo	  und	  Belgrad	  mit	  Zairischen	  und	  Sowjetischen	  Diplomaten;	  1972	  &	  1974	  C947/78,	  Aufenthalt	  Rumänischer	  Parlamentsdelegation	  in	  Zaire,	  Mai	  1973	  C949/78,	  Aufnahme,	  Kontakteherstellung,	  Beziehungen	  der	  DDR	  und	  Zaire;	  1968,	  1970-­‐73	  C948/78;	  Beziehungen	  Zaire	  zu	  Afrika	  Staaten;	  Oktober	  1965	  C959/78,	  Aufenthalt	  Kongolesischer	  Delegation	  in	  der	  DDR;	  1976	  C1089/77,	  Aufenthalt	  Stellvertreter	  der	  HV	  DDR	  in	  Conakry	  als	  Beauftragter	  MfAA	  in	  Kongo;	  1969	  C1400/78,	  Außenpolitik	  und	  Beziehungen	  Kongo-­‐Sowjetunion;	  1970,1974	  C6185,	  Beziehungen	  Kongo-­‐Sowjetunion;	  Mai72,	  Juni73	  C6186,	  Beziehungen	  Kongo	  zu	  Bulgarien	  und	  Ungarn;	  1973	  C6240,	  Beziehungen	  Zaire-­‐DDR;	  1973-­‐1975	  C6241,	  Vorschlag	  Gestaltung	  Bez.	  DDR-­‐Zaire;	  1973,	  1975,	  1977	  C6242,	  Jahresberichte	  Botschaft	  der	  DDR	  zu	  Zaire;	  1973,	  1975-­‐77	  C6246,	  Diplomatische	  Gespräche	  zwischen	  Zaire	  und	  DDR;	  1973-­‐1976	  C6247,	  Beziehungen	  zwischen	  UdSSR	  und	  Zaire;	  1973-­‐74,	  1976-­‐77	  C6248,	  Beziehungen	  zwischen	  Zaire	  und	  Korea;	  1975	  C6249,	  Beziehungen	  Zaire	  China;	  1973-­‐76	  C6250,	  Beziehungen	  zwischen	  Zaire	  und	  Frankreich;	  1975	  C6251,	  Beziehungen	  zwischen	  Zaire	  und	  USA;	  1974-­‐76	  C6252,	  Beziehungen	  zwischen	  Zaire	  und	  BRD;	  1972-­‐3,	  1975,	  1977	  C6253,	  Beziehungen	  zwischen	  Zaire	  und	  Belgien;	  1974-­‐1975	  C6254,	  Beziehungen	  zwischen	  Zaire	  und	  Angola;	  1975-­‐1976	  C6255,	  Einschätzungen	  der	  Botschaft	  der	  DDR	  in	  Zaire;	  1976	  C6256,	  Aufnahme,	  Abbrechung	  und	  Wiederaufnahme	  Diplom.	  Beziehungen	  der	  DDR	  und	  Zaire;	  1961,	  1972,	  1977,	  1979	  	  
v.	  Ghana	  
	  
Public	  Records	  and	  Archives	  Administration	  Department,	  Castle	  Road,	  Accra	  
(PRAAD)	  ADM	  16-­‐54	  1964	  ADM	  14-­‐2	  Parliamentary	  Debates	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐232-­‐	  Political	  Reports	  from	  Congo,	  1964-­‐65	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐256	  Mixed	  Letters	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐259A	  Draft	  Ministry	  of	  State	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐3	  Immediate	  Inward	  Letters	  RG	  12-­‐2-­‐46	  Immediate	  Inward	  Letters	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐207	  Political	  Relations	  Congo-­‐	  1963-­‐65	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐446	  OAU,	  1964-­‐65	  RG	  172-­‐2-­‐534	  Misc.	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐536	  Misc.	  19645-­‐65	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐570-­‐	  OAU,	  1964-­‐65	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐584	  Misc.	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐685	  Immediate	  Inward	  Letters.	  Misc.	  1964	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐691	  Misc.	  1969-­‐65	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐693	  Misc.	  1960-­‐66	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐720	  Misc.	  1960-­‐65	  RG	  17-­‐2-­‐689	  Misc.	  1953-­‐65	  SC	  BAA-­‐64	  Tragic	  Case	  of	  Congo	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Secondary	  Sources:	  	  Abramson,	  Rudy	  Spanning	  the	  Century:	  the	  Life	  of	  W.	  Averell	  Harriman,	  1891-­‐1986	  (New	  York;	  Morrow,	  1992)	  	  Acheson,	  Dean	  Present	  at	  the	  Creation	  (New	  York;	  W.W.	  Norton,	  1969)	  	  Alimadi,	  Milton	  The	  Heart	  of	  Darkness,	  How	  White	  Writers	  Created	  the	  Racist	  Image	  of	  Africa	  (Black	  Star	  Books;	  New	  York,	  2002)	  	  Attwood,	  William	  The	  Reds	  and	  the	  Blacks	  (Harper	  &	  Row;	  New	  York	  &	  London,	  1967)	  	  Ball,	  George	  W.	  ‘Should	  the	  US	  Fight	  Secret	  Wars?’	  	  Harper’s	  (September,	  1984)	  	  Bender,	  Gerald	  J.;	  Coleman,	  James	  S.	  and	  Sklar,	  Richard	  L.	  (eds.)	  African	  Crisis	  Areas	  and	  US	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Berkley	  and	  California;	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1985)	  	  Bender,	  Gerald	  J.	  ‘The	  Eagle	  and	  the	  Bear	  in	  Angola’	  Annals	  of	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Political	  and	  Social	  Science,	  Vol.	  489,	  International	  Affairs	  in	  Africa	  (Jan.,	  1987),	  pp.	  123-­‐132	  	  Bienen,	  Henry	  S.	  (ed.)	  Arms	  and	  the	  African:	  Military	  Influences	  on	  Africa’s	  International	  Relations	  (New	  Haven	  and	  London:	  Yale	  Uni	  Press,	  1985)	  -­‐	  ‘U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  a	  Changing	  Africa’	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  93,	  No.	  3	  (Autumn,	  1978),	  pp.	  443-­‐464	  	  Birmingham,	  David	  &	  Martin,	  Phyllis	  (eds.)	  History	  of	  Central	  Africa:	  The	  Contemporary	  Years	  Since	  1960	  (Longman;	  London	  &	  New	  York,	  1998)	  	  Birmingham,	  David	  Decolonisation	  of	  Africa	  (UCL	  Press;	  London,	  1995)	  -­‐	  Kwame	  Nkrumah;	  The	  Father	  of	  African	  Nationalism	  (Ohio	  University	  Press,	  1990)	  	  Blum,	  William,	  The	  CIA:	  A	  Forgotten	  History;	  US	  Global	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